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Seré todos o nadie. Seré el otro 
Que sin saberlo soy, el que ha mirado 
Ese otro sueño, mi vigilia. La juzga, 
Resignado y sonriente. 
 
—Jorge Luis Borges 
—“El sueño” 
 
[I shall be all or no one. I shall be the other 
I am without knowing it, he who has looked on 
that other dream, my waking state. He weighs it up, 








 Personalmente, yo no me creo dotada de poderes especiales, sino más bien de una 
capacidad para ver rápidamente las relaciones de causa a efecto, y ello fuera de los 
límites ordinaries de la lógica corriente. 
 
—Remedios Varo 
     —Cartas  
  
[Personally, I do not think I am endowed with special powers, but rather an ability to 
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The Numinous Gate: A Philosophico-Phenomenological Study  




This study investigates the roles of wonder and a sensibility to “the numinous” in the 
work of Spanish-Mexican painter Remedios Varo and Argentine writer and poet 
Jorge Luis Borges, each of whom created fabulist narratives, visual and literary 
respectively. An investigation of wonder as a distinctly “disruptive” universal 
phenomenon and its accompanying “not-knowing” and “self-forgetting” qualities 
serve as an entryway for engaging, contemplating and depicting the infinitely shifting 
terrain that marks the invisibility of the numinous. Eastern approaches to 
understanding the variations and fluctuations of aesthetic consciousness might 
describe this theme as a “gateless gate.” Thus European and Asian thought are 
combined to support the argument that Varo and Borges’s irrealistic narratives 
challenge any immutable account of truth and reality in art. The proposal herein is 
that truth and reality are ultimately indefinable aspects of art. Grounding this study in 
a philosophico-phenomenological orientation by combining a methodology rooted in 
Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology with aesthetically oriented 
philosophical commentary by other thinkers allows the seemingly amorphous and 
paradoxical roles of subjectivity and spiritual consciousness in modern art and 
aesthetics to be more directly examined and understood. That the dynamic of the 
artist-philosopher fuels an impulse to make visible through art the invisibility of what 
 vii 
Rudolf Otto called “the numinous” reflects how, as Remedios Varo asserted, art is 
made “as a way of communicating the incommunicable,” thus bringing meaning to 
what Borges describes as “the overwhelming disorder of the real world.” The seminal 
roles of subjectivity—the decentering of the subject, Husserlian transcendental 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity, and intertexual philosophical assessments of 
subjectivity— are all used to explore Borges’s literary and Varo’s visual storytelling 
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The Numinous Gate: A Philosophico-Phenomenological Study  
of Wonder and Image Consciousness in the Fabulist Art of Varo and Borges 
 
Introduction—Communicating the Incommunicable 
This study investigates the interwoven roles of the numinous, wonder, and 
image consciousness in the work of Spanish-Mexican painter Remedios Varo and 
Argentine writer and poet Jorge Luis Borges, both of whom created narratives—
visual and literary respectfully—of what is described here as irreal fabulism.1 
Explicating Varo and Borges’s irreal fabulist storytelling magnifies the broader 
thematic focus of the study. Similarly, considering the art of Varo and Borges as 
being rooted in wonder opens an investigative window for viewing how a sensibility 
to what Rudolf Otto termed “the numinous” lends itself to an aesthetically inspired 
nonlinear search of mystery.2 Grounding this investigation in a philosophico-
phenomenological3 orientation allows the seemingly amorphous and paradoxical role 
of spiritual consciousness in art and aesthetics to be more directly examined and 
understood.  
However, a necessary interjection here is that because the word “spiritual” is 
so replete with multiple connotative meanings, the broader definition inherent in “the 
numinous” is utilized because it enfolds spirituality as well as other topics that are 
seemingly less spiritual but nonetheless related to mystery or the unknown. These 
additional meanings of the numinous will be examined ahead. 
Similarly, employing a methodology inspired by Edmund Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology, and especially his theories of epochē, image 
 2 
consciousness (Bildbewußtein, also translated as “depicting consciousness”), fantasy 
or imagination, and memory, yields a more logical and conceptual rendering of the 
ineffable nature of the proposed theme. Essentially, this study argues that art4 is 
rooted in an impulse to disclose or make visible the invisibility of numinous presence, 
or as Remedios Varo put it, art can serve as “a way of communicating the 
incommunicable” (Elizondo 216), thus bringing meaning to what Borges describes as 
“the overwhelming disorder of the real world” (Selected Non-Fictions 81).5 Related 
topics include intertexualities (both conceptually driven discursive and perceptually 
fueled visual versions), and a consideration of how the root source of wonder in the 
specific cases of Varo and Borges serves the dynamic of the artist-philosopher.  
Examining the creative processes of Remedios Varo and Jorge Luis Borges 
allows the multifarious and interwoven topics of irreal fabulist storytelling, wonder, 
the numinous, and image consciousness to be elucidated and presented via a 
consolidated examination, while a philosophico-phenomenological orientation allows 
plurality to be partnered with congruity. In other words, the manifold topics and 
subtopics that surface here can be illustrated in the literary art of Borges and the 
visual art of Varo, even though this is neither an exhaustive study nor a survey of 
their work. While both of these artists respond aesthetically to a sensibility to the 
numinous in his or her distinctive fashion, Borges’ philosophically and intertextually 
oriented work is clearly different from Varo’s representational magical and mystical 
paintings. Varo and Borges also emphasize autobiographical elements in different 
ways, as will be seen. Nonetheless, their common orientation to creativity involves an 
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amalgamation of wonder and an impulse to seek, elucidate, and somehow represent 
the numinous via irreal fabulist art.   
What is more challenging is to explicate the evidence of sensibility in these 
two artists and the other artists referenced herein—from Kandinsky to Duchamp and 
beyond—to a common numinous presence, one that exists prior to any subjective 
filtering. While subjectivity is central here, it is not a conventional or psychological 
study of individual subjectivity per se. Instead, Husserlian transcendental subjectivity 
and intersubjectivity concepts, as well as other theories about subjectivity and 
creativity, are referenced. For example, the writings of Russian theorist Mikhail 
Bakhtin, French novelist and philosopher Georges Bataille, and German philosopher 
Arthur Schopenhauer, among others, are referenced in regards to aesthetically 
oriented metaphysical concepts and issues, and to address the paradoxes and 
conundrums inherent in subjectivity.  
The Chapters 
Specific topics and issues are explored to explicate the multi-thematic territory 
described above, beginning with Chapter One—Phenomenological: A Husserlian 
Methodology, which establishes the methodological means used to elucidate relevant 
thematic territories. While that chapter aims primarily at establishing the 
methodological means inherent in Husserlian phenomenological concepts such as 
epochē,6 intersubjectivity, image consciousness, and other tools used for explicating 
more clearly topics related to mystery, there are additional non-Husserlian concepts 
that are relevant and very useful as well.  
 4 
Chapter Two—Wonder as Disruption: Subjectivity and Not-knowing, besides 
investigating the phenomenon of wonder itself, argues that wonder undermines 
various presumptions about subjectivity and conceptual thinking, as well as specific 
presuppositions about life and the world—presumptions rooted in scientific 
materialism and conventionally linear ways of knowing.  Wonder is closely related to 
the topic in Chapter Three—The Numinous, which addresses  a topic that—at least in 
phenomenological and philosophical terms, and to some extent in contemporary 
sociopolitical thought—is taboo. There are various reasons for this unspoken 
prohibition against studying the numinous in contemporary aesthetics and philosophy, 
the most salient of those reasons being the question of how can one possibly address 
(beyond religious belief and New Age notions) what is by its very nature seemingly 
not addressable. Because the numinous is invisible and a highly subjective, seemingly 
enigmatic experience, one naturally is puzzled as to how it might be examined and 
understood objectively as a universal element of life and reality. Yet this is also a 
primary reason why this kind of investigation can be valuable—the numinous is 
rarely examined in the conceptual and discursive worlds of contemporary philosophy. 
There remains a tendency to either ignore topics like wonder, the numinous, and 
ecstasy, or to reassign them to other fields such as religious studies or psychology. In 
fact, it is not unusual for contemporary thinkers to categorize wonder and the 
numinous as banal topics in the sense that they are unsuited for objective 
philosophical studies and consequently are irrelevant in contemporary thought and art 
theory.   
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That attitude is not the case here. In regards to mystery and the invisible, part 
of this study’s purpose is to argue against contemporary presumptions that such 
ineffable topics are automatically invalid ideas impenetrable to scholarly 
investigation. This inquiry proposes and argues that such an understanding is indeed 
possible even if these topics ultimately appear to be apodictic, and that such an 
explication is a valid philosophical project. This last point is asserted with a caveat—
merely presuming the numinous is apodictic is not enough. While part of the answer 
to this conundrum is explicated in the chapter on wonder, what is required is more 
than a neatly packaged answer rooted in conjecture and opinion. Just as significant as 
eschewing any pat answer in regards to challenging the unspoken prohibition 
described above is to formulate the right questions without philosophical, theoretical, 
theological or personal presuppositions. A failure to bracket out presuppositions of 
any kind places this investigation (and in fact any philosophical investigation) in 
jeopardy of becoming something less than what it is or what it intends to be. To 
burden something as critical and far-reaching as philosophical investigation with 
presuppositional and thus possibly invalid understanding, which is to say possible 
misunderstanding, is to place philosophy itself in the precarious position of becoming 
yet another belief system. The unconscious motive to undermine philosophical 
discourse by converting it to a belief system must not be ignored; it must be bracketed 
out. Open-mindedness is understood to be more than a cultural or religious 
automaticity since what is required is an immaculately constituted examination and 
exegesis. Thus the approach here is to utilize scholarly work for a philosophical 
examination of what has frequently been avoided, ignored or dismissed. 
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 Chapter Four—Seeking the Numinous in Modern Art may at  first seem 
superfluous, given that numerous artists besides Varo and Borges are referenced. Yet 
this chapter is essential in that it establishes a broad grounding of evidence that many 
modern artist-philosophers confronted and attempted to communicate through 
aesthetic motifs,  artistic styles, and leitmotifs7 such as wonder, a sensibility to the 
numinous, and ecstatic expression, a search for a numinous gateway. The purpose of 
this chapter, then, is to establish with clarity and via historical evidence that an artistic 
attraction to wonder and the numinous, while not universal, is nonetheless much 
broader than the work of the two artists emphasized in this particular thesis.  And that 
is possible. Art commentaries of numerous modern artists and writers besides Varo 
and Borges have explored various expressions of this issue. Those art commentaries 
and the artworks viewed in this chapter add substance to the overall thematic purport 
of this study. In other words, Chapter Four helps to provide evidence within an 
investigational framework that can be described as a specific thematic geography, one 
that takes into account the impulse to seek the numinous in artistic creativity, thus 
accentuating how such themes were acceptable prior to unconscious contemporary 
(and in some cases emphatically and calculatedly conscious) prohibitions. It is 
essential to show that an artistic sensibility to and a seeking for the numinous has not 
been restricted to only a few seemingly eccentric artists, but was, especially before 
postmodernist thought and aesthetics, widespread. Evidence is also presented in this 
chapter that some postmodernist and contemporary artists have continued to 
demonstrate this sensibility to and search for the numinous.  
Chapter Five—Philosophico: An Intertextual Orientation to Aesthetic 
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Thinkers continues to examine the validity of this thematic territory. A major section, 
for example, of Arthur Schopenhauer’s masterpiece The World as Will and 
Presentation (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung)—“Third Book: The Platonic Idea: 
The Object of Art” explicates an essential subtopic here via his writing and thought. 
Schopenhauer was the first major western philosopher to acknowledge and 
incorporate in any substantial way non-Eurocentric concepts and forms of 
understanding.  
Similarly, the concept of carnivalesque presented by Russian thinker Mikhail 
Bakhtin, and his advocacy of “art for life’s sake,” is important when applied to 
Borges and Varo. These two artists’ uses of  irrealist fabulism—terms explicated in 
more detail ahead—elucidate and are elucidated by Bakhtin’s  theme of the 
carnivalesque. The writings of Borges and paintings of Varo both signal a life-
positive orientation to the human being, one that affirms a sensibility of art for life’s 
sake. Bakhtin presents the carnivalesque as a merging of the sacred with the 
irreligious or profane, inspiring an anti-authoritarian, contrarian celebration of life 
and art, a style of presentation relevant to the work of Borges and Varo. A liberating 
attitude towards the humor and the grotesque is inherent in the carnivalesque, just as 
humor is inherent in the artist-philosopher dynamic fueling the creativity of Varo and 
Borges. Both artists immerse, to some extent, their work in popular culture, while 
simultaneously challenging, through the carnivalesque and other means, uninspected 
categorical presumptions and cultural limitations of what only appears to be a 
stabilized society. Thus this chapter utilizes, often in an intertextual context, the work 
of Schopenhauer, Plato, Kant, Bakhtin, Bataille and other thinkers whose ideas are 
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specifically relevant to wonder, the numinous, image consciousness, and the various 
aspects of subjectivity.  
Chapter Six—Art for Life: Varo and Borges as Artist-Philosophers brings the 
previous chapters together to bear more directly on the work of these two artists. 
Working from the already established historical and aesthetic ground established in 
Chapter Four about the search for the numinous in modern art, the unique and what is 
described by the title of Rick O’Rawe’s study of The Unorthodox Spiritualities of 
Jorge Luis Borges and Remedios Varo are disclosed and elucidated. The relevance of 
themes and topics introduced in the first five chapters—Husserlian phenomenology, 
wonder as disruption, the numinous, the artistic seeking of the numinous, or mystery, 
and multifarious philosophy of art concepts—emerges again in Chapter Six to 
illustrate in artistic terms within the artist-philosopher dynamic what was 
philosophically and aesthetically explicated earlier.  
The Interrelatedness of Not-knowing, Ecstasy, Self-forgetting 
Some  significant (and to some extent precursory) inquiries underlie the 
explication of the primary themes in the chapters described above. While most of 
these subtopics will be addressed in the relevant chapters themselves (such as, for 
example, the phenomenological Husserlian terms intentionality, givenness, and re-
presentation in Chapter One), a few are relevant throughout all the chapters. These 
include knowing and not-knowing, ecstasy, self-forgetting, chance, invisibility, 
intuitive perception, and performance-assisted subjective process. However, only a 
few need to be introduced immediately. 
It is necessary, for example, to ask what knowledge is, or exactly how do we 
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know something to be true?  This is more complex than one might initially presume.  
One of the most direct answers to the question of how can we know something to be 
true requires an address of what we do not know, and certainly the “answer” Socrates 
offers in Plato’s Theaetetus reveals a description of unknowing or not-knowing that is 
relevant here. In his discussion with the young Theaetetus, Socrates notes that a 
“strange occurrence” surfaces in an attempt to understand or define knowledge. This 
occurrence, Socrates asserts, is that “an interchange of pieces of knowledge should 
ever turn out to be a false judgement” (Plato, Theaetetus, 91). When Theaetetus asks 
for clarification about this assertion, Socrates goes on to say:  
First of all, that someone who has knowledge of something should be 
ignorant of that very thing, not through ignorance, but because of his 
own knowledge; and second, that he should judge that thing to be 
something else, and something else to be that thing—surely it’s very 
unreasonable? That, when knowledge has come to be present in it, the 
mind should know nothing, and be ignorant of everything? Because 
according to that argument, there’s nothing to stop even ignorance 
making one know something, or blindness making one see, if even 
knowledge can sometimes make one ignorant (91-92). 
 Besides “blindness making one see” being a profound statement, it is more 
importantly a relevant one.8 Recalling the famous statement by Socrates in Plato’s 
Apology is also useful: 
When I left him, I reasoned thus with myself: I am wiser than this 
man, for neither of us appears to know anything great and good; but he 
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fancies he knows something, although he knows nothing; whereas I, as 
I do not know anything, so I do not fancy I do. In this trifling 
particular, then, I appear to be wiser than he, because I do not fancy I 
know what I do not know (Plato, Six Great Dialogues, 4-5).9 
Although wonder  and not-knowing are fully explicated in Chapter Two, this 
seeking to understand the nature and validity of knowledge demands some 
explanation of how an association between wonder and not-knowing surfaces. The 
sense of wonder is acknowledged in the philosophies of both Plato and Aristotle, 
though in distinct ways. As Aristotle wrote in the Metaphysics, “For it is owing to 
their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize” (Vasalou, 
“Wonder” 51).  In her essay “Wonder and the Beginning of Philosophy in Plato,” 
Sylvana Chrysakopoulou writes, “No wonder that Socrates in the Theaetetus begins 
the genealogy of philosophy with “wonder”— a highly ecstatic yet profoundly 
disorienting state of consciousness arising when experiencing the unfamiliar as 
strangely familiar and vice versa, or when unexpected attraction for the unknown 
triggers memories of a life never lived” (89). Later, Chrysakopoulou examines the 
extended implications of Greek wonder and the beginnings of philosophy: “To 
Socrates, wonder is a ‘passion,’ a state to which the soul is subjected—in accordance 
with the meaning of pathos in ancient Greek. Although thauma [wonder] is described 
as a malady, a kind of malaise that captures the soul all of a sudden, wonder is not 
only welcome, but also necessary to begin philosophizing” (94).  
Chrysakopoulou goes on to propose that understanding begins with ignorance, 
not with knowledge, and that this may well include a sense of disorientation. At the 
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same time, thauma also leads to intellectual illumination, as when the first messenger 
of the Greek gods, Iris, appears “like an iridescent vision through the dark mists of 
the soul’s ignorance” (95), a beginning principle in seeking wisdom, as in a rainbow 
or archê “bridging over philosophy” (95). It is Plato’s emphasis on wonder as “the 
beginning of philosophizing as a divine phenomenon, a sort of epiphany, related to 
the sight of divine beauty” (95) that sets off the Platonic version of wonder from 
Aristotle’s more scientific observation of wonder as a starting point.  
The moment of unfamiliarity, of mystery or  not-knowing occurs—as 
contemporary phenomenological scholar Jennifer Anna Gossetti-Ferencei argues in 
The Ecstatic Quotidian: Phenomenological Sightings in Modern Art and Literature—
against the background of daily life experience:  
The “quotidian” is the sense of life built up in daily experience by 
everyday habits, by the sedimentation of ordinary expectation of the 
world, but also by the tensions between the regularity of the familiar 
and necessary innovation. The quotidian is that background in contrast 
to which new discoveries emerge and we are surprised; and more 
pointedly, it is a necessary condition for surprise, the regularity in 
contrast to which something new and unexpected occurs. 
Unfamiliarity, wonder, and mysteriousness are both embedded in and 
turnings-away from familiarity and predictability. These turnings-
away, our stepping outside of the ordinary, do not leave it behind, but 
draw energy and vivacity from this deviation (Gosetti-Ferencei 1).  
While the experience of wonder may perhaps be less likely to arise 
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spontaneously with adults, who are burdened, in a sense, with a plethora of 
presuppositional knowledge, it is nonetheless available over and against a contextual 
disruption of the quotidian.  
The primary point is that wonder is an essential factor in life, in philosophy, in 
art and in the philosophy of art, and that wonder includes an experience of not-
knowing. As will be seen, wonder and not-knowing are also connected to art for life’s 
sake. In fact, prior to art and scholarship (although related to both) is the role of 
wonder in humankind’s collective experience of knowing and not-knowing. The 
phenomenon of wonder reflects a philosophical and aesthetic significance greater 
than any presumption of fairytale “make believe” entertainment. While Varo and 
Borges were chosen specifically because they do not dismiss mystery and the 
invisible as impenetrable, but acknowledge and attempt to excavate the phenomenon 
through their art,  Gossetti-Ferencei’s point above about “unfamiliarity, wonder, and 
mysteriousness” (1) signals, among other issues, that the proposal here of wonder and 
not-knowing is not restricted to the oeuvres of Borges and Varo. Bataille, for 
example, not only discusses “nonknowledge” and ecstasy in art; he discusses the 
connection between nonknowledge and topics like torture, pain, pornography, and 
death. To Bataille, nonknowledge opens doorways:  
On entering into nonknowledge, I know I erase the figures from the 
blackboard. But the obscurity that falls in this way isn’t that of 
annihilation, it is not even the “night when all cows are black.” It is the 
enjoyment [jouissance] of the night. It is only slow death, death that it 
is possible to enjoy. And I am learning, slowly, that the death at work 
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in me wasn’t missing only from my knowledge, but also from the 
depths of my joy. I learn this only in order to die. I know that without 
this annihilation already within my thought, my thought would be 
servile babble, and I will not know my ultimate thought as it is the 
death of thought (Unfinished System of Nonknowledge 204).   
 That Bataille’s approach is that of the artist-philosopher and not simply the 
thinker becomes evident throughout his writings, as when he states, “The death of 
thought is the voluptuous orgy that prepares death, the festival held in the house of 
the dead” (204). Bataille’s great value is that he passionately enters the darkness of 
mystery, and even provides for himself an intimate examination of evil, in order to 
access ecstatic joy and a kind of freedom that engenders artistic integrity that extends 
his art and his life beyond the limitations of linear discursive thought.  Nor is the 
festival he speaks of above so distant or different from the Bakhtinian carnivalesque, 
with its feast animated within the contrarian trope.  
That said, ample evidence exists that both Borges and Varo are well aware of 
the implications and value of mystery, or the numinous, and of not-knowing. Among 
the writings of Borges is an excerpt from his 1928 “The Language of the Argentines” 
(“El idioma de los argetinos”)10 in which he describes an experience that occurred as 
he arrived at a certain street corner in the Barracas district, a barrio of Buenos Aires. 
Before reaching that corner in his anecdote, Borges reflects on his feelings and state 
of consciousness during his evening walk that led up to this incident.   
I did not wish to have a set destination, I followed a random course, as 
much as possible; I accepted, with no conscious prejudice other than 
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avoiding the avenues or wide streets, the most obscure invitations of 
chance. But a kind of familiar gravitation drew me toward certain 
sections I shall always remember, for they arouse in me a kind of 
reverence, I am not speaking of the precise environment of my 
childhood, my own neighborhood, but of the still mysterious fringe 
area beyond it, which I have possessed completely in words and but 
little in reality, an area that is familiar and mythological at the same 
time. The opposite of the known—its wrong side, so to speak—are 
those streets to me, almost as completely hidden as the buried 
foundation of our house or our invisible skeleton (Kodama xiv).11 
Some of the language in Borges’ anecdote accentuates and confirms the 
primary purpose of this study, which is to investigate what is invisible and thus 
normally hidden from consciousness but nonetheless existing on the “mysterious 
fringe area beyond it” (Kodama xiv). Mystery can be vaguely threatening yet still 
attractive partly because it is not known, as reflected in Borges’s description of the 
Buenos Aires streets. 
Acknowledging and exploring the parameters of mystery in art also becomes 
evident in the paintings of Remedios Varo.  While describing one of the thematic 
sections of the exhibition The Magic of Remedios Varo, the first retrospective show in 
2000 of Remedios Varo’s art in the United States,12 exhibition curator Luis-Martin 
Lozano referenced the painting Exploración de las Fuentes del rio Orinoco (fig. 1): 
The second thematic nucleus, entitled  “In Search of other 
Dimensions: The Conjunction of Magic Forces,” examines one of the 
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conceptual constants Varo developed throughout her career: the 
permanent search for new metaphysical dimensions within the two-
dimensional space of painting. Her characters assume a Platonic 
attitude of meditation and explore inwardly, searching for the balance 
between yin and yang; or they travel in a continuous and frantic 
exploration of the analogous mountains or the dark waters of the 
afterworld. They are untiring travelers who reach the miasma of the 
Orinoco River in search of the primordial origin of all oracles. These 
travelers often go into occult dimensions, using fantastic means of 
locomotion to traverse winding roads and labyrinthian canals. Always 
clandestine, they discover the secret passageways of walls and 
cathedrals, searching for answers to the mysteries of the universe 
(Lozano 45).  
 
Fig. 1. Remedios Varo. Exploration of the Sources of the Orinoco River (Exploración 
de las Fuentes del rio Orinoco), 1959. 
 Oil on canvas, 44 x 39.5 cm., private collection. 
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However, the approach herein is not to examine the occult per se, although 
varieties of occultism, magic, mysticism, and related topics surface from time to time  
within the philosophical and aesthetic themes of the study. Wonder, the numinous,  
and fabulist storytelling, on the other hand, are essential topics here. Extending the 
metaphor of search shown in Varo’s Exploration of the Sources of the Orinoco River, 
one might say (at the risk of oversimplifying the labyrinthine aesthetics of the artists 
studied here) that Varo and Borges are explorers attempting through their fabulist 
storytelling to locate the sources of the river the artists themselves are already 
immersed in, the immense flow of existential, aesthetic consciousness. While wonder 
itself is a kind of interruption or a temporary experience universally familiar to every 
human being, in artists wonder can also fuel a creative dynamic. 
 For example, this phenomenon of not-knowing is central to an anecdote told 
by a pioneer of nonobjective abstraction, Wassily Kandinsky. Among the influences 
and experiences fueling Wassily Kandinsky’s artistic journey into non-objective 
abstract painting is a 1908 anecdote told by the artist: 
Much later, after my arrival in Munich, I was enchanted on one 
occasion by an unexpected spectacle that confronted me in my studio. 
It was the hour when dusk draws in. I returned home with my painting 
box having finished a study, still dreamy and absorbed in the work I 
had completed, and suddenly saw an indescribably beautiful picture, 
pervaded by an inner glow. At first, I stopped short and then quickly 
approached this mysterious picture, on which I could discern only 
forms and colors and whose content was incomprehensible. At once, I 
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discovered the key to the puzzle: it was a picture I had painted, 
standing on its side against the wall. The next day, I tried to recreate 
my impression of the picture from the previous evening by daylight. I 
only half succeeded, however; even on its side, I constantly recognized 
objects, and the fine bloom of dusk was missing. Now I could see 
clearly that objects harmed my pictures (Kandinsky: Complete 
Writings, 369-370).13  
Kandinsky’s intense interest in the spiritual in art14 and his movement towards 
non-objective abstraction,15 when combined with this moment of perceptual not-
knowing or mystery in consciousness, illustrates an aspect of the phenomenon of 
wonder. Not-knowing is, in fact, inherently related to subjectivity, the subject-object 
dichotomy, and perception in a particularly phenomenological way, as will be seen in 
the chapter on Husserlian transcendental phenomenology.  
A more recent example of art-making and the roles of wonder and not-
knowing are evident in both the content and title of Lawrence Weschler’s book on 
contemporary American installation artist Robert Irwin, Seeing is Forgetting the 
name of the Thing One Sees: Over Thirty Years of Conversations with Robert Irwin. 
The title is related to a line attributed to the French poet-philosopher Paul Valéry, that 
“to see is to forget the name of the thing one sees” (Weschler 207). That artists are 
acutely sensitive to wonder is echoed in this anecdote about Irwin:  
During the early seventies, when Robert Irwin was on the road a lot, 
visiting art schools and chatting with students, he was proffered an 
honorary doctorate by the San Francisco Art Institute. The school’s 
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graduation ceremony that year took place in an outdoor courtyard on a 
sunny, breezy afternoon, sparkling clear. Irwin approached the podium 
and began, “I wasn’t going to accept this degree, except it occurred to 
me that unless I did I wasn’t going to be able to say that.” He paused, 
waiting as the mild laughter eddied. “All I want to say,” he continued, 
“is that the wonder is still there.” Whereupon, he simply walked away 
(Weschler vii). 
It should be noted that this anecdote is not presented to support an argument 
that scholarship and a philosophical understanding of knowledge are irrelevant to art. 
On the contrary, the argument here is that the phenomena of not-knowing and 
unknowing inherent in the experience of wonder are, as in the quotidian experience of 
ecstasy,16 significantly important elements in any investigation of knowledge. 
In fact, Chapter Six—Art as Life: Varo and Borges as Artist-Philosophers 
considers how not-knowing or unknowing in Borges and Varo affects the dynamic 
that refines and redefines the artist as theorist or philosopher. As the chapters ahead 
unfold, it is useful to remember that the thematic orientation here is not to establish a 
theological, philosophical, or any other kind of “belief” system characterized by 
presuppositional knowledge. Any attempt to establish a presuppositional element 
must be rigorously explicated, illustrated, and documented with a body of genuine 
evidence that can authenticate such an argument, which is why Edmund Husserl’s 
meticulously unfeigned scholarship is, despite some difficulties, such an invaluable 
resource for elucidating this topic.  
Sylvana Chrysakopoulou’s description above (pages 10-11) of Socrates’s 
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wonder as a kind of epiphany and a highly ecstatic state signals another element to be 
incorporated into the consideration of the numinous and wonder—ecstasy.  
It should also be noted here that “epiphany” does have a relationship to 
ecstasy, although epiphany, most frequently defined as divine appearance ("epiphany, 
n.2.") and ecstasy, defined as a state of being “beside oneself” in astonishment, fear 
or passion ("ecstasy, n. 1") are not synonymous, although other definitions of ecstasy 
reflect how ecstasy amalgamates epiphany into itself as “the state of rapture in which 
the body was supposed to become incapable of sensation, while the soul was engaged 
in the contemplation of divine things” ("ecstasy, n. 3a). Another definition of ecstasy 
is as a state of consciousness beyond conceptual thinking as “an exalted state of 
feeling which engrosses the mind to the exclusion of thought” ("ecstasy, n. 4a”). This 
last definition of ecstasy is one especially relevant to the sense of not-knowing or 
unknowing that is significant to the present study, as is the etymology entry in the 
Oxford English Dictionary entry of ecstasy:  
The classical senses of ἔκστασις [ecstasy] are ‘insanity’ and 
‘bewilderment’; but in late Greek the etymological meaning received 
another application, viz., ‘withdrawal of the soul from the body, 
mystic or prophetic trance’; hence in later medical writers the word is 
used for trance, etc., generally. Both the classical and post-classical 
senses came into the modern languages, and in the present fig. uses 
they seem to be blended (“ecstasy, n.” etymology).  
Although the experience of ecstasy, or stepping outside of oneself (what one 
conventionally considers to be oneself), appears—at least superficially—to be more 
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of a psychological or theological topic than a philosophical one, this dissertation 
challenges that presumption along with other philosophical presuppositions. In a 
certain sense, a primary use of art is a kind of aesthetic ecstasy in which not-knowing 
and self-forgetting occurs, albeit temporarily. While clearly there are other uses of 
art,17 in the present context of wonder and seeking the numinous, the experience of 
ecstasy is a frequently related aspect.  
 To that end, Bataille’s work is accentuated, although not as a principle theme.  
His passionate references to and elucidations of the roles of mysticism, the sacred, 
and ecstasy—albeit in a more uniquely oblique fashion than that utilized by many 
philosophers, theologians, and artists—serve to illustrate how an artist-philosopher 
may, via a highly emotive intellectual approach, present those topics. Furthermore, if 
one considers Bataille's work in an intertextual context, the highly emotive 
orientation to his work can be understood to be an expression of the intensely 
emotional state of Gefühl, a concept and phenomenon that will be explicated farther 
ahead.  
The point here is that the multifarious topical territory explicated throughout 
this study are not a group of unrelated topics. What is intended is an exploration of a 
single fabric, so to speak, a multi-colored, interwoven work, as reflected in the 
study’s title. That said, this work necessarily raises the question of principal themes—
or what the study is about chapter by chapter, even if every chapter also examines 
numerous interrelated topics. 
Along with ecstasy, the subtopic of self-forgetting is used in several chapters, 
especially to clarify some of the characteristics of wonder as disruption and some 
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Husserlian concepts. It needs to be understood, however, that there is nothing 
negative or psychologically debilitating about self-forgetting as used in the present 
context; what is being discussed is not the tragic suffering inherent in Alzheimer’s 
Disease or various unfortunate psychotic manifestations studied in psychiatry, nor 
does the usage here include the admirable altruistic and sometimes religious contexts 
of forgetting about oneself  and one’s personal welfare in order to serve or help 
others. Self-forgetting here is used in an explication of consciousness, including states 
of so-called alternative and altered states of consciousness. Various states of 
consciousness have long been included in Eastern philosophical studies, but less in 
Occidental studies. Part of this study’s purpose is to readjust that imbalance. 
Obviously, the experience of self-forgetting has several definitions and 
usages, but in the present context this phenomenon is referenced because it 
sometimes (not always) accompanies wonder and a sensibility to the numinous, and is 
almost always closely related to ecstasy, or the temporary experience of stepping 
outside of one’s usual sense of separative self-identification. 
How are these themes—primary and secondary—related to the work of 
Borges and Varo? The most accurate description of Borges and Varo might be to 
simply say that both are—primarily by virtue of his or her art, but also in other ways 
in their respective lives—storytellers, or fabulists. This will be explored in more 
detail in Chapter Six. Here it is enough to point out that while in the 15th century a 
“fabulist” was a title for a professional storyteller, the definition now is simply “one 
who relates fables or legends; a composer of apologues” ("fabulist, n."). An apologue 
is a synonym for a fable, but usually is understood to be an allegorical story, one 
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usually intended to serve a moral purpose ("apologue, n."). While the term fabulist 
has often been applied to Borges, Remedios Varo has more often been called a 
surrealist. Here, however, both Borges and Varo will be referred to as fabulist 
storytellers. 
When primary themes along with accompanying secondary themes come 
together and congeal as a central thematic unity, what is most apparent is that Borges 
and Varo are, as artists, like explorers repeatedly entering an unknown forest to locate 
what they can sense but cannot see. In a more literal sense, the forest is consciousness 
and Borges and Varo are exploring consciousness via their fabulist art-making. For 
Varo, the cliché that every picture tells a story is accurate, and the visual story she 
tells is an exploration of this forest of consciousness. For Borges, every story yields a 
literary picture, or rather a series of narrative pictures, about the forest and its history, 
about the dense tangles of the forest of consciousness, about the explorers who 
preceded his own exploration, as well as those who will follow him. How these two 
artists enter the forest, what they see, and how they report their sightings via their art 
becomes central to this investigation. 
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Chapter One—Husserlian Phenomenological Methodology  
Using some selected elements of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to 
explicate the art of Varo and Borges may seem less than pragmatic given the contrast 
between Husserl’s style of research and thought over against the work of these two 
artists, who were metaphorically described in the introduction as explorers of a forest 
of consciousness searching for the numinous. However, there are both practical and 
philosophical reasons for using what can be described as a Husserlian methodology 
here, even though this study makes no claims to being a detailed exegesis or 
exhaustive exploration of Edmund Husserl’s lifetime of work. The inventive and 
irrealistic18 literary and visual narratives of these two fabulists demand an 
investigative means that can balance and ground those narratives in a clarifying 
philosophical language, one that admits conceptual thought about what seems at times 
to be beyond the reach of conceptual thinking. In fact, even acknowledging the 
challenge to investigating, assimilating, and critiquing the art and aesthetic of Borges 
and Varo reflects the relevance of choosing Husserl’s phenomenology as a grounded 
methodological means of addressing that challenge.  
Given the irreal nature of both Borges and Varo’s art, an orientation rooted in 
analytical philosophy is unlikely to provide a philosophical language that can 
effectively explore (without undermining, marginalizing, or dismissing) an 
investigation of mystery. Although an occasional point may be best considered via a 
thinker associated with the analytic tradition, or with the precursors to logical 
positivism (Ludwig Wittgenstein and Bertrand Russell come to mind), the avenues 
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developed over the history of what is called continental philosophy are more 
promising. Specifically, phenomenology offers the strongest possibility of articulating 
and explicating the complex aesthetic elements germane to the work of Borges and 
Varo.  The potential of phenomenological thought for investigating the primary 
themes herein eventually leads—via a refined phenomenological root specificity—to 
the decades of pioneering work of Edmund Husserl and the transcendental 
phenomenology he initiated and developed. In a sense, Husserl’s phenomenology 
offers perhaps the most analytical and logical methodology available in the 
continental tradition, which also points to why Husserlian approaches are increasingly 
utilized by various scientific and other fields, from mathematics to cognitive 
science.19  
One must remember that Husserl’s earliest work focused on mathematics and 
psychology, and that among his earliest seminal work is his 1900-1901 Logical 
Investigations.20 That approach to understanding eventually proved inadequate for 
Husserl. This study primarily references and utilizes work subsequent to what has 
been described as Husserl’s “transcendental turn” after his 1913 Ideas: General 
Introduction to Pure Phenomenology.21  A volume frequently referenced here is 
Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory (1898-1925), a posthumous collection 
of Husserl’s work (a translation of Husserliana XXIII) on representational 
consciousness that is important in this study for several reasons, but especially 
because it addresses Husserlian explications of fantasy and especially image 
consciousness—the awareness in a person looking at a painting or a photograph, 
reading a novel or story, or attending a dance, theatre, or musical event and how that 
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awareness is related to art and aesthetics. Those writings collected in Phantasy, Image 
Consciousness, and Memory (1898-1925) are of direct significance here because 
fantasy, image consciousness, memory, time, and related Husserlian topics also 
represent elements in the work of Varo and Borges. While Husserl did hope to 
publish a single book on systematic presentation of perception, phantasy, and time 
consciousness, the book was not published in his lifetime.22 However, Husserl created 
courses with notes and wrote sketches addressing the topics (Brough, “Translator’s 
Introduction” XXIX-XXX). 
Focusing on Husserl’s work uncovers a somewhat peripheral question. If 
phenomenology is the selected means for explicating primary themes such as wonder 
and the numinous, as well as image consciousness, fantasy, and memory in the 
fabulist art of Varo and Borges, why not utilize instead the concepts of some of 
Husserl’s more famous and decidedly more art-oriented students or thinkers—
scholars who were influenced by Husserl, such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, 
Derrida, Levinas or others? To use one of the systems devised by those individuals 
seems sensible, especially since most of those thinkers established more detailed 
philosophies of art, or what we might describe, in some cases, as aesthetic systems, 
than did Husserl.  
While the work of some of the thinkers named above will be utilized at times 
to address specific points, Husserlian phenomenology is established as the primary 
working methodology throughout because it was Husserl who presented a working 
methodology first before scholars like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas 
developed their own methodologies based on but stretched beyond Husserlian 
 26 
transcendental phenomenology. In other words, besides resourcing the book of 
Husserlian thought that most directly addresses the topics of this study,23 the rationale 
in choosing Husserlian transcendental phenomenology has been that while the 
individual philosophers named above were highly creative and in some individual 
ways original thinkers, it was Husserl’s decades of original and innovative work that 
served as the initial foundation for each of those philosophers. Husserl’s demanding 
search for evidence and certitude, his great integrity and willingness to admit his own 
errors and shifts in thinking, and his passionate and obstinate drive to establish a 
scientifically rigorous means for investigating perception and knowledge, the 
phenomenon of this world, subjectivity and other issues, lends to this study a means 
of articulating more clearly the investigation of phenomena that are generally 
considered to be too ungrounded or too fanciful to yield to philosophical articulation 
or analysis.  
Husserl, who did not claim to have created an aesthetic or even a 
philosophical system per se, did create an immaculately designed method of 
investigation: 
Although it is true to say that, for Husserl, the subject matter of 
philosophy dictates the phenomenological method, it would be a 
mistake to see in this an indication that he is advocating a 
philosophical system. Husserl was a systematic thinker, but anything 
but an advocate of a system. What he called for was a unified method 
of approach to each philosophical problem in order to clarify and 
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validate significant concepts, but this did not mean the interweaving of 
concepts into one systematic whole (Lauer xiv).  
Nonetheless, Husserl did interweave many of his concepts in the sense that 
one concept or action may be inherently linked to or conjoined with another, not in 
order to create a system of thought, but to refine his investigative methodology. For 
Husserl, since the method is the message, so to speak, his partial affinity for a 
Cartesian approach to investigation is emphasized (Lauer xix).24  
Descartes does influence Husserl. In fact, in his Cartesian Meditations,25 
Husserl describes how his transcendental phenomenology is both distinct from and 
similar to the Cartesian approach. This will be examined more closely ahead. 
 




Husserl emphasizes knowing and apodictic certainty over opining and 
believing. This becomes more valuable in regards to the narratives of Varo and 
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Borges, which do tend to arouse and activate uninspected personalized opinions in 
readers and viewers.  In this study, the transcendental phenomenological 
methodology referenced and used include some of the primary terms and concepts 
that have specific meanings in Husserl’s work that can be applied to the circuitous, 
labyrinthine aesthetic orientations and work of Varo and Borges.  
Although these terms and concepts are interrelated in Husserlian 
methodology,26 each requires definition and clarification in this chapter. As these 
terms, concepts, and principles are considered individually, one must nevertheless 
continually keep in mind that each term does not really exist in isolation but functions 
in an interrelated dynamic of investigative thought with various other Husserlian 
terms, concepts, and principles. Epochē, for example, works with Husserl’s neutrality 
modification, along with his frequently repeated admonition to “return to the things 
themselves.” Husserlian givenness functions in conjunction with intentionality and a 
specific form of intuition. Presentation and re-presentation, subjectivity and 
consciousness, and other terms and concepts work together as reciprocal units. 
Meanwhile, the multifarious meanings of the term “transcendental” pervade Husserl’s 
entire body of thought.27 These terms and the combined usages of terms require more 
elucidation before moving on to the question of a Husserlian approach to the arts.  
Husserlian Transcendental Subjectivity and Consciousness 
Since “transcendental consciousness” and “transcendental subjectivity” are 
sometimes used synonymously, either by Husserl or Husserlian scholars, it is useful 
to distill and clarify, as much as possible, the Husserlian use of the word 
“transcendental” in general. What does Husserl mean by transcendental subjectivity, 
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transcendental consciousness, transcendental ego, or, for that matter, why does he 
describe his work as transcendental phenomenology in the first place?                                                                                                                                                            
In order to understand transcendental phenomenology one must first consider 
Husserl’s orientation to subjectivity. David Carr excerpts a comment from Husserl 
about subjectivity:  “The paradox of human subjectivity: being a subject for the world 
and at the same time being an object in the world” (Carr, Paradox, 3).28  John B. 
Brough describes the distinctive uses of Husserlian subjectivity, in which “authentic 
philosophical reflection” is inherent in the turn to the subject:  
The subject in question is transcendental in Husserl’s sense; it is the 
subject that intends or presents the world. The Husserlian turn to the 
subject is therefore not a turn away from the object into a solipsistic 
self, nor is it a turn to a self which creates its object out of whole cloth; 
it is rather a taking up of the object in its relation to the subject, the 
‘dative of manifestation,’ as Thomas Prufer so aptly puts it, to which 
the object presents itself ” (Brough, “Art and Artworld” 35-36).29  
Husserl’s methodology30 necessarily requires a turn towards the subject 
himself or herself, which action leads to Husserlian transcendental subjectivity, and 
which is not just about a completely separated version of self-identified subjectivity. 
For Husserl, “it is clear also that the subjectivity of the transcendental subject is a far 
cry from the arbitrariness of individual subjectivity—from ‘subjectivism,’ we might 
say” (Lauer xviii), or from some form of solipsism.  
The art of Varo and Borges often reflect encounters with memory and the 
shifting characteristics of self  and subjectivity. Husserl’s understanding of 
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subjectivity, on the other hand, is a challenge to the objectivist turn in modern 
science, which Husserl felt was a misunderstanding of how subjectivity functions and 
accomplishes actions in the world. In fact, this misunderstanding sometimes surfaces 
in regards to Husserl’s work itself.  
 It has frequently been presumed, and rightly so since Husserl made this 
statement himself,  that Husserl’s approach to consciousness is always consciousness 
of an object. While that is correct, at least as a stand alone assertion, it is also in some 
contexts a partial view of Husserl’s work because it does not take into account related 
aspects such as Husserlian “absolute consciousness” or other essential factors.  In one 
art history discussion of Sartre’s philosophical position quoted below, for example, it 
is noted that Sartre’s argument “begins with the perception, adopted from Edmund 
Husserl’s phenomenology, that consciousness is always consciousness of something 
other than itself” (Foster 460).  What is presumed to be Husserl’s summary 
understanding of consciousness is then described in more detail: 
It is what Husserl had called “intentional consciousness,” which means 
that it comes into being only in the act of perceiving, grasping, direct 
itself toward an object. It is thus always a movement beyond itself, a 
projection that empties itself out, leaving no “contents” behind. 
Consciousness is “nonreflexive”: I do not hear myself speaking any 
more than I see myself seeing. Empty and transparent, consciousness 
traverses itself without ever finding anything in its path on the way to 
its object. And that object is marked by its own transcendence, its 
outsideness to consciousness itself (460).  
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Yet is Husserl’s “intentional consciousness” actually an adequate summary of 
Husserl’s understanding of consciousness? The authors of this art history textbook, a 
group of preeminent contemporary art professionals, go on to describe Husserl’s 
intentional consciousness as an “exteriorization” process in which the human being is 
synthesized in a unity with the world (460).31  
Meanwhile, other scholars have brought a more detailed assessment to 
Husserl and consciousness, noting that Husserl felt subjectivity’s first person point of 
view was “ineliminable from the very concept of knowledge” and that what he called 
“functioning subjectivity” is an anonymous pre-egoic form of subjectivity which is 
responsible for the givenness of the world and its ‘always already there’ character” 
(Moran and Cohen 311-312). Husserl’s mature work with consciousness has been 
described as a “framework that recognized all consciousness as part of the mysterious 
transcendental life of the subject in an intersubjective community of co-subjects” 
(Moran, Husserl: Founder, 173). 32   
In his “Husserl and the ‘absolute’,” Dan Zahavi gives his rendering of a 
central aspect of Husserl and transcendental idealism: 
On my reading, Husserl is committed to the view that reality depends 
transcendentally upon consciousness…This view has various 
metaphysical implications—it has implications for our fundamental 
understanding of what counts as real and it leads to a rejection of 
metaphysical realism—but it doesn’t entail that consciousness is the 
metaphysical origin or source of reality. Husserl might indeed consider 
consciousness a necessary condition for reality. To that extent, Smith33 
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is right in saying that for Husserl nothing would exist in the absence of 
consciousness (“Husserl and the ‘absolute’ ” 87).   
The above statement, which to some degree accentuates the insufficiency and 
unfairness of reducing Husserl’s work with consciousness to only being “intentional 
consciousness,” also represents the Husserlian track generally followed herein as 
well—that consciousness is not separated from reality, that so-called reality “depends 
transcendentally upon consciousness” (87). In other words, what is argued in this 
study, which uses Husserlian methodology, is that it is not consciousness that is 
dependent on the world, but vice versa—that the world appears within consciousness.  
Husserl’s work with consciousness has also been described thus: 
Around 1907 Husserl came to postulate an “absolute” or “primal 
consciousness” (Urbewußtsein) as a temporalizing consciousness that 
is not itself temporal but constitutes everything temporal. This absolute 
consciousness is the basic level of consciousness; it is “originary 
consciousness” (Urbewusstsein). Consciousness as such is absolute 
being to which everything has to be related. Absolute consciousness 
contains the past, present and future, all included within it (Moran and 
Cohen 24).  
That stated, as valuable as it is, does not, however, erase the complexities of 
Husserlian phenomenology. For example, Anthony J. Steinbock addresses, while 
considering the scope of transcendental phenomenology, the multifarious nature of 
Husserl’s use of the word “transcendental”:  
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Let me note at the outset that the problem with speaking of Husserl’s 
notion of the “transcendental” is that Husserl does not have a singular 
theory of transcendental philosophy. Or at least this is my contention. 
As we shall see later in more detail, what transcendental 
phenomenology means depends to a large extent on the ways in which 
it is carried out in concrete contexts of phenomenological research 
(Home 12). 
Steinbock goes on to say that, nonetheless, two traits are identifiable. For 
Husserl, a transcendental phenomenology must investigate the constitution of sense 
through a constitutive reduction, and it must identify a priori structures through an 
eidetic reduction (Home 12).  
To consider this more generally for a moment, what is the meaning of 
consciousness in the field of phenomenology? Many books have been written about 
this theme, but how does one succinctly address the topic of phenomenological 
consciousness? In the forward to Maurice Natanson’s The Erotic Bird: 
Phenomenology in Literature, Judith Butler addresses questions of consciousness and 
subjectivity:  
Phenomenology has been dismissed by some as a philosophy of 
“consciousness,” where the presumption reigns that “consciousness” is 
a speculative and psychologistic notion, unnecessary or a diversion in 
relation to literary reading. Such arguments, however, presume that 
they know what they mean by consciousness: that it is an interior and 
ideal “stream” of perceptions, the property of a subjectivity cut off 
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ontologically from a relationship to the world. Such notions, however, 
have little to do with the notion of consciousness offered here (Butler, 
ix).  
 In The Erotic Bird, Natanson applies a phenomenological methodology to the 
literature of Franz Kafka, Samuel Beckett and Thomas Mann, among others. In the 
present context, the goal is to consider how these kinds of phenomenological themes 
are specifically related to the work of Borges and Varo, and part of this argument 
includes an acknowledgment that absolute consciousness in art surfaces when a 
sensibility to the numinous attracts, fuels, or at least in some way affects the artist’s 
creative process. 
Before addressing the Husserlian uses of a priori and eidetic reduction per se, 
some additional points warrant consideration. One is the similar yet distinct 
approaches to subjectivity in Descartes and Husserl. In fact, Husserl felt that 
Descartes unknowingly did discover transcendental subjectivity but could not 
recognize or make use of it. In his Cartesian Meditations Husserl asserts:   
At this point, following Descartes, we make the great reversal that, if 
made in the right manner, leads to transcendental subjectivity: the turn 
to the ego cogito as the ultimate and apodictically certain basis for 
judgments, the basis on which any radica-philosophy [sic] must be 
grounded” (18).34  
Essentially, Husserl is saying that if Descartes had gone about his argument in 
“the right manner” (20), he would have recognized and acknowledged transcendental 
subjectivity. In other words, Descartes did not go far enough to satisfy Husserl, but 
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instead concluded his argument with the syllogism cogito ergo sum, implying by that 
proposition an individualistic subjectivity as the final ground of being. Husserl, 
however, sees subjectivity as a means, albeit a mandatory and preeminent means, 
rather than a terminal designation of being. His “functioning subjectivity” (Moran and 
Cohen 312) is pre-egoic and nameless.   
A key point that bears repeating is that Husserl’s search for knowledge is 
primarily aimed at understanding transcendental consciousness. The Husserlian 
meaning of transcendental consciousness is “consciousness as the agent disclosive of 
the world and intentionally united with that world, or, more simply, the whole that is 
‘consciousness of the world’—is for phenomenology the absolute concretum. There 
is nothing that can be meaningfully posited outside this concretum” (Drummond 
205). The ultimate “absolute concretum” is in Husserlian terms “absolute 
consciousness,” or the most fundamental level of phenomenological analysis 
(Drummond 32).  
Epochē, Neutrality Modification, and “Back to the Things Themselves” 
Epochē is quite possibly the single most important concept of Husserl’s 
investigations. Husserl’s uses the epochē as an active method of bracketing out 
certain elements from perceptual considerations. At the same time, epochē is directly 
related to Husserl’s broader concept of neutrality modification and his term “back to 
the things themselves,” and thus is the pivotal means around which Husserl’s 
phenomenology turns, rendering it of paramount importance for understanding his 
work and to understanding the significance of using his work in this study: “The 
Greek term epochē is used by Husserl (sometimes transliterated in German as 
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Epoche) to mean a procedure of bracketing, excluding, canceling, putting out of 
action certain belief components of our experience” (Moran and Cohen 106), which is 
to say that Husserl’s use of epochē acts as a clearing mechanism, one that allows an 
investigation to proceed without becoming entangled with preconceptual issues that 
are, thematically speaking, of peripheral phenomenological significance.  
It is important to remember that Husserlian phenomenology must deal (or 
rather not deal) with what Husserl calls the natural attitude. The epochē (or bracketing 
out or phenomenological reduction) is a means for accounting for the natural attitude 
in a way that allows a phenomenological investigation to explicate not the what of the 
appearance of an object, but the how of that appearance. What is this troublesome 
natural attitude that must be accounted for and why must it require a bracketing out? 
Husserl states: 
Our first outlook upon life is that of natural human beings, imaging, 
judging, feeling, willing, “from the natural standpoint”. Let us make 
clear to ourselves what this means in the form of simple meditations 
which we can best carry on in the first person. I am aware of a world, 
spread out in space endlessly, and in time becoming and become, 
without end. I am aware of it, that means, first of all, I discover it   
seen and observed, through the unseen portions of the room behind my 
back to the verandah, into the garden, to the children in the summer-
house, and so forth, to all the objects concerning which I precisely 
“know” that they are there and yonder in my immediate co-perceived 
surroundings— a knowledge which has nothing of conceptual thinking 
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in it, and first changes into clear intuiting with the bestowing of 
attention, and even then only partially and for the most part very 
imperfectly (Ideas 51-52). 
In Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, the phenomenological epochē 
as evolved by Husserl is closely associated with an admonition or phrase Husserl 
often used: Wir wollen auf die ‘Sachen selbst’ zurückgehen (“back to the things 
themselves”):  
Otherwise put: we can absolutely not rest content with ‘mere words’, 
i.e. with a merely symbolic understanding of ‘words’, such as we first 
have when we reflect on the sense of laws for ‘concepts’, 
‘judgements’, ‘truths’ etc. (together with their manifold specifications) 
which are set up in pure logic. Meanings inspired only by remote, 
confused, inauthentic intuitions—if by any intuitions at all—are not 
enough: we must go back to the ‘things themselves’. We desire to 
render self-evident in fully-fledged intuitions that what is here given in 
actually performed abstractions is what the word-meanings in our 
expression of the law really truly stand for (Husserl, Logical 
Investigations v.1 168).  
This seemingly simple admonition of “back to the things themselves” is given 
an almost mantric principle in Husserlian thought, reflecting how Husserl’s passion to 
free up thinking from any abstract presupposition that would disallow genuine 
investigation is a foundational principle in his work. It also reveals much about 
phenomenology, about Husserl’s integrity and character, and about understanding 
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Husserlian methodology in the present study. Husserl uses epochē as a means for 
bringing his seminal principle of “back to things themselves” into the actual 
phenomenological dynamic itself rather than simply talking about the principle and 
the dynamic: 
Husserl’s commitment to knowledge’s integrity involves something 
greater than the theory of knowledge that is today defined under the 
heading of “epistemology”. Beyond theory and its pretension to know, 
Husserl’s philosophical thought, from its initial concern with the 
philosophy of arithmetic to its final concern with the crisis of 
European humanity, is driven by the following: the felt need to justify 
all claims to know, even the seemingly most secure, on the basis of 
something more original than the computational consistency of logical 
and mathematical formulae and supposed facts supplied by the natural 
and social sciences. This “something more” is early on formulated by 
him as the “things themselves”, the return to which was to become not 
just Husserl’s motto but the watchword of the entire phenomenological 
movement spawned by his thought. “We must”, Husserl exhorts us in 
all his major works beginning with the Logical Investigations, “return 
to the things themselves” (Hopkins 3).  
The Husserlian epochē has already been referenced and utilized in other 
phenomenological aesthetic studies of modernism (Mildenberg, “Openings” 41-49). 
Likewise, contemporary French scholar Natalie Depraz has emphasized the inherent 
relationship between epochē and imagination, noting that in the first volume of 
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Husserl’s  Ideen,“he provides us with an intrinsic link between imagination and the 
very method of phenomenology, namely, the epochē” (Depraz 155). Explaining how 
imagination (unlike perception) “suspends the actual existence of the object,” 
directing toward its “ineffective modality,” Depraz suggests that this clears the way to 
a great variety of possibility instead of (as in perception) one unique reality (Depraz 
155-156). In this context both epochē and imagination override factual limitations and 
allow fresh possibilities, a dynamic that will be examined in more detail later. 
Givenness, Intentionality, Intuition 
In phenomenological terms a reception of givenness or the appearance of the 
object occurs. If appearances are given to consciousness, givenness (Gegebenheit) 
becomes relevant, for example, when examining an artist’s creative process, a point 
that is relevant ahead. Givenness in Husserlian terms is an experience of something, 
the object appearing (being given in appearance) and experienced (received), at which 
point the subject (here, the artist, and also the viewer of a work of art) is perceiving 
the object that is given in appearance. 
Another related central principle of Husserl’s phenomenology is intentionality 
(Brough, “Edmund Husserl” 151).35  Intentionality (Intentionalität) in a Husserlian 
context indicates the directedness of a conscious state.  
Judith Butler, in her introduction to Maurice Natanson’s The Erotic Bird 
referenced above (pages 33-34) goes on to discuss Natanson’s use of two Husserlian 
elements—Husserl’s theory of intentionality and the givenness of objects of 
consciousness. After mentioning the uses of intentionality by William James and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Butler notes: “Intentionality thus characterizes a certain 
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isomorphism between consciousness and its world, one that cannot be spatially 
grasped” (x). Butler then addresses subjectivity and consciousness as understood in 
phenomenology:  
The notion that consciousness belongs solely to the domain of 
subjectivity thus misses the phenomenological point that subjectivity 
always belongs to the world: consciousness is always consciousness of 
its object, it is nothing without its preposition, and its preposition 
marks its kinship with the world that it interrogates. Consciousness is, 
thus, in its very structure, in an implicit relation to the world it seeks to 
know, and seeks to know that world precisely to the extent that it is 
“of” it in some way. What this means is that the terms of subjectivity 
that we often imagine to be residing in a psychic interiority, such as 
consciousness, memory, and imagination are to be found precisely in a 
constitutive and binding relation to the world, intentional relations that 
posit a world they do not make, that build up a world of objects whose 
thereness is disclosed as irrefutable (x).36 
That intentionality is closely partnered with intuition in Husserl’s 
phenomenology requires one to understand how Husserl uses the term “intuition.” 
The most immediate and primary definition of intuition in the Oxford English 
Dictionary is that intuition is “immediate apprehension” (“Intuition”). Derived from 
the Latin intueri, which is often translated as meaning “to look inside” or “to 
contemplate,” intuition when defined as “immediate apprehension” allows for a broad 
interpretation of “apprehension,” covering many states such as sensation, knowledge, 
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and even mystical rapport. “Immediate” in this context can be used for a variety of 
mediation, and also implies a lack or absence of interference, or an absence of 
cognitive thought (“intuition”). Intuition in Husserl’s phenomenology is used in 
several ways, including as “evidence” and as eidetic intuition, the intuition of an 
eidos or essence. Suffice it to say here that intuitions are perceptions or modifications 
of perception, and intuition indicates a “location” where an intentional object is 
directly present via that intentionality; when an intention is "filled" by the 
apprehension of an object, that object is intuited. Varo’s paintings reflect a use of 
intentionality in which a direct apprehension of a given object fulfills intentionality as 
an intuition of the object, even when that apprehension is rooted in, fueled by, or 
transformed into fantasy or memory. Ultimately, intentionality and apprehension 
yield an intuition of immediate structure as evidence of life in art.  
While some of the subtle distinctions among Husserl’s uses of “intuition” are 
explicated and broken down by his student Emmanuel Levinas (Levinas, Theory), 
what is important to emphasize is how Levinas’s explication of Husserlian 
intentionality recognizes the uncommon significance (beyond the common one of 
intending to do something) that Husserl assigns to intentionality: 
It expresses the fact, which at first does not seem original, that each act 
of consciousness is conscious of something: each perception is the 
perception of a perceived object, each desire the desire of desired 
object, each judgment the judgment of a “state of affairs” 
(Sachverhalt) about which one makes a pronouncement. But we shall 
soon realize the philosophical interest of this property of 
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consciousness and the profound transformation that it brings to the 
very notion of consciousness (Levinas, Theory 40). 
Levinas emphasizes that when intentionality becomes (in Husserlian 
phenomenology) a bridge between the world and consciousness, what occurs is the 
breakdown of the subject-object dichotomy, so that “[intentionality] is not the way in 
which a subject tries to make contact with an object that exists beside it. Intentionality 
is what makes up the very subjectivity of subject” (Levinas, Theory 41). Levinas 
asserts that Husserl, by overcoming the substantialist concept of existence, 
demonstrated how “a subject is not something that first exists and then relates to 
objects” (41).  
To stay for a moment with Husserl’s use of intentionality, it is again 
contemporary scholar Dan Zahavi who offers a clear interpretation of that topic: 
In his analysis of the structure of experience, Husserl pays particular 
attention to a group of experiences that are all characterized by being 
conscious of something, that is, which all possess an object-
directedness. This attribute is also called intentionality. One does not 
merely love, fear, see, or judge, one loves a beloved, fears something 
fearful, sees an object, and judges a state of affairs. Regardless of 
whether we are talking of a perception, thought, judgment, fantasy, 
doubt, expectation, or recollection, all of these diverse forms of 
consciousness are characterized by intending objects and cannot be 
analyzed properly without a look at their objective correlate, that is, 
the perceived, doubted, expected object (Husserl’s Phenomenology 
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14). 
Givenness remains relevant both to Husserlian phenomenological principles 
and art-making in artists whose creative processes are connected to a sensibility to the 
numinous. Anthony J. Steinbock’s reference to “givenness in mystical experience and 
phenomenology” emphasizes that a Husserlian orientation facilitates more than a 
theological rendering and categorization: “This is why it is necessary to be open to a 
broader field of evidence. Such a task…is philosophico-phenomenological, not 
theological” (Steinbock 27). 
Image Consciousness (or “Depicting Consciousness”) 
The “broader field of evidence” cited above by Steinbock, one that requires a 
philosophical-phenomenological orientation, was noted on the first page of this 
study’s  introduction. The Husserlian concepts and terms used are interwoven and 
interact within in a context of reciprocity. In arguing that image consciousness as it 
exists in an artist’s creative process of making art is rooted in a sensibility to the 
numinous, some points arise about Husserl’s orientation to image consciousness 
(Moran and Cohen 158-159). Although perception obviously plays a major role in 
making and viewing visual art, perception and image consciousness are not identical 
in Husserl’s phenomenology.  The specific modality of consciousness that is 
Husserlian image consciousness is separate from but combined with perception, 
including being combined in the creative process.  
To step back momentarily, the key to understanding this lies in Husserlian 
givenness (Gegebenheit), the appearance itself. There are multifarious influential 
elements, depending on the form of consciousness being experienced, that enter into 
 44 
Husserlian givenness. Besides perceiving and imagining, there is Husserlian picture 
consciousness or sign consciousness (signitive consciousness).37  Therefore, “as 
Husserl writes, even external perception is a constant pretension to accomplish what 
it is not in a position to accomplish, namely, the complete givenness of the object; we 
are never with a plus ultra.” (Steinbock, Phenomenology and Mysticism, 35).38  
Memory, fantasy, and image consciousness are all forms of re-presentation for 
Husserl, although image consciousness is related to perception, which is presentation, 
“where what is actually intended is not the same as what is sensuously presented” 
(Moran and Cohen 158).  By this schemata, a photograph of a person first appears, for 
example, as a paper object, not as a person, and a painting first appears as paint 
applied to canvas rather than as a composition, although I would predict that many 
viewers would debate that. A photograph might appear only tangentially as a paper 
object rather than “first” appearing that way. 
But then again, how is knowing related to perceiving?  Artists often scoff at 
being asked what some work “means.” Can a sense of unknowing or not-knowing be 
allowed or even caused beyond a spontaneous occurrence of not-knowing? I propose 
that the epochē does at least provide for such a possibility. Although obviously not a 
Husserlian exclusivity, Husserl’s use of epochē, when combined with the 
ocularcentric premises in Husserl’s phenomenology, lends itself, at least up to a point, 
to an unfettered phenomenological explication of visual art, an explication that also 
works with literary art.   
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Two other key elements in the overall Husserlian phenomenological 
orientation, and especially here in regards to examining art, are the terms presentation 
and re-presentation.  
Presentation and Re-presentation  
Husserl connects perception directly to presentation, while re-presentation is 
essential to Husserlian concepts of memory, expectation, phantasy (or imagination), 
and image consciousness. Nonetheless, perception is “never far from the center” of 
any discussion of re-presentation (Brough, “Translator’s Introduction” XXXII-
XXXIII). Brough also notes in his introduction to Phantasy, Image Consciousness, 
and Memory (1898-1925) that Husserl worked on understanding the forms of re-
presentation for many years: 
Despite the ubiquity and obvious importance of presentation and re-
presentation in our conscious lives—we are always perceiving in our 
waking moments, and very often remembering, phantasizing, and 
looking at images—the connections and differences among these 
experiences are elusive and obscure. They initially confront the 
philosopher as a tangled skein of phenomena, and Husserliana XXIII 
may be read as a chronicle of Husserl's attempts to tease them apart. 
He returned to this task again and again, his views evolving over the 
years and in some cases undergoing dramatic change. What he 
achieved by the end of his life was a comprehensive, if not exhaustive, 
account of the forms of re-presentation and their relations to one 
another to other phenomena (XXXI).   
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Another kind of neutralization in consciousness is possible aesthetically 
(Moran and Cohen 221). Thus, “a member of a theatre audience, for example, does 
not posit an actor’s being assaulted on the stage as a real world event, and this 
precludes the audience member from rushing to the stage to intervene on behalf of the 
assaulted actor” (Drummond 143). Before going into more detail about a 
transcendental phenomenological approach to art, it is necessary to consider the 
infrastructure of Husserlian image consciousness. 
The Infrastructure of Image Consciousness and “Questioning Back,”  
To consider the precise meaning of Husserlian image-consciousness requires a 
continuation of examining the meanings of the larger context that includes not only 
image-consciousness, but also other Husserlian principles.  One might say that 
understanding Husserlian image-consciousness requires what Husserl himself 
sometimes referred to as “questioning back” (Rückfragen), a regressive inquiry or 
dismantling in order to locate the “primary foundation” (Urstiftung) of concepts 
(Moran and Cohen 70). Thus, if phenomenology is the study of  phenomenon and a 
phenomenon appears, then the next question to ask is what this something is 
appearing to? Since it can only be appearing in consciousness, Husserl investigates 
how appearances are “given” to consciousness, and this is one of the most central and 
essential functions of phenomenology—to study how something appears. 
“Phenomenology does not attempt to speak about things, but only about the way they 
manifest themselves, and hence it tries to describe the nature of appearance as such” 
(Lewis and Staehler 1).  In a Husserlian phenomenological context, what the 
something is that is given, or why the something is given to consciousness, are 
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secondary considerations. The most fundamental phenomenological principle driving 
an investigation is to return to the thing itself and see how it appears. One can 
understand, then, why Husserl insisted that phenomenology was a scientific study 
rather than a metaphysical one.   
As pointed out by Brough, Husserlian image consciousness “is complex, 
involving as many as three objects” (Translator’s Introduction XLV). For Husserl, 
one work of art, say a painting, is three objects described as the physical image (e.g. 
the physical canvas), the representing or depicting object, and the represented or 
depicted object. On the other hand—to momentarily drop into a non-Husserlian 
mode—a framed painting could be seen as one object, as an assemblage, representing 
more than one form of consciousness simultaneously.39   
Since a theme underlying this investigation of how a sensibility to the 
numinous influences the role of image consciousness in making and viewing modern 
art, it remains essential to reference Husserl’s phenomenological principles alongside 
his philosophy of art, at least to the extent that he stated a philosophy of art. If 
Husserlian transcendental phenomenology addresses imagination, image 
consciousness, phantasy, memory, and time consciousness (Brough, Translator’s 
Introduction XXIX-LXVIII ), these principles can be applied aesthetically in order to 
expand Husserl’s thinly expressed philosophy of art.  
The point here is that any Husserlian philosophy of art or aesthetic is never far 
from his phenomenological methodology. For Husserl, what is being perceived, or 
given to consciousness, becomes in the present study the art object. To investigate in 
Husserlian terms the art object and the creative process that yielded the art object as 
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given to consciousness for perceptual receiving, it is necessary to understand a few 
more details of Husserlian methodology. 
Image Consciousness and the Work of Art 
Husserl’s insistence that aesthetic consciousness is directly related to the 
consciousness of an object and the manner of that object’s appearing (Phantasy 459) 
leads one to ask if his theory of image consciousness is the same as consciousness of 
an object.  In other words, does Husserl consider aesthetics as being somehow outside 
the realm of phenomenological principles, or are they the same principle?  Either 
answer—yes or no—is a real possibility, given the somewhat contradictory way 
Husserl compares phenomenology and the work of art in the Hofmannsthal letter, 
considered ahead. However, Husserl does employ his phenomenological principle of 
neutrality modification in an artistic context when directly viewing and considering, 
or participating in, a work of art. In fact, the Husserlian epochē acts as one kind of 
neutrality modification: 
According to Husserl, the neutrality modification is universal 
in that it can modify not just beliefs but all kinds of position 
takings. It is akin to pure entertaining of the content of the 
judgement without the making of any explicit judgement or 
taking any stance including a sceptical one (Moran and Dermot 
221).  
Husserl sees neutrality modification as a universal aspect of consciousness:  
For Husserl, the neutrality modification is a wholly unique yet 
universal structural feature of consciousness and one that it is 
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hugely important in that its presence enables the very 
possibility of philosophical reflection on the life of 
consciousness. Epochē, idle fantasy, etc., are themselves all 
varieties of neutrality modification. The neutrality modification 
is a very deep part of consciousness, but, because it makes no 
claim on truth or validity, it is, according to Husserl, difficult to 
access (Moran and Dermot 222).  
When explicating neutrality modification, Husserl is addressing belief, or the 
sphere of belief, and how neutrality modification is a general kind of modification of 
consciousness that has nothing whatsoever to do with the sphere of belief  (Ideas 224-
225), which is to say that the neutrality modification deals with or neutralizes opinion 
and assumption. Husserl states:  
We are dealing now with a modification which in a certain sense 
completely removes and renders powerless every doxic modality to 
which it is related, but in a totally different way from that of negation, 
which, in addition, as we saw, shows in the negated a positive effect, a 
non-being which is itself once more being. It cancels nothing, it 
“performs” nothing, it is the conscious counterpart of all performance: 
its neutralization (Ideas 224). 
 Husserl’s definition of phenomenology as the study or science of the essence 
of consciousness, and his assertion that consciousness is always consciousness of 
something, means that any attempt to excavate a Husserlian methodology associated 
with a philosophy of art must begin with consciousness (Bewußtsein). Narrowing that 
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orientation to the thematic context of this dissertation, all the facets and ramifications 
of Husserlian image consciousness or “depicting consciousness” (Bildbewußtein, also 
translated as “depicting consciousness”) should be defined and understood, although 
with image consciousness examples or illustrations are more clarifying than verbal 
explanations.  
But to reach the implications of image consciousness, subject-object 
dichotomy needs to be acknowledged. In applying a Husserlian methodology to art-
making, the problem of subject-object dichotomy sooner or later surfaces. Varo, for 
example, had a distinctive approach to the object, an irreal approach. The object is a 
fundamental component of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, whereas Varo 
and other artists are, to put it simply, working to move beyond the art object, or (to be 
specific in her case) working to move beyond the conventional notion of an object via 
creating the transformed irreal art object. How is this distinction reconciled in a 
Husserlian aesthetic that addresses Varo’s or Borges’s creative processes? Ultimately, 
the answer is different for each artist, but to continue with the case of Varo’s 
aesthetic, she is actually motivated, via her irreal fabulism, to challenged the 
implications inherent in the conventional belief of  the recognizable object, which 
thus is not at odds with the Husserlian neutrality modification. Her art-making is an 
example of a neutrality modification that is not specifically the epochē, but is unique 
to the aesthetics of the creative process, a process related to image consciousness. 
 Also, Varo and Borges necessarily accentuate the object in art in the sense 
that the recognizable object’s irreal appearance remains present as an aspect of the 
reality depicted within the work of art. Ultimately, a Husserlian methodology yields 
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an infrastructure or network of Husserlian concepts that underlie image consciousness 
in a given work of art.   
In fact, Husserl’s investigations of subjectivity, consciousness, intentionality, 
intersubjectivity, objectivity, and image consciousness are as complex as Borges and 
Varo’s entanglements with self and self-identification. The two artists’ uses of 
irrealism are related to subjectivity and intersubjectivity.  Thus before looking more 
closely at Borges and Varo’s work with irrealism40 it is important to understand 
beforehand Husserl’s work with fantasy.41  
Fantasy 
In Husserlian terms, fantasy is imagination. The complex distinctions among 
perception, image consciousness, fantasy and related topics have been elucidated: 
Husserl was interested in all the central mental acts including 
perception, memory, and fantasy. He regards an act of fantasizing or 
imagining (as distinct from seeing pictures as pictures: ‘image 
consciousness’) as a special modification of perception. Without 
perception there could be no fantasy. Fantasy is characterized as a kind 
of re-presentation or ‘presentification’ or ‘presentiation’ 
(Vergegenwärtigung) since it does not have the full ‘fleshly’ 
(leibhaftig) character of perception. Husserl distinguishes between 
image consciousness (Bildbewußtsein) and fantasy (Phantasie). Image 
consciousness is rooted in the perception of a present object that, as 
image, refers to an other (absent) object (Husserlina XXIIII 82). The 
fantasy, by way of contrast, is not based on the perception of a present 
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object but is a quasi-perception of a sensuous object. Fantasy differs 
from perception in that perception presents the object with the 
character of existing in the present whereas the existence of the 
fantasized object is irrelevant in acts of fantasy and imagination. 
Existence is simply left to one side. What is fantasized is not 
necessarily past, present, or future, but is presented ‘as-if’ (Husserl, 
Thing and Space, 11-12), and is not an actual perception. This is a 
structural feature of fantasy itself: it has the character of ‘depicting’ 
rather than presenting (Husserl, Phantasy, 16). In fantasy, there is no 
positing the object (Moran and Cohen 120).  
As is often the case, commentaries on Husserl can be more accessible than 
Husserl’s own writings. However, To quote directly from Husserl:  
In phantasy, the object does not stand there as in the flesh, actual, 
currently present. It indeed does stand before our eyes, but not as 
something currently given now; it may be possible to be thought of as 
now, or as simultaneous with the current now, but this now is a 
thought one, and is not that now which pertains to presence in the 
flesh, perceptual presence. The phantasized is merely ‘represented’ 
(vorgestellt), it merely places before us (stellt vor) or presents (stellt 
dar), but it ‘does not give itself’ as itself, actual and now (Husserl, 
Thing and Space, 12). 
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Husserlian fantasy is a topic that will necessarily be applied to an 
understanding of  irreal fabulism in Borges and Varo, but a question to explore first is 
if Husserl even proposes an aesthetic or a philosophy of art.   
Excavating a Husserlian Philosophy of Art 
Does Husserl already have a philosophy of art? Whether or not a fully 
developed Husserlian philosophy of art is possible has remained debatable. This study 
may provide a step towards authenticating that possibility, but it doesn’t claim to fully 
explicate that issue. It must be noted here, however, that contemporary scholars such 
as John B. Brough and Milan Uzelac have each already suggested a Husserlian 
aesthetic, and their commentaries are valued resources for this paper,42 as are the 
Husserlian aesthetic themes in the essays of Christian Ferencz-Flatz.  
Since the proposal here is to use Husserl’s phenomenology to investigate 
art—primarily in this study, the art of Varo and Borges—one is required to 
understand any aesthetic or philosophy of art already evolved in Husserl’s work. That 
said, any attempt to excavate a Husserlian philosophy of art must begin, as Edmund 
Husserl did in all of his investigations, with a return to the thing itself. An artist’s root 
impulse to create a physical work of art in a specific manner can be better understood 
via a magnified focus on the object, and that magnification occurs naturally when 
using the epochē, or phenomenological reduction. If preliminary elements for a 
Husserlian philosophy of art are already present, they may surface more directly and 
accessibly by examining a work of art via a transcendental phenomenological 
methodology in which phenomena—objects, physical and non-physical—are given in 
appearance prior to the assigning recognizable attributions or characteristics. Various 
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components in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological investigations of appearance can 
serve to explicate issues of consciousness when applied to specific art works. One 
aspect of using the epochē or Husserlian bracketing is that a kind of unknowing 
occurs, and there are many avenues on which this experience of unknowing can 
travel, including artistic avenues. 
Varo is altering so-called reality via her art, as is Borges. Usually in Husserl’s 
epochē the lived experience is bracketed out in order to distill to an essence of what is 
being considered; in the case of Varo’s painting, the presumptions and 
presuppositions inherent in the lived experience are not nullified but presented as 
transformed experiences. In both Varo and Borges, presumptions and presuppositions 
inherent in the lived experience are modified via imagination and transformed into an 
aesthetic that allows the dream state and other, less common or alternative states of 
consciousness. Bracketing out conventional definitions of reality in order to 
accentuate via irrealism a kind of spiritual impulse in their art, Varo and Borges each 
repeatedly reshapes sans presuppositions their fabulist storytelling to express their 
searches for the numinous. As will be seen in more detail in the next chapter, the 
experience of wonder and self-forgetting serve to open the perceptual mind beyond 
conscious and unconscious notions of philosophical and aesthetic barriers. The fact 
that such barriers are partly in place because of unconscious presumptions reflects the 
value of irrealism in art as a means of bringing to the visible, narratological (visual or 
literary) surface the intense emotional and psychological personal symbolism of lived 
experience and a sensibility to the numinous. 
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“Bracketing,” however, is more complex than one might presuppose. As noted 
earlier, the Husserlian epochē clears the way for a Husserlian methodology. Now if 
that bracketing process of epochē sets aside preconceptual belief systems, as Husserl 
asserts, are his opinions relative to the purity of art (described shortly) set aside as 
well, or do the methodological principles of his transcendental phenomenology 
become somehow incorporated by his philosophy of art? In other words, how can a 
“return to the things themselves” and Husserl’s use of epochē combine with the 
idealistic trope of purity as described in the pages ahead in Husserl’s letter to 
Hofmannsthal? That ideal of purity is a rare moment for Husserl in that he is 
momentarily more aligned with a metaphysical orientation than the scientific 
principles he usually calls forth in his transcendental phenomenology.43  
Phenomenology’s fundamental premise consists in stripping away 
presuppositions, going back to what is primary, to intentional acts 
through which one constitutes one’s experience. Husserl’s call to 
return ‘to the things themselves’44 amounts to a bracketing of the real, 
to a return to the things as they appear to consciousness, the things as 
phenomena, as they are perceived by consciousness. Such a view is 
bound up with a principle of doubt directed towards the reality of 
things (Bourne-Taylor and Mildenberg 25). 
Considering the roles of reduction in Husserl’s work brings up a related and, 
in this investigation, very relevant issue about transcendental consciousness—
Husserlian transcendental experience (transzendentale Erfahrung): “Husserl claims 
that the epochē opens up a new dimension of experience—transcendental 
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experience—and the functioning of transcendental subject that is normally hidden is 
brought to light. Husserl speaks of this domain as a domain of experience” (Moran 
and Cohen 329).45  This dimension of experience is promising in explicating the 
driving forces behind Varo and Borges’s respective aesthetics. Indeed, transcendental 
experience is a key to understanding much art. 
However, Husserl’s investigative methodology per se does not supplant his 
philosophy of art, as limited as it may be. Husserl does present various aesthetic 
observations and principles. He did observe, for example, that all art moves between 
two extremes, one being image art, mediated through image consciousness, and the 
other being “purely a matter of phantasy [fantasy], producing phantasy formations in 
the modification of pure neutrality. At least producing no concrete depictive image” 
(Husserl, Phantasy 651). The fact that Husserlian transcendental phenomenology 
addresses imagination (or what Husserl called phantasy), as well as image 
consciousness, memory, and time consciousness (Brough, Translator’s Introduction 
XXIX-LXVIII ) allows these principles to be applied aesthetically: “This achievement 
of the imagination does not affect the side of sensibility but the side of the expected, 
that is, in a certain sense the side of the schema. It is a method of perspectival 
correction (Umzeichnung) and positional alteration of the expected objects” (Lamar, 
“Husserl’s Type and Kant’s Schemata” 102). These principles in Husserl’s 
phenomenological investigations of appearance become accentuated when applied to 
visual or literary art. While Husserl did not establish a highly defined or extensive 
aesthetic per se, he did create a highly sophisticated investigative means for studying 
 57 
anything one wishes to study, and that investigative means can be useful in exploring 
the distinctive creative processes utilized by both Varo and Borges.  
Their work and their creative processes are also accessible to Husserlian 
transcendental phenomenology—especially in their cases—because Husserl 
considered how perspectival distortion and the alteration of shape, because of a 
change in an object’s position, has to be accounted for via the imagination and image 
consciousness. Although Husserl does not restrict “consciousness” to a state of 
consciousness, be it conceptual, visionary, fantasy, memory or other, the object 
(physical or otherwise) of consciousness remains predominant in transcendental 
phenomenology, and visual consciousness is a seminal element in his 
phenomenology. Husserl often offers up visual examples to illustrate a point or 
theory; in other words, there is a central strand of ocularcentrism in his work.  
Husserl’s Ocularcentrism 
The point for now is to excavate a Husserlian philosophy of art, a point that is 
much enhanced by Husserl’s ocularcentrism. Some scholars have noted ocularcentric 
premises in Husserl’s phenomenology (Jay 265-268; Lyotard 40). While his 
preference for immediate vision is an aspect of Husserl’s methodology that lends 
itself to a phenomenological explication of art, some of those scholars have described 
the limitations and contradictions that Husserl’s obsession with vision led to:  
Even a cursory reading of Husserl’s writings, surveying his lifetime of 
work from the early Logical Investigations of 1901 through the late 
lectures and manuscripts of 1936, cannot but be struck by Husserl’s 
ocularcentrism: his reliance on a vision-generated, vision-oriented 
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rhetoric—and, as Derrida puts it, “the privilege given to vision.”46 And 
not only his reliance on the tropes of light and vision, but also, more 
extensively, his apparently inescapable dependence on metaphors of 
all sorts. But this dependency and reliance would not be the 
catastrophe that it is for his philosophical program, were it not for the 
fact that the logic of his visualism tempted him to envision an 
uncompromisingly total suspension or bracketing of existential 
referentiality and an absolutely uncompromised clarity and 
determinacy of meaning (Levin 67).  
Without challenging the validity of David Michael Levin’s insightful  
criticisms of  Husserl’s ocularcentrism and preference for immediate vision,47 I would 
postulate here that those noted implications of Husserl’s obsession with vision—
bracketing out existential referentiality, desire for uncompromised clarity, and his 
ocularcentric obsession in general—are in fact some of the reasons a Husserlian 
methodology is so valuable for this study; Husserl’s exacting philosophy and precise 
methodology lends itself to a phenomenological explication of visual art. On the other 
hand, a Husserlian aesthetic remains an insufficient means, as a sole thematic 
resource, for a philosophico-phenomenological understanding of the roles of wonder 
and the numinous in artistic image-consciousness.  Questions have been raised, for 
example, about the validity of Husserl’s “picture consciousness” (Lotz 171-185).  
These kinds of legitimate criticisms are necessary and essential; they must at the very 
least be acknowledged, and if shown to be valid, the Husserlian theory must give way 
to more specifically oriented, unequivocal theories. In fact, these kinds of challenges 
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to a Husserlian aesthetic, and there are a number of these,48 represents one of the 
ways to determine what additional resources specific to art are required, even if a 
Husserlian methodology remains essential.  
A Husserlian transcendental phenomenological methodology applied in an 
aesthetic context gives rise to a caveat. Given the extensive and multifarious range of 
the arts, a Husserlian aesthetic approach requires and thus must allow for a degree of 
plasticity. An investigative means rooted in Husserlian principles or concepts may 
need to emphasize a given set of principles for one genre of art and a different set for 
another genre. While one or more principles might be applied to the visual art of 
Varo, for example, exploring some of Borges’s verse via a Husserlian orientation can 
require a different set of principles or components. Even contextual themes for one 
artist may require a shift of applied principles. Varo’s early more surrealistically 
oriented art from her life in Spain and France requires a shift of principles when 
considering the more distinctively irrealistic fabulist art and unique style she 
developed in Mexico. Thus some Husserlian principles may require of the art being 
investigated a thematic shift of emphasis in order to coherently elucidate that work of 
art. To investigate some of Borges’s fiction, for example, can require a multiple or 
multi-layered orientation and a transcendental phenomenological approach paired 
with philosophical intertextuality. This justifies the addition of some of Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s ideas and aesthetic theories, especially in Chapter Six.  
Husserl does discuss aesthetic consciousness, primarily in Phantasy, Image 
Consciousness, and Memory (1898-1925), but elsewhere as well. Even though 
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is emphasized as much if not more for his 
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methodology as for his thoughts and opinions about beauty and art per se, his 
thoughts and opinions about seeing and receiving art, as well as making art, and his 
investigations of perception in general, are relevant to this thesis. The fact that image 
consciousness, for example, is thematically inherent in this study magnifies the 
importance of extending a Husserlian methodology towards and into aesthetic issues.  
Furthermore, while Husserl’s work with perception and image consciousness 
become, in the language of  Husserlian methodology, presentation and re-
presentation, such specialized terminology does not mean that the methodological 
language of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology is too abstract or delineated to 
be used for an investigation of art and art theory. Thus any proposal for a Husserlian 
aesthetic or philosophy of art must take into account Husserl’s investigations of 
perception as presentation and the varieties of intuitive re-presentation he defines as 
image consciousness, phantasy, and memory, topics he sometimes directly illustrated 
via art and aesthetic examples in several of his books.49   
While Husserl did not formally propose an aesthetic theory, he did on 
occasion address art and aesthetics in some of his lectures and writings, usually in a 
context of explicating a broader usage of phenomenological concepts. Neither did 
Husserl’s conversations and correspondence contain a philosophy of art per se, but he 
did at times consider the significance of art and aesthetics with others, as he did 
following a December 1906 visit by a distant relative of his wife, Malvine Husserl 
(née Steinschneider). The visiting relative was the poet Hugo von Hofmannsthal, who 
was touring Germany to read his paper “The Poet and this Time” at conferences 
(Huemer 121).  
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The Hofmannsthal Letter 
In January 1907 Husserl sent a letter to Hofmannsthal (Husserl “Letter”) that 
reveals some of Husserl’s more general ideas and opinions about a philosophy of art. 
At that time, Husserl had recently established some of his primary phenomenological 
principles, and there are a number of important issues disclosed in this letter. The first 
may be that, as Wolfgang Huemer proposes, Hofmannsthal, through his book Kleine 
Dramen, which Husserl read, stimulated Husserl’s development of epochē (121-122). 
Huemer goes on to explain why he thinks Husserl failed to see “an important analogy 
between Husserl’s phenomenological method and Hofmannsthal’s aesthetic theory” 
primarily because Husserl did not at the time actually read Hofmannsthal’s most 
recent aesthetic writings (128).  
However, the fact that Husserl talked about art and aesthetics in a non-
scientific context is very useful here. In the Hofmannsthal letter, he affirms some 
affinities between a pure phenomenology and purity in art, and considers the role of 
intuition in both phenomenology and art, albeit in distinctive ways. For Husserl, a 
trope of purity exists in both phenomenology and art. Husserl explains how the 
“natural” attitude and all existential attitudes must be suspended both in 
phenomenological methodology and in viewing art:  
The intuition of a purely aesthetic work of art is enacted under a strict 
suspension of all existential attitudes of the intellect and of all attitudes 
relating to emotions and the will which presuppose such an existential 
attitude. Or more precisely: the work of art places us in (almost forces 
us into) a state of aesthetic intuition that excludes these attitudes. The 
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more of the existential world that resounds or is brought to attention, 
and the more the work of art demands an existential attitude of us out 
of itself (for instance a naturalistic sensuous appearance: the natural 
truth of photography), the less aesthetically pure the work is. (To this 
also belong all kinds of “tendency”.) The natural stance of the mind, 
the stance of actual life, is “existential” through and through (Husserl, 
“Letter” 133). 
One wonders if Husserl thinks of this “bracketing” out of existential 
influences as Kantian “disinterestedness,” a topic to be examined ahead. Continuing 
with the Hofmannstahl letter, Husserl also writes that he prefers not to say anything 
about Hofmannsthal’s poetry because an artist should be indifferent to praise and 
scorn. He adds, “And the three golden rules for the artist (in the widest sense), which 
at the same time are the public secrets of all true greatness, are surely familiar and 
evident to you: 1) He shall have genius—obviously, otherwise he is not an artist. 2) 
He shall follow, purely and solely, his daimonion, which, from within, drives him to 
an intuiting-blind production. 3) Everyone else knows better, thus he observes them 
all—in a purely aesthetic and phenomenological fashion” (136). 
In an essay on the Hofmannsthal letter, Sven-Olov Wallenstein points out the 
trope of purity in both Husserl’s phenomenological and aesthetic considerations as 
well as the Kantian elements reflected or echoed in Husserl’s thoughts about art: 
The task of the artist is threefold, Husserl concludes: he must be a 
genius (once more a Kantian echo: unlike science, art need not account 
for all of its steps and procedures, and it does not attempt to grasp the 
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world in concepts); he follows his own demon; and he observes the 
world in a “purely aesthetic and phenomenological fashion”. Together, 
this demon and this capacity for observation, Husserl suggest, lead to 
an “intuiting-blind production” (schauend-blindem Wirken). The idea 
of a pure art and a pure phenomenology in this way remain closely tied 
together, and the first wave of abstraction that emerged at the same 
time Husserl wrote his letter was one way to articulate this connection. 
Others would follow, opposing themselves to a certain modernist 
“purity” by, often unwittingly, drawing on other aspects of the 
phenomenological heritage, most notably temporality and kinesthesia. 
The story of these highly complex exchanges remains to be written 
(Wallenstein 4).50 
Epochē was obviously very much on Husserl’s mind in the Hofmannsthal 
letter, but that is not surprising given Husserl’s constant attention on and immersion 
in creating his transcendental phenomenology. 
However, some problematic issues exist around Husserl’s comparison 
between phenomenological principles and neutrality in an aesthetic attitude. Christian 
Ferencz-Flatz, referencing the Hofmannsthal letter, argues for a separation “between 
the neutrality of image consciousness, on the one hand, and the disinterestedness of 
the aesthetic attitude towards reality, on the other hand” (Ferencz-Flatz, Neutrality 
477), and Ferencz-Flatz’s argument is detailed and convincing. It is useful to consider 
at this point Husserl’s Dürer. 
 64 
In Ideas, Husserl considers Dürer’s Knight, Death and the Devil (Ritter, Tod 
und Teufel) (fig. 3). While describing perception, Husserl notes that through a mental 
process of “phantasizing consciousness” we simultaneously perceive this world and, 
via neutrality modification, the phantasized world. He notes, “We can satisfy 
ourselves with the help of an illustration that the neutrality modification of normal 
perception which posits its object with unmodified certainty is the neutral 
consciousness of the picture-object, which we find as a component in our ordinary 
observation of a depicted situation perceptively presented” (Ideas 228).  
Husserl then discusses Dürer’s engraving as an example, perceiving first the 
“engraved print” as a thing, and then considering the figures created with the lines of 
the drawing, including the knight on his horse, “death,” and the “devil” not as objects 
but as “depictured” realities. The words in emphasis below are Husserl’s: 
This depicturing picture-object stands before us neither as being nor 
as non-being, nor in any other positional modality; or rather, we are 
aware of it having its being, though only as a quasi-being, in the 
neutrality modification of Being. But it is just the same with the object 
depicted, if we take up a purely aesthetic attitude, and view the same 
thing again as “mere picture”, without imparting to it the stamp of 
|Being or non-Being, of possible Being or probable Being, and the 
like. But as can clearly be seen, that does not mean any privation, but a 
modification, that of neutralization. Only we should not represent it as 
a transforming operation carried out on a previous position. 
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Occasionally indeed it can be this. None the less it need not be it 
(Ideas 228-229). 
 
Fig. 3. Albrecht Dürer, Knight, Death and the Devil 
(Ritter, Tod und Teufel),1513.Copper engraving 9.6 x 7.5 inches. 
Prints in Museum of Modern Art, New York, British Museum, and elsewhere. 
 
Husserl’s phrase, “if we take up a purely aesthetic attitude” (Husserl’s 
emphasis) has generated some scholarly debate, including the aforementioned 
Ferencz-Flatz’s essay, “The Neutrality of Images and Husserlian Aesthetics.” For 
now, consider that an artist’s root impulse to create a physical work of art in a 
specific manner can be better understood via a magnified focus on that aesthetic 
impulse itself. That magnification occurs naturally when using the epochē, or 
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phenomenological reduction. To bring this into a modern context, as artist-
philosophers Borges and Varo bring their intellects to bear on the art-making process 
while at the same time remaining attuned to intuitive aspects of perception and art-
making. Both philosophy and a search for the numinous have influenced these artists 
in their respective theories of art. Schopenhauer was important to Borges’s thought, 
for example, so the extent to which a sensibility to the numinous is integrated with the 
thinking mind of the artist becomes relevant.  
Given the ocularcentric premises in Husserl’s phenomenology, that preference 
for immediate vision and how it lends itself to a phenomenological explication of 
visual art points to the relevance of Husserl’s “seeing-in” (Hineinschauen) here. As 
John Brough has emphasized: 
Essential to imaging is what Husserl calls “seeing-in” 
(Hineinschauen). Seeing-in operates in two ways. First, I can see 
something in the physical support: a human face. In lines drawn in ink 
on a sheet of paper, for example, or a runner cast in the bronze of a 
sculpture. Seeing-in carries me beyond the perception of ink and paper 
or bronze to the consciousness of an image-face or image-body. I can 
also see something in the image itself, in the sense that I take it to have 
a subject. Thus I see Bismarck in the image-face before me. This is a 
case of meaning what is absent—Bismarck himself—in what is 
actually present and appearing—the image of Bismarck. It is seeing-in 
that distinguishes image-consciousness from symbolic consciousness, 
the kind of awareness I have when I recognize an overhead sign in an 
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airport as indicating the direction of the airport. Images represent 
things internally. I see the restaurant in the painting of the restaurant 
and am not carried beyond it. The sign or symbol, on the other hand, 
represents its subject externally; it points me toward something else 
that is not contained within it (“Edmund Husserl” 152). 
Considering Husserl’s “seeing-in,” one immediately thinks of aesthetic 
contemplation. This necessarily brings up a need to consider Platonic influences on 
Husserl, and the distinctions between Platonic ideal entities and Husserlian essences, 
eidos. 
Platonic Influence and Husserlian Essence, Eidos, Eidetic Issues 
Are Husserl’s essences, his eidos, ultimately a version of the Platonic world of 
real forms, perfect essences beyond the world of appearances? Although Husserl 
denied the validity of accusations of Platonism in his work, he did “credit Bozano’s 
‘truths in themselves’ for the original inspiration [in his Logical Investigations], and 
Lotze’s ‘brilliant interpretation of Plato’s doctrine of ideas’ for making it intelligible 
to him” (Moran and Cohen 257). Regardless, it is difficult to discount the influence of 
Plato on Husserl in regards to his eidetics: “eidetic insight” and “eidetic intuition” or 
“essence viewing” or “eidetic seeing” or “essence inspection.” These are all central to 
his transcendental phenomenology (91). 
By eidos, Husserl means essence (Drummond 65), and his use of  “eidetic 
reduction” signals one of the ways Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology differs 
from the phenomenological concepts of some of Husserl’s students, especially the 
“realistic phenomenologists” in the Munich Circle and the Göttingen Philosophical 
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Society (64).51 More pertinent is to consider how the Husserlian version of eidos is 
rooted in Husserl’s foundational principle of epochē and his apophthegmatical 
maxim,  “back to the things themselves.”  While Husserl had to take into account 
both Platonic concepts and the Kantian revision of Platonic concepts, that is 
especially true of the pivotal issue of the thing-in-itself, rooted as it is in the 
traditional metaphysical assertion (since Plato) of the thing-in-itself being beyond 
appearance. Revising both that Platonic concept and Kant’s revision of the Platonic 
concept, Husserl contends that everything that exists appears; i.e., “the thing in itself 
appears to us. So there is no distinction between the thing that hides in itself and the 
thing that appears to me. There is no secluded noumenon hiding behind the mask of 
the phenomenon. Things show themselves to me, they ‘announce’ or ‘express’ 
themselves” (Lewis and Staehler 4-5).  
Remembering Kant’s historically revolutionary interpretation of the 
transcendental as “the conditions of possibility for objective knowledge,” or 
knowledge of the object by the subject, and how that dynamic requires the subject to 
construct the object, since objects are always objects for a transcendental subject to 
construct (4-5), helps one to understand Husserl’s revision of both Plato and Kant. 
The influences of Plato and Kant on both Husserl and Schopenhauer are examined 
later in Chapter Five.  
One might ask the role of emotional expression in this. Both of the artists in 
this study acknowledged some degree of emotion in art-making. The expressive 
element in the artist’s aesthetic is driven by the sensibility to the numinous that is 
initiated by the emotional desire to convey that sensibility via his or her artistic work 
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in a way that allows image consciousness to become absolute consciousness. If 
Husserlian intuitions are perceptions or modifications of perception, and intuition 
indicates a “location” where an intentional object is directly present via that 
intentionality, when an intention is “filled” by the apprehension of an object, that 
object is intuited. While the appearance of the object is “given” and the 
phenomenological reception of the given object is a key element in an artist’s creative 
dynamic, that artist’s simultaneous intentionality to invoke the numinous via his or 
her art represents a form of direct apprehension in which a given object fulfills 
intentionality as an intuition of the object, even when that object is unrecognizable or 
pre-interpretational. Since the artists being studied here were working to make what is 
“invisible” visible, an art object arises, a physical object. The “interwoven” aspect of 
a creative process reveals how intentionality and apprehension yield an intuition of 
immediate structure as evidence of life in art. I should add that speaking of life in art 
draws near to the radical Material Phenomenology of Michel Henry, 52 and art as life 
is considered in more detail in Chapter Six.  
On the other hand, can the creative process itself reflect objecthood? And is 
this an ontological rather than phenomenological issue? Or is it both? Or as Jeff 
Malpas states this question: “What is the relation between the objectivity of an art 
work, that is, its material being as an object, and its nature as an artwork? The 
relation is surely not an irrelevant or contingent one, and yet it is a relationship the 
nature of which is not at all self-evident” (54).53 
Subject and object considerations are important in any consideration of a 
Husserlian aesthetic. In fact, another way of approaching the epochē and a Husserlian 
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philosophy of art would be to assert, as Milan Uzelac does, that “the essence of 
classical, modern and postmodern art is the same,” the point of difference being “the 
way of interpretation of objectification, which is constituted in the creative act” (9). 
In relation to this topic, Arvidson notes:  
With Husserl’s Logical Investigations, phenomenology established a 
new sense of the traditional relation between object and subject in 
philosophy. This doctrine of intentionality in phenomenology asserts 
that the subject (as consciousness) is already directed toward or 
involved with an object, when object is understood in the very general 
sense as anything that is presented. The subject and object are part of a 
structure of relations in which meaning is revealed between them 
(125).  
As noted earlier, what is closely associated to a search for knowledge is a kind 
of not-knowing. Although it may be surprising when first encountering Husserl’s 
work, not-knowing has a role in several ways in Husserlian transcendental 
phenomenology. Going hand-in-hand with wonder and not-knowing is self-forgetting, 
which is more than an idea; self-forgetting is an actual experience that challenges the 
idea of self and its substantiality. The presuppositional notion that subjectivity is a 
valid label for the separately self-identified individual being may provide some 
logical sense, but the question to ask is whether that presuppositional interpretation of 
subjectivity is actually valid or an error that everyone presumes is factual? An error 
can be factual in the sense that it is an error, but can philosophy go forward if a 
philosophical concept is rooted in a factual error?  
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In the next chapter on wonder, we examine in more detail the experience of 
self-forgetting, which is to say that within the universal experience of wonder the idea 
of self is erased, albeit temporarily. When Husserl wrote in lecture notes that 
“aesthetic consciousness [is] essentially connected with the distinction between the 
consciousness of an object as such and the object’s manner of appearing”  (Husserl, 
Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory 459), Husserl could just as well have 
been addressing Borges’s unknowing of familiar streets in Buenos Aires, or 
Kandinsky’s anecdote of not knowing his own painting.  
Husserl’s work is considered again in Chapter Five in relation to 
Schopenhauer and other thinkers, and Husserlian transcendental phenomenological 
topics and concepts are applied specifically to the work of Varo and Borges in 
Chapter Six.  
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Chapter Two—Wonder as Disruption: Subjectivity and Not-knowing  
Although the importance of wonder and its relevance to philosophy and art 
was described in the introduction, this chapter proposes to elucidate in more detail 
how the phenomenon or experience of wonder is directly related to a sensibility to the 
numinous. Given that the title of this study begins with the phrase The Numinous 
Gate, it is imperative to clarify what that phrase means. If one of the characteristics of 
the numinous is its invisibility, how could a “gate” appear? At the risk of 
oversimplification, it must be noted that the argument here is not that a physical or 
even imaginary gate visually appears. While saying the numinous is a gate is 
obviously intended metaphorically (although a verbal metaphor can initiate a 
visualized rendering), the point is that the numinous becomes accessible via a 
seeming rupture in what we presume is consciousness or so-called reality, and this 
rupture or disruptive phenomenon is what can be described as wonder.  
Investigating the role of wonder in the irreal fabulism of Remedios Varo and 
Jorge Luis Borges requires a suspension of presuppositional concepts such as 
linearity, conventional appearance, and spatial-temporal presumptions. In other 
words, a form of epochē, described in the last chapter, is required. Whether or not a 
reader or viewer consciously creates such a bracketing or a suspension of belief is a 
secondary point, because that epochē requirement is not essentially manipulative even 
if consciously generated; the primary point is the process that occurs subsequently to 
a suspension of belief. In a Husserlian sense, wonder is spontaneously “given” to 
consciousness along with wonder’s accompanying “not-knowing” and “self-
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forgetting” qualities. Wonder ushers in a distinctly disruptive experience that is a 
universal yet nonetheless subjectively accentuated phenomenon, and the seemingly 
paradoxical condition of subjectivity joined with universality indicates the challenge 
of even discussing the nature of wonder and the numinous. That the experience of 
wonder can serve or at least influence art-making seems to be only marginally or 
peripherally acknowledged in scholarly studies. This is partly because wonder, in 
spite of its universality, is difficult to investigate—partly because of its inherent 
relationship with subjectivity but also due to its spontaneously abrupt, immediate and 
often unrecognizable appearance in the midst of one’s quotidian life. 
Experiencing Wonder 
Before examining the aesthetic and philosophical significance of wonder, it is 
useful to consider the experience of wonder itself. There are many definitions of 
wonder in the Oxford English Dictionary. The primary definition of wonder is: 
“Something that causes astonishment” ("wonder, n." I). Other definitions relevant to 
this study include: “An astonishing occurrence, event, or fact; a surprising incident; a 
wonderful thing” ("wonder, n." I,4), and  “The emotion excited by the perception of 
something novel and unexpected, or inexplicable; astonishment mingled with 
perplexity or bewildered curiosity. Also, the state of mind in which this emotion 
exists; an instance of this, a fit of wonderment” ("wonder, n." II,7, a). These three 
definitions can be combined and used to understand the meaning of wonder as a noun 
or what it is in its substantive form. Essentially it is a surprising event or thing that 
causes astonishment, and in some cases causes a strong emotional response to the 
astonishing event or the thing in itself. Most uses of the noun wonder pivot around the 
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experience of wonder as astonishment. Another relevant definition addresses the 
verbal use of wonder, essentially as a question or an expression of doubt: “To ask 
oneself in wonderment; to feel some doubt or curiosity (how, whether, why, etc.); to 
be desirous to know or learn” ("wonder, v." 2).  The verb wonder is closest to a 
philosophical usage, if someone, for example, wonders about the nature of reality; the 
usage of the verb wonder is closest to scientific use if, for example, someone wonders 
if a certain container of water is pure H2O. The two approaches are sometimes 
intertwined, as when someone sees something inexplicable and is stunned by 
astonishment, then starts considering whether this or that factor initiated or caused the 
logically inexplicable event. For example, seeing a rainbow for the first time is 
usually followed by asking what the phenomenon is or to wonder how it happened; 
however, the first and most apropos or pertinent response is the experience of 
astonishment. 
Even though a primary point of this study is to accentuate and explicate the 
power of wonder as an unusual, albeit universal, state of consciousness, wonder must 
be elucidated in a philosophico-phenomenological context. While so-called New Age 
and occult anecdotes and assertions can be entertaining and even to some extent 
useful, keeping wonder in a bubble of magical possibility is one reason wonder has 
been to some extent circumvented or ignored by contemporary philosophy. A major 
purpose in this dissertation is to philosophically and phenomenologically legitimize 
or at least make philosophically accessible topics like wonder and the numinous, and 
the artistic impulse to communicate the numinous. Wonder and the numinous are not 
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nonsense; they are critically significant topics, albeit the kind of topics that are 
difficult to understand because of their inherently ineffable, amorphous qualities.  
Encountering a rainbow is only one of the more common examples of an 
experience of wonder. Other examples might include meeting an extraterrestrial 
being, a distinctively different and unfamiliar life form, or waking up and finding 
oneself to be a cockroach instead of a human being—as did Franz Kafka’s literary 
protagonist, the salesman Gregor Samsa, who finds himself somehow transformed 
overnight into a large and monstrous insect in Kafka’s 1915 novella, Die 
Verwandlung, translated as The Metamorphosis or The Transformation. Kafka’s 
work, in fact, has also been used as an example of irreal fabulism.  
The Universality of Wonder 
Prior to art and scholarship—although related to both—is the role of wonder 
in humankind’s collective experience. As every parent or kindergarten teacher knows, 
for example, young children have no problem allowing or expressing spontaneous 
and genuinely amazed wonder many times in one day. If a young child is seeing an 
elephant for the first time without any preconception of what an elephant is in 
conventional terms, that child is unlikely to suppress a sense of amazement. He or she 
may subsequently ask what this creature is or why it has such a long “nose,” but the 
initial state of wonder simply occurs spontaneously in a form of not-knowing. 
Furthermore, even an adult who presumes to know what an elephant is but lives in a 
society where elephants are rarely seen can be astonished when seeing an elephant up 
close. That astonishment, even if momentary, is a form of wonder and not-knowing. 
In his discussion of wonder and learning, Philip Fisher describes how wonder 
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is related to three elements, “by suddenness, by the moment of first seeing, and by the 
visual presence of the whole state or object” (21). He goes on to say that within the 
arts, only those available as a whole visual experience in an instant, such as a painting 
or sculpture, can offer the complete absence of expectation (21). 
Whether one agrees or disagrees with Fisher in regards to wonder and art, the 
phenomenon of wonder does undermine expectation, whether the expectation is to 
understand the phenomenon or to gain knowledge as information. One aspect of the 
present argument is to reveal how artists incorporate wonder as an aesthetic means to 
create their art. This has been investigated relatively infrequently, at least in a direct 
sense, although related topics have been explicated; it is more commonly presumed, 
for example, that one function of the artist is to serve human perception, to enable us 
to see more directly (Maine 151-163). There are countless examples of this function, 
whether in the work of William Blake, Paul Cézanne, Rainer Maria Rilke, Henri 
Matisse, Mark Rothko, Wallace Stevens, Agnes Martin, and Wassily Kandinsky, to 
use some established examples, or, as are primarily the cases here, in the art of Jorge 
Luis Borges and Remedios Varo. While artists as purveyors of perception and wonder 
will be examined in more detail in the next chapter about the numinous, as well as in 
Chapter Six about Varo and Borges as artist-philosophers, it should be noted here that 
some philosophers also discuss this theme: 
Wonder, Wittgenstein tells us, gives us the ability to see the world as a 
“limited whole,” in other words, sub specie aeternitatis.54 Wittgenstein 
writes in his notebooks that such a globalized wonder is usually the 
provenance of the artist: “the aesthetic miracle [Wunder] is that the 
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world exists.55 In Culture and Value, he suggests that since philosophy 
opens with wonder, it can also “capture the world” from a heavenly 
perspective: “Thought has such a way—so I believe—it is as though it 
flies above the world and leaves it as it is, observing it from above, in 
flight”56 (Rubenstein, 124).  
 Wittgenstein’s approach to wonder and the ineffable is similar to 
Schopenhauer’s, and it is interesting, though perhaps not widely known, that 
Schopenhauer’s writings influenced Wittgenstein (Cahill 26). Wittgenstein, for 
example, is, like Schopenhauer, not intimidated or repulsed by a notion of the 
mystical: “There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make 
themselves manifest. They are what is mystical” (Cahill 19).57  
Wonder as Rupture and Hinge  
To return to the fundamental question of how wonder is related to the 
numinous, Jerome Miller’s proposal that wonder is a hinge (33-51), a metaphor he 
borrows from Derrida (33), also works here. While wonder is a disruption, a kind of 
rupture that is best understood phenomenologically, the implications include how the 
numinous can sometimes be accessed via art. This may also be a factor behind why so 
many western artists have been interested in eastern philosophy and spirituality. It is 
not difficult to understand why artists have been attracted to eastern ideas and 
practices—engaging, contemplating and depicting the infinitely shifting terrain of 
subjectivity and the invisible influence of the numinous in art-making might lend 
itself more to an Eastern philosophical approach because in Asian philosophy a 
metaphorical rendering of the variations and fluctuations of aesthetic consciousness 
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and subjectivity in regards to wonder has been described as a “gateless gate.”58 While 
Continental philosophy is referenced and accentuated in this paper, both European 
and Asian thought can be referenced to support the argument that Varo and Borges’s 
irrealistic narratives challenge any immutable account of truth and reality in art.  
Performance-assisted Subjective Process, the Numinous and Wonder 
One useful term in a consideration of the role of subjectivity in art is 
“performance-assisted subjective process,” a phrase coined by artist and author Adi 
Da Samraj to describe audience participation in a work of art, indicating that each 
individual goes through his or her own inward (or subjective) course of response to a 
performance or artwork presented. The artwork itself, then, is moved beyond being an 
objectified thing, becoming instead a means of assisting in a transformation of 
consciousness in the participant (Adi Da Samraj 240).  
What, then, are the implications of a sensibility to the numinous whether for 
the artist or for the viewer or reader? First, related to the performance-assisted 
subjective process are the observations by artists as well-known as Marcel Duchamp 
that a work of art is not completed until the viewer receives and interacts with the art:  
In the creative act, the artist goes from intention to realization through 
a chain of totally subjective reactions. His struggle toward the 
realization is a series of efforts, pains, satisfaction, refusals, decisions, 
which also cannot and must not be fully self-conscious, at least on the 
esthetic plane. The result of this struggle is a difference between the 
intention and its realization, a difference that the artist is not aware of. 
All in all, the creative act is not performed by the artist alone; the 
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spectator brings the work in contact with the external world by 
deciphering and interpreting its inner qualification and thus adds his 
contribution to the creative act (Duchamp 3).   
A more phenomenological way of saying this is that until an art object is 
given to the viewer in consciousness, it does not exist. If the glamor inherent in the 
cultural recognition of an individual artist’s accomplishments are set aside, bracketed 
out, who is more important, the artist or the viewer, the writer or the reader? There is 
a kind of intersubjectivity at work here that defies or at least challenges the notion of 
separative self-identification.  That wonder invites a sensibility to the numinous, or 
makes visible the invisibility of what is called here the numinous gate, again is a 
highly participatory phenomenon. 
The aesthetic and philosophical significance of the phenomenon of wonder, 
which itself often arises in response to a variety of strange or startling phenomena, or 
in response to perplexing or seemingly unanswerable questions, is a factor in some, if 
not most, art. That the experience of wonder sometimes overflows into peripheral 
areas described as mysticism, occultism, magic or theology signals the complex 
challenge of bringing a scholarly orientation to wonder and the numinous, as well as 
to examining responses to wonder. The first step in the examination of wonder begun 
in the introduction is to accentuate the inverse of not-knowing, unknowing, self-
forgetting and doubt—knowing itself, a subject investigated far more frequently in 
philosophy. What is knowledge, or knowing, and to what extent can knowledge be 
explained? In fact, can knowledge be “explained” at all? Formulating this last 
question tacitly acknowledges the array of approaches to knowledge. Thinking about 
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knowledge and knowing leads one back into a distinctly human milieu, because 
before examining knowledge, one must consider more specifically what subjectivity 
is, what the knower knowing actually denotes. What is different here is to consider 
how subjectivity is impacted by its encounter with the disruption of wonder, and what 
are the ramifications of that encounter? One aspect of responding to that question is 
related to the inherent heterogeneity of subjectivity. 
Subject and Subjectivity 
The modernist/postmodernist divide in art reflects, among other issues, 
disparate assessments and theories of subjectivity. The contemporary art world 
(which often reflects contemporary thought) sometimes roots itself in a 
poststructuralist foundation that defines different uses of the word “subject”:   
Most obviously, the word [“subject”] simply implies a “subject”—in 
the sense of a “topic”—under discussion or being represented. But 
more to the point here, it suggests the idea of a human subjectivity. 
“Subject” is preferred to “self” because “self” is likely to be taken to 
suggest an essentialist notion of subjectivity that is antithetical to 
poststructuralist and other contemporary thinking. The word “subject” 
also evokes the idea of being subject to a larger force or forces: a king, 
a dictator, or a totalitarian state, perhaps. Of course, in the 
poststructuralist world the larger force to which one is subject is not an 
individual or human agency, but language itself, which contains all of 
us in its prisonhouse, makes subjects of us all. Finally, “subject 
suggests the idea of the grammatical “subject” of a sentence. One is 
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made a subject when one is represented in language, hailed by 
ideology, constructed as a subject, and subjected to the force of 
representation” (Gaggi, From Text to Hypertext, xii). 
 This excerpt is excellent and relevant in that it points to why the thematic 
direction of this paper is not rooted in contemporary poststructuralist thought. While 
the excerpt above clearly expresses a scholarly tone in which the content is valid in 
regards to current aesthetic trends, this paper is rooted in a distinctively different 
approach to subjectivity, one that may be considered invalid by some contemporary 
thinkers but that is nonetheless aligned with this author’s experiences and subsequent 
years of conclusions from studying and explicating those experiences.  To say, as 
Silvio Gaggi does (xii), that language “contains all of us in its prisonhouse” and 
denigrates human subjects or positions humans to be dominated by a larger force, be 
it grammatical or sociopolitical, is virtually the opposite assertion of the present 
thesis.  
This in no way should be interpreted to mean that the work of many modern 
scholars who engaged the study of language—Wittgenstein, Derrida, Barthes, and 
others—has been invalid or not valuable; their work has been validated and is of 
course valuable. In fact, it is also important to note that Jorge Luis Borges and many 
other writers, including Derrida and Barthes, have challenged the idea that language 
is a subjective enclosure. Borges’s fictional and nonfictional intertextuality and 
irrealistic narratives undermine fixed notions of language and reflect an intention to 
ignore and circumnavigate immutable concepts of subjectivity. When Borges, 
discussing how H.G. Wells insisted that human beings take precedence over ideas 
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about  human beings, responds “with the nominalist Hume, that very person is 
equally plural and consists of a series of perceptions; or with Plutarch, ‘Nobody is 
what he was, or will be what he is now’; or with Heraclitus, ‘No one steps into the 
same river twice’” (Selected Non-Fictions 212), he circumvents fixed ideas of self, 
and reaffirms the reality of fluctuating, pluralistic subjectivities. Is a Borgesian 
subjectivity a temporally rooted subjectivity? Perhaps. In a famously beautiful 
passage from his essay “A new Refutation of Time,” Borges concludes:   
Time is the substance of which I am made. Time is a river that sweeps 
me along, but I am the river; it is a tiger that mangles me, but I am the 
tiger; it is a fire that consumes me, but I am the fire. The world, 
unfortunately, is real; I, unfortunately, am Borges (Selected Non-
Fictions 322).  
Likewise with Remedios Varo’s visual representations of subjectivity—she 
repeatedly challenges through her fabulist paintings the idea of conventional 
subjectivity and considers the self as a means or avenue to transcending not just 
conventional ideas of visual representation, but the sometimes uninspected conceptual 
exclusivities imprisoning and solidifying the self.  Her paintings often reflect 
fragmented versions of herself, and especially express her seeking to understand 
herself as a journey.  
Searches for Knowledge 
Is knowledge, then, something that only thought can address, or that can be 
experienced only through discursive ideas? This seems unlikely, given the history, for 
example, of the varieties of esoteric spirituality and their promulgated experiential 
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teachings of alternative states of consciousness. In fact, some of the world’s greatest 
Asian scholars and aestheticians have simultaneously been spiritual practitioners. For 
example, Abhinavagupta (950-1020 AD) was one of India's greatest philosophers, 
mystics and aestheticians, as well as an important musician, poet, dramatist, exegete, 
theologian, and logician – a polymath, and a man whose voracious appetite for 
knowledge and learning was legendary.59  
While any claim to a global approach for art should take into account the 
many Eastern philosophies of art and aesthetics—as, to some limited extent, did both 
Borges and Varo’s art—this dissertation for the most part remains within the 
admittedly Eurocentric context of Continental philosophy. The primary eastern 
philosopher referenced here, besides Abhinavagupta, is Adi Shankara, who lived 
788–820 AD. There is a relevant reason for referencing Adi Shankara, a scholar and 
spiritual teacher who studied and wrote about the Upanishads, a text that deeply 
influenced Arthur Schopenhauer. In fact, the Upanishads was reportedly the only text 
that Schopenhauer kept continually on his desk.60 Borges, in turn, was greatly 
influenced by the writings of Schopenhauer. Adi Shankara, also known as Sankara 
Bhagavatpadacarya and Adi Sankaracarya, remains one of the most important Hindu 
philosophers; besides his studies and writings about the Upanishads, he synthesized 
and rejuvenated the doctrine of Advaita Vedanta, a multi-faceted philosophical and 
religious system that argues for a nondualistic orientation to consciousness.  
The point here is that knowledge is not a Western exclusivity, and that Eastern 
thought can be merged with a study that is primarily rooted in Western philosophy.61  
There is no reason for an investigation of knowledge and art to be restricted to 
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geography or cultural identification. Questioning is a universal human characteristic. 
Considering the fact that Arthur Schopenhauer was the first major European 
philosopher to openly reference Asian philosophical and spiritual writings beyond a 
cursory mention, and that Borges repeatedly expressed a lifelong admiration for 
Schopenhauer’s writings, vindicates an acknowledgement of Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy in this study, and in this chapter at least, a mention of Schopenhauer and 
wonder.  
Schopenhauer and Wonder 
  David Cartwright’s summary of Schopenhauer’s position regarding religion, 
that of a self-described atheist, is clarifying and signals several preeminent points 
comprising the Schopenhauerian aesthetic argument as well as the present orientation 
here:  
Schopenhauer did not subscribe to a religion, and he was an atheist. 
Still, he took a lively interest in the religions of the world. That he 
would do so is not surprising, since he saw a strong kinship between 
philosophy and religion, and also a natural antagonism. He held that 
both philosophical and religious systems attempt to address a deep 
human need for metaphysics. He attributed this need to a sense of 
wonder or astonishment, one that arises from the recognition of the 
ubiquity of suffering and death within the world (145). 
If Schopenhauer’s work was characterized by a sense of wonder, his aesthetic 
also points to the liberating dynamic of contemplating art, a dynamic that generates 
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self-forgetting and freedom from the devastating drive of the will. His aesthetic is—
through the contemplation of art—rooted in a sense of wonder.  
Wonder, the Night Sky, and the Circle 
A particular form of wonder in nature that humankind has long recognized, 
and that has been and continues to be a creative force in art, including in modernist 
visual art, is space, and especially the night sky. Probably the most famous modern 
painting of the night sky is post-impressionist painter Vincent van Gogh’s The Starry 
Night (fig. 4).   
 
Fig. 4. Vincent van Gogh, The Starry Night (Dutch: De sterrennacht), 1889. 
Oil on canvas, 29 x 39 ¼ in. Museum of Modern Art, New York. 
 
Voluntarily confined in 1889 to a hospital in the town of Saint-Remy 
northeast of Arles in southern France (Silverman 393), Van Gogh painted (during the 
day from memory) the night view from his sanitarium room window.  Although Van 
Gogh was suffering intensely at this time, The Starry Night has been described as a 
work that “sums up his religious journey in a triumphant vision of the mystical union 
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with God” (Erickson 79). In this painting Van Gogh depicts, in visual aesthetic terms 
(albeit visual terms fueled by an intense emotional state) a dynamic of the linear 
becoming curvilinear with arciform shapes spinning into circles of light to express the 
beauty and wonder of the night sky.  
The circle in artmaking can be—at least in specific cases—an aesthetic 
element that signals a sensibility to the numinous.  This line-becoming-circle dynamic 
is echoed repeatedly in art, and while such usage does not always claim a spiritual 
significance, it sometimes, on the other hand, acknowledges exactly that significance.  
With the advent of modernist non-objective abstraction, however, one might expect a 
diluting of that sensibility, especially given the absence of the recognizable visual 
human root of more representational abstraction. Yet here again the issue of quotidian 
context and wonder arises.  
While the topic of nonobjective abstraction is covered in Chapter Four: 
Seeking the Numinous in Modernist Art, it needs to be emphasized here that 
nonobjective abstraction does reflect a different (albeit related) orientation to 
expressing a sensibility to the numinous. Whereas Borges and Varo, while working in 
an irreal narratology, almost always include the human being via a representational 
motif, nonobjective abstraction purports to reveal some version of the absolute, which 
need not include any references to the human entity.62 Nonetheless, a sense of wonder 
can easily arise when viewing and contemplating a nonobjective abstract work of art.  
What is it, then, that one is seeing? What is being expressed or not expressed? 
One aspect of this is that nonobjective abstraction is in some sense a more directly 
perceived and experienced occasion of wonder because, to put it in the colloquial, the 
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viewer does not know what the picture is, what it is about, or what it has to do with 
human identification. If a child inspects a work of nonobjective abstraction, what is 
that child going to “see”? Patterns, lines, colors? An adult who is versed in art history 
may immediately bring  presuppositional information to viewing a piece, or to invert 
that thought, an artist may be influenced by a philosopher’s concept, or his or her own 
philosophical concept. The point is that a kind of not-knowing can occur with 
nonobjective abstraction as well as irreal fabulism, a point that signals how not-
knowing is germane to wonder in the sense of wonder as amazement or awe. 
To extend this in visual and textual intertextual context, it is relevant that 
Schopenhauer’s thought does influence Kandinsky (among other artists) in several 
ways. “As a thinker, Kandinsky was highly eclectic, and his discussion of color 
theory in On the Spiritual in Art is deeply influenced by the optical studies of Goethe 
and Schopenhauer” (Lindsay 116).   
Not only color, but the use of geometric and other forms may be accentuated 
through various ideas. Kandinsky’s uses of the circle are evident especially in, among 
other works, two paintings, Several Circles (fig 5) and Composition 8 (fig. 23, p.173) 
and, and point to what the contemporary Guggenheim Museum curator Nancy 
Spector describes as the significance of Kandinsky’s art and aesthetic while he was 
working at Weimar Bauhaus:    
Originally premised on a Germanic, expressionistic approach to 
artmaking, the Bauhaus aesthetic came to reflect Constructivist 
concerns and styles, which by the mid-1920s had become international 
in scope. While there, Kandinsky furthered his investigations into the 
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correspondence between colors and forms and their psychological and 
spiritual effects. In Composition 8 (fig. 23, p.173) the colorful, 
interactive geometric forms create a pulsating surface that is 
alternately dynamic and calm, aggressive and quiet. The importance of 
circles in this painting prefigures the dominant role they would play in 
many subsequent works, culminating in his cosmic and harmonious 
image Several Circles. “The circle,” claimed Kandinsky, “is the 
synthesis of the greatest oppositions. It combines the concentric and 
the eccentric in a single form and in equilibrium. Of the three primary 
forms, it points most clearly to the fourth dimension” (Spector). 
 
Fig. 5. Wassily Kandinsky. Several Circles (Einige Kreise), 1926. Oil on canvas, 
55 1/4 × 55 3/8 inches, Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York. 
 
Regardless of Kandinsky’s conscious intention, his Several Circles might be 
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interpreted as a “night sky” or as an expression of astronomical deep space. Spector’s 
comments above echo the description of H.H. Arnason, who notes that in Several 
Circles “the transparent color circles float serenely across one another above an 
indeterminate gray-black ground, like planets orbiting through space. It is hardly 
surprising that the artist revered the circle as a ‘link with the cosmos’ and as a form 
that ‘points most clearly to the fourth dimension’ ” (Arnason 355). Earlier, Arnason 
wrote a more emphatic assessment of how Kandinsky considered the circle to be an 
expression of the spiritual: 
Kandinsky fervently believed that abstract forms were invested with 
great significance and expressive power, and the spiritual basis of his 
abstract forms set him apart from Bauhaus teachers like Moholy-Nagy. 
“The contact of the acute angle of a triangle with a circle,” he wrote, 
“is no less powerful in its effect than that of the finger of God with the 
finger of Adam in Michelangelo’s [Creation of Man] painting.” The 
circle, in particular, was filled with “inner potentialities” for the artist, 
and it took on a prominent role in his work of the twenties (354-355). 
To continue with Schopenhauer and wonder, it would be difficult to discuss 
Schopenhauer without referencing Kant. While discussing Kant’s two sublimes (the 
mathematical sublime and the dynamical sublime) in a context that includes aesthetic 
contemplation, Schopenhauer, as Kant did before him in Critique of Practical Reason 
(WWP1 252),63  notes with reverence and admiration the overwhelming beauty of the 
starry night sky. However, unlike Kant, Schopenhauer acknowledges a more detailed 
connection:  
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When we lose ourselves in contemplation of the infinite magnitude of the 
world in space and time, reflect on the millennia that flowed past and on those 
to come—or indeed, when the night sky actually brings countless worlds 
before our eyes, and thus impresses the immensity of the world upon our 
consciousness—we feel ourselves reduced to nothingness, feel ourselves as 
individual, as animate body, as transitory phenomenon of will, vanishing like 
a drop in the ocean, dissipating into nothingness (251). 
That both Kant and Schopenhauer bring up the immensity of space points 
again to humankind’s fascination and wonder with the night sky. All one has to do is 
to look upwards to allow wonder to arise in consciousness. Sophia Vasalou argues 
that “Schopenhauer’s own analysis of the sublime” combines with “a therapeutic of 
wonder at its heart—a therapeutic of the passions that is simultaneously a therapeutic 
of the subjectivity that underpins them” (Schopenhauer 5).  
Both Borges’ intellectual character and his layered fabulist writings and 
poetry are reflected, so to speak, in the complexity and beauty of the night sky, which 
one might say reflects the wonder that fuels so much of Borges’ literary vision. 
Similarly, numerous Varo paintings also refer to the stars, the sky, and space, often as 
background in paintings depicting other subjects, and sometimes obliquely 
intertwined with philosophical meaning that influences human lives, as in her Three 
Destinies (fig. 6), a work Varo commented on:  
Each of these three characters is peacefully doing what he wants to, 
oblivious to the others; but there is a complicated machine from which 
come pulleys that wind around them and make them move (they think 
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they move freely). In turn, the machine is propelled by a pulley 
connect to a star in the sky that moves the whole apparatus. The star 
represents the destiny of these people, and although they are not aware 




Fig. 6. Remedios Varo. Three Destinies (Tres destinos), 1956. 
Oil on Masonite, 35 3/8 x 42 ½  in. Private collection. 
 
One theme reflected by Varo’s art and art commentary is the human 
connection to the cosmos, accentuating how people’s lives are not alienated from the 
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night sky, from the unknown, or from wonder itself. As noted elsewhere, Borges and 
Varo virtually always reference the human being in the midst of their art. Varo’s Star 
Catcher (fig. 7) magnifies this concept. 
 
Fig. 7. Remedios Varo. Star Catcher (Cazadora de astros), 1956. 




Questioning and Explaining Wonder 
The history of Western philosophy notes some master questioners among the 
great thinkers, from Socrates to Wittgenstein and beyond.  Wittgenstein, certainly a 
preeminent investigator of knowledge, wrote, “Explanations come to an end 
somewhere” [“Die Erklärungen haben irgendwo ein Ende.”] (Philosophical 
Investigations 6).  
To extend this farther and with more specificity within the present study, 
artists, philosophers, and artist-philosophers do use the experience of wonder as an 
entryway into expressing through their work a sensibility to the numinous. To shine a 
light of scholarly explication onto a seemingly inexplicable or ineffable thematic 
territory without automatically accessing logical presuppositional theories of 
knowledge is, to say the least, challenging, but the challenge works in both directions 
as well. In short, to formulate the questions that will enrich and illuminate the 
thematic territory surrounding each question necessarily requires the questioner to 
challenge the limitations inherent in the question itself, and in the questioner himself 
or herself.  
Several factors work to prevent or obstruct the challenging of a question’s 
inherent limitations. One is the concept of objectivity, and the second, clearly 
daunting factor is the role of science in human culture. If a scholarly approach to a 
theme or topic consists of being objective, or not influenced by personal feelings, 
then subjectivity is unapproachable. Yet that cannot be—subjectivity is the initial 
gateway to all philosophical and spiritual thought, and in fact to any thought 
whatsoever. The real question is whether or not scientific orientations alone can lead 
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to an excavation of truth. 
Scientific Materialism 
At this point in contemporary society the belief in the automatic validity of 
science is so prevalent that scientific factual knowledge has in some ways become an 
almost fundamentalist, unquestionable belief system, one that ushers the individual 
into a theatre filled with a passive and in some cases quasi-religious audience. This 
orientation amounts to what can be described as scientific materialism. While 
scientific proofs, thoughts, and ideas clearly have significantly useful places in the 
thinker’s toolbox, or the artist’s paint box, metaphorically speaking, acknowledging 
science as an infallible and exclusive revelation of “objective” knowledge creates a 
mythological idol of scientifically validated factual objectivity that can become, at its 
most distant borders, a close-minded exclusivity. The argument here is that if 
scientific objectivity and logic-rooted factual validity are the only tools in one’s 
toolbox, the phenomenon and experience of wonder can be easily dismissed and 
discarded as invalid or irrelevant to humankind and truth. 
Yet wonder cannot be completely dismissed because it is a universal human 
experience. Wonder is a key element in both artistic creativity and the philosophical 
understanding of aesthetics, as well as in philosophical inquiry in general; this is 
neither a new idea nor a radical discovery, even though it “is relatively under-
represented in the scholarship” (Deckard xvii). Among the varieties of wonder,64 the 
forms most relevant to this study are those rooted in, first, astonishment and awe, and 
secondly, what can be interrupted as perplexity and doubt—both of which are 
presented here as forms or modifications of “not-knowing.” 
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Related to objectivity is the subject-object dichotomy, which is frequently a 
presuppositionally referenced concept, and not necessarily a valid idea. It certainly 
appears to be a valid presupposition: there is this “me” and the rest of the world, but 
the validity of that idea has long been questioned. One must challenge the validity of 
the subject-object dichotomy to even begin to effectively inspect what knowing and a 
knower are. Thus the subjective self is a vehicle to a broader landscape. Part of the 
argument herein is that when a state of wonder is not suppressed for one reason or 
another, it can eventually initiate a search for the numinous. Before that search can 
even begin, however, one must necessarily fully allow wonder and its attendant not-
knowing to manifest instead of instantly explaining wonder away with scientific 
materialist facts.  
Mary Midgley, using a parable by Jesus that itself uses the example of the 
interior motivation of a merchantman seeking and buying pearls, addresses the issue 
of expectation and knowledge, proposing that wonder involves more than factual 
information: 
Of late, scientists have been so anxious to exclude irrelevant, outward 
sorts of usefulness from the value of science that they do not easily 
notice this point. Yet it must surely be central. Unless the 
merchantman merely wants that pearl to sell again, he wants do 
something with it. He wants, it seems, to enter into relation with it, to 
wonder at it, to contemplate its beauty. But wonder involves love. It is 
an essential element in wonder that we recognize what we see as 
something we did not make, cannot fully understand, and acknowledge 
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as containing something greater than ourselves. This is not only true if 
our subject matter is the stars; it is notoriously just as true if it is rocks 
or nematode worms (41).  
 While this example veers into theological thought, which this study, for the 
most part, disclaims, the point to make is that the experience of wonder can be more 
than an isolated experience in that it may influence one’s orientation to and 
assessment of life and the world. Wonder may, in fact, represent one of the most 
powerful motivators in science, and it may be wonder not at a single object or 
phenomenon, but to the sheer range of direct, non-theoretical experience:  
Darwin’s success had a great deal to do with the larger spirit of 
empiricism—with a ready acceptance of the richness of experience, 
and a refusal to distort it by premature intrusion of theory. What 
distinguished Darwin from the innumerable scholars who were 
wrangling in his youth about the relations between different life-
forms—and more especially from the Continental scholars—was his 
direct, undisputatious, fascinated absorption in the range of facts that 
the natural world laid before him. On the voyage of the Beagle, he was 
not looking for something that he could use to support a theory. He 
was absorbed in the wonder [my emphasis] at the immense range and 
variety of the life-forms that he saw (Midgley 201).  
 Thus the pursuits of science per se are not problematic. The problem is one of 
presupposition and application, the presumption and expectation that a purity of 
investigation (and this more of an idea about purity rather than the essence of purity 
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itself) disallows invisible, non-linear, and only factual elements. While many 
scientists would never go so far as using Husserl’s epochē to bracket out specific 
presuppositions in their investigations, often a kind over inverted bracketing happens 
through theoretical presuppositions, such as the presumption of the invalidity, or at 
least the irrelevance of wonder. In the context of this study, that is an error: “If 
thinking is our professional concern, then wisdom and wonder are our business; 
information-storage, though often useful, is just an incidental convenience” (Midgley 
253). 
This does not mean that scientific fact has no role or value, or that thinking 
should be disallowed. In fact, if there is a primary principle in Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology, it is that his work and all philosophy should reflect an 
immaculate scientific rigor, albeit a Husserlian scientific rigor. Nonetheless, in the 
face of spontaneous wonder, initial thoughts sans presuppositional prejudices must be 
established. If wonder and not-knowing are allowed and presented to consciousness 
without presuming scientifically materialistic or religiously consoling explanations, 
an egress from the confines of preconceptual thinking is formed, opening onto a  
more directly experiential and penetrating explication of wonder. Experience, in fact, 
is another key element in Husserlian thought and intention.  
No claim is made as to this study to being a conventional or purely logical 
orientation to investigating knowledge. What is claimed and investigated is that 
wonder, not-knowing, and a sensibility to the numinous must be considered and 
investigated in an open-minded and scholarly approach if the essential value of 
acknowledging, exploring and communicating knowledge itself is to be understood 
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and communicated. In other words, in regards to mystery and the invisible, it is not 
useful to dismiss those elements as automatically invalid ideas impenetrable to 
scholarly investigation. Varo and Borges were chosen specifically because their work 
does not dismiss mystery and the invisible as impenetrable; they acknowledged, 
excavated, and presented the phenomena through their art, albeit in highly 
individualistic styles. 
This approach to knowledge is described in detail by Ariane Mildenberg 
through her examination of Virginia Woolf’s “The Mark on the Wall” (“Openings” 
41-69). 65  While doing so, Mildenberg unearths an analogous response to wonder and 
not-knowing—doubt. Mildenberg’s referencing of Woolf gives a sense of the 
conjunction of art and wonder in regards to doubt and not-knowing. 
At the end of the story, the narrator offers a final variation of the mark: 
“Ah, the mark on the wall! It was a snail.”66 But having offered 
various possibilities as to what the mark could be, the finality of this 
last remark cannot but be doubtful.67  In fact, this sense of doubt is 
triggered by the short story’s opening sentence—“Perhaps it was in the 
middle of January in the present year that I first looked and saw the 
mark on the wall”—preventing us from ever reaching a believable 
identification of the mark: “as for that mark, I’m not sure about it, I 
don’t believe it was made by a nail [sic] after all” (“Openings” 55).  
 Mildenberg continues, first quoting Husserl, “ ‘The attempt to doubt 
everything has its place in the realm of our perfect freedom […] the attempt to doubt 
any object of awareness in respect of its being actually there necessarily conditions 
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certain suspension [Aufhebung] of the thesis; and it is precisely this that interest us’ ” 
(“Openings” 55).68  Mildenberg also points out that Maurice Natanson, in his study of 
Husserl (“Openings” 55-56),69 suggests that humans have a taken for granted attitude 
to life, a “natural standpoint” that has “suspended our abilities to wonder in the face 
of the object” (55). Natanson also argues that Husserl’s reduction (epochē) also leads 
the perceiver back to the dimension of “primordial doubt or wonder” (Natanson 54). 
 The nature and ultimate significance of Husserlian primordial doubt is too 
complex to explicate in detail here. Nonetheless, in the present context doubt is 
presented as a response to phenomena, whether in the form of philosophical 
questioning or as a means of epochē or the suspension of belief rooted in 
preconception. Natanson does attempt to clarify the general ramification of 
primordial doubt, epochē, and wonder:  
The immanent suspension of primordial doubt is the obverse side of 
the general thesis of the natural attitude. The suspension assures the 
indomitable faith of everyday man in the actuality of his world and 
helps to explain his refusal to take seriously the philosopher’s 
argument about realism and solipsism. Such discussions are 
recognized as clever and entertaining but not as part and parcel of the 
truth of daily life. Yet philosophy does arise, there is wonder, and we 
do have recourse to the kind of radical reflection which Husserl 
proposed. Despite the apparent insularity of common sense to 
primordial doubt, daily existence swarms with possibilities, among 
them the self-illumination of mundanity (56).  
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An objective skepticism or philosophical doubt naturally arises in tandem with 
the type of wonder characterized by perplexity, or the question that seeks the true 
answer. While the majority of philosophers understand the purposes and value of 
doubt as a form of questioning, perhaps fewer thinkers write about the broader 
significance of wonder in questioning. Nonetheless, numerous great thinkers 
emphasized the critical significance of wonder, including a master of questioning, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, who famously wrote, “Man has to awaken to wonder—and so 
perhaps do peoples. Science is a way of sending him to sleep again” (Culture 5e).70  
Wonder and Not-knowing 
A central theme of wonder, and a preliminary consideration here is to look at 
how an association between wonder and not-knowing surfaces.  
The salient point is that wonder is an essential factor in life, in philosophy, in 
art and in the philosophy of art, and that wonder includes an element, and an 
experience, of not-knowing. Prior to art and scholarship (although related to both) is 
the role of wonder in humankind’s collective experience of knowing and not-
knowing. Unless “ knowing” can be put aside at certain junctures, one remains in a 
maze of recurring conceptual thought that disallows any inner experience. This is the 
real value of the artist-philosopher, whose artistic activity within the larger context of 
life (art for life’s sake) challenges seemingly impenetrable labyrinthine qualities of 
the conceptual maze. Bracketing out presuppositional knowledge in order to step 
directly into “inner experience” requires less of an analytical approach and more of an 
oblique, less categorical orientation. That art history remains addicted to categories, 
hierarchies, definitions and other fixed divisions is both amusing and oppressive. 
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Artist-philosophers such as Borges and Varo challenge not only categories and linear 
thought, but perceptual and narratological boundaries as well. Few artist-philosophers 
could accomplish this seemingly oblique approach as did Bataille, whose attraction to 
mysticism includes a dislike of the word mysticism, and whose passionate resistance 
to definitions and the limitations of discursive thought (instances below of italic 
emphasis are Bataille’s) remains always evident:  
By inner experience, I understand what one usually calls mystical 
experience: states of ecstasy, of ravishment, at least of meditated 
emotion. But I am thinking less of confessional experience, to which 
one has had to hold oneself hitherto, than of a bare experience, free of 
ties, of an origin, to any confession whatsoever. This is why I don’t 
like the world mystical (Inner Experience 9). 
To release inner experience from what Bataille describes above as 
“confessional experience” in order to allow “bare experience” also opens the door to 
the  numerous aspects of subjectivity and perception. Merleau-Ponty, whose work 
pivots from and beyond the work of Edmund Husserl, addresses some features of this 
territory while writing about the distinctions between perception and thought, as well 
as some of their conjunctions and reciprocal exchanges. However, he also makes 
clear by the very title of one of his books, The Primacy of Perception, what is, in his 
philosophy, fundamental. Accentuating the value of doubt, Merleau-Ponty writes: 
At the moment when I am thinking or considering an idea, I am not 
divided into instants of my life. But it is also incontestable that this 
domination of time, which is the work of thought, is always somewhat 
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deceiving. Can I seriously say that I will always hold the ideas I do at 
present—and mean it? Do I not know that in six months, in a year, 
even if I use more or less the same formulas to express my thoughts, 
they will have changed their meaning slightly? Do I not know that is a 
life of ideas, as there is a meaning of everything I experience, and that 
one of my most convincing thoughts will need additions and then will 
be, not destroyed, but at least integrated into a new unity. This is the 
only conception for knowledge that is scientific and not mythological 
(Moran, Phenomenology 442).71  
 Merleau-Ponty, besides endorsing philosophical doubt, is echoing Borges’s 
Heraclitean approach to subjectivity and time.  
Skepticism, Doubt, and Wonder 
Doubt is clearly a seminal tool in thinking, including doubt of thinking itself 
and doubt in the form of questioning the limitations of a question or an answer. 
Discursive thought can create (beyond its function as a necessary and useful tool) an 
abstracted belief system that is every bit as misleading as a fundamentalist religious 
belief system. Even logic has limitations, although it remains a necessary rudder for 
navigating the waters of knowledge. In the years between the publication of his 
Tractatus Logico-philosophicus and the posthumously published collection 
Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations), Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s writings about language and logic continued to evolve. As Gordon 
C.F. Bearn points out, this period between Tractatus and Investigations was a turn 
around for Wittgenstein, threatening the “the very idea of logic itself” (81). While 
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Wittgenstein initially proposed, in almost mystical terms via Tractatus, that 
understanding the logic of language would calm human unrest, subsequent years of 
reflection undermined, at least to some degree, that argument: “Coming face to face 
with the dumb fact that some things do and some things do not make sense can incite 
the feeling that one is in Wittgenstein’s words: ‘walking on a mountain of wonders’” 
(Bearn 81).72 This is not to say that Wittgenstein did always take into account wonder 
in the midst of his philosophical examinations, including the “early” Wittgenstein of 
Tractatus. In fact, it is Tractatus that is sometimes described as Wittgenstein’s 
mystical work (Bearn 126). Writing in 1916 before the publication of Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein declares, “Aesthetic wonder [Das künstleriche Wunder] is: that the 
world exists. That what exists does exist” (Notebooks 86). And, “a few years later, in 
the Tractatus, this wonder is no longer specifically associated with art, and is 
renamed the mystical (Bearn 126):  ‘Not how the word is, is the mystical, but that it 
is’ ” (Tractatus 5.552).73  
A summary statement, and an indication of Wittgenstein’s genius, might be 
simply to say that Wittgenstein was amazed that the world exists; he felt wonder in 
the face of the world’s existence. This is not so different from another acclaimed 
modern philosopher, Martin Heidegger, who, in his discussion of Hölderlin and the 
underlying meaning of festivals or holidays, speaks of wonder: “On the authentic 
holiday, says Heidegger, we ‘step into the …intimation of the wonder (Wunder) that 
around us a world worlds at all, that there is something rather than nothing, that there 
are things and we ourselves are’ ” (Young, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art, 86). That a 
world “worlds” as a verb, or that existence occurs at all, generates a certain species of 
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wonder that occurs perhaps more frequently with philosophers, or with the 
philosopher in every man and woman. This is a kind of unknowing in that what one 
presumed was known or knowable becomes undone or disassembled.  
 While doubting or questioning what one perceives or thinks can lead to a kind 
of intellectual paralysis, it is also essential to challenge oneself continually, as did 
Plato, Kant, Husserl, and Wittgenstein. The first step to challenging presuppositional 
bias is to acknowledge the influence of wonder, a phenomenon that paradoxically 
allows and in fact demands an initial subjective participatory activity with its 
accompanying self-forgetting and not-knowing experience.  
Humor and Playfulness 
Also analogous to wonder is humor or playfulness, a topic that is more 
relevant than one might expect at first glance. Humor and playfulness are 
characteristics of a certain kind of wonder associated with delight that frequently 
surfaces in art. Varo and Borges both inserted humor into their art, wrapping their 
playful fabulist narratives in a setting that allowed a seamless reciprocal 
amalgamation of wonder and humor. In the preface to his Order of Things, Michel 
Foucault credits a passage from Borges for its expression of humor in the midst of its 
simultaneous disruption of “known” parameters and the subsequent presuppositions a 
reader may bring to the usual orientation of literature:   
This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter 
that shattered, as I read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my 
thought—our thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age and 
our geography—breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes 
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with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing 
things, and, continuing long afterwards to disturb and threaten with 
collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other 
(xv).74  
 Borges’s humor is, as René de Costa emphasizes, “important precisely 
because it is embedded in deliberately weighty subjects” (15).75  Nor does one need to 
search far to find a conjunction of humor and wonder among Varo’s paintings, as in,  
 
Fig. 8. Remedios Varo. Vegetarian Vampires (Vampiros vegetarianos), 1962. 
Oil on canvas, 84 x 60 cm., Coleccion, GMG. 
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for example, her 1962 Vegetarian Vampires (fig 8), where her playfulness is instantly 
evident.  
A sense of strangeness like the one that enriches Varo’s paintings can itself 
generate wonder. While wonder in the sense of astonishment or strangeness is only 
one element in the creative process, and not an end in itself, strangeness might be 
seen as a trace of wonder and mystery expressed in the aesthetic object. Mikel 
Dufrenne writes: 
Strangeness expresses not so much a lacuna within our knowledge as a 
positive attribute of the object, which would be falsified were it to be 
eliminated. Nor can the strange be explained by the hidden, since the 
aesthetic object hides nothing. The meaning of the work is entirely 
present, and any mystery it may contain is fully illuminated” (410). 
One could describe some of Remedios Varo’s paintings as simultaneously 
strange and illuminated. There is also a revelatory quality in many or her works—
revelatory yet meaningful, as in her Revelation or The Clockmaker (Fig 9). 
Commenting on this painting, Varo speaks about time, revelation and astonishment:  
This painting is about time. That’s why there is a clockmaker (who, in 
a sense, represents our ordinary time), but through the window comes 
a “revelation” and all of the sudden the clockmaker comprehends a 
whole lot of things. I have tried to make him look both astonished and 
enlightened. He is surrounded by a series of timepieces all showing the 
same time, but containing a figure from very distinct epochs. I achieve 
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the effect through different period costumes. Each clock has a window 
with bars, like in a prison (Ovalle 111).76  
 
Fig. 9. Remedios Varo. Revelation or the Clockmaker (Revelación o El relojero), 
1955. Oil on Masonite, 27 7/8 x 33 in. Private Collection. 
 
It should be noted here, although it is obvious, that the explication of meaning 
in Varo’s metaphorically and symbolically rich paintings can almost always go down 
any of several interpretative paths, depending on the elements or features being 
accentuated by a given writer. For instance, Tere Arcq interprets Revelation or The 
Clockmaker in terms of the writings of P.D. Ouspensky’s writings about fellow 
Russian G.I. Gurdjieff’s mystical theories that interested Varo, who kept a large 
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library of esoteric writings. In regards to the revelation the clockmaker encounters, 
Arcq writes, “This revelation enters in the form of several concentric circles. What 
might they symbolize? What is the revelation?” (77-78). Arcq interprets the circles as 
actually being one “closed curve” based on a concept of the fourth dimension, and 
that this closed curve passes into eternity, which could be described as infinite in 
time.  
Janet Kaplan, on the other hand, discusses the same painting in more scientific 
terms. Noting that Varo, while not completing trusting science, “looked for a science 
open to a multiplicity of possibilities, one that would greet with wonder [my 
emphasis], and some humility, the potential of the unknown” (174). Kaplan goes on 
to say that in Revelation or The Clockmaker, “The vision that has caught the 
clockmaker by surprise and sent his spare parts crashing to the floor represents the 
Einsteinian revelation that time is relative” (174-175).  
Concluding her assessment of the painting, Kaplan writes, “Rather than 
deriding the myopia or arrogance or folly of scientific rigidity, Varo here celebrates 
science at its best, as a creative discipline open to the Marvelous” (175).  
Speaking to how the specific character of “Schopenhauer’s philosophical 
wonder forms an illuminating category through which to calibrate the way we read 
his philosophy” (Vasalou, Schopenhauer 3), Sophia Vasalou argues that 
“Schopenhauer’s own analysis of the sublime” combines with “a therapeutic of 
wonder at its heart—a therapeutic of the passions that is simultaneously a therapeutic 
of the subjectivity that underpins them” (5).  
Scholars have noted that Husserl felt subjectivity’s first person point of view 
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as being “ineliminable from the very concept of knowledge” and that what he called 
“functioning subjectivity” is an anonymous pre-egoic form of subjectivity which is 
responsible for the givenness of the world and its ‘always already there’ character” 
(Moran and Cohen 311-312). 
As will be seen in the next chapter on the numinous, there is a strong 
connection between wonder and the numinous. One might say that the two are 
inseparable in some ways. Wonder is the disruption or rupture in consciousness that 
allows an awareness of the numinous, and wonder also becomes the hinge that allows 
the gate of the numinous to swing open.  
Again, it is Bataille’s writings that so vividly and with great integrity 
communicates his subjective experience of wonder and the numinous. Bataille’s 
commitment to expressing the layered complexity of such an experience justifies 
quoting him at length: 
At the moment of nightfall, when silence invades an increasingly pure 
sky, I found myself alone, sitting on a narrow white veranda, not 
seeing anything of where I was but the roof of a house, the foliage of a 
tree and the sky. Before getting up to go to bed, I felt the extent to 
which the sweetness of things had penetrated me.  I had just had the 
desire for a violent movement of the spirit and, in this sense, I 
perceived that the felicitous state into which I had fallen did not differ 
entirely from “mystical” states. At the very least, as I passed quickly 
from inattention to surprise, I felt this state with more intensity than 
one normally does and as if an other and not me had experienced it. I 
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could not deny that, with the exception of attention, which was lacking 
only at first, this banal felicity was an authentic inner experience, 
obvious distinct from project, from discourse. I thought that the 
“sweetness of the sky” communicated itself to me and I could feel 
precisely the state within that responded to it. I felt it to be present 
inside my head like a vaporous streaming, subtly graspable, but 
participating in the sweetness of the outside, putting me in possession 
of it, making me take pleasure in it (Inner Experience 113-114).77 
 This passage comes from “Ecstasy,” a section of Bataille’s Inner Experience,  
and he goes on for some 17 additional pages to write about his subjective rendering of 
such experiences. When an artist-philosopher goes to that extreme to question and 
excavate the significance of his or her experience of the numinous, the philosophical 
component outshines the artistic one. And yet even in a nonfictional essay, the artist-
philosopher is very likely to present his or her thoughts in a highly creative rather 
than analytical manner. As Bataille emphasizes above, the inner experience, however 
seemingly banal, is distinct “from discourse.” He demonstrates how one can write 
philosophically about a topic that is seeming impervious to philosophical discourse. 
In his introduction to Bataille’s On Nietzsche, contemporary scholar Sylvére 
Lotringer vividly describes Bataille’s orientation: “Georges Bataille wasn’t a 
“regular” philosopher like Hegel or Sartre. He was diffident of concepts, resilient to 
systems and deeply suspicious of language. Bataille never developed ideas that he 
didn’t back up with his life” (1).  
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This last point is especially relevant to how thinkers often approach 
philosophical topics—not as a subjective experience, but as a conceptual theory. An 
unusual attribute of the artist-philosopher is that he or she can break free or return to 
the discursive mind at will by shifting into or shifting out of artistic expression. Art 
does not suffer the same impediments as discursive thought. While discursive thought 
admittedly can be a very valuable and finely honed tool capable of cutting through 
superficialities and irrelevant peripheral issues, it also can create mental manacles that 




Chapter Three—The Numinous  
The central topic here is the necessary definition and explication of usages of 
the numinous. Again, the governing intention of this investigation is to construct a 
philosophico-phenomenological exploration of wonder and image consciousness, 
which subsequently leads to a consideration of the numinous in regards to 
consciousness and art, particularly in regards to the art of Varo and Borges, but in 
modern art in general as well.78  
As stated earlier, the primary thematic purpose of this study is not theological. 
Nonetheless, since the word numinous arises most often in religious studies, a 
temporary excursion into some of the contextual territories of the term’s use becomes 
necessary. Inquiring into the definition and usage of the numinous requires especially 
a familiarity with the theological-philosophical79 rendering Rudolf Otto applied to the 
word numinous, as well as an understanding of how his orientation differs from the 
usage here. 
Usage and Definition of the Numinous 
Why use “numinous” instead of a more familiar word? One reason is that 
synonyms or related words such as spiritual, religious, holy, divine, sacred, or 
mystical are connotatively overloaded alternatives, although at times it will be 
necessary to resource works that use one or more of these more familiar terms.80  
Another reason is that Otto’s study of the numinous as well as subsequent usages of 
that term by other theologians, philosophers, artists, and writers represent the means 
to explicate the topic, one that that can be reconfigured and refined for the purposes 
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of the present thesis. Finally, the word numinous works well here in that, more than 
some of its synonyms, the numinous readily combines a spiritual and aesthetic 
interpretation.81  That combined usage is signaled by the definitions of numinous in 
the Oxford English Dictionary, which include: “revealing or indicating the presence 
of a divinity; divine, spiritual,” and  “in extended use: giving rise to a sense of the 
spiritually transcendent; (esp. of things in art [emphasis mine] or the natural world) 
evoking a heightened sense of the mystical or sublime; awe-inspiring” (“numinous”). 
Numinous has been used to describe the spiritual impulse in contemporary art 
(Yoon), as well as, in a more scientifically oriented evolutionary vein, explicated as a 
prehistoric developmental topic (Oubre´). Likewise numinous was chosen over other 
terms such as immanent or transcendental, although both of these terms may be used 
at times in this investigation to explicate specific points. While “immanent” is 
sometimes used in a religious or theological context, often a Christian context, to 
indicate “Indwelling, inherent; actually present or abiding in; remaining within” 
(“immanent”), it is also widely used in philosophical contexts.82 “Transcendental” is a 
more complex term in the sense that the word has been used extensively throughout 
the histories of both philosophy and religion, from Aristotle, as “transcending or 
extending beyond the bounds of any single category” (“transcendental”), to Kant’s 
transcendental idealism: what is a priori or “not derived from experience, but 
concerned with the presuppositions of experience” (“transcendental”; 
“transcendentalism”) to the “religio-philosophical teaching of the New England 
school of thought represented by Emerson and others” (“transcendentalism”) to 
Transcendental Meditation.83  
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As repeatedly stated, Edmund Husserl called his work transcendental 
phenomenology, but even his uses of “transcendental” were also varied and 
inconsistent, as was noted in Chapter One.   
Other words, phrases, and concepts like “epiphany” and “the sublime” and 
“ecstasy” are relevant to this study. In particular, “the sublime” has an extensive use 
in the history of aesthetics and philosophy, and is integral to some of the thematic 
implications in this chapter. Thus the sublime must be addressed in some detail in this 
study, especially in relation to Schopenhauer’s aesthetic, but more immediately as it 
is contrasted with the numinous. While the meanings of “the sublime” are at times 
very close in meaning to “the numinous,” and each term overflows at times into the 
other, the two terms are nonetheless distinct, and that distinction should be clarified in 
this chapter so that both terms can be correctly and consistently applied. Neither term 
is definable in a immaculately lucid way, but a general understanding of distinctions 
is possible.84  
Rudolf Otto and The Numinous 
“Numinous” was first used extensively in Lutheran theologian Rudolf Otto’s 
1917 Das Heilige, translated in 1923 into English as The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry 
into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the 
Rational. In describing why he chooses the word “numinous” to discuss the holy, 
Otto writes that he adopted the term from the Latin numen:  
Omen has given us 'ominous', and there is no reason why 
from numen we should not similarly form a word 'numinous'. I shall 
speak, then, of a unique 'numinous' category of value and of a 
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definitely 'numinous' state of mind, which is always found wherever 
the category is applied. This mental state is perfectly sui generis and 
irreducible to any other; and therefore, like every absolutely primary 
and elementary datum, while it admits of being discussed, it cannot be 
strictly defined (6-7).  
The detailed examination of the numinous in Das Heilige serves, up to a 
point, the clarification of how the numinous is used in this dissertation. Although 
Otto’s perspective is rooted in a specifically German Lutheran theological orientation, 
he grew dissatisfied with organized religion’s tendency to remain myopic, provincial 
and insular.  Part of this dissatisfaction was undoubtedly stimulated by his global 
travels. His initial trips to England, France, and Italy were useful, but as noted by 
John Harvey:  
The long sojourn in the East in 1910-11 must have meant much more 
to him. He visited North Africa, Egypt and Palestine, India, China, and 
Japan, returning in due time by way of the United States. In this and in 
later visits to the Near East and India (1925, 1927-8), he not only 
deepened an already profound study of the great religions of the East 
but was able to realize at first hand what in the religious experience 
which they enshrine is specific and unique and what on the other hand 
is common to all genuine religions, however diversely expressed in 
sacred writings, ritual, or art (ix-x).  
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Fig. 10. Rudolf Otto (1869-1937) 
http://student.britannica.com/comptons/art-13317/Rudolf-Otto-1925 
 
Thus Otto developed an expanded focus more oriented to the great world-
religions (ix-x). The numinous is the primary topic of Das Heilige, and for Otto the 
numinous is necessarily non-rational and has two characteristics, a sense of 
creatureliness and a sense of tremendous mystery. Regarding the former, Otto 
references 19th Century German theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher’s commentary 
about a “feeling of dependence.” There are distinctions between the theories of Otto 
and Schleiermacher: 
Schleiermacher’s ‘feeling of absolute dependence’, it may be noted at 
this point, does not correspond to what are sometimes considered to be 
the typically ‘religious’ emotions of awe and wonder in face of the 
‘numinous’, to use the famous terminology of Rudolf Otto (1869–
1937). Like Schleiermacher, Otto sought to identify a specifically 
religious element in human experience, and located it in the sense of 
the mystery which is both fearful and attractive, the mysterium 
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tremendens et fascinans. Such a ‘numinous’ encounter comes as a 
strange irruption into the world of normal experience (Clements 38).  
Otto, however, differs from Schleiermacher. Otto describes the numinous as 
“something other than, merely a feeling of dependence” (9). He revises 
Schleiermacher’s feeling of dependence:  
Desiring to give it a name of its own, I propose to call it 'creature-
consciousness' or creature-feeling. It is the emotion of a creature, 
submerged and overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that 
which is supreme above all creatures (9-10).  
While bracketing out Otto’s religious belief reference above to “that which is 
supreme above all creatures,” it is still relevant to note that his reference is very much 
about a feeling sensibility to something more than the conventional notion of self-
referencing. This reference to a feeling sensibility becomes more relevant as this 
chapter develops.85  
The second characteristic of the numinous, its tremendous mystery, or as Otto 
calls it, mysterium tremendum, to which he subsequently adds the element of 
fascination, or fascinans, is more directly relevant to a philosophico-
phenomenological understanding and use of numinous. Otto describes this mystery as 
a presence that can be profane or divine, demonic or purely glorious and ecstatic (12-
13). But the point here is that it is a mysterious presence available spontaneously 
through a feeling sensibility. Analyzing mysterium tremendum as a plurality, one Otto 
also refers to at times as “states of mind,” he first considers the details of three states 
of minds that he describes as aspects of tremendum. These include “awfulness,” an 
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overpoweringness or majestas, and energy and urgency, or orge and urgos. By 
awfulness, Otto refers to a form of dread, a species of mystical awe. He especially 
draws on Judaic-Christian scriptural references. While discussing the nuances of 
majestas, which he relates to creature-consciousness and Schleiermacher’s original 
“feeling of dependence” on something greater than the creature, which is to say the 
human being, Otto considers mysticism as follows:  
A characteristic common to all types of mysticism is the Identification, 
in different degrees of completeness, of the personal self with the 
transcendent Reality. This identification has a source of its own, with 
which we are not here concerned, and springs from 'moments' of 
religious experience which would require separate treatment. 
'Identification' alone, however, is not enough for mysticism; it must be 
Identification with the Something that is at once absolutely supreme in 
power and reality and wholly non-rational. And it is among the 
mystics that we most encounter this element of religious consciousness 
(22).  
Otto also references a description, originally collected by William James, of a 
mystically oriented incident of religious sensibility recalled by a clergyman:  
It is impossible fully to describe the experience. It was like the effect 
of some great orchestra when all the separate notes have melted into 
one swelling harmony that leaves the listener conscious of nothing 
save that his soul is being wafted upwards, and almost bursting with its 
own emotion. The perfect stillness of the night was thrilled by a more 
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solemn silence. The darkness held a presence that was all the more felt 
because it was not seen. I could not any more have doubted that He 
was there than that I was. Indeed, I felt myself to be, if possible, the 
less real of the two (James 56). 
While there may be hundreds, if not many more, descriptions of sensibility to 
the numinous,86 the countless varieties of such epiphanic experiences challenge, in 
their multifarious details, the task of framing the consciousness of a sensibility to the 
numinous. Given the specific topic at hand of relating the numinous to image 
consciousness, that task becomes more possible and more clearly defined when 
applying the theories and experiences of working artists in the chapters ahead.  
To continue with Das Heilige, Otto also explicates the third part of 
tremendum, the element he describes as energy or urgency, and how it is associated 
with the numinous. Describing this energy as vitality, passion, emotional temper, will, 
force, movement, excitement, activity, and impetus, he states that all of these forms of 
energy or urgency reflect “a genuine aspect of the divine nature—its non-rational 
aspect—a due consciousness of which served to protect religion itself from being 
'rationalized' away” (23).  Otto also for the first time mentions the work of 
Schopenhauer, whose 19th century anti-religious sentiments and commentaries were 
well known to philosophers, theologians, and artists of the 20th century.  
The element of 'energy' reappears in Fichte's speculations on the 
Absolute as the gigantic, never-resting, active world stress, and in 
Schopenhauer's daemonic 'Will'. At the same time both these writers 
are guilty of the same error that is already found in myth; they transfer 
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'natural' attributes, which ought only to be used as 'ideograms' for what 
is itself properly beyond utterance, to the non-rational as real 
qualifications of it, and they mistake symbolic expressions of feelings 
for adequate concepts upon which a 'scientific' structure of knowledge 
may be based (24).  
This quote is also referenced to foreshadow a common misunderstanding of 
Schopenhauer, whose aesthetic will assume ahead a pronounced and integral function 
within this study. Otto is presuming (perhaps because of what he perceives to be 
Schopenhauer’s atheism) that Schopenhauer cannot access or even directly 
experience the non-rational aspect of the numinous except through symbolic 
expressions of feelings. This is simply not the case in Schopenhauer’s philosophy of 
art, which is, as we shall see, very much about a direct non-rational experience of 
self-transcendence, albeit in his mind not a religious experience (World as Will, Vol. 
1, 167-267; Vol. 11, 406-447). 
Otto goes on to assert that the two aspects of the mysterium tremendum can 
function together as a reciprocally overflowing dynamic, or singularly as tremendum 
or mysterium. The three functional elements of the tremendum—awfulness, 
overpoweringness, energy or urgency—altogether serve a qualitative descriptive 
function of what is tremendous about the numinous, but Otto does note (25-26) that 
the meaning of mysteriousness is different from the adjective tremendous, and that 
the levels of meanings germane to mysterium are also different: 
Taken, indeed, in its purely natural sense, mysterium would first mean 
merely a secret or a mystery in the sense of that which is alien to us, 
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uncomprehended and unexplained; and so far mysterium is itself 
merely an ideogram, an analogical notion taken from the natural 
sphere, illustrating, but incapable of exhaustively rendering, our real 
meaning. Taken in the religious sense, that which is 'mysterious' is—to 
give it perhaps the most striking expression—the 'wholly other' (ganz 
anders), that which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual, the 
intelligible, and the familiar, which therefore falls quite outside the 
limits of the 'canny', and is contrasted with it, filling the mind with 
blank wonder and astonishment (26).   
What exactly is Otto asserting about the mysterious? Is it an invisible presence 
forever unknown but just sensed, a state of consciousness forever out of reach of 
human rationality?  Or is it a temporary mystery that can eventually be solved by the 
logic, neuroscience, and other scientific evidence? Otto tries to address some 
questions, stating that the mysterious is not simply something that could be called a 
“problem” because it temporarily eludes understanding: “The truly 'mysterious' object 
is beyond our apprehension and comprehension, not only because our knowledge has 
certain irremovable limits, but because in it we come upon something inherently 
'wholly other', whose kind and character are incommensurable with our own, and 
before which we therefore recoil in a wonder that strikes us chill and numb” (28). 
Again, Otto’s “wholly other” denotes a religious deity or presence that is common 
with dualistic religious concepts. More esoteric spiritual orientations, ones that 
propose a nondualistic spirituality, assert an ontological or cosmological unity, a form 
of what is ultimately non-dual consciousness.  
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The most important question that needs to be addressed here and throughout 
the present study is one that falls outside of Otto’s theological parameters, which, as 
he continues into a consideration of the element of fascination, or fascinans, reflects a 
degree of westernized misunderstanding of some primordial forms of the numinous 
and sensibility to the numinous that are too exclusively Christian to be of thematic 
use here. Otto’s somewhat intolerant views of meditation and shamanistic ritual are 
demonized in his theology (31-39) within the consideration of  fascinans so that any 
degree of philosophical objectivity established earlier is undermined.  In the interest 
of staying on track with the present study, one must simply ask how is the numinous 
aligned with a sensibility to that presence within the context of art and aesthetics?  
Otto does briefly discuss art and the numinous, but I propose here to preface his 
discussion of art with a clarifying interjection. 
The Numinous and a Sensibility to the Numinous 
Since the extended force of conviction inherent in Otto’s Lutheran Protestantism can 
be overwhelming, as in (despite his radical reformative tone) a scholarly sermon, it is 
useful here to make a navigational adjustment, so to speak, between Otto’s gusts of 
principles about the numinous and the more steady numinous headwind of this 
specific dissertation. The distinctions and contrasts between Otto’s religiously 
oriented numinous and the use of the numinous in the aesthetic context of this study 
will become clearer ahead, but meanwhile there are a few points that merit immediate 
clarification, whether in concurrent or dissimilar terms. First, it is correct to assert that 
the usage of numinous in Otto’s study and in this investigation are both “non-
rational” and, in some sense, not accessible via discursive thought alone.  
 123 
However, unlike Otto, this study is not explicating recognition and worship of 
what religion and theologians often refers to as “Divine Presence.” Adding personal 
religious belief and judgment to an issue creates a sense of exclusivity around a topic, 
one that diminishes the effectiveness of any scholarly explication of philosophical 
and phenomenological topics. Indeed, one reason Husserl’s epochē is invaluable is 
because it suspends personal belief and opinion or any kind of preconceived and fixed 
subjectivity that might undermine phenomenological investigation. Husserl appears to 
have kept his personal religious life out of his phenomenological investigations, at 
least for the most part, although he did have a genuine interest in spirituality (Bello, 
Divine in Husserl, 65-79), and there is evidence of his “religious search” (Bello, 
“Archeology,” 5-7). His conversion from Judaism to Christianity, something not 
uncommon among Jewish professionals working in the larger context of Europe, 
especially Germany, where anti-Semitic prejudices might negatively influence a 
career, is not as important here as Husserl’s direct communications with Otto, which 
will be considered in more detail shortly. 
Husserl and Otto 
The respective investigations of Edmund Husserl and Rudolf Otto are 
important to this study. Thus any connection between the two scholars needs to be 
examined. Otto initially taught at Göttingen, where he was a colleague of Husserl 
(Cox 55).87 To some extent, both Husserl and Otto (especially Husserl) were working 
within the stream of modern phenomenology:  
Although phenomenology had already existed for almost two decades 
as a fairly esoteric form of academic philosophy, after the war it 
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received increasing public attention, and came to be regarded by some 
as a means for restoring European culture. Among those to have 
regarded Das Heilige as a contribution to phenomenology were two of 
the movement’s leading representatives, Husserl and [Max] Scheler. 
Husserl had been professor of philosophy at Göttingen around the turn 
of the century, when Otto was also  there, and the two appear to have 
been personally acquainted (Gooch 160-161).  
In 1919, Husserl read Das Heilige and wrote to Otto, saying, despite 
methodological reservations, he regarded the book as ‘ein erster Anfang für eine 
Phänomenoligie des Religiösen’ [A beginning for a phenomenology of religion.]” 
(Dahl, Phenomenology 18).88  The details of the actual letter are far more telling, 
however, in that it discloses much about Husserl’s thoughts about Das Heilige and 
also about phenomenology’s relationship to both religion and metaphysics in general. 
As in most of his writings, Husserl is passionate about protecting the purity of his 
transcendental phenomenology. Since it offers a sustained and intimate encounter 
with both Husserl and Otto’s work, an excerpt of the final page of Husserl’s letter is 
quoted in full here:  
Through Heidegger and Oxner [sic]89 (I no longer know who took 
precedence in the matter) I became aware last summer of your book, 
Das Heilige [The Idea of the Holy], and it has had a strong effect on 
me as hardly no [sic] other book in years. Allow me to express my 
impressions in this way: It is a first beginning for a phenomenology of 
religion, at least with regard to everything that does not go beyond a 
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pure description and analysis of the phenomena themselves. To put it 
succinctly: I cannot share in the additional philosophical theorizing; 
and it is quite non-essential for the specific task and particular subject 
matter of this book, and it would be better left out. It seems to me that 
a great deal more progress would have to be made in the study of the 
phenomena and their eidetic analysis before a theory of religious 
consciousness, as a philosophical theory, could arise. Above all, one 
would need to carry out a radical distinction: between accidental 
factum and the eidos. One would need to study the eidetic necessities 
and eidetic possibilities of religious consciousness and its correlate. 
One would need a systematic eidetic typification of the levels of 
religious data, indeed in their eidetically necessary development. It 
seems to me that the metaphysician (theologian) in Herr Otto has 
carried away on his wings Otto the phenomenologist; and in that 
regard I think of the image of the angels who cover their eyes with 
their wings. But be that as it may, this book will hold an abiding place 
in the history of genuine philosophy of religion or phenomenology of 
religion. It is a beginning and its significance is that it goes back to the 
“beginnings,” the “origins,” and thus, in the most beautiful sense of the 
word, is “original.” And our age yearns for nothing so much as that the 
true origins might finally come to word and then, in the higher sense, 
come to their Word, to the Logos.  
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I am sure that you will not take amiss this free expression of 
mine. From our Göttingen years you know how highly I esteem you 
and with what pleasure seek out intellectual contact with you. Now 
that you have brought us phenomenologists worthwhile gifts, we 
would be very happy if new ones were to follow these. With cordial 
greetings and constant esteem, F. Husserl (“Letter” 25).90 
The connections between Husserl and Otto are relevant, especially when one 
considers that “Otto begins by employing a kind of epochē to cordon off a number of 
prejudices which obstruct the pure access to the phenomenon” (Dahl, In Between, 
27). What are the prejudices Otto brackets out? He first challenges the notion that the 
holy at its most fundamental root, which is to say the numinous, can be conceptually 
understood or identified. Nor can conceptual thinking call forth the numinous (27-
28), since, Otto asserts, the nature of the numinous is completely non-rational.91  
Otto and Art 
 When Otto states, “In the arts nearly everywhere the most effective means of 
representing the numinous is 'the sublime',” (65) his assessment of the role of art does 
coincide with the present investigation, although his religious motives for recognizing 
this are different from the thematic direction intended here. Somehow, the beauty and 
sublime nature of art brings Otto’s tolerance and open-mindedness to the surface, 
which is in itself a testimony to the power of art:  
The art of China, Japan, and Tibet, whose specific character 
has been determined by Taoism and Buddhism, surpasses all 
others in the unusual richness and depth of such impressions of 
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the 'magical', and even an inexpert observer responds to them 
readily. The designation 'magical' is here correct even from the 
historical point of view, since the origin of this language of 
form was properly magical representations, emblems, 
formularies, and contrivances. But the actual impression of 
'magic' is quite independent of this historical bond of 
connexion with magical practices. It occurs even when nothing 
is known of the latter; nay, in that case it comes out most 
strongly and unbrokenly. Beyond dispute art has here a means 
of creating a unique impression--that of the magical--apart 
from and independent of reflection. Now the magical is nothing 
but a suppressed and dimmed form of the numinous, a crude 
form of it which great art purifies and ennobles. In great art the 
point is reached at which we may no longer speak of the 
'magical', but rather are confronted with the numinous itself, 
with all its impelling motive power, transcending reason, 
expressed in sweeping lines and rhythm. In no art, perhaps, is 
this more fully realized than in the great landscape painting and 
religious painting of China in the classical period of the T'ang 
and Sung dynasties (66-67). 
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Fig. 11. Ma Yuan, Song Dynasty. Dancing and Singing  
(Peasants Returning from Work) 1160-1225. Ink on silk.  
75.8 × 43.7 in. Beijing Palace Museum. Beijing, China. 
 
Otto’s assertion that great art can be a vehicle of the numinous itself, signals  
an aspect of this thesis, although this thesis does specifically explore how a sensibility 
to the numinous is related to the art of Varo and Borges. The Chinese landscape 
painting Otto admires could be described as expressing a distillation of perceptual 
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reality, a moment of seeing, as well as an instance of  mysterium tremendum and 
perhaps in some version an experience of the sublime.  
The Sublime 
In Chapter VIII of Das Heilige, Otto considers how the mysterium tremendum 
element of the numinous is related to “analogies and associated feelings” (41-49). An 
essential task is to consider how the numinous is the same or distinct from the 
aesthetic concept of the sublime. Describing contrasting elements in mysterium 
tremendum requires Otto to reference the sublime:  
No attempt of ours to describe this harmony of contrasts in the import 
of the mysterium can really succeed; but it may perhaps be 
adumbrated, as it were from a distance, by taking an analogy from a 
region belonging not to religion but to aesthetics. In the category and 
feeling of the sublime we have a counterpart to it, though it is true it is 
but a pale reflexion, and moreover involves difficulties of analysis all 
its own. The analogies between the consciousness of the sublime and 
of the numinous may be easily grasped.1 To begin with, 'the sublime', 
like 'the numinous', is in Kantian language an idea or concept 'that 
cannot be unfolded' or explicated (unauswickelbar). Certainly we can 
tabulate some general 'rational' signs that uniformly recur as soon as 
we call an object sublime; as, for instance, that it must approach, or 
threaten to overpass, the bounds of our understanding by some 
'dynamic' or 'mathematic' greatness, by potent manifestations of force 
or magnitude in spatial extent. But these are obviously only conditions 
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of, not the essence of, the impression of sublimity. A thing does not 
become sublime merely by being great. The concept itself remains 
unexplicated; it has in it something mysterious, and in this it is like 
that of the numinous. A second point of resemblance is that the 
sublime exhibits the same peculiar dual character as the numinous; it is 
at once daunting, and yet again singularly attracting, in its impress 
upon the mind. It humbles and at the same time exalts us, 
circumscribes and extends us beyond ourselves, on the one hand 
releasing in us a feeling analogous to fear, and on the other rejoicing 
us. So the idea of the sublime is closely similar to that of the 
numinous, and is well adapted to excite it and to be excited by it, while 
each tends to pass over into the other (41-42). 
That a religious purity—or “high” versus “low” conceit around authenticity—
exists in Otto’s account has been noted by critics and scholars (Harten 76),92 but 
before contrasting the numinous and the sublime we should ask: what is the sublime? 
The long history of the aesthetic concept of the sublime began with the Greek figure 
Longinus, who may have lived in the 1st century AD and wrote On the Sublime, a 
critical treatise about writing style, which began to be translated in the 10th century 
but did not evolve into the powerful aesthetic concept we know as the sublime until 
the 18th century with Edmund Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of 
Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757) and Immanuel Kant’s seminal texts: 
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (Beobachtungen über das 
Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen) (1764) and The Critique of Judgment (Kritik der 
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Urteilskraft) (1790). Kant, described as “the great theorist of the sublime” (Kirwan 
159), would tremendously influence, in one direction or another, the majority of art 
theorists, aestheticians, and philosophers of art who followed. Kant’s aesthetic, and 
especially his explication of the sublime, “has grown exponentially in recent years” 
(Pillow 1). As has already been noted in this study, Kant’s overall aesthetic theory did 
influence to some degree the philosophies of Husserl and Otto, and as we shall see, 
Kant greatly influenced Schopenhauer’s aesthetic.93 
 Asking what the sublime is might be compared to picking up a palm-size 
stone in a field and slowly turning it over while closely inspecting each aspect of the 
stone that comes into the viewer’s perceptual field of vision. Each angle offers a new 
perspective with its own details.  This analogy works thematically here because the 
interpretations and explications of the sublime are multifarious in meaning and usage. 
Sublimis, or sub and limen, the Latin roots of sublime, combine “up to” (sub) with 
“lintel” or the top section of a door (limen). The Oxford English Dictionary’s ten 
definitions and numerous secondary definitions of sublime indicate the variety of uses 
of the word (“sublime”). Nonetheless, the first definition, “Set or raised aloft” 
(“sublime”), signals a primary starting point in the use of the sublime, one that Philip 
Shaw emphasizes “also describes a state of mind,” and he uses as an example the 
sense of awe or high emotion one feels when encountering a cathedral’s “cavernous 
interior” or the dying words of King Lear (1).  
One interesting point emphasized by James Kirwan is how 18th century 
writers not only broke with Longinus’ examples of the sublime in writing, but also 
used the words and examples of other writers. As noted by Kirwan, “Burke illustrates 
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the material sublime with quotations from the classics; Kant, the great theorist of the 
sublime, exemplifies it with the effect of the Pyramids and St. Peter’s, which he had 
never seen; Radcliffe, the great novelist of the sublime, describes a landscape she had 
not visited; Whitman, singing the song of himself, dredges up every cliché of the 
genre” (159). Thus one might say that a magnified type of intertextuality, one that is 
emphatically employed almost to the point of appropriation, exists with 18th century 
writing about the sublime. 
Intertexual interpretations represent only one aspect of studying the sublime. 
A major characteristic often emphasized is terror.  
Burke, Kant, and Schiller on the Sublime 
Besides Longinus, the writings of Edmund Burke, Immanuel Kant, and 
Friedrich Schiller were primary influences on subsequent interpretations of the 
sublime. In a section titled “Mapping the Contemporary Sublime” (Morley 19-21) in 
the anthology writings about the sublime he edited, Simon Morley points to these four 
figures as precursors of the present day orientations to the sublime, although each 
emphasized his own orientation to an experience or a version of encountering reality 
(19).94 
How did the evolution of the sublime evolve after Longinus? Paul Guyer 
notes that the title of Kant’s 1764 Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and 
Sublime was influenced by Burke’s 1757 A Philosophical Enquiry into the Original 
of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful, especially by including “feeling” in the 
title, “although Kant does not provide an extensive psychological and physiological 
analysis of these feelings, as Burke did, but is instead primarily concerned with 
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differences in the capacities for these feelings between the two sexes and diverse 
cultures and nations” (xv). There are several differences between the two thinkers’ 
approaches to the sublime. First, Kant seems to question, in his 1790 Critique of the 
Power of Judgment, whether Burke’s enquiry is even actually philosophical: “To 
make psychological observations (as Burke does in his book on the beautiful and the 
sublime), and thus to gather material for rules of experience that will be 
systematically connected in the future, without yet seeking to comprehend them, is 
certainly the only true obligation of empirical psychology, which only with difficulty 
could ever lay claim to the rank of a philosophical science” (38). In other words, Kant 
asserts that “it would be absurd” (39) to explain a judgment in psychological terms. 
Later, when Kant compares his “transcendental exposition of aesthetic judgments” to 
“the physiological exposition, as it has been elaborated by a [sic] Burke and many 
acute men among us, in order to see whither a merely empirical exposition of the 
sublime and beautiful would lead,” and then directly describes Burke by name as 
someone who is “the foremost author of this sort of approach” (158), he is essentially 
drawing a line between Burke’s empirical methodology and his own transcendental 
aesthetic rendering of the sublime.  
In considering poet and dramatist Friedrich Schiller’s contribution to the 
evolution of the sublime, one must remember that Schiller was born in 1759, two 
years after Burke’s book was published. One of the primary influences in Schiller’s 
life was his later friendship with Goethe. However, the fact that Schiller’s series of 
letters, On the Aesthetic Education of Man (Über die ästhetische Erziehung des 
Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen), was published in 1794, during the years that 
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Schiller and Goethe began a lifelong friendship, does not mean that these two artistic 
geniuses completely agreed about the nature of the sublime.95 Schiller’s letters 
pivoted around his disenchantment with the violence of the French Revolution, which 
also inspired in him the ideas expressed in his poem “The Artists” (“Die Künstler”):  
In labor is the bee your master,  
In skillfulness the earthworm has your teacher grown,  
Your knowledge you do share with spirit minds far vaster,  
'Tis {Art,} O Man, you have alone!   
 
The land which knowledge does reside in  
You reached through beauty's morning gate.  
Its higher gleam to now abide in,  
The mind on charms must concentrate.  
What by the sound of Muses' singing  
With trembling sweet did pierce you through,  
A strength unto your bosom bringing  
Which to the world-soul lifted you. 
That Schiller’s response to the sublime as ecstatic experience (Morley 19) is 
most directly revealed in his poetry, points to the creative expression artists bring to 
the sublime, and more specifically in this study, to the numinous.  
Modern and Contemporary Uses of The Sublime 
When the 18th century sense of terror mixed with awe in the face of nature’s 
overpowering and threatening vastness is reseeded in the chaos of twentieth-century 
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violence, sublimity becomes an aesthetic abstraction, because its aesthetic 
significance becomes secondary to its sociopolitical implications. I say an abstraction, 
because the contemporary sublime is in some sense a non-object, or at least a 
complex version of a non-object. For example, Kristeva connects obliquely with the 
sublime when she designates the abject as something that is the “well-spring of sign 
for a non-object, on the edges of primal repression, one can understand it skirting the 
somatic symptom on the one hand and sublimation on the other” (11). Describing the 
night sky, oceanic vistas, or light coming through stained glass, Kristeva notes how 
“the ‘sublime’ object dissolves in the raptures of a bottomless memory” (12). She 
then offers one of the richest, verbally poetic renderings of the sublime ever written:  
As soon as I perceive it, as soon as I name it, the sublime triggers—it 
has always already triggered—a spree of perceptions and words that 
expands memory boundlessly. I then forget the point of departure and 
find myself removed to a secondary universe, set off from the one 
where “I” am—delight and loss. Not at all short but always with and 
through perception and words, the sublime is a something added that 
expands us, overstrains us, and causes us to be here, as dejects, and 
there, as others and sparkling. A divergence, an impossible bounding. 
Everything missed, joy-fascination (12). 
 Besides the emphasis on psychoanalysis in her general writings, Kristeva in 
this excerpt signals an interpretation of the sublime that is somewhat different from 
the traditional definitions and even from many contemporary understandings.  When 
she states that the sublime surfaces “always with and through perception and words,” 
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that is unusual. Most definitions of the sublime so frequently emphasize a nonverbal 
aspect to this experience that one could almost presume that the sublime could be 
described as that for which words are inadequate, or something words cannot express. 
Yet as Shaw notes (1-4) often the declaration of the failure to communicate in words 
what the sublime actually becomes a communication in words of the nature of the 
sublime; he uses, as an example, lines from Keat’s 1817 poem “On Seeing the Elgin 
Marbles,” in which Keats uses words like “undescribable” and “dim-conceived” to 
emphasize the “magnitude” of what he is encountering. 
Interestingly, though not surprisingly, Kristeva,96 creates her own definition 
and explication of the sublime, one that could really not be described as eighteenth-
century, modernist or postmodernist, but simply Kristevian. Nonetheless, what is the 
significance of Kristeva’s comments?  Does her description of “always with and 
through perception and words” point to an entirely subjective response, or is it an 
indication of modern and contemporary responses to the sublime in general? Shaw, in 
a chapter titled “The Sublime is Now: Derrida and Lyotard” (115-129), explicates the 
postmodernist orientation to the sublime. “The difference between Romanticism, 
modernism, and postmodernism can therefore be measured in their contrasting 
attitudes to the unpresentable” (115), stressing that rather than ideas of the divine or 
the humanist concept of mind, the unpresentable sublime in postmodernism remains 
“absolutely other” (115).  
While both Lyotard and Derrida offer a rereading of Kant, Lyotard argues that 
the postmodernist presentation of the unpresentable is a search for a new presentation 
that accentuates not a form of enjoyment but of pain because the unpresentable is 
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impossible to see. Derrida’s deconstructive methodology, on the other hand, stresses 
the contrivance of any system that conceptually conditions the sublime. For Derrida, 
what is transcendental is never free of the empirical. Shaw points (116-117) to 
Derrida’s argument in The Truth in Painting about the Kantian parergon—a 
bordering device such as the frame of a painting, or something subordinate or 
embellishing—as evidence that the formlessness of the sublime eliminates the 
possibility of a parergon for the sublime. Even so, some critics suggest that Derrida 
does suggest that the sublime is “bounded” and thus not “wholly other or beyond,” 
and Shaw references (117-118) critic Mark Cheetham’s comments in Kant, Art, and 
Art History: Moments of Discipline, about Derrida’s many “seems” as leading to the 
possibility of a sublime that is bounded. That Cheetham’s argument ultimately yields 
a postmodernist interpretation of Kant’s “Analytic of the Sublime,” points to the 
contemporary revising of the Romantic sublime: “The pleasure that arises from the 
sublime consists, therefore, precisely in the setting of, rather than the overcoming of, 
limits, for reason, unlike imagination, can put such a border in place and take 
emotional pleasure from this accomplishment” (117). 
 “Pleasure,” however, is an inadequate description of Kristeva’s response to 
the sublime. Saying her encounter with the sublime is pleasurable does not match in 
interpretation, intensity, and depth her experience of the sublime as “a spree of 
perceptions and words that expands memory boundlessly” (12). Ultimately, as will be 
considered later, at least part of the answer may lie in Kristeva’s orientation to the 
“decentered subject,” a concept that adds a dimension to the sublime that also serves, 
in some artistic cases, as an additional means for understanding the varieties of 
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numinous sensibility. An immediate observation is that while a broad understanding 
of the sublime, especially in the 18th century was of a phenomenon that words cannot 
express, Kristeva’s “a spree of perceptions and words that expands memory 
boundlessly” is actually more aligned in some sense with Longinus’s focus on writing 
and rhetoric.  
Lyotard, whose writings led to a 1985 Centre Pompidou exhibition on the 
sublime that he curated,97 explicated the implications of Kant’s version of the sublime 
in his 1991 Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, taking the Kantian thought in a 
new direction. “Postmodernism, as Lyotard sees it, is not a deviation from but rather a 
radicalization of Kant’s original ‘Analytic’; it aims to maintain the shock of the 
sublime so as to prevent the ascendancy of the rational over the real” (Shaw 116).98  
The modern and postmodern sublime is most effectively understood directly 
via the art of the artist-philosopher, and his or her artmaking. In that context, both the 
aesthetic relevance of the sublime and its reciprocal relationship with the numinous, 
and vice versa, is revealed, especially in regards to the thematic explication central to 
this study.  Non-rational aspects of the sublime and the numinous that surface while 
explicating topics such as sacred cultures and alternative states of consciousness can 
be communicated by artists in more concrete language through the experience of their 
own artmaking activities. 
Comparing the Numinous and The Sublime  
While the sublime has generally been contrasted with the beautiful, in this 
study it is essential that the sublime be compared to the numinous. The concepts are 
so close as to be synonymous at times. Thus to distinguish the distinctions between 
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the two requires some painstaking explication, especially since every scholar seems to 
have his or her version of articulating that difference. In reality, the similarities are 
what one first notices. As Otto emphasized, “the idea of the sublime is closely similar 
to that of the numinous” (41-42).  He notes that the numinous and the sublime are 
alike in two respects—each includes “something mysterious” and each  “exhibits the 
same peculiar dual character” (41-42). When discussing Asian art, for example, Otto 
compares the sublime and the numinous:  
Besides silence and darkness oriental art knows a third direct means 
for producing a strongly numinous impression, to wit, emptiness and 
empty distances. Empty distance, remote vacancy, is, as it were, the 
sublime in the horizontal. The wide-stretching desert, the boundless 
uniformity of the steppe, have real sublimity, and even in us 
Westerners they set vibrating chords of the numinous along with the 
note of the sublime, according to the principle of the association of 
feelings (69).  
 Also, for Otto, the sublime is a “means” to represent the numinous in art, and 
he goes into some detail to argue for this idea:  
In the arts nearly everywhere the most effective means of representing 
the numinous is 'the sublime'. This is especially true of architecture, in 
which it would appear to have first been realized. One can hardly 
escape the idea that this feeling for expression must have begun to 
awaken far back in the remote Megalithic Age. The motive underlying 
the erection of those gigantic blocks of rock, hewn or unworked, single 
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monoliths or titanic rings of stone, as at Stonehenge, may have well 
been originally to localize and preserve and, as it were, to store up the 
numen in solid presence by magic; but the change to the motive of 
expression must have been from the outset far too vividly stimulated 
not to occur at a very early date. In fact the bare feeling for solemn and 
imposing magnitude and for the pomp of sublime pose and gesture is a 
fairly elementary one, and we cannot doubt that this stage had been 
reached when the mastabas, obelisks and pyramids were built in 
Egypt. It is indeed beyond question that the builders of these temples, 
and of the Sphinx of Gizeh, which set the feeling of the sublime, and 
together with and through it that of the numinous, throbbing in the soul 
almost like a mechanical reflex, must themselves have been conscious 
of this effect and have intended it (65-66).  
 One naturally wonders why Otto cannot address the numinous without 
referencing the sublime. It has been noted that philosopher Max Scheler, while using 
and in some ways extending Husserl’s phenomenological approach, also commented 
on Otto’s approach to the numinous: “Scheler specifically affirms Otto’s allegation 
that the numinous constitutes a primary datum sui generis, which, as such, is 
incapable of being defined and must be approached instead by means of description 
and comparison” (Gooch 161).99  Certainly Otto is using description and comparison 
in his writing about the sublime and the numinous. Scheler also suggested:  
Otto’s method of successively exploring, comparing and contrasting 
the various layers and nuances of the experiences that he describes, in 
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order thereby to isolate and exhibit the numinous, “is the way that 
leads to the phenomenological intuition of essence (Wesensschau)” 
(162). 
sui generis and Wesensschau 
Thus it is useful to consider in more detail—in regards to Otto’s presentation of the 
numinous—two terms: sui generis and Wesensschau. The more common former is 
defined as “Of one's or its own kind; peculiar” ("sui generis, n." OED Online); the 
latter, Wesensschau, means the intuition of essences, or eidetic intuition, which can 
also has been described as “Husserl ‘s famous Wesensschau” (Levinas, Theory of 
Intuition, 105). Levinas goes farther in elucidating Husserl’s Wesensschau, noting, 
“Just like individual objects, ideal beings and essences admit of truth and falsity. 
Essences are not fictions about which one may say anything” (105). It is interesting 
that Levinas points out that Husserl, in his explication of imagination said that ideal 
objects cannot be divided between actually perceived and imagined objects (105), a 
point that is clearly relevant to the art of Borges and Varo.   
 In other words, sensible intuition is not eidetic intuition. The key to 
understanding this approach lies in the understanding (as accentuated earlier and 
reemphasized farther ahead) Husserlian presentation (Vorstellung),  givenness 
(Gegebenheit) and Intentionality (Intentionalität).  
It is useful here to remember that there are numerous attempts to deal with the 
ineffable.  For example, the Kantian noumena refers not to experience, but to the 
underlying conditions of experience that are not knowable as things-in-themselves, 
yet which nonetheless must be presupposed in order for an experience of phenomena 
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to be able to “cohere” (Shaw 155). Essentially, this means that the Kantian thing-in-
itself “exists independently of experience” (156). While the Kantian noumena is not 
Otto’s numinous, Otto does reference Kant at times, and in fact, while discussing how 
Kant separates what he means by “aesthetic” from logical judgment, Otto references 
Kant and then goes on to quote both Schiller and Goethe in order to illustrate Kant 
(148), a superb moment of intertexual gymnastics:  
Kant's distinction between the 'aesthetic' and logical judgement did not mean 
to imply that the faculty of 'aesthetic' judgement was a judgement upon 
'aesthetic' objects in the special narrow sense of the term 'aesthetic', as being 
concerned with the beautiful. His primary intention is simply and in general 
terms to separate the faculty of judgement based upon feeling of whatever sort 
from that of the understanding, from discursive, conceptual thought and 
inference; and his term 'aesthetic' is simply meant to mark as the peculiarity of 
the former that, in contrast to logical judgement, it is not worked out in 
accordance with a clear intellectual scheme, but in conformity to obscure, dim 
principles which must be felt and cannot be stated explicitly as premises. Kant 
employs sometimes another expression also to denote such obscure, dim 
principles of judgement, based on pure feeling, viz. the phrase 'not-unfolded' 
or 'unexplicated concepts' (unausgewickelte Begriffe); and his meaning is here 
exactly that of the poet, when he says: 
It waketh the power of feelings obscure  
That in the heart wondrously slumbered. 
Und wecket der dunklen Gefühle Gewalt,  
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Die im Herzen wunderbar schliefen.  
( Schiller: Der Graf von Habsburg.) 
Or again: 
What beyond our conscious knowing  
Or our thought's extremest span  
Threads by night the labyrinthine  
Pathways of the breast of man.  
Was von Menschen nicht gewußt  
Oder nicht bedacht,  
Durch das Labyrinth der Brust  
Wandelt bei der Nacht. 
 (Goethe: An den Mona.)            
As a literary artist who was also a thinker and scientist, Goethe presents a 
perspective to the numinous that is less burdened with sentimentality or romantic 
idealism, and more about the artist in the world. Nonetheless, Otto accessed Goethe’s 
writings in Das Heilige, albeit at times to contrast his orientation to the numinous 
with Goethe’s “pagan” orientation (153).100 Paul Bishop, a contemporary professor of 
German literature and someone who has written about C. G. Jung in a context of 
German literature and the numinous, describes Otto’s use of Goethe’s writings, 
including Faust, to describe the German use of the numinous via the term das 
Ungeheure. Bishop quotes “the famous scene from Part Two where Faust visits the 
Mothers” (Bishop 117): 
Our sense of awe’s what keeps us most alive.  
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The world chokes human feeling more and more, 
But deep dread still can move us to the core.  
Das Schaudern ist der Menschheit bestes Teil.  
Wie auch die Welt ihm das Gefühl verteuere, 
Ergiffen fühlt er tief das Ungeheure (Bishop 117).101 
 
The Jungian Numinous and the Numinous in the  Present Study:  
Distinctions and Similarities 
 
Another area in which the sublime and the numinous appear together is when 
the Romantic sublime meets the Jungian numinous. Although the latter will be 
examined in more detail shortly, it is important to note right away that Wordsworth’s 
poetry is a poetry of the sublime, so that its relationship to the numinous is always 
near at hand. “Rather than invoke the vast library of works on Wordsworth and the 
sublime, for the purposes of my discussion, I propose that for Wordsworth, the 
sublime is an aesthetic and affective experience of the environment that becomes 
something numinous” (Goss 1). Goss, referencing Otto, goes on to define numinous 
as something beyond oneself and generally inaccessible except “in the moment of 
encounter with the numinous, one is afforded a momentary glimpse into, or intuition 
of, hidden depths in a view, image, object, sound or other sensory stimulus” (Goss 1). 
The idea of the numinous as something that is hidden or invisible does not in 
itself distinguish the sublime from the numinous. The sublime is not always as visible 
as a distant volcano or the pyramids. In gothic literature as well as modern horror 
fiction, an invisible presence which may only be perceived via a sensibility initially 
conveys a kind of thrill of terror, a variety of the sublime, that pivots on the 
anticipatory edge of the possibility of the unseen becoming a visible, destructive 
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“something” that will disrupt, terrorize, or end one’s existence. 
For Jung, however, the numinous represents other qualities. While Jung did 
appropriate Otto’s term (Main 158),102 he used the numinous in his work more with 
“healing and with the psychological process of individuation” (Stein 43) than Otto’s 
usage, which was defining the numinous as “a feeling of the supersensual” and thus 
as “the experiential basis of religions” (41). Unlike most theologians of his time, Otto 
stressed direct experience rather than conceptual thought about religious experience 
as the basis of his theory, and his “preference for feeling over thought set him apart 
from his theological fellows” (39).103 
Jung’s focus on the unconscious as a site of the numinous experience can be 
contrasted with Otto’s religious orientation, but there are numerous reciprocities, not 
least of all because of Jung’s interest in how religious symbols and ideas evoked the 
numinous (45). One such agreement in regards to a sensibility to the numinous is that 
certain artistically inclined individuals—artists and those who have an ongoing 
appreciation of art may have an intensified sensibility to the numinous (45).104   
Returning to the topic of art also reengages the primary focus and purpose of 
this chapter, which is to elucidate the meaning of the numinous as used here. While 
“numinous” has been used to describe the spiritual impulse in contemporary art,105 it 
has also been used in a more scientifically oriented evolutionary vein as a prehistoric 
developmental characteristic.106  
How are art, art-making and art-viewing related to the numinous? Is this only 
a “transcendent” issue?  Otto frequently uses the word transcendent (transzendent) in 
his references to God, but to what extent is that concept a factor in the investigation 
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of a numinous sensibility to art and image consciousness? Jungian scholars question 
the role of a transcendent force. For example, Bishop, quoting from Goethe’s 
“Trilogy of Passion,”107 argues against such a force: 
Thus the sense of the Numinous does not so much reveal the Divine as 
reside in a way of seeing things, seeing them with “the eyes of the 
spirit,” so that we realize the divine nature of all things. This, then, is 
the true sense of the Numinous in Goethe—and, by extension, in Jung 
as well. For him, the sets of “feelings,” “ideas,” and “events,” that Otto 
described as numinous, can be understood in terms of Goethe’s “eyes 
of the spirit” as aesthetic experiences, ones that “shape” us, “impress” 
us, and “leave their mark” upon us: in other worlds, they are 
“archetypal.” The power of the Numinous, the transformative effect of 
the archetypal, resides not in a breakthrough from some transcendent 
realm, but in a profound, even life-changing alteration in the way we 
view the present and our life in it. Such a de-metaphysicized, de-
mystified conception of the Numinous would reveal the divine nature 
of life itself—divine, that is, not in terms of an external, transcendent 
force, but inherently, immanently, immediately. As Jung pointed out, 
the philological root of the Numinous lies in the notion of divinity and 
of respect for the religious, but can we have a conception of the divine 
without God? The ancient Epicurean and Stoic belief in the sanctity of 
the moment might provide such a model of the divine without the 
belief in transcendence” (Bishop 129-130). 
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Bishop is quoted at length because there are both affinities and disparities 
between his argument and the present investigation. Even though the present study of 
the numinous is not a Jungian study, some aspects of Bishop’s explication of the 
Jungian numinous—for example, that aesthetic experiences can be expressions of the 
numinous—are congruent with this study, while others are not. When Bishop, for 
example, describes the Jungian archetypal effect as a type of numinous factor that is 
de-metaphysicized, metaphysics is not rendered for this study as a conception of God 
or exterior deity, so that argument is not valid for this study. In the next chapter, the 
importance of aesthetics and art in the writings of Schopenhauer, who was a severe 
critic of religion and the God idea, is presented in order to subsequently be 
interwoven with a Husserlian transcendental phenomenological methodology, and 
other philosophical and phenomenological strands, to construct an original aesthetic 
of the numinous to investigate image consciousness in abstract art.108  The point here 
is that metaphysics is actually not defined in religious terms, but instead is described 
formally as “a branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things or 
reality” (“metaphysics”). There are other affinities and disparities. The assertion that 
life itself reflects a divine nature is not antithetical to this study, but the idea that the 
transcendent must be some exterior realm is incompatible with the inherent thesis 
here.  
The Numinous and the Transcendent Experience 
 Some fundamental questions about the transcendent must be considered first.  
For example, do transcendent experiences actually exist, and if so what is a 
transcendent experience?  
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Sociological surveys report that a significant percentage of the 
Australian, British, and north-American population (from 35 percent 
up to 50 percent) recall having had a transcendent experience.109 A 
transcendent experience can be characterized as an event in which 
individuals, by themselves or in a group, have the impression that they 
are in contact with something boundless and limitless, which they 
cannot grasp, and which utterly surpasses human capacities. While 
many reach a positive judgment regarding the status of what has been 
apprehended, others discount such incidents a purely subjective and as 
not indicative of anything real. In contrast to this dismissive attitude, I 
would like to look at such experiences favorably and interpret them in 
accord with thinkers who envision the human self as essentially open 
to the infinite (Roy Transcendent xi). 
Roy goes on to note that such experiences are likely to be of unequal value 
and may be problematic, even psychotic, in various ways, and describes the reasons 
he decided against a theological approach in favor of a “phenomenology of 
transcendent experience” (xii).110 The present study proposes several ways through 
the somewhat daunting labyrinth that arises when considering the varieties of the 
transcendent experience.  
Intentionality and the Numinous 
One gateway through that labyrinth is intentionality, which is also considered 
to some extent by Roy,111 but which cannot be fully explicated beyond an elementary 
orientation until the next chapter. For now, the reader should know that Husserl’s 
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three concepts of consciousness include: “(1) Consciousness as the entire, real (reelle) 
phenomenological being of the empirical ego, as the interweaving of psychic 
experiences in the unified stream of consciousness; (2) consciousness as the inner 
awareness of one’s own psychic experiences; (3) consciousness as a comprehensive 
designation for ‘mental acts’, or ‘intentional experiences’ of all sorts” (Husserl 
Logical Investigations vol 2, 81). 
His third concept of consciousness, intentionality, is of deep interest to 
Husserl and is discussed at length and in much detail in all his writings except those 
on mathematics, but its relevance here is that Husserl declared intentionality to be 
“prior to all theories” (Husserl Phenomenological Psychology 9).112  This notion of 
intentionality as an antecedent event, one that occurs before conceptually 
encountering the object was introduced in Chapter One, along with Husserl’s 
intention to create an apodictic science via his transcendental phenomenology.  
How does intentionality enter into this? Roy attempts to clarify this in his 
examination of the transcendent experience by noting that “human intentionality is an 
intersubjective capacity for reaching out to what exists; when such intentionality feels 
that it is in the presence of the mystery [which is to say in terms of this study, the 
numinous], it does encounter a reality” (Transcendent xii). Roy goes on to say that 
emotion enhances a person’s response to reality: “The feeling of being in touch with 
something absolutely transcendent is the affective side of an intentionality oriented 
toward the mystery” (Transcendent xii). Later, Roy resources the work of Bernard 
Lonergan, a Canadian philosopher-theologian who thoroughly studied intentionality:  
Lonergan helps us move further away from the widespread 
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perceptualist model of mysticism, by clarifying the nature of 
consciousness. Inspired by Husserl, his intentionality analysis 
distinguishes the data of a twofold awareness: the objects of one’s 
operations, and the operations themselves. The human self who wants 
to know and interact with reality intends what is other than itself. In 
doing so, the inquiring subject is aware of both the intended objects 
and the several acts that constitute its intending. Difficult as it is to 
pinpoint, the intending is no less conscious than the intended, since 
people are conscious of their cognitive and affective operations (133).  
That an accomplished scholar like Lonergan has understood the implications 
of one of the principles of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology indicates how a 
Husserlian methodology within a fully developed aesthetic of the numinous can 
coherently address and respectfully explicate the many varieties of art having an 
element of the transcendent experience.   
Gefühl 
To return to Otto, in addition to the phenomenological complexities of 
intentionality, another means for navigating the varieties of the transcendent 
experience, one already touched on when Roy said “emotion enhances a person’s 
response to reality” (xii) is signaled in Louis Roy’s Transcendent Experiences: 
Phenomenology and Critique in a chapter titled “Rudolf Otto and the Numinous.” 
Roy discusses Otto’s comments about feeling, and how the German expression 
Gefühl, although it can be translated as feeling or emotion, does not have the same 
meaning as the English word “emotional.”113 Otto notes that “Gefühl” is in some 
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ways more intensely magnified and penetrating than ordinary emotional expressions 
and can point to “a form of cognizance in an unconceptual or preconceptual way” 
(Roy Transcendent 106-107). Roy suggests that “Otto is involved in a forceful 
rehabilitation of feeling, in opposition to the rationalism of those who exalt 
conceptual thinking over against emotion” (107). Roy also suggests that for Otto 
Gefühl is a powerful emotional expression that is connected to a sensibility to the 
numinous.114 
Gefühl and the Numinous in the Artistic Process 
 This study proposes to use Gefühl as an expression of a heightened version of 
emotion in the special sense suggested by Otto, one that can be understood as a 
nonconceptual or preconceptual means of cognizance, a form of intensified emotional 
awareness or perception that occurs prior to conceptual thought, even though it is 
likely to spark conceptual thought. In that context, Gefühl can be understood as a 
significant component in the creative processes of artists examined, so that within the 
thematic territory of this study, Gefühl serves as a kind of initiating fuel to drive the 
aesthetic consolidation of a sensibility to, or awareness of, the numinous with actual 
art-making and art-viewing activities, which ultimately blend and become a blur, so 
to speak, of a single dynamic.  
Another way of describing this phenomenon is simply to say that all the artists 
considered in this study show some form of seeking the numinous through their art 
and their art commentaries; they were seeking as artists to communicate that seeking 
and understanding through their work. How did they do that?  
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If what one is sensing standing in front of a 12th century painting is the 
numinous, even if the viewer does not label that sensibility as the numinous, it is clear 
that ultimately descriptive words are secondary in that the art speaks in its own 
fullness with great visual articulation, whether it is a cave drawing of a bison or bear, 
a Chinese landscape, or a Rothko color field painting.  
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Chapter Four— Seeking the Numinous in Modern Art 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish evidence—before explicating the 
work of Varo and Borges in more detail—attesting to the fact that many other 
modernist and contemporary artists have created work that reflects an aesthetic 
impulse rooted in a sensibility to the numinous. In other words, the purpose of this 
chapter and the next one is to lay the art historical and philosophy of art foundation 
for subsequently explicating, in the final chapter, the art of Varo and Borges. 
 Having already established in the foregoing chapter what the numinous is, the 
point now is to present instances in modern art-making that reflect artistic sensibility 
to the numinous. Far from being a complete survey or exhaustive investigation of the 
numinous in art, this chapter simply asserts that Varo and Borges were not the only 
artists working within this thematic territory. Processes examined at the end of this 
chapter, and subsequently in Chapter Six, investigates how and why Varo and 
Borges’s respective oeuvres pivot around their respective sensibilities to the 
numinous. In addition, it should be emphasized that, that with a few exceptions, 
visual art, and specifically the work of painters, is a primary focus; there simply is not 
space enough here to include relevant auxiliary topics such as photographic art and 
the broad stream of literature. Since Varo was a painter and Borges a poet, mostly 
paintings by other painters and a few poems by other poets will be referenced. The 
central intention is to show that modernist artistic interest in and sensibility to the 
numinous is well-known, albeit in a variety of verbal descriptions by critics and 
artists themselves, even if sometimes dismissed as being irrelevant to whatever work 
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has been created.  Nonetheless, during the modernist era seeking what is described in 
this study as the numinous was a prevalent theme, and to some extent this theme did 
continue to a much less degree into what is generally considered to be the 
postmodernist era and beyond.  
Another point to clarify is that while it may be true that a given artist is 
working via a sensibility to the numinous to create a work of art that is in some sense 
greater than the artist, or overpowering to the artist who is making the art, that kind of 
artistic practice may or may not be consciously what might be described as 
worshipping a presence. Certainly in some sacred or explicitly spiritualized contexts 
artistic practice serves a devotional purpose that is self-transcending in nature, but 
this is not necessarily what is consciously occurring when someone “allows” a 
sensibility to the numinous to fuel the art-making process. Nor is a viewer who is 
“allowing” a sensibility to the numinous in a participatory viewing process 
necessarily involved in a devotionally or consciously spiritual action.115 This seems 
obvious, and in the context here the sensibility to the numinous can be used in 
multifarious ways that may or may not be explicitly religious as Otto describes the 
numinous. Nor is this assertion unique. Artist and scholar Jungu Yoon describes in 
his Spirituality in Contemporary Art: The Idea of the Numinous his merging of three 
orientations to numinous, those of Rudolf Otto, C.J. Jung, and Mircea Eliade: 
My own understanding of the numinous draws on all three definitions. 
Like Jung, I conceive the numinous to be an experience of an 
archetype. In contrast to Otto, however, I argue that this experience is 
not limited to the context of organized religious traditions. One 
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example of this can be seen in the East Asian idea of the numinous in 
Taoist philosophy, which is not dependent on the existence of a deity. 
However, it is unhelpful to conceive of Taoism and the numinous as 
interchangeable concepts, since Taoism makes no distinction between 
its understanding of the numinous and its understanding of natural 
mysticism. Therefore this interpretation is too all-encompassing and 
requires refining. Natural mysticism can be said to include the concept 
of the numinous, but at the same time it is more extensive and 
inclusive than the concept of the numinous itself (28-29). 
Continuing with the line of thought, and regarding the present orientation to 
the numinous and any artistic sensibility to the numinous, a definite difference is 
apparent, for example, between a Tibetan Buddhist mandala painting created by an 
anonymous Buddhist monk, and an abstract painting created by a modernist painter, 
or an installation by a contemporary artist, even though a strong impulse so seeking 
the numinous may be evident in all three.  
The Mandala of Vajradhatu (fig. 12), was created by a 19th century Tibetan 
monk who lived and practiced both esoteric spirituality and artistic expression of that 
esoteric spirituality within the parameters of a monastic community somewhat set 
apart from larger society. An important aspect of Tibetan Buddhism teachings is the 
transcendence of separative self-identification, a spiritual erasing of the artist’s 
personal identification, not as self-suppression, but as a gesture of self-expansion that 




Fig. 12. Mandala of Vajradhatu. Anonymous Tibetan artist. 
Tibetan Buddhist thangka painting. 19th century. 
Public domain image. Web accessed, September 26, 2013. 
 
A peripheral question to ask is whether anonymity is a key to the distinction 
between traditional esoterically oriented spirituality and the modernist sensibility to 
the numinous.  This seems unlikely, given that artistic sensibility responds to the 
same ineffable mystery regardless of era and other circumstances. Can modern art 
reflect the same feeling sometimes assigned to what is called sacred art? This does 
seem possible.  
Then there is the question of whether sacred art has influenced modernist art. 
While numerous connections to an aesthetic rooted in a sensibility to the numinous 
over the course of history are evident, one obvious artistic propinquity surfacing from 
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that alignment would be that of the modern artist influenced by an earlier sacred 
culture. Strong influences on artist Charmion Von Wiegand (1898-1983), for 
example, included her personal friendship with the Dutch modernist Piet Mondrian 
that yielded her 1940’s Neo-Plasticism geometric abstractions, and her later intense 
interest in and practice of Tibetan Buddhism. Her Invocation to Adi Buddha (fig. 13) 
does express the structural radiance of a Tibetan mandala, while also showing the 



















Fig. 13. Charmion Von Wiegand. Invocation to Adi Buddha. 1968-70. 
Oil on canvas, 50x27 inches. Michael Rosenfeld Gallery, New York. 
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One point that arises from this kind of juxtaposition is the universality of 
geometric elements in human culture, which element might even be described—if one 
reflects on the evolution of  Paul Cézanne’s painting, for example—as being inherent 
in the natural world. Even though the modernist abstract geometric influence is 
perhaps more compositionally more evident in Von Wiegand’s painting (except for 
the Tibetan lettering at bottom), the 19th century Mandala of Vajradhatu (fig. 12) 
composition, while having numerous representational elements, remains like most 
Tibetan mandalas within a compositional geometric infrastructure of squares, circles, 
pyramids, or various straight divisional lines. At the same time, the geometric 
elements of both works, while visually prominent, are not the central feeling being 
expressed. The expressed feeling is a sensibility to the numinous, which while 
presented differently are nonetheless, to this viewer, analogous in sensibility.  
To bring this into a more contemporary setting, it can be argued that Tibetan 
Buddhism scholar Robert A. F. Thurman’s  “feeling of mystic oneness apart from 
ordinary reality” (quoted on page 149 by Bass) is also evident in contemporary artist 
Teresita Fernández’s Fire (fig. 14), albeit in a 3-dimensional rendering that is less 
like a mandala but nonetheless conveys a circular, contemplative, meditative quality 
that echoes Tibetan painting. The meditative quality merges with a dynamic quality 
of action in Fernández’s piece, and that amalgamation of the dynamic and 
contemplative is likewise a motif of Tibetan Buddhist mandalas. Both convey a 
sensibility to the numinous, even if that is not the exact wording that would ordinarily 
be used in a discussion of these two works.  
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Ultimately, this issue of discussing a sensibility to and seeking of the 
numinous is a matter of semantics—a botanist who is discussing some finer points of 
plant life may not use words like “vegetation” or “plant” at all in a discussion of 
photosynthesis, but that scientist is discussing a phenomenon universal to all plant 
life, even if more obvious in the specific type of tree or other vegetation that he or she 
is referencing and discussing. 
 
Fig. 14. Teresita Fernández. Fire, 2005. Silk yam, steel armature, and epoxy. 
96 in x 144 in. Collection SFMOMA. 
(In the 2013 exhibition Beyond Belief: 100 Years of the Spiritual in Modern Art.  
A collaboration between the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art  
and the Contemporary Jewish Museum SF.) 
 
Modernist Abstraction and the Numinous 
Abstract art in general, and especially modernist abstract art, has been a genre 
closely associated with a seeking and revelation of the numinous. Kandinsky, Rothko, 
Mondrian, Malevich and many other abstract modernist artists openly discussed art as 
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a means of spiritually related expression. They discussed this in different ways, but 
what is proposed here is that they were attempting to discuss a common sensibility to 
the numinous. 
In considering similarities between the Rothko color field painting (fig. 15) 
and the Chinese landscape (fig. 11, p.128), there is similar phenomenon of the 
miniscule within immensity. The tiny human figures at the bottom of the Chinese 
landscape and the intersecting multilinear-to-single-point in the center of the Rothko 
occur in midst of a domain of vastness (rather than vast domain), an overwhelming 
vastness.  A disruption of perceptual scale and focus captures attention and allows a 
sense of being overwhelmed in consciousness. The heightened color in the Rothko 
with its chromatic afterimage effect that induces each colored segment to change the 
perceptual reality of adjacent segments occurs as a dynamic penetration, a motion in  
 
Fig. 15. Mark Rothko. No.5/No.22. 1949-1950. 
Oil on canvas. 297 x 272 cm. Museum of Modern Art, New York. 
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the midst of  stillness, which to this viewer reflects a sensibility to the numinous. Just 
so, the Chinese peasants returning from work allows a similar dynamic rooted in that 
sensibility. That there is a sense of “prior” or precursory infinite unity, an inherent 
quality of the numinous, surfaces in both works. This is more than compositional 
mechanics, although the dynamic itself can appear in a great variety of ways. As 
Rothko, for example, famously said, "If you are only moved by color relationships, 
then you miss the point. I'm interested in expressing the big emotions—tragedy, 
ecstasy, doom" (Baal-Teshuva 50). 
As artists working in some form of abstract imagery, the modernist artists 
were especially focused on understanding and communicating the implications of 
invisible reality.  If we consider the pioneers of abstraction in the early twentieth 
century, many artists were aware of a sensibility to the numinous, albeit in a different 
context for each individual that evolved as a given artist’s work evolved into 
abstraction.  
Transcendental Phenomenological Influences on Abstract Art 
Husserl’s work as a primary means for investigating art and the numinous has 
already overflowed at times to working artists themselves. Alexandra Munroe, the 
Senior Curator of Asian Art at the Guggenheim and the curator of the exhibition The 
Third Mind: American Artists Contemplate Asia, 1860-1989, discusses in that 
exhibition’s catalog the influence of phenomenology on Minimalist abstraction, and 
especially artistic interest in Husserl’s epochē. Munroe goes on to describe how west 
coast artists of that time such as Robert Irwin used Husserl’s epochē in another way, 
namely to “go back to the beginning and rethink …, [which] looks like the realm that 
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has always been the Orient, the East” (297).117  
In other words, artists such as Irwin used Husserl’s “questioning back” 
(Rückfragen) to locate the “primary foundation” (Urstiftung) (Moran and Cohen 70) 
in their creative processes, whether they used those phrases and concepts consciously 
or not. Phenomenological influences on artists stretch beyond using the Husserlian 
epochē, “back to the things themselves,” and “questioning back.” Discussing the 
influences of Asian art and aesthetics on sculptor Robert Morris and other American 
artists, Munroe also noted the parallels between phenomenology and Buddhism: 
Unsurprisingly, the theories of Husserl and his disciples Martin 
Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose writings on 
phenomenology were so influential among Morris and the Minimalist 
critics, have been analyzed in light of their parallels to and 
appropriations from the Madhyamaka and Yogacara traditions of 
Buddhism. These Western and Buddhist systems ground the ego-
experienced spatio-temporal realm in a primordial consciousness and 
dismiss discursive consciousness (as ordinary or delusionary) in favor 
of a radical empiricism (297). 
Again, one must remember that Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger were deeply 
influenced by Husserl, even if that influence has been only lightly acknowledged by 
some scholars. Even Heidegger and Derrida, both of whom veered away from 
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to establish their own phenomenologically 
rooted theories, acknowledged their intellectual debt to Husserl.  
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To continue with the topic at hand, if any outer artistic impulse is bracketed 
via Husserlian epochē, the artist can be observed allowing and receiving the mystery 
of the unrecognizable object, or the mystery of a reshaped irreal object. The artist 
receives the outer influence not just as recognition of natural beauty, but in Husserlian 
terms as givenness—an object is “given” to perceptual consciousness—(Lyotard 44) 
of the object itself. This orientation ultimately allows the artist to receive the 
givenness of the art object he or she has created, or even has visualized creating. The 
same process could be described as being a dynamic of givenness active in the 
participatory viewer who can see a modernist painting without instantly assigning 
conceptual or preconceptual attributes to a work of art. 
Invisibility and the Numinous 
While the significance of invisibility and the numinous in relation to 
individual artists is relevant, it is useful here to note that a sensibility to the numinous 
also surfaces through an interest in “the notion of a dimension behind the visible 
reality” (Müller-Westerman “Painting for the Future” 45). Often this interest 
coincided with an interest in scientific phenomena, especially microscopic cellular 
phenomena, but also the interest in invisibility led to or coincided with an interest in 
the occult. An interest in microscopic cellular phenomena can be found in the creative 
thinking and art-making of both Kandinsky and Duchamp, for example, two 
prominent but distinctly different artists—the former being the quintessential 
modernist, the latter being probably the best-known pioneer of postmodernism. Both 
expressed a passionate interest in the invisible world. 
For now it is useful to acknowledge how the seminal role of intentionality, 
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when applied to art, can ultimately serve the aesthetic investigation not only of the 
art-making of Varo and Borges, but abstract modernist art as well—everything from 
Mondrian’s Neo-Plasticism and Kandinsky’s nonobjective abstraction to Hilma af 
Klint’s spiritualistically sourced paintings and the healer-pendulator Emma Kunz’s 
mandala-like geometric abstractions. These last two figures are more conceptual in 
their orientations than a casual observer might presuppose, given the occult contexts 
each of them functioned within and that to some degree prevented them and their 
work from being recognized by the broader mainstream art world during their 
lifetimes.118 
That early abstract artists like Kandinsky, Mondrian, Malevich, and Kupka 
were also interested in various degrees of occultism, especially through theosophy, is 
well documented.119 To reiterate a point, while this is not a study of occultism or 
spiritualism in art, but a philosophico-phenomenological investigation of the 
implications of wonder and the numinous in image consciousness, it is nonetheless 
useful and necessary to acknowledge the ways individual artists expressed these 
interests through their art-making, even if some of those ways seem eccentric or 
strange to mainstream society. A number of artists wrote or talked about aspects of a 
sensibility to the numinous. “The Futurist painter Umberto Boccioni (1882-1916), 
formulated the conversations of many of his avant-garde contemporaries as follows: 
‘What must be painted is not visible, but that which was previously regarded as 
invisible, namely what the clairvoyant painter sees’ ”( Müller-Westerman “Painting 
for the Future” 45).  
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Fig. 16. Jeanne Nathalie Wintsch. Je suis radio [I am Radio], 1924. 
Embroidery on linen, 42.5 x 103 cm. Sammlung Rheinau, Zurich 
Web accessed, November 20, 2013. 
 
Not only the works of these famous artists attest to this focus. The work of 
lesser-known artists, including many of those sometimes categorized as outsider 
artists, also may reflect a connection between art-making and the numinous. For 
example, this needlework (fig.16) by early-20th-century Swiss artist and psychiatric 
patient Johanna (Johanna) Natalie Wintsch (1871-1944) mixes enigmatic visual 
language with theosophical symbolism, giving expression to inner thoughts within 
private worlds.  
Inner and Outer Versions of Consciousness 
as Components of the Artistic Process 
 
Yet another consideration relevant to a seeking of the numinous is the 
distinction between inner and outer versions of the transcendent experience. The 
shifting focus on inner and outer experience is a recurring theme, one that is evident 
in the creative processes of many artists.  All artists seem to have some degree of both 
inner and outer perceptual and art-making dynamics. Although an artist may feel that 
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he or she has a single and simple aesthetic for making art, one that is straightforward 
and without complexity, another artist may feel overwhelmed by complexity and 
multiple forms of consciousness.120  
 
Fig. 17. Agnes Martin. Untitled, c. 1960. 
Collection Emily Fisher Landau, New York. 
 
 
Hilma af Klint, Emma Kunz, and Agnes Martin all stressed inner 
consciousness in their art:  
The drawings of af Klint, Kunz, and Martin reflect the inner necessity 
of any creative activity as two-dimensional projections of a process 
beyond space and time. The emphasis rests on the fact that it is not the 
product that is the artwork but the working of the mind—the slow time 
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of viewing and thinking as working. Through a combination of 
perception, joy, and vision and a sense of reciprocity, their work has a 
dimension of both inner and outer coherence that sets it apart from the 
familiar conventions of Modernism and its avant-garde (de Zegher 
“Abstract” 37).  
Agnes Martin is the most recognized and perhaps the least oriented to the 
occult of the three artists discussed here, but the point is that she, like Emma Kunz 
and Hilma af Klint,  openly discussed the influences of what is being explicated here 
as the numinous. Her work is meditative and visionary, and she neither hid nor 
proselytized her interest in Zen Buddhism and other spiritual paths.  
 
 
Fig. 18. Hilma af Klint. Altarpiece, No. 1, Group X. 
Altarpieces, 1915.  Stiftelsen Hilma af Klints Verk. 
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Hilma de Klint, whose work has begun to gain some posthumous recognition, 
was, though a very private person, open about her interests in occult issues like 
“channeling.” That a sensibility and expression of the numinous is inherent in her 
paintings is obvious. 
 
Fig. 19. Emma Kunz. Work No. 014. n.d. 
Emma Kunz thought of herself as a healer and researcher. In fact, Kunz, who 
usually did not give her drawings a title or date, “considered her artistic practice to be 
a process of research and discovery” (Teicher 127).  
The end result of the abstract art of Martin, af Klint, and Kunz—each created 
via distinctively personal approaches—is that they each felt a inner sensibility to the 
numinous and attempted to outwardly express that sensibility via art.  
How does that sensibility manifest prior to making art? To some extent, 
although not exclusively, modernist non-objective modernist abstraction developed as 
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a means to reflect an invisible numinous gateway that becomes visible through the 
experience and phenomenon of wonder. Some of the later paintings of Gordon 
Onslow Ford, for example, visually transmit the unfathomable wonder and beauty of 
deep space. Ford was the youngest and last surviving member of the 1930s Paris 
Surrealist group associated with André Breton, and he was also a friend of Remedios 
Varo when she lived in Paris and later in Mexico. Some of the exhibition names of 
Ford’s work invoke his sense of space:  Surrealism: New Worlds, Stellar Orbits, and 
Voyager and Visionary.  
 
Fig. 20. Gordon Onslow Ford, Constellations in Hand, 1961 
Parle's paint and aqua polymer on canvas, 72 1/8 in. x 108 in.  
Collection SFMOMA © Estate of Gordon Onslow Ford. 
 
Ford also expressed an interest in theory and philosophy, and thus 
occasionally spoke or wrote about his lifelong interest in the metaphysical 
significance of the artistic process. Like many modernist artists, Ford also had some 
sense of the value of Asian aesthetics.  
To use a more contemporary example, Robert Percy, who worked as a studio 
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assistant to Ford in California for several years, and who is an accomplished 
contemporary abstract artist in his own right, has long reflected in his work a vividly 
developed sensibility to Asian aesthetics. Percy’s calligraphic uses of brushes, Sumi-e 
ink, casein, and kozo paper reflect a general orientation to his art that is rooted in trips 
to China and Japan, and come together to erase any east-west dichotomy.121  
 
Fig. 21. Robert Percy, Same-in-All, 2004. 
Collection of the Artist, Marin County, California. 
 
The Asian influence on Percy’s work also serves to visually illustrate some 
points surfacing in Schopenhauer’s interest in Hinduism and Buddhism, and in the 
influence of Asian aesthetics on western artists altogether. An aspect of Percy’s 
aesthetic—described by him in vernacular terms as “Whatever happens happens”— 
actually reflects a complex sequence of artmaking techniques that are clearly related 
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to his study of calligraphic art.122  
It is useful to remember that artistic abstraction actually did not originate in 
the twentieth century. This point was made by a contemporary cultural critic in a  
 
 
Fig. 22. Illustrations accompanying G. Roger Denson’s exhibition review, 
 
Huffington Post review of the 2013 Museum of Modern Art exhibition in New 
York, Inventing Abstraction, 1910-1925: 
Shouldn't the most authoritative of our cultural institutions be as 
mindful of the language used in representing the history of 
international art, especially a history in which mitigating the injuries 
historically wrought by political and cultural colonizations still within 
memory are required to facilitate a new global civilization eager for 
crosscultural exchange?  I'm referring to the title of the Museum of 
Modern Art's current exhibition, Inventing Abstraction, 1910-1925. It 
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may seem a benign choice of words to Europeans and Americans who 
have been educated with little orientation to our former roles as 
colonizing nations, but to art audiences from the myriad nations with 
whom we are building the new global agora, the title conveys a 
dishonest attempt to sell the world on a genesis of abstraction that is 
entirely a modern European enterprise. How much more historically 
accurate and relevant the show's title would have been had the curators 
added two small letters--the "Re" of Reinventing Abstraction.  
(“Colonizing Abstraction: MoMA's Inventing Abstraction 
Show Denies Its Ancient Global Origins.” 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/g-roger-denson/colonizing-
abstraction-mo_b_2683159.html 2013. Web April 2014.) 
 
While Inventing Abstraction, 1910-1925, was a significant exhibition,  
especially for any viewer interested in the history of modernism, Denson’s point is 
clearly valid, and remains relevant both for the MoMA exhibition and any study of 
abstract art. In fact, the Eurocentric bias in Western philosophy and art history is one 
reason for choosing and discussing the multicultural work of Schopenhauer in 
Chapter Five. Furthermore, an additional point to be noted is that in the examples 
Denson offered the cultures wherein those earlier examples of abstract art appeared 
did not need to justify or explain either the sacred nature or the aesthetic abstraction 
of those artifacts. One could argue that only a post-industrial, scientific materialist 
society would require the justification of the sacred or an explanation for a sensibility 
to the numinous in much abstract art.  
For Kandinsky, perhaps the most influential and spiritually oriented of 
preeminent modernist abstract artists, inner and outer versions of consciousness 
 173 
remain germane to his creative process. Whether or not there is, philosophically and 
phenomenologically speaking, an actual genuine distinction between “inner and 
outer” is a complex issue that will not be addressed in this study. However, the 
difficulty inherent in explicating the intuitive property of what Kandinsky called inner  
 
Fig. 23. Composition VIII, 1923, oil on canvas, 55x79 
The Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York 
 
necessity, or is called here a version of a sensibility to the numinous, signals why this 
is such a challenging topic, especially given that Kandinsky was far more open about 
his work being a conjunction of spirituality and art than most modern artists, 
including other modernists, but also including postmodernists.  
At this juncture, then, it is useful to consider the work of an artist who is 
usually considered by many to be the original postmodernist in spite of his modernist 
beginnings and his longtime friendships with modernist artists such as Francis Picabia 
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and many others. 
Search and Stoppage: Marcel Duchamp as Bridge 
Marcel Duchamp remains special for several reasons, not the least of which is 
how postmodernist aesthetics and art history adopted Duchamp’s work as the marker 
that initiated postmodernism. Duchamp’s Fountain (fig. 24), for example, is 
sometimes considered to be the seminal work of postmodernist art, and there are 
reasons for that:  
Were the readymades art because Duchamp declared them to be, or 
were they “based on a reaction of visual indifference, a total absence 
of good or bad taste, a complete anesthesia,” as he argued much later, 
and so a challenge to such authority? Never shown in it initial guise, 
Fountain was suspended in time, its questions deferred to later 
moments. In this way it became one of the most influential objects in 
twentieth-century art well after the fact (Foster, el al 129). 
 
Fig. 24. Marcel Duchamp, Fountain, 1917 (1964 replica) 
Readymade: porcelain, 36 x 48 x 61. 
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Thus Duchamp is discussed here at some length, partly to make the point that 
an artistic seeking of the numinous is not an isolated incident relevant only to a few 
modernist artists, and partly to emphasize (albeit in what is not the usual thematic 
orientation for such a proposal) that the impulse of seeking the numinous is a theme 
that actually does bridge the divide between modernism and postmodernism, even if, 
in the latter, via a more disguised and convoluted style.  
Duchamp also referenced and discussed at length here to emphasize that this 
study is not simply about modernism and the numinous, nor about abstraction and the 
numinous. The sensibility to the numinous extends far beyond art history and art 
theory categories. An aspect of this study is that a sensibility to the numinous is 
ultimately a universal phenomenon. Thus one could naturally ask why a universal 
sensibility should be restricted to a modernist trope, or why postmodernist and 
contemporary art should represent exclusions from the present theme, even if 
emphasized less than in the earlier so-called modernist era?  
 Two figures who were friends with modernist artists as well as friends with 
each other, and who are both sometimes considered to be both modernist and 
postmodernist artists, are Marcel Duchamp and John Cage. Cage’s work, which is 
primarily influential in music, performance art, and fluxus will not be considered here, 
even though to some degree the work of both of these artists straddles modernism and 
postmodernism and simultaneously expresses a strong interest in the numinous, even 
if that interest is seldom acknowledged in the world of art scholarship. This lack of 
acknowledgment is especially true of scholarship about Duchamp.123 
At first glance, it would seem that Duchamp is not very interested in topics 
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like the numinous and wonder. That is, however, a presumption. The fact is, 
Duchamp did at times express a passionate interest in a merging of spirituality and 
art—in spite of his iconoclastic orientation to art and the art world: 
Religion has lost much of its territory and it is no longer a source of 
spiritual values. [It is up to the artist] to conserve the great spiritual 
tradition with which even religion, it would seem has lost 
contact...[and] keep the flame of inner vision, which the work of art is 
perhaps the most faithful interpreter for profane man (Chalupecky 
136). 
 
Fig. 25. Marcel Duchamp. Network of Stoppages. Paris 1914. 
Oil and pencil on canvas, 58 5/8" x 6' 5 5/8" (148.9 x 197.7 cm). 
Museum of Modern Art, New York. 
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Duchamp’s aesthetic orientation is not easy to summarize. One might say that 
a map is required, and in fact, one of Duchamp’s works, Network of Stoppages (Fig. 
25) is a map of sorts. When viewing Network of Stoppages what registers first for this 
viewer is a quality of meaningful beauty, a kind of cartographic beauty that, like most 
maps, can be translated into a topographical territory of exploration. One visual 
expression, then, is that of a neurological map of circuitry or synaptic networking 
within the brain’s cortex, which in visual art is related to the perceptual mechanics of 
seeing, or related to neurobiology and neuroaesthetics, and ultimately can be 
understood as the physical neurological side of aesthetics. Viewing Network of 
Stoppages as a map of search and stoppage, as well as invisibility and alterity, is akin 
to exploring the geography of unknown territories via a multiplicity of routes, 
junctions, starts and stoppages. All but one of the lines in Network go “off the map” 
and into the black, but all lines have barrier-like marks and definite stops. 
One means to describe Duchamp’s art-making orientation as a kind of search 
and stoppage phenomenon is to consider the titles of several of Duchamp’s works. 
Besides combining Network of Stoppages and the precursory and historically 
significant 3 Standard Stoppages (figs. 23-24), the term “search and stoppage” also 
describes Duchamp’s style of working in which he would combine actual artworks, as 
is essentially the case with Network of Stoppages.  
To what extent was Duchamp conscious of his work as even being a search, 
and how did he perceive it? As seen in the quotations, usually from interviews, there 
were times when Duchamp openly connected the numinous and art, yet given his 
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somewhat indecipherable character, as well the way his oblique and ironic approach 
to investigation merged with an admirable contempt for labels or categorization, 
Duchamp’s seeking of the numinous remains largely indefinable by conventional 
language. Is it even about art as commonly defined? Duchamp’s work has been 
described as “Art as Anti-Art” (Mink 3). 
When considering the areas of investigation and exploration that influenced 
Duchamp’s search, it is clear that to describe his search as “spiritual” would be 
inaccurate, given that word’s religious connotations. The numinous, with its 
characteristic invisibility and it inherent universal quality is—given Duchamp’s 
intense interest in invisibility and his impulse to break loose from the confines of the 
art world and “retinal painting”—a more accurate indicator of his search.   
Also relevant is that Duchamp was an artist-philosopher, although his was a 
more metaphysical orientation to search—“metaphysical” in the most general sense 
of a “philosophical investigation of the nature, constitution, and structure of reality” 
(Audi 153). Metaphysical is in fact the descriptive term Duchamp least resisted, 
though he questioned the validity of even that word.  Asked by William Seitz which 
adjective he would use to describe his work, Duchamp replied:  
Metaphysical if any. And even that is a dubious term. Anything is 
dubious. It’s pushing the idea of doubt in Descartes.... to a much 
further point than they ever did in the school of Cartesian: doubt in 
myself, doubt in everything...in the end it comes to doubt the verb “to 
be” (Ades, Cox, Hopkins, Marcel Duchamp, 61). 
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It should be noted that because Duchamp did not define his own search as 
spiritual does not mean that he considered irrelevant or false the emphatically stated 
interests in the confluence and conjunction of spirituality from Kandinsky and other 
artists. In 1912 in Munich, for example, Duchamp purchased Kandinsky’s 
Concerning the Spiritual in Art and subsequently translated it from German into 
French for his brothers (Howard 166).  This is not irrelevant. The catalog to the 1986 
Los Angeles County Museum of Art exhibition, The Spiritual in Art: Abstract 
Painting 1890-1985, notes the inclusion of this book:  “Duchamp’s copy of 
Kandinsky’s book, with his own extensive translations, is presented” (Tuchman 47).  
Although one scholar noted that “no artist could be more diametrically 
opposed to Kandinsky than Duchamp” (De Duve 159), another points out that 
Duchamp, in a letter to Jean Crotti in 1920, “proposed a scheme to transform the 
chessboard into a shifting field of symbolic color strikingly reminiscent of 
Kandinsky’s theory of color essence in Concerning the Spiritual in Art” (Joselit  159).  
The fact is, Duchamp was friends with Kandinsky and respected him, even visiting 
the Kandinskys in Paris not long before Kandinsky’s death.  
Part of the issue here is that Duchamp, unlike Kandinsky and others, seldom 
disclosed the details of his inner aesthetic experiences except through his art. For 
example, while Duchamp’s artist sister Suzanne and her husband Jean Crotti “openly 
examined occult notions in their paintings” even though “in Duchamp’s work such 
ideas were characteristically hidden” (Tuchman 46-47), this was a difference in 
communication that reflects Marcel’s relatively undisclosed approach to everything. 
His own interests in the influences of occultism and spirituality on the art of that time 
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may have been largely concealed, but this was an open topic for his family and 
friends.  
Since Duchamp said and wrote very little about anything in a straightforward 
and explicit manner, what is most accurate, though admittedly weak in its generality, 
is to simply acknowledge Duchamp’s search (without adjectival labels) as his attempt 
to understand what cannot be seen with ordinary vision, which includes not only 
invisible force or structure, but also forms of alterity and chance. Interviews with 
Duchamp over the years have provided some of the documented resources that are 
most relevant to understanding his search. Also relevant are interviews in some cases 
referencing earlier comments in previous interviews, as in the following 1967 
exchange with curator and author Lanier Graham. In it, Graham refers to a 
conversation the artist had with American critic J.J. Sweeney a decade earlier. This 
excerpt also reflects Duchamp’s orientation to philosophical interpretation, including 
his opposition to defining art with words: 
Graham: It seems that almost from the beginning of your work as an 
artist, you have had a philosophical attitude toward what being an 
artist is. In one of your interviews with Sweeney, for example... you 
describe Dada as a “metaphysical attitude.” What you have talked 
about and written is permeated with the thought-feelings of a 
philosopher. At the end of your 1956 interview with Sweeney, you 
spoke of art as a path "toward regions which are not ruled by time and 
space." 
Duchamp: Was that the one filmed in Philadelphia? 
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Graham: It was.  
Duchamp: Yes. Perhaps that is about as much as you can say in a film 
being made for wide consumption. If one says too much more, the 
result is simply a great deal of misunderstanding. Understanding can 
emerge from a co-experience, a non-verbal experience which the artist 
and the onlooker can share by means of aesthetic experience. So I 
leave the interpretation of my work to others. 
Graham: Nevertheless, I think it would be correct to say that you 
regard the practice of art as a philosophical path toward that which is 
beyond time and space. 
Duchamp: That is correct. This is my view, but only part of my view. 
My view is beyond and back. Some get lost “out there.” My frame of 
reference is out of the frame and back again. 
Graham: That sounds like the dance of the finite and infinite, stepping 
back and forth between three dimensions and four dimensions, as 
Apollinaire or Mallarme would say. 
Duchamp: So it does. No one says it better than Mallarme! 
Graham: May we call your perspective Alchemical?  
Duchamp: We may. It is an Alchemical understanding. But don’t stop 
there! If we do, some will think I’ll be trying to turn lead into gold 
back in the kitchen [laughing]. Alchemy is a kind of philosophy, a 
kind of thinking that leads to a way of understanding. We may also 
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call this perspective Tantric (as Brancusi would say), or (as you like to 
say) Perennial (Graham 41-43).124  
Irony is one of the keys to understanding Duchamp. In regards to “stoppage,” 
for example, it has been pointed out that Duchamp intended 3 Standard Stoppages, 
made in 1913-1914, as a play upon the rigidity of officially imposed standards of 
measure:  
As much is suggested in its French title 3 Stoppages Etalon, [it is] 
supposed to play on the word ‘stoppages’ meaning to mend invisibly 
(a shop sign in Paris carrying the word had inspired Duchamp), so that 
it can be said he is imposed upon us legally and scientifically” 
(Parkinson 114-115).125  
There is another meaning to the English word stoppage, one more literal in 
that it also expresses the evolutionary development of  Duchamp’s work: 
An evolutionary sequence is really a network of catastrophes: 
development occurs through an irregularity that escapes a general 
peril. Evolution moves by collisions, weaknesses, failures, accidents; it 
only looks tidy and teleological after the fact, and to the outsider. 
Similarly, Duchamp’s career has its stalls, lurches, and burnouts, with 
development evidencing itself only after mutations and adjustments 
have occurred (Masbeck 1).  
Duchamp’s abandonment of what he called “retinal painting” in 1912 
represents a form of stoppage, perhaps his most dramatic one. Later he would also 
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“retire” from being an artist, though as stated here, abandonment might be a more apt 
description: 
This process of “retirement” was already well under way by the end of 
1912 because, amazingly, at the moment of his greatest triumphs as a 
painter, Duchamp decided to abandon painting...apparently bored with 
the process of painting, had now given up the idea of a career of as a 
painter, enrolling in a librarian’s course at the Ecle des Chartes in late 
1912 instead (Parkinson 27).  
Over time Duchamp’s interests in investigating forms of invisibility merged 
with his stated emphasis on restoring the mind’s preeminent role to art making as a 
source of ideas and conceptual thought, a role he felt had been lost in “retinal 
painting.” Two specific factors that remained stable despite Duchamp’s capricious 
nature— his interest in invisibility and his innate attraction to alterity—steadily 
informed and fueled his impulse to understand reality. Duchamp’s interest in 
invisibility along with multifarious kinds of alterity fueled the combination of search 
and stoppage, the latter being yet another multiple or layered factor in Duchamp’s 
existence, and thus in his work:  
Marcel Duchamp’s art operates on more than one level of 
meaning and in more than one dimension of form. Disliking 
the exoteric, Duchamp’s esoteric mind created images which 
would open upon hidden perspectives beyond the merely 
visible (Masbeck 72-79).  
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Professor Linda Dalrymple Henderson’s scholarship in both her The Fourth 
Dimension and Non-Euclidian Art in Modern Art,  and in her Duchamp in Context: 
Science and Technology in the Large Glass and Related Works, can be described as  
two original and penetrating examinations of Duchamp’s fascination with invisibility 
and his search for underlying reality, or reality as it might exist through and beyond 
the senses, and especially that version of reality that may manifest as a force, 
presence, or idea beyond the readily apparent physical and materialistic version of 
reality. In other words, Duchamp’s intense interest in invisibility and his search for 
underlying reality substantiates the assessment here of his seeking the numinous. 
 
 
Fig. 26. Marcel Duchamp, Portrait of Dr. R. Dumouchel, 1910. 
Oil on canvas. 100 x 65 cm.  Philadelphia Museum of Art 
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Duchamp’s interests and investigations of occultism, alchemy, 
electromagnetism, radioactivity, x-rays, and various other natural and technological 
phenomena are linked to visual perception and art.  The first artistic evidence of 
Duchamp’s interest in “invisibility” is in his 1910 Portrait of Dr. Dumouchel (fig. 
26), with the aura around the hands of the figure as an expression of magnetism, 
popular at that time. Duchamp’s use of an aura in that painting, signals an interest in 
the numinous:  
A curious coloured emanation surrounds the figure’s hand and head 
are haloed in a deeper pink, which indicate the subject’s possession of 
special powers. The probable source is the idea of the aura as 
promoted in Theosophical writings such as Annie Besant and Charles 
Leadbeater’s [1896] Thought Forms (Ades, Marcel Duchamp, 26).  
Another influence often suggested was Duchamp’s mentor during that time, 
Czech painter, Theosophist, and spiritualist medium Frantisek Kupka, who was an 
early artistic explorer of X-ray imagery (Henderson, Duchamp 3-4).  Along with 
those influences should be added the wide-ranging conversations the Duchamp 
brothers participated in with the Paris “Salon Cubists”, who debated topics such as 
simultaneity and the fourth dimension (Ades, Marcel Duchamp, 36).  
Duchamp’s study of non-Euclidean geometry and the fourth dimension 
exceeded even the consideration of these elements in Cubist theory. Speaking in 
general, the investigation among pre-WWI artists of X-rays as evidence of perceptual 
relativity, however, served as a precursor to exploring “higher spatial realms” 
(Henderson, Duchamp 4) and also provided a neutral topical territory where in 
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science and occultism could co-exist and exchange influence, experimental evidence, 
and possibility. His deep interest in chance also points to a version of seeking the 
numinous: “Another notorious Duchampian pursuit, never before considered from an 
exclusively esoteric perspective, is that of Chance, le Hasard” (Moffitt 304).  Moffitt 
goes on to describe Duchamp’s reading of Pierre Camille Revel’s book on the laws of 
chance:   
Revel’s work was “esoteric” in that he also studied and wrote about 
the transmigrations of spirits or metempsychosis. This is especially 
important to mention since Revele’s two-part book, as published in 
1905, presently remains the single documented, published source for 
Duchamp’s notorious preoccupation with le Hasard, or Chance (304-
305).  
 Describing Revel’s books as “the single documented, published source”  may 
make literal sense, but experience is a major factor for Duchamp as well, as becomes 
evident when one reads some of Duchamp’s comments about the role of “chance” in 
several published interviews, including in an interview with Katherine Kuh. In 
response to Kuh’s question, “Has the accidental played a  role in your work?” 
Duchamp said:  
My first accidental experience (what we commonly call chance) 
happened with the Three Stoppages, and as I said before, was a great 
experience. The idea of letting a piece of thread fall on a canvas was 
accidental, but from this accident came a carefully planned work. Most 
important was the accepting and recognition of this accidental 
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stimulation. Many of my highly organized works were initially 
suggested by just such chance encounters (Kuh 92).   
How does Duchamp’s Network of Stoppages, now in the Museum of Modern 
Art in New York, visually register elements inherent in Duchamp’s art-making that 
are relevant to his quest to understand reality? As already emphasized, Duchamp’s 
native impulse toward search and stoppage are visually expressed in the 
cartographically styled graphic dynamics in Network of Stoppages, while his 
fascination with invisibility and alterity become apparent in that work, regardless of a 
variety of possible thematic interpretations of that work. Search, stoppage, 
invisibility, and alterity are interrelated in a variety of ways in Duchamp’s art. For 
example, when considering how the artist actually made Network of Stoppages and 
how it relates to his work both previously and subsequently, those four key 
elements—search, stoppage, invisibility, alterity—visually surface.  
Although this paper is not an investigation of Duchamp’s interest in alchemy 
as proposed and investigated by some scholars126, one might say that these four 
themes of search, stoppage, invisibility and alterity are like elements in an alchemical 
process. This process does unfold as a stirring of multiple dynamics, or as a swirl of 
amalgamations and disintegrations, all of which repeatedly resurface as artistic means 
and even as specific motifs in Duchamp’s work, as well as reflecting biographical 
details in his life.  
Nonetheless, given the plethora of interpretations and presumptions and 
theories about Duchamp and his art, a single definitive study of him and his work 
remains unlikely, if not impossible. Multiple interpretations of Duchamp and his 
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work arise because, as art historian David Joselit wrote, “There is no single Marcel 
Duchamp but many” (Joselit 3). 
It should be noted here that Joselit’s insightful scholarly study of Duchamp 
begins with an interpretation of Network of Stoppages that considers how that work 
“summarizes his cubist art,” and also notes its positioning between 3 Standard 
Stoppages and The Large Glass (fig. 30). Joselit goes on to suggest that “Network of 
Stoppages is structured as an agonistic and gendered form of semiosis in which a 
feminine body is submitted to a masculine graph” (9-18).127 
There are two splits, or alternate routes that eventually rejoin, and there are 
multiple off shoots, which end in their own unique stops. The lines shapes are 
actually made from the curved meter measure templates created from the way lines of 
the 3 Standard Stoppages. The painting Network of Stoppages uses each of the 
stoppages three times to describe the nine channel-like lines which touch and join 
together into a two-dimensional pattern suggestive of circuitry, but which actually are 
the “capillary tubes” of The Large Glass. The black lines with white shadow or 
seemingly illuminated capillary tubes appear, one might assert, to be aura-like visual 
expressions of search and stoppage. Thus, in addition to the numerous visual 
stoppages, there is a sense of alterity, of chance and of choice in this visual network. 
Invisibility comes into play when one considers how Duchamp made this work, 
which is directly related to his 3 Standard Stoppages.  
As is often the case with Duchamp, irony extends even to sequential 
relationships between individual pieces; if Network of Stoppages is “his only 
thoroughly abstract painting” (Masbeck 16), its source, so to speak, 3 Standard 
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Stoppages, is “a monument in Duchamp’s development of an aesthetic of chance” 
(16). 
 
Fig. 27. Marcel Duchamp. 3 Standard Stoppages. Paris 1913-14.  
Wood box 11 1/8 x 50 7/8 x 9" with three threads 39 3/8", glued to three 
painted canvas strips 5 1/4 x 47 1/4" each mounted on  
a glass panel 7 1/4 x 49 3/8 x 1/4", three wood slats 2 1/2 x 43 x 1/8" (6.2 x 
109.2 x 0.2 cm), shaped along one edge to match the curves of the threads.  
Museum of Modern Art, New York. 
 
Fig. 28. Marcel Duchamp. 3 Standard Stoppages. Paris 1913-14. 
Secondary Images 
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Duchamp considered 3 Standard Stoppages  a breakthrough moment in 1913: 
That was really when I tapped the mainspring of my future. In itself it 
was not an important work of art, but for me it opened the way—the 
way to escape from those traditional methods of expression long 
associated with art. I didn’t realize at the time exactly what I had 
stumbled on. When you tap something, you don’t always recognize the 
sound. That’s apt to come later. For me the Three Stoppages was a 
first gesture liberating me from the past” (Kuh, The Artist’s Voice, 81).   
3 Standard Stoppages, although not a readymade, does vividly demonstrate 
the role of chance in Duchamp’s work, albeit chance that is combined with precision, 
or as he described it in one of his dialogues with Pierre Cabanne, he had “canned 
chance” (47). 
Parkinson also notes that Duchamp intended 3 Standard Stoppages as a play 
upon the rigidity of officially imposed standards of measure and the connotation of 
“mend invisibly” in the word stoppage, “so that it can be said he is (a)mending with 
thread the unit of length imposed upon us legally and scientifically” (114-115). That 
Duchamp used three works, a painting and two drawings, to make Network of 
Stoppages itself attests to his use of alterity:       
Network of Stoppages consists of three superimposed works, whose 
connections with each other may not be purely fortuitous. The earliest 
is an enlarged, unfinished version of Young Man and Girl in Spring 
probably dating from 1911. Its sides were then painted over with black 
bands to produce the dimensions of The Large Glass, in which he 
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drew a half-scale plan, consisted largely of measurements. The 
uppermost layer is the ‘network of stoppage’ itself, almost certain 
undertaken in 1914. Chance, then, in the guise of the 3 Standard 
Stoppages, equipped Duchamp with drawing instrument for The Large 
Glass (Ades, Marcel Duchamp, 81).  
 
Fig. 29. Young Man and Girl in Spring, oil on canvas 1911 
 
While this study is not a study per se of Marcel Duchamp’s work, it should be 
noted that elements in both  3 Standard Stoppages and Network of Stoppages are 
intricately involved in other works by the artist, including his The Bride Stripped 
Bare by Her Bachelors, Even, (The Large Glass)  (fig. 30). That Duchamp merged 
the two drawings for his Large Glass with the 1911 Young Man and Girl in Spring 
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speaks to the relevance of that work as a reflection of what occurred in Duchamp’s 
artistic process both before and after 3 Standard Stoppages. For Network of 
Stoppages Duchamp rotated Young Man and Girl in Spring and incorporated the two  
 
Fig. 30. Marcel Duchamp, The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even 
(The Large Glass), 1915-23 . Oil, varnish, lead foil, lead wire, and dust on two 
glass panels. 9 ‘ 1 1/4 “ x 69 1/4 “.Philadelphia Museum of Art. 
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drawings for The Large Glass. This incorporation reflects a sensibility that is related 
to invisibility as well, since one must look closely at Network of Stoppages (fig. 25, p. 
176) to even see the three works made into one.  
Another point is that Network of Stoppages can be read cartographically not 
only temporally as a record of the “past” 3 Standard Stoppages and the “future” The 
Large Glass, but also as a visual work representative of Duchamp’s modernist cubist 
root that he abandoned and the postmodernist and conceptualist work that would be 
described as “readymades.” In that sense, Duchamp’s Network of Stoppages  is a 
statement of a transition in the history of modern art, which might be described as a 
record or primary example of the transition from modernism to postmodernism. 
Taking this orientation to Duchamp’s work as a dynamic of that modernist-to-
postmodernist transition farther and relevant to the present thematic context, it was 
Duchamp’s search that fueled that dynamic. To say that, for example, The Large 
Glass is an example of conceptual art, or was an idea made into art, is not entirely 
accurate since Duchamp was seeking, among other purposes, to move beyond art:  
Pierre Cabanne: “Several interpretations of The Large Glass have 
been given. What is yours?”  
Marcel Duchamp: I don’t have any, because I made it without an 
idea. There were things that came along as I worked. The idea of the 
ensemble was purely and simply the execution, more than descriptions 
of each part in the manner of the catalogue of “Armed de Saint-
Etienne” [a sort of French “Sears, Roebuck”]. It was a renunciation of 
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all aesthetics, in the ordinary sense of the world...not just another 
manifesto of new painting (Cabanne 42).  
Ultimately even androgyny, another manifestation of his attraction to alterity 
and chance, remained insufficient for Duchamp, primarily because of his intention to 
leave art behind in the wave of his art-making:  
They [androgyny and chance] remained gestures...Duchamp came to 
resemble a religious figure, a visionary, an ecstatic, a shaman. In any 
case, he was well aware of how close the artistic and the religious 
experiences were to each other. At the same time he argued against all 
religious systems, and against the Christian system in particular, and 
this was done in the same spirit in which he attempted to keep his 
activities from being classified as “aesthetic”, that is, classified with 
the established system of art. He was interested in something more 
original. He spoke of himself as an “anartist” and at the same time, of 
the “parareligious” nature of artistic experience. Both expressed his 
conviction that mere immanence, mere dependence on an existence 
enclosed in the given world, was not enough. As far as Duchamp was 
concerned, therefore, art should be more like a religious act than the 
manifestation of a skill. It had to have some relationship to the 
transcendent dimension of existence” (Chalupecky 133). 
Admittedly, that statement is an interpretation of Duchamp, as is this 
Duchampian section of the present study. Nonetheless, including Duchamp is 
necessary and valid in order to interpret Duchamp’s art and art-making as an example 
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not only of straddling the divide between modernism and postmodernism, but also as 
an example of seeking the numinous. Duchamp’s oblique and ironic approach to his 
art does not annul that seeking impulse, although obviously it complicates and 
camouflages it.  
This consideration of Duchamp leads to a consideration especially of Borges’s 
work, since he too was a master of complication and camouflage.  
The Numinous and the Irreal Fabulism of Varo and Borges 
Now that the widespread impulse towards and sensibility to the numinous in 
modernism and postmodernism has been noted, how is this applied to the work of 
Varo and Borges? With these two artists another layer of complexity surfaces. That 
distinction might be distilled down to the word narrative, or in essence, storytelling. 
Varo and Borges are working in irrealism and fabulism. Their art is not ineffable or 
abstract (although one could argue that in some respects their work is ineffable 
because it is irreal).  
There are floods of recognizable elements, albeit presented in a wide variety 
of appearances. While one might argue that irrealism is a form of abstraction, it is not 
abstract in the sense of modernist abstract art that seeks to express the numinous. 
Non-objective abstract art is a visual rendering of the ineffable qualities of abstraction. 
Irrealism is related to surrealistic abstraction, yet that it is not purely surrealistic has 
been discussed in the introduction. However, the irreal fabulism of Varo and Borges 
is very much about the rupture of so-called reality, wonder, that opens onto the 
mutable, dynamic, and seemingly invisible territory of the numinous. Part of the 
argument here is that the fabulist art of Varo and Borges represents a version of 
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seeking and locating the numinous that is more humanly oriented than non-objective 
abstract art. Memory, fantasy, image consciousness, and the dynamic energies of 
subjectivity as described in the previous chapter, all have salient functions in the art 
of Varo and Borges, as will be fully disclosed and elucidated in Chapter 6—Art as 
Life—Varo and Borges as Artist-Philosophers. Until then, the next chapter on 
aesthetic thinkers and intertextuality will provide the general groundwork for the 
conjunction of philosophy and art that becomes evident in the artist-philosopher.  
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Chapter Five—Philosophico: An Intertexual Orientation to Aesthetic Thinkers 
The work of several thinkers remains central to the thematic territory of 
understanding the roles of wonder, the numinous, and image consciousness in Varo 
and Borges’s fabulist art, including the writings of Edmund Husserl, Arthur 
Schopenhauer, Rudolf Otto, all of whom were influenced to some extent by 
Immanuel Kant and Plato. While Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, examined 
in the opening chapter, forms the central methodological means for investigating art 
and art theories, this chapter brings other philosophical concepts to the forefront, 
especially the concepts in Arthur Schopenhauer’s aesthetic philosophy. Two other 
figures whose work serve an elucidation of Borges and Varo are Mikhail Bakhtin and 
Georges Bataille.  
Schopenhauer 
Schopenhauer’s work combines well with other features here.  As mentioned 
earlier, Borges made clear over his lifetime that Schopenhauer was, for Borges 
himself, the consummate philosopher. Other points are that Schopenhauer does 
acknowledge the role of wonder in philosophy and art, and his aesthetic reflects a 
global orientation that can mitigate the limitations of Eurocentric, scientific 
materialist, and Christian-Judaic exclusivity in thought and art. An additional positive 
feature is that Schopenhauer's writing style is for the most part clear and accessible. It 
is interesting to note that as a teenager, he spent some time in a boarding school in 
England, where he learned to fluently speak and write English, which influenced his 
writing style thereafter.128 The challenge in working with Schopenhauer’s writings 
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have less to do with his writing style and more to do with the occasional ambiguous 
and contradictory aspects of some of his concepts. Nonetheless, Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy of art is, thematically speaking, an appertaining and necessary element for 
this dissertation. 
Schopenhauer and Art 
The predominant  point about Schopenhauer is that art is of seminal 
importance in his thought. His emphatically positive assessment of artistic genius, 
and the positive and liberating role he assigns to art in a world dominated by the 
highly negative aftereffects of the will and its selfish, survivalist self-fulfillment have 
greatly influenced musicians, writers, and artists, from Wagner to Beckett (Jacquette 
“Schopenhauer’s Metaphysics” 1).129  In regards to art scholarship, modernist, 
postmodernist and contemporary thinkers and artists have studied Schopenhauer’s 
aesthetic philosophy and found it relevant to understanding the uniquely important 
role of art in the world. While discussing Schopenhauer’s influence on nineteenth and 
twentieth century traditions, for example, Dale Jacquette points to the relevance of 
Schopenhauer for understanding modern and contemporary art and philosophy: 
With its roots firmly embedded in a particular interpretation of Plato, 
Kant, and Asian philosophy, Schopenhauer’s theory sheds light on 
these important intellectual and mystical religious traditions. Through 
its diffusion into the history of post-nineteenth-century art, especially 
idealism, symbolism, romanticism, and certain phrases of naturalism 
and gothic and neoclassical rivals, Schopenhauer’s aesthetics provides 
the philosophical subtext for major artistic moments, as it does for 
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particular psychological and philosophical developments. It is 
consequently no exaggeration to say that Schopenhauer’s aesthetics is 
central to understanding the history of modern and contemporary art 
and philosophy of art (Jacquette, “Schopenhauer’s Metaphysics” 31).  
 Jacquette’s assertion that Schopenhauer’s aesthetic is key to understanding 
modern art and contemporary art, especially for providing, as stated above,  “the 
philosophical subtext for major artistic moments,” signals the purposes of this 
chapter. The primary elements of a Schopenhauerian philosophy of art serve an 
explication of the thematic features of this study—wonder, the numinous, image 
consciousness—while also elucidating the broader implications of conceiving an 
intertexual philosophico-phenomenological orientation. It is important to consider 
how in the present context a Schopenhauerian aesthetic includes both metaphysical 
and phenomenological facets, as well as issues about how the contemplation of art 
and self-forgetting are related to subject and object. Beauty and a Schopenhauerian 
version of the numinous are key components to Schopenhauer’s philosophy of art, 
although that issue may be more frequently described in other studies as beauty and 
sublimity. Nonetheless, and as discussed in Chapter Three, the numinous and the 
sublime are so closely related as to be considered, at times, synonymous, and this 
subtopic needs to be revisited specifically in Schopenhauer’s work.   
A part of Schopenhauer’s intense interest in the arts might be traced to the 
interest in all the arts that his parents passed to him. Besides an emphasis on 
education and reading, his parents took Arthur to art galleries, museums, theaters, and 
other artistic venues all over Europe (Cartwright lii). As an adult, Schopenhauer 
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continued these interests, including playing the flute daily for an hour as a break from 
reading and writing.  
 
Fig. 31. Arthur Schopenhauer  1788-1860 
3 September 1852, Schopenhauer Archiv, 
Stadtund Universitätsbibliothek, Frankfurt am Main 
 
Schopenhauer’s  “Better Consciousness”  
Schopenhauer’s aesthetic philosophy cannot be separated from his general, 
metaphysically oriented philosophy, which includes a passionate interest in 
consciousness:  
Adapting the thought of both Plato and Kant, he had become 
convinced that there was a split between ordinary consciousness and a 
higher or “better” state in which the human mind could pierce beyond 
mere appearances to knowledge of something more real. The thought 
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had aesthetic and religious overtones: Schopenhauer wrote of both the 
artist and the “saint” as possessing this “better consciousness”—
though it should be said straightaway that his philosophical system is 
atheist through and through. He also struck one of the keynotes of 
pessimism, saying that the life of ordinary experience, in which we 
strive and desire and suffer, is something from which to be liberated. 
Such thoughts were well established in Schopenhauer’s mind by 1813 
(Janaway, Schopenhauer, 6).  
Although Schopenhauer did not describe his work “in any of the books that he 
prepared for publication” (Cartwright 125) as being pessimistic,130 the notoriety of his 
pessimism (Cartwright xl), when combined with his well-known anti-religious 
opinions and his rejection of the idea of an absolute (1) might seem to preclude any 
relevance to a study that emphasizes numinous sensibility. However, Schopenhauer’s 
writings about art are relevant to this study for the several reasons mentioned, and not 
simply because his extensive writings about the significance of art have influenced 
artists. Schopenhauer considered philosophy and art to be two means of resolving the 
same issue—existence, as when he wrote, “Not only philosophy but the fine arts too 
are fundamentally working toward solving the problem of existence” The World as 
Will and Presentation II, 459).  
Thus it is necessary to ask, what is Schopenhauer’s general philosophy 
regarding the issue of existence? Beginning with his 1813 University of Jena doctoral 
dissertation, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Ground: A 
Philosophical Treatise (Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden 
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Grunde: Eine philosphische Abhandlung), Schopenhauer examines perceptual versus 
abstract presentations of objects in the world, and how we daily experience the world 
as an object.131 The first three versions of objective presentation are material objects, 
structures of space and time, and abstract concepts. Later, a fourth concept of an 
“inner” relation that is psychological in nature is also examined.  
Schopenhauer’s 1819 magnum opus, The World as Will and Presentation  
(henceforth WWP I)132 is comprised of four large sections called books. In summary, 
Book One argues that the world is presentation; Book Two argues that the world must 
necessarily be viewed as will, which via desire and seeking, is the source of the 
world’s suffering, and to which all individuals, being caught up in the unrelenting 
force of the will, are enslaved; Book Three argues that aesthetic contemplation that 
allows a forgetting and loosening of separative self-identification eliminates willing 
in that individual, thus at least temporarily lifting the person out of suffering and 
enslavement to the will; and Book Four argues that another way of eliminating will in 
the individual is through denial of the will, essentially through an ascetic orientation 
(Janaway, Schopenhauer, 28-29).133  Schopenhauer argues that the daily experience 
of the world is an interactive subject/object dynamic—no object without a subject, 
and vice versa, no subject without an object. It has been noted that “for 
Schopenhauer, subjects and objects are thus of different, though complementary, 
metaphysical kinds” (Wicks 35). Thus it is necessary in this chapter to compare 
Schopenhauerian and Husserlian distinctions in regards to subjectivity, and the 
encountering and engaging of the art object.    
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Vorstellung as “Presentation” in a Philosophico-Phenomenological Orientation 
An initial translation issue must be addressed before discussing 
Schopenhauer’s writings in more detail—namely, why in this study the English word 
“presentation” is used for the German Vorstellung. In the first volume of 
Schopenhauer’s WWP, his opening sentence, Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung, usually 
translated as “The world is my representation” (Schopenhauer, Payne, 3), points to an 
inherent translation challenge (Schopenhauer, Aquila xii). Among the words in that 
first sentence, Vorstellung has been translated into several different English words in 
translations of Schopenhauer’s writing, including representation, idea, and 
presentation, with “representation” being the most widely acknowledged English 
noun for Vorstellung, partly because of the widespread use of the 1958 Payne 
translation (Schopenhauer, Payne).134 “Idea” has also been used for Vorstellung, 
albeit less universally.135   
This study uses the word “presentation” based on the 2008 Aquila and Carus 
translation (Schopenhauer, Aquila) for several reasons, even though translating 
Vorstellung as presentation may seem too literal. As Aquila states, “Etymologically, 
Vorstellung connotes placement in a position (Stellung) before (vor) or as present to 
someone” (xii). “Presentation” (along with “givenness” and “intentionality” and other 
concepts) was a key idea in the first chapter about the methodology fueling Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology. Thus using Vorstellung in the sense of presentation 
rather than as idea or representation is one means of strengthening a necessary bridge 
across any Husserlian-Schopenhauerian divide within the philosophico-
phenomenological orientation to this treatise.  
 204 
The translation of Vorstellung as representation is a Kantian rendering of 
Vorstellung, but this is neither a study of the Kantian aesthetic per se nor is this 
exclusively a Schopenhauerian-Husserlian dynamic. However, understanding 
Vorstellung as presentation allows a rudimentary combining of some common 
concepts pivoting around perception and image consciousness. 
Interwoven Phenomenological and Metaphysical Strands 
A few phenomenologically accentuated strands of both Schopenhauer’s 
general philosophy and his aesthetic philosophy parallel and merge with Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology. Presentation as givenness—something is given in 
consciousness—is a fundamental phenomenological understanding. While Aquila 
does not present Schopenhauerian presentation as a phenomenological concept, his 
description of Schopenhauer’s use of Vorstellung is not radically different from 
Husserl’s use:  
In any event, as suggested, the case for “presentation” goes hand in 
hand with the need to avoid the sense of possession generally attaching 
to possessive pronouns. More positively, the point is to promote what 
we take to be the central intention in Schopenhauer’s use of the term: 
not possession by, but presentation of objects to, a cognizant subject 
(xii-xiii).   
A “presentation of objects to” above could easily be described as being given 
to consciousness, and Aquila’s point about avoiding the sense of possession signals 
how the topic of subjectivity has been philosophically explicated in a variety of ways. 
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Another approach Aquila recommends is to understand Schopenhauer’s use of 
the subject as a kind of witness or spectator, and presentation as a theatrical 
phenomenon:  
With respect to this central sense, it may also be useful to note that the 
term Vorstellung is commonly used to refer to theatrical presentations. 
Several times, Schopenhauer in fact calls the side of the world that he 
calls meine Vorstellung a Schauspiel, or a “show” (or “play”): a show 
that is “mine” in the sense that I am its spectator. But as it turns out, it 
is also mine in another sense. Just as with the corresponding English 
term, Vorstellung can refer either to what is presented or to the 
processor action of presenting it (xiii).136  
On a humorous note, this sounds appropriate enough given Schopenhauer’s 
proclivity for human (and often contrarian) showmanship. While Schopenhauer’s 
aesthetic philosophy contributes to the philosophico side of the study, and Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenological methodology contributes to the phenomenological 
side, there are also inverted and reversed approaches, as when Schopenhauer becomes 
somewhat phenomenological in his writings about vision or the object, or when 
Husserl discusses a philosophy of art topic that is more philosophical or metaphysical 
than it is phenomenological. Husserl, for example, sometimes discusses existential 
factors, and Schopenhauer discusses the significance and ramifications of perceptual 
mechanics and consciousness that do at times sound very similar to what one finds in 
key phenomenologists such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and Heidegger.  
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Schopenhauer actually assigns a more far-reaching meaning and function to 
art than Husserl. In spite of that, an advantage of referencing the writings of both 
Schopenhauer and Husserl is that both thinkers considered the aesthetics of visual art 
within a larger context of perception that includes the seeing of all “things.” 
The Central Role of Intuitive Perception: Anschauung 
In a broader Schopenhauerian and Husserlian thematic territory, topics like 
diversity and unity, the plasticity of visual mechanics, and classical aesthetic topics 
like the essence of beauty and the role of spontaneity can be considered.  In a 
statement that serendipitously summons up Husserl’s epochē, Schopenhauer writes:  
In order to see that a purely objective and therefore accurate 
apprehension of things is only possible when we consider them 
without all personal involvement, thus under complete silencing of the 
will, we might call to mind how much every emotion or passion 
obscures and falsifies cognizance, indeed how every inclination or 
disinclination warps, colors, distorts—no, not merely, e.g., judgment—
even the original perception of things (Schopenhauer, WWP II, 422-
423).137  
 In other words, the natural attitude needs to be bracketed out. Also, in his 
consideration of vision and intuitive perception, Schopenhauer argues for a 
knowledge he calls “pure understanding,” an essential argument worth reviewing in 
detail:  
All intuitive perception [Anschauung] is intellectual. For without 
understanding we could never arrive at intuitive perception, 
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observation, and apprehension of objects; rather, all would remain 
mere sensation, which could have at most a meaning in reference to 
the will as pain or comfort, but otherwise would be succession of 
states devoid of meaning and nothing resembling knowledge. Intuitive 
perception, that is, knowledge of an object, comes about first of all 
because the understanding refers every impression the body receives 
to its cause. It shifts this cause into the a priori intuitively perceived 
space—to the point from which the effect originates—and thus 
recognizes the cause as acting, or actual, that is, as a representation 
[presentation] of the same kind and class as the body. However, this 
transition from the effect to the cause is a direct, vivid, and necessary 
one, because it is knowledge of the pure understanding, not a rational 
conclusion, not a combination of concepts and judgements according 
to logical laws. The latter is instead the business of the faculty of 
reason, which contributes nothing to intuitive perception, and whose 
object is an entirely different class of representations [presentations] 
which on earth belongs solely to the human race—namely the abstract, 
not intuitively perceivable representations [presentations], that is, 
concepts (Schopenhauer, On Vision, 48).  
 Schopenhauer’s commitment to reason is important because he disallows, for 
the most part, any resort to supernatural or magical solutions that circumvent 
applications of conceptual thinking. While supernatural and magical elements in Varo 
and Borges’s work, or at least elements assigned in their work as supernatural or 
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magical descriptions or roles, do occur and must be acknowledged rather than ignored 
or avoided, it is important to permit intellectually accessible handholds, so to speak, 
to those elements to whatever degree that is possible. As noted earlier, any topic 
rooted in belief rather than experience is axiomatically rendered self-enclosed and 
invulnerable to investigation. Belief systems—scientific, religious, or philosophical—
have little if any scholarly value here.  
Generally, Schopenhauer used Anschauung to refer to “our apprehension of 
empirical objects, that is spatio-temporal particulars that stand in causal relations to 
others, like objects” (Cartwright 88). Schopenhauer also argued, contrary to Kant, 
that intuition requires no thinking or discursive thought (Cartwright 88). Nonetheless, 
“All intuitive perception [Anschauung] is intellectual” (Schopenhauer, On Vision, 
48). When Schopenhauer explains that understanding is a precursor to “intuitive 
perception, observation, and apprehension of objects” (48), and that without 
intellectual understanding, there would be only sensation, which, while it could act as 
a reference to “will or pain or comfort” (48), could not lead to meaning or knowledge, 
the reader (whether agreeing or not with Schopenhauer’s arguments and concepts) 
receives a sense of the depth of Schopenhauer’s thought about perception and the 
world.  
What also surfaces is evidence of Schopenhauer’s ambivalence, or at least his 
equivocal assessment of the role of intuition. On the one hand, intuition is a 
nondiscursive experience that underlies the phenomenon of reason creating abstract 
concepts, or as Cartwright states it, “Schopenhauer argued that intuition requires no 
thinking or discursive thought” (Cartwright 88-89), and yet, “all intuition is 
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intellectual” (88). Thus what role, if any, does not knowing or unknowing serve in 
Schopenhauerian philosophy? Is the sudden and initial experience of wonder a 
thinking experience for Schopenhauer? Does he even acknowledge wonder and the 
numinous? For Schopenhauer, the answers lie in part with the influence Plato and 
Kant had on his theories.  
Influences on Schopenhauer’s Aesthetic: Plato and Kant 
Schopenhauer, Husserl, and Otto were all influenced, albeit each in somewhat 
different ways, by Kant and Plato. The influences on Otto’s thought were discussed in 
the chapter on the numinous, but Schopenhauer and Husserl’s respective combining 
of Kantian transcendental idealism and Platonic ideals or essences points to one of 
several contextual elements that contribute to the philosophico-phenomenological 
emphasis of this study. The three major influences on Schopenhauer’s philosophy of 
art—Plato, Kant, and Asian philosophy and spirituality are acknowledged by him and 
by Schopenhauerian scholars. Still, Schopenhauer’s references to and uses of the 
philosophies of Plato and Kant are so interwoven that it is more accurate, at least at 
times, to explicate them as a single (albeit multi-faceted) topic.  
While a student, Schopenhauer’s first philosophy professor, G.E. Schulze at 
the University of Göttingen, recommended that he study Plato and Kant, the two 
philosophers Schopenhauer came to regard as the greatest in the Western 
philosophical tradition (Cartwright 131). In WWP I, translator Aquila added subtitles 
to each section of the book, which are useful signposts pointing to key steps in 
Schopenhauer’s argument throughout the “Third Book” of WWP I. Thus in § 30, the 
translator subtitle “Levels of Objectification of Will as Platonic Ideas” (211) helps to 
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clarify more succinctly Schopenhauer’s own subtitle for his “Third Book: 
Presentation Independent of the Principle of Sufficient Ground: The Platonic Idea: 
The Object of Art.”  
Explicating the Third Book requires a familiarity with the theme of 
Schopenhauer’s dissertation, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient 
Ground: A Philosophical Treatise (Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom 
zureichenden Grunde: Eine philosphische Abhandlung) (WWP I, 11). In the 
introduction to that book,138 Schopenhauer acknowledges some principles from Plato 
and Kant that he is using in his own argument: 
The divine Plato and the marvelous Kant unite their firm and 
impressive voices in recommending a rule for the method of all 
philosophizing, indeed of knowledge in general. We should comply 
with two laws, they say, namely with those of homogeneity and 
specification; they should be equally observed, neither to the detriment 
of the other. The law of homogeneity tells us to start with kinds by 
observing the similarities and agreements in things, and also to unite 
these kinds into species, and these again into genera until we 
ultimately arrive at the highest concept that embraces everything (1). 
Homogeneity and specification appear to be more of an organizational 
resource than an explicating principle. The Principle of Sufficient Ground, on the 
other hand, accounts for the appearance of individuals. However, in WWP I, 
Schopenhauer describes the world as an object for a subject and discusses how the 
will alone is beyond presentation, and that our cognizance of this fact leads to an 
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“objectivization of will, both in its entirety and in its parts” (211). Ideas, moreover, 
are not covered by The Principle of Sufficient Ground (212). Understanding what 
Schopenhauer means by individuation is key here. He refers to space and time as the 
principium inviduationis,139 or the principle of individuation. In Book One of WWP I, 
he considers presentation as it appears in time and space, whereas Book Three has 
another orientation—presentation as it appears independently of space and time, and 
this points to the significance of Schopenhauer’s use of the timeless Platonic Ideas 
(Wicks 82). Regarding the similarities between Platonic ideas and Kant’s thing-in-
itself, the latter, Schopenhauer asserts, is an “obscure and paradoxical doctrine” that 
is “the weak side of his [Kant’s] philosophy” (212). 
Schopenhauer notes that both Plato and Kant’s philosophies emphasize that 
the ordinary world, the world of objects in space and time, is not the true world 
(Wicks 83). Plato describes the true world as one of Ideas, while Kant calls it the 
thing-in-itself, a difference that allows Schopenhauer to delineate the two-fold nature 
of the Will—its permanent Platonic Ideas beyond space and time and the temporal 
and perishable thing-in-itself. According to Kant, no experience or insight is possible 
with the thing-in-itself; it is forever unknowable. Schopenhauer differs from Kant 
here, saying that an intuitive reception of the timeless dimension is possible (Wicks 
84).  In his explication of the Kantian thing-in-itself and the eternal Platonic Idea, 
Schopenhauer considers modes of cognition, and an enhanced presentation of 
Platonic ideas through art:  
What mode of cognition, however, is concerned with that aspect of the 
world that is alone truly essential, standing beyond and independent of 
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all relation—the true content of its phenomena—that which is subject 
to no change and thus for all time cognized with equal truth, in a word: 
the Ideas that are the immediate and adequate objectivization of the 
thing-in-itself, of will? —It is art, the work of genius. It replicates the 
eternal Ideas that are apprehended through pure contemplation, that 
which is essential and enduring in all the world’s phenomena, and 
depending on the material in which it replicates them, it is plastic or 
pictorial art, poetry, or music. Its single origin is cognizance of Ideas, 
its single goal communication of this cognizance (WWP I, 228). 
Schopenhauer goes on to note that unlike science, which is always moving 
towards “something else” without ever reaching an ultimate goal, “art, to the 
contrary, is always at its goal” (WWP I, 228). Although not every single concept 
within Schopenhauer’s thought will require explication in this chapter, some concepts 
do require some specific elucidation as to their Schopenhauerian meanings. One of 
his strongest contributions to western thought is that of the world as will (Wille).  
The Will (Der Wille) 
Aquila points out in the translator’s introduction in WWP I that for 
Schopenhauer Der Wille is what the world is in its innermost essence or “in itself” 
(WWI xxiv). While his work with the will is most elaborated and central to his work 
in The World as Will and Presentation, Schopenhauer also considered the role of the 
will earlier in On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. 
According to Schopenhauer, all knowledge inevitably presupposes subject and 
object. Thus self-consciousness is not absolutely simple, but, like our consciousness 
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of things (i.e., the faculty of intuitive perception), is divided into a known and a 
knower. Now here the known appears absolutely and exclusively as will:  
Accordingly, the subject knows itself only as a willer, not as a knower. 
For the ego that represents [presents], thus the subject of knowing, can 
itself never become representation [presentation] or object, since, as 
the necessary correlative of all representations [presentations], it is 
their condition. On the contrary, the fine passage from the sacred 
Upanishad applied: “It is not to be seen; it sees everything; it is not to 
be heard: it hears everything; it is not to be known: it knows 
everything; and it is not to be recognized: it recognizes everything. 
Besides this seeing, knowing, hearing, and recognizing entity there is 
no other” (Schopenhauer, Fourfold, 208).140  
 Thus in the present context, the “recognizing entity” Schopenhauer is 
describing is the invisible numinous being recognized via a sensibility to the 
numinous. In general, one can only have a sensibility to the numinous because of it 
ineffable, or mysterious quality. But there is far more to this if one travels completely 
down a Schopenhauerian path. The world to Schopenhauer is both will and 
presentation. The will is the a posteriori essence of the empirical world; thus in a 
basic Schopenhauerian sense, everything is will, including the thing-in-itself (Ding-
an-sich). If there is a oneness or a prior unity to Schopenhauer’s thought, it is present 
as will in nature and in each person, but not in the sense of plurality; i.e., the will is 
not restricted to or within space and time, nor is it related to the principium 
individuationis, which is to say that the will is not related to individuation. In fact, 
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Schopenhauer describes the will as being free and transcendental, not having anything 
to do with presentation. Presentation to Schopenhauer is simply a reflection of the 
will. What additional vicissitudes of the will are utilized in Schopenhauer’s thought? 
He uses the phrases “affirmation of the will” (Die Bejahung des Willens) and “denial 
of the will”  (Die Verneinung des Willens) to designate, in the former, how everything 
in the world is an objectification of the will, and thus an affirmation of the will. The 
affirmation of the will has also been referenced by Schopenhauer as the will to live 
(Wille zum Leben) (Cartwright 182). The most potent manifestation of the affirmation 
of the will is the sex drive, the urge to reproduce.  
 The denial of the will (Die Verneinung des Willens), on the other hand, is 
ultimately a positive phenomenon. Schopenhauer argued that cognition (Erkenntnis) 
is what is occurring within every living thing:  
All animals, human and nonhuman, have nonrational cognitions of the 
external world, Schopenhauer argued, but only humans have the 
faculty of reason, and thus, he held that only humans have the capacity 
to have abstract representations [presentations] of concepts. 
Consequently he held that only humans are capable of rational, 
discursive thought while nonhuman animals are capable of only 
perception (Cartwright 28).  
The denial of will expressed through cognition or intellectual awareness leads 
to a liberating kind of rebirth (Cartwright 183). This liberating dynamic is without a 
subject and object interplay, and it cannot be thought or known in the usual sense of 
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knowledge. However, one can have a sensibility to what Schopenhauer calls the 
denial of the will.   
The Central Conundrum 
Is Schopenhauer’s transition from the denial of the will to a liberating 
reorientation an example of a “belief” system because it is invulnerable to thought? 
This question points to more than a Schopenhauerian conundrum, which in fact does 
exist in that this question is, at least at times, the central conundrum of the entire 
study.  
Again in Varo’s words, the intention herein is to communicate the 
incommunicable.  But what does that mean? Besides being a puzzling statement 
connected to a pun, other wordplay, or paradox, a conundrum is, in this context, “Any 
puzzling question or problem; an enigmatical statement” (“conundrum, n.” 4.b.). In a 
philosophical context that is stressing the elucidation of concepts over language per 
se, how does one address an inherently contradictory concept or action wherein the 
invisible becomes visible or the logically nonsensical statement is made 
comprehensive?  
In this study, the answer is simultaneously straightforward and complex. The 
conundrum is solved, answered and clarified through artistic work. “Art” is the 
primary answer in the present context. As already discussed in the two chapters on 
the numinous and the artistic seeking of the numinous, outside of new age 
declarations and theological approaches, artists have been society’s forward wave of 
seekers attempting to communicate the incommunicable. While this is not an 
exclusivity in the sense of art being the only means to investigate and communicate 
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knowledge, other activities like scientific research, behavioral psychology or 
psychoanalysis, study of language, and other activities, art does not require words, 
although in word and image studies, storytelling as literary art, and even various 
languages of storytelling themselves address that non-requirement. One needs to be 
aware that Borges, in fact, is a master—via his fabulist irrealism, of playing with 
words and language. In fact humor can always be heard, metaphorically speaking, 
rustling around and clearing its throat just outside the door in the work of both Borges 
and Varo. 
This will be addressed in more detail in the next and final chapter on Varo and 
Borges as artist-philosophers. In the meantime, Schopenhauer argues that what one 
can be liberated from the suffering of the will and survivalist self-identification, as he 
emphasizes in a chapter of WWP II titled “On Death and Its Relation to Our Essence 
in Itself.” This is quoted at length because it gives a sense of this conundrum and 
what some readers may consider to be contradictory about Schopenhauer’s thought in 
regards to subjectivity and transcendence:  
During one’s lifetime a person’s will is without freedom: on the basis 
of his inalterable character, his action proceeds necessarily along the 
chain of motives. But now everyone carries within his memory a great 
number of things that he has done and with regard to which he is not 
satisfied with himself. If he then goes on living, he would, by virtue of 
the inalterability of character, also go on forevermore acting in the 
same manner. Accordingly, he must cease to be what he is, in order to 
be able to emerge from the seed of his essence as a new and different 
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being. Therefore death loosens those bonds: the will becomes free 
again, for freedom lies in esse, not in operari [‘in being, not in 
doing”]: Finditur nodus cordis, dissolvuntur omnes dubitationes, 
ejusque opera evanescunt [“The heart’s knot is cloven, all doubts are 
dissolved, its works pass away”: from the Mundaka-Upanishad 2,2,8] 
is a very famous saying of the Veda, which all followers of the Veda 
often repeat. Dying is the moment of that liberation from the one-
sidedness of an individuality that does not constitute the inner most 
core of our essence, rather is to be thought of as a kind of aberration 
from it; true original freedom returns at this moment, which, in the 
sense that has been stated, can be regarded as a restitutio in integrum 
[“restoration to original condition” (expression from Roman law)] 
(WWP II, 567).  
Reading this passage, one is also struck by Schopenhauer’s profoundly 
positive attraction to Indian spirituality. The liberating death described by 
Schopenhauer may simply seem like bodily extinction, but Schopenhauer places the 
phenomenon in a spiritual context, one that buffers or detoxifies the nihilist 
connotation that often surfaces with the topic. Nonetheless, a question also arises. Is 
there no way to be liberated from the will except through death?  As mentioned 
previously, according to Schopenhauer there are two ways to transcend the bondage 
of the will while alive: asceticism and art. The latter is the one of primary significance 
in this study.  
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Schopenhauer’s Freedom from the Will in the Contemplation of Art 
The contemplation of art is germane to Schopenhauer’s consideration of 
liberation from will, and the making and contemplating of art is a means in this study 
to use the hinge or disruption of wonder to access the numinous gate. In that 
circumstance, the invisible numinous becomes to some extent visible, and the 
incommunicable suddenly become communicable.  
Arguing that the world is will and presentation, and that even the thing-in-
itself is the will, and that consequently the world is a place of intense suffering and 
conflict and death because of the universal predominance of the will, Schopenhauer 
begins to examine subject-object presentations that are not affected by the principle of 
sufficient reason (Satz vom zureichenden Grund), which he proposed was not 
applicable to the thing-in-itself, but was a priori applicable to all the possible objects 
of cognition, which are presentations (Cartwright 138-139).  
Art, the object of contemplation, remains as an apparently individual thing 
outside of time, butt in the case of a work of art, it is “only that which is essential, the 
Idea, is an object for it” (WWP I, 228). Wicks notes that Plato’s Allegory of the Cave 
inspires Schopenhauer’s “aesthetics in general, and in particular, his understanding of 
aesthetic perception, artistic genius, and the nature of art” (90). Schopenhauer goes on 
to describe art as “that way of regarding things which is independent of the Principle 
of Sufficient Ground” (WWP I, 229). For Schopenhauer, since the Principle of 
Sufficient Ground is rational in character and helpful in practical life and science, 
“that which turns away from the Principle of Sufficient Ground is the genius’s way of 
regarding things, which is applicable and helpful only in art” (WWP I, 229). He 
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describes the essence of genius as a capacity for pure contemplation, “entirely 
absorbed in its object” (WWP I, 229). For Schopenhauer, only through the pure 
contemplation of the artistic genius are Ideas apprehended: 
Accordingly, genius is the capacity for maintaining a purely perceptual 
state, for losing oneself in perception, and for withdrawing cognizance 
from service of the will that it existed originally but to serve, i.e., 
entirely losing sight of one’s interest, one’s willing, one’s purposes, 
and thus getting utterly outside one’s own personality for a time, so as 
to remain as purely cognizant subject, clear eye of the world (WWP I, 
229).   
Like Kant’s aesthetic methodology, Schopenhauer’s aesthetic stresses the 
subjective experience of art instead of the qualities of the object, but unlike Kant, 
Schopenhauer has the subject undergo an aesthetic experience of wonder, unknowing, 
and self-forgetting rather than a Kantian judgment. 
Whether or not one completely agrees with Schopenhauer—and there are 
reasons to question his philosophy of art—in the present investigation the 
contemplation of art is an essential element, playing a role in all of its primary 
features: wonder, the numinous, and image consciousness. However, the element of 
artistic genius as a mandatory means to liberation through art is not necessarily valid. 
The contemplation of art is not restricted to the idea of genius in the present study. 
One does not have to be a genius to perceive, contemplate, meditate, enact, or create 
art, nor does one have to be a genius to experience wonder and a sensibility to the 
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numinous. In fact, the use of the word genius may itself be a presupposition that 
requires bracketing.  
The earliest meaning of the word contemplation is a religious one, which the 
Oxford English Dictionary describes as “religious musing, devout meditation” 
("contemplation, n."), an interesting and relevant factor when considering 
Schopenhauer and the numinous. Is Schopenhauer religious? He claims not. 
The Spiritual-Atheistic Root of Schopenhauer’s Aesthetic 
While Schopenhauer is often classified as an atheist by conventional 
definition, his thinking, referenced in the foregoing pages, is clearly related to certain 
theological and spiritual issues.  Addressing some of the seemingly contradictory 
issues and points in Schopenhauer’s work can begin by considering how this thinker 
may well be described as a “spiritual-atheist.” While “spiritual-atheistic” is not a 
descriptive term Schopenhauer or any Schopenhauerian scholar has used, some 
scholars have noted the seemingly paradoxical orientation: 
Life is not worth living! This is the thought most associated with 
German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, who was virtually 
unacknowledged when he died one hundred fifty years ago. 
Increasingly, however, we understand that behind the mask of a 
pessimist Schopenhauer was a Zen master and arguably the greatest 
mystic of the nineteenth century. Schopenhauer roused more than two 
thousand years of Western philosophy from its delusion about who we 
really are, by declaring that materiality—the life of the body, rather 
than the mind—was the driving force of existence (Schirmacher, 
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“Living Disaster” vii).141 
If the reader does acknowledge and at least momentarily accept a concept that 
combines the seemingly contradictory and admittedly rather amusing joining of 
antonyms—spiritual and atheist—much of the seemingly contradictory constitution of 
Schopenhauer’s thought becomes clarified. It is of paramount importance to 
understand that while Schopenhauer was anti-religious, he was not anti-spiritual.142  
He did not believe in God or a god idea, or in some form of religious absolute, yet he 
did acknowledge, via his passion for Asian thought and spirituality, a reality greater 
than the individual that is clearly related to the Asian concept of a divine presence. 
The notion of Schopenhauer as spiritual-atheist is accentuated and to some 
extent authenticated by the sense of wonder in Schopenhauer, and wonder does have, 
as already considered, a seminal role in the artistic process. This chapter ultimately 
considers Schopenhauer’s interest in the numinous to be more than a peripheral 
interest, one that is best elucidated in a more detailed consideration of how Hinduism 
and Buddhism parallel his philosophy. As evidenced by his emphatically positive 
interest in Asian thought, terms like intuition, ecstasy, epiphany, self-forgetting, self-
transcendence, eternity, unity, and so on neither intimidated Schopenhauer nor 
defined his thinking. In actuality, what defined his thinking was how he applied to his 
western philosophy his Asian philosophy. It is well-known that original or traditional 
Asian philosophy is very often integrated with Asian spirituality. 
The Influence of Asian Philosophy and Spirituality on Schopenhauer’s Aesthetic  
After Plato and Kant, the third, and in some ways the strongest influence on  
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Schopenhauer’s thought was Hindu and Buddhist ideas. Schopenhauer’s interest in 
Eastern thought was not a unique phenomenon in early 19th Century Germany, but 
part of a larger “Oriental Renaissance” (Cross 9). Nonetheless, Schopenhauer was the 
first major Western philosopher to openly advocate and testify to the deep value of 
Indian thought:  
It is a sobering thought that more than a century and a half after his 
death Arthur Schopenhauer remains, as Bryan Magee143 has pointed 
out, the only major Western philosopher to have shown a serious and 
sustained interest in the thought of Asia and to have consistently 
sought to relate it to his own philosophical ideas; he goes much further 
in this direction than does Heidegger, for example (Cross xiii). 
 Cross also notes Schopenhauer’s criticisms of Christian translators of Indian 
texts misleading readers by using Christian diction like “soul and capitalized He in 
place of atman, God for Brahman, etc.” (Cross xiii). Repeatedly in WWP and other 
writings, Schopenhauer referenced Asian concepts and writings very positively, 
especially in, for example, his reading of the Upanishads, where he finds every line 
imbued with “firm, definite, and harmonious significance” (Parerga and 
Paralipomena 376).  His interest in Indian thought was more than a hobby or passing 
fancy, as he explained in the preface to the first edition of WWP: 
The philosophy of Kant, then, is the only one with which a thorough 
acquaintance is directly presupposed by that which is to be here 
expounded. If beyond this, however, the reader has lingered in the 
school of the divine Plato, he will be all the better prepared and the 
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more receptive to hearing me. But if he has even yet further shared in 
the benefaction of the Vedas, access to which, opened up to us through 
the Upanishads, is in my eyes the preeminent greatness that this still 
young century has to show over earlier ones—in that I presume that 
the influence of Sanskrit literature will be no less deep in its reach than 
that of the revival of Greek literature in the 15th Century—if, I thus 
assert, the reader has in fact already received and embraced 
consecration from the ages-old Indian wisdom, then he is best of all 
prepared to hear what I have to expound to him. It will then not speak 
to him, as to many others, in foreign, indeed hostile terms. For, if it 
does not sound too vain, I would maintain that every one of the 
individual and disparate pronouncements that constitute the 
Upanishads can be derived as a consequence from the thought to be 
communicated by me, although in no way, conversely, is the latter 
already to be found there (WWP I, 13).  
What precisely stimulated such a positive orientation in a man whose 
otherwise negative assessment of human life is so emphatic, or as some would argue, 
an assessment of life that is exaggeratedly negative?  How did the Schopenhauerian 
rendering of the elements of art and Asian thought combine so comprehensively with 
Kant, Plato, and Schopenhauer’s own theory of the will to form a unique force in 
Continental philosophy, a force that continues even today to challenge the 
presuppositions and exclusivities of Eurocentric thought? Several elements in 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy of art were in some respects at least as related to his study 
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of Asian philosophy as to the foundation influence of Plato, Kant and Occidental 
philosophy in general.  
Schopenhauer’s Optimism as Rooted in Asian Spirituality 
Themes and concepts such as wonder, aesthetic contemplation, self-
transcendence, intense feeling (Gefühl) and intuitive (intuitiv) cognizance while not 
by any means exclusively Asian nonetheless are very directly acknowledged and 
studied in generous detail in Hindu, Buddhist, and other Asian aesthetics. That a 
vibrant optimism is operative in Schopenhauer’s philosophy is especially evident in 
his relationship with Asian thought has been less acknowledged in Continental 
philosophy than it might have been, not just because of the Eurocentric nature per se 
of western thought, but perhaps for other biases only reflected by Eurocentrism. Ideas 
that address the limitations of scientific materialism or that emphasize the key 
importance of wonder and the numinous or more often addressed by Asian thought 
and practices than by European ideas. Also, one must push past the arbitrary label of 
pessimism to appreciate the depth and originality of Schopenhauer’s work: 
If optimism and pessimism were the stuff of temperament only, they 
would have no place in the tenets of a noble philosophy. A 
philosophical system must be more than a hypostasis of wishful 
thinking, or a rationalized frustration. And the argumentum ad 
hominem applied as a serious charge against a philosophical doctrine 
would be amusingly irrelevant if it were not superlatively misleading. 
Refutations must be made of firmer stuff. Thus that late nineteenth 
century critique of Schopenhauer144—an approach still unfortunately 
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sometimes practiced—that seeks to trace the source of his ideas top 
alleged strains of pathological melancholia and emotional obsession in 
himself and his ancestry, amounts in fine to a simple case of gossip-
logic (Muses 19).  
 Muses’s small volume East—West Fire: Schopenhauer’s Optimism and the 
Lankavatara Sutra identifies, clarifies, and compares numerous parallels between The 
Lankavatara Sutra, a seminal text in Mahayana Buddhism, and various aspects of 
Schopenhauer’s writings. This is all the more interesting in that while Schopenhauer 
did read the Vedas, and especially the part of the Vedas known as The Upanishads, as 
well as some Buddhist texts, he “never read the Lankavatara or any other of the great 
Mahayana scriptures; for they, together with the entire Canon they represent, have 
enjoyed only a relative recency of authentic knowledge in the Western acquirement of 
learning” (21).   
In other words, Schopenhauer read the Asian literature that was available in 
his lifetime. Muses does acknowledge that one could also find parallels between 
Schopenhauer’s thought and the Asian texts that he did read, but that some of the 
confluences between the powerful Lankavatara Sutra and Schopenhauer’s philosophy 
do reveal places where Schopenhauer’s native optimism does in fact surface. For 
example, the core of The Lankavatara Sutra is its teaching of a “two-fold 
egolessness,” or the truth behind world-illusion described traditionally as the veil of 
Maya. According to Muses, illusion is an error in perception, whereas delusion is a 
belief in the validity of that illusion (Muses 23-25). In the concept of two-fold 
egolessness, no entity is actually separate from other entities. First, the self-nature of 
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a conscious entity is not truly separate from the self-nature of all other conscious 
entities; likewise, the self-nature of an object or group of objects is not separate from 
the self-nature of all other objects because “all meanings and indeed all activities 
[are] springing from the interrelations of all things” (Muses 25). That the two-fold 
egolessness in The Lankavatara Sutra corresponds to Schopenhauer’s world as 
presentation and world as will opens a consideration of related aesthetic and 
metaphysical themes—whether the emphasis is Western, Eastern or both.  
 It cannot be emphasized enough that for Schopenhauer, the challenge to linear 
or discursive knowledge comes from a source he considered authentic, one that has 
been and continues to be an inspiration to artists—Asian thought and aesthetics.  
The art theories of many modern artists have been influenced by both Asian 
and Schopenhauerian thought. John Cage, for example, was influenced not only by 
Zen Buddhism, but also by Schopenhauer, whom Cage read with genuine interest. 
Once it is understood that a primary element in the Schopenhauerian aesthetic 
is the contemplation of art, it is then necessary to examine some of the 
Schopenhauerian concepts related to that contemplation.  
Wonder [thauma], Quotidian, tat tvam asi, the Sky, the Circle 
The possibilities inherent in wonder and the absence of expectation deserve to 
be considered and explored in more detail. It can be argued that the experience and 
phenomenon of wonder is not restricted to a set of parameters or locked inside a 
system of circumstances. Music alone challenges these restrictions, not to mention 
many other phenomena. As noted in the earlier quote by Cartwright about 
Schopenhauer’s need for metaphysics, “He attributed this need to a sense of wonder 
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or astonishment, one that arises from the recognition of the ubiquity of suffering and 
death within the world” (145). The seminal element informing Schopenhauer’s 
aesthetic is a sense of wonder, which is also a phenomenon that straddles Eastern and 
Occidental aesthetics. Furthermore, inherent in Asian aesthetics is a broader reach 
that more directly and openly allows for the possibility of a sensibility to the 
numinous in art and life in general.  
Before labeling any experience or phenomenon as an occurrence of wonder, 
the numinous, the sublime, or any other name, there is the nameless experience or 
phenomenon itself. Neither spiritual nor philosophical understanding should rotely 
depend on categories or names. Not-knowing or unknowing is not a form of stupidity, 
nor a lack of intelligence or understanding. What is referred to metaphorically as the 
gateless gate in Zen Buddhism, for example, or any other authentic form of esoteric 
spirituality, does not require verbal labeling before being experienced. In this sense, 
language is more like a street map for navigation through life rather than an entire 
(ontological) city in itself. Even though language is an aspect of being, it is also a  
means to describe non-linguistic being, a means that can obviously influence to some 
extent ontological perception.  Even though an absence of verbal or textual 
description or language can occur, to assert that language is inconsequential or 
irrelevant would be erroneous. On the contrary, language, as many thinkers145 have 
asserted, is very relevant to philosophical understanding. Virtually every philosopher 
has worked with language, including Plato, through the Socratic dialogues, although 
modern and contemporary thinkers have clearly worked far more extensively with 
language. Indeed, Russian literary theorist Mikel Bakhtin’s brilliant work with 
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language is utilized ahead. Also, as has been noted earlier, the Husserlian epochē and 
“back to the things themselves” (Wir wollen auf die ‘Sachen selbst’ zurückgehen) are 
part of a methodology that navigates through secondary aspects of phenomenon, 
including the presuppositions of language.  
After Sophia Vasalou says,  “Schopenhauer’s philosophical wonder forms an 
illuminating category through which to calibrate the way we read his philosophy” 
(Vasalou, Schopenhauer 3), she goes on to argue, “Schopenhauer’s own analysis of 
the sublime” combines with “a therapeutic of wonder at its heart—a therapeutic of the 
passions that is simultaneously a therapeutic of the subjectivity that underpins them” 
(Schopenhauer 5). The present argument is that when Schopenhauer’s aesthetic 
emphasizes the liberating dynamic of contemplating art, a dynamic that generates 
self-forgetting and freedom from the devastating drive of the will, his aesthetic is—
through the contemplation of art—rooted in a sense of wonder that is, at least in some 
case, caused by art. By its nature as a phenomenon universal to human consciousness, 
the sense of wonder is restricted neither to European nor Asian experience. 
Schopenhauer’s sense of wonder is enhanced and magnified for him via the influence 
of and reference to Indian philosophy, but also through the influence of Platonic Ideas 
on his thought.  
What are the elements within the phenomenon of wonder that connect 
Schopenhauer with Indian philosophy and spirituality that are relevant to the current 
investigation? A primary element surfaces in Schopenhauer’s acknowledgement of 
overcoming individuation through the contemplation of art, which he articulates, 
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while discussing the many forms of nature, by borrowing a well-known Sanskrit 
term:  
But were we to communicate for the sake of the observer’s reflection, 
and in a single word, an insight into that nature’s inner essence, then 
we could best employ for that purpose the Sanskrit formula that 
appears so often in the holy books of the Hindus and is called 
Mahavakya, i.e., great word: Tat twam asi. Which means: “This living 
thing is you” (WWPI 266).  
When Schopenhauer is discussing aesthetics, he references either art and 
nature, or both, while considering simultaneously the role of Platonic Ideas and how 
overcoming individuation might occur. As one scholar describes it:  
This special attitude of our consciousness, which Schopenhauer calls 
“aesthetic contemplation,” is the most important factor in seeing 
through the principium individuationis, the knowledge of the Ideas as 
the essence of the phenomena, or, at last, the deeper insight into the 
thing-in-itself, the will-to-live as the common ground of all beings. 
The objective contemplation of works of art, of vegetative forms or of 
animalistic behavior and actions allows us to forget our individuality 
and its limited and dissociative harmful character. We see instead “the 
manifold grades and modes of manifestation of the will that is one and 
the same in all beings,” and reflecting this experience, we recognize 
the will-to-living as our common inner nature, essentially beyond any 
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individuation. The condensed version of this insight is the tat tvam asi 
(Ruffing 99).   
While remaining within a contextual sphere of artistic knowledge, what in 
Schopenhauerian terms underlies a spontaneous and positive sense of transcending 
separative self-identification though a sense of wonder?  Platonic Ideas are key here: 
If the subject is to perceive Platonic Ideas which exist outside space, 
time and causality and which, therefore, are not individuals, the 
subject must forget about his or her individuality and, in the process of 
perceiving the extraordinary, must not have any self-awareness as a 
person of our common world. To achieve this, the subject must 
undergo a change which deeply alters the whole mode of perception 
(Pothast 34).  
In the interest of relating this to ordinary human existence, this might also 
simply be called self-forgetting, which is something everyone experiences in some 
moments, as when driving somewhere or being absorbed in some activity or other 
person or object. An aspect of the argument here is that self-forgetting occurs 
temporarily in a moment of wonder in both art-making and art-viewing. The details of 
this experience are more phenomenological in nature than metaphysical. 
Schopenhauer notes that, first, “these worlds exist only in a presentation to us, only as 
modifications of the eternal subject of pure cognition that we find ourselves to be as 
soon as we forget individuality” (251), which essentially serves to refine a 
metaphysical orientation by acknowledging the phenomenological point of 
presentation. Secondly, Schopenhauer uses a non-Eurocentric reference to elucidate 
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his assertions: 
All of this does not enter reflection at once, however, but shows itself 
as a merely felt consciousness that we are in some sense (which 
philosophy alone explicates) one with the world and thus not crushed, 
but lifted, by its immensity. It is the felt consciousness of that which 
Upanishads of the Vedas repeatedly pronounce in such manifold 
variations, particularly in the passage already quoted: Hae omnes 
creaturae in totum ego sum, et praeter me aliud ens non est [“All these 
creatures together am I, and beyond me no beings exists.”] (251).146 
Music 
Another major art theory confluence, a kind of aesthetic intertexuality, 
occurred with both Schopenhauer and Kandinsky—the importance of music. 
Kandinsky’s emphasis on music is well-documented,147 and for Schopenhauer, music 
was the supreme pure form of art, one that is independent of the phenomenal world, 
because it bypasses Ideas and stands uniquely on its own: 
And since our world is nothing other than the phenomenon of Ideas in 
the form of multiplicity, by means of their entry into the principium 
individuationis (the form belonging to the sort of cognition possible 
for individuals as such), it follows that music, since it bypasses Ideas, 
is also entirely independent of the phenomenal world, completely 
ignores it, could even to a certain extent exist if the world were not 
there. This cannot be said of the other arts. In other words, music is 
just as immediate an objectivization and image of will as a whole as 
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the world itself is, indeed just as much as the Ideas whose multiplied 
phenomenon constitutes the world of individual things. Thus music is 
in no way, like the other arts, an image of Ideas, but an image of the 
very will of which Ideas are also the objectivization. Just for this 
reason, the effect of music is so very much more powerful and 
penetrating than that of the other arts. For the latter speak only of 
shadows; it, rather, speaks of the essence of things (WWPI 307-308). 
That Kandinsky and Schopenhauer both emphasized the primary significance 
of music points to the role of intense emotion—Gefühl. As discussed previously, 
Rudolf Otto’s referencing of Gefühl as a feeling more intense and penetrating than 
ordinary emotional expressions also can be understood as one factor that can enhance 
a sensibility to the numinous, one that occurs prior to conceptual thought.148 Earlier 
than Otto, Schopenhauer also considered the significance of Gefühl, albeit in a far 
more complicated way, and generally in relation to music. Schopenhauer argued that 
music was not concerned with ordinary emotions. These emotions were considered to 
be phenomena, “but Schopenhauer asserted that music contained the inner nature of 
these phenomena, the feelings or emotions themselves as aspects of the will” (Hall 
167-168). For Schopenhauer, that inner nature is not available through rational 
knowledge (Wissen) but “through Erkenntnis, a kind of knowledge suffused with 
emotion or feeling (Gefühl).  
There are some points of Schopenhauer’s argument that can be challenged, 
especially in relation to visual art and the phenomenon of the world. That he presents 
music as the most uniquely powerful of the arts, and the only art that directly 
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communicates an essence (to Schopenhauer, a direct communication of the will) 
rather than, like the other arts, a mere reflection of Ideas) remains debatable. In 
particular, Schopenhauer does not take into account thoroughly enough are the forms 
and complexities of subjectivity in regards to art, especially in regards to narrative or 
storytelling, and specifically in the present case, irrealism and fabulism. 
Consequently, it is useful to call on some of the concepts of another thinker to better 
clarify and consider the art of Varo and Borges. 
Bakhtin 
Mikhail Bakhtin is best known for his literary theory,149 which presents his 
rendering of aesthetic ideas (the majority of them rooted in his original concepts), 
including dialogism, polyphony, polyglossia, theoretism, answerability, outsideness, 
intertextuality, heteroglossia, chronotope,  finalizability and unfinalizability, 
carnivalesque and grotesque realism. While not all of these Bakhtinian concepts are 
relevant to this study, some are referenced in the next chapter. Some central points 
that makes Bakhtin’s theories relevant are his emphasis on the human beings and his 
avoidance of a complete system of artistic theory: 
Unlike some of his contemporaries such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
and Henri Bergson, Bakhtin’s goal was not to create a moral or 
philosophical system. Most of his essays are predicated on the 
presupposition that the human being is the centre around which all 
action in the real world, including art, is organized. In his writing, the 
“I” and the “other” are the fundamental categories of value that make 
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all action and creativity possible, as in the work of Marin Buber and 
Emmanuel Levinas (Haynes, Bakhtin Reframed, 5).   
In her discussion of Bakhtin’s aesthetics in Bakhtin Reframed, Deborah 
Haynes describes Bakhtin’s orientation to art for life’s sake, not art for art’s sake (12-
13). To say art is for art’s sake was to Bakhtin an error that signaled a crisis for 
modern artists and writers. Even though, as already quoted above, Haynes asserted 
that Bakhtin did not set out to create a moral system, she also subsequently 
emphasizes, “At its foundation, Bakhtinian aesthetics is profoundly moral and 
religious. In fact, Bakhtin’s early aesthetic essays derived many of the terms from 
theology” (13). Haynes adds, “Bakhtin reputedly said that aesthetics is similar to 
religion inasmuch as both help to transfigure life” (13).150 
Nor is a spiritual impulse absent in the writings of Western philosophers 
discussed here. Although Husserl is not as anti-religious as Schopenhauer, and at 
times authenticates while simultaneously disavowing the influence of 
phenomenological theology in his work,151 there can be no denying that Husserl was a 
religious person.152 Husserl simply brackets out that aspect of his own life and beliefs 
within his writings about transcendental phenomenology.  
Schopenhauer’s orientation is not theological per se, but primarily a 
metaphysical and aesthetic one. Nonetheless, even though Schopenhauer was 
antagonistic towards religion, the fact of his recognition and use of topics such as the 
sublime and beauty, artistic and spiritual freedom, Eastern spirituality and aesthetics, 
and the transcendence of human suffering through the self-forgetting contemplation 
of art does represent altogether a sensibility to the numinous. 
 235 
 
Chapter Six—Art as Life: Varo and Borges as Artist-Philosophers 
Extending some of the philosophical topics from the previous chapters to 
apply to this final chapter about the artist-philosopher dynamic discloses some 
philosophical aspects of the art of Varo and Borges. While a Husserlian 
phenomenological methodology provides a primary means or infrastructure for 
examining the work of Borges and Varo, additional and multifarious means are 
utilized briefly at times to explore the unorthodox work of these two accomplished 
and idiosyncratic artist-philosophers. For example, Schopenhauerian, Platonic, 
Kantian, Bakhtinian, Bataillean and other multifarious philosophical concepts—or 
explicatory points used for elucidating certain concepts—are succinctly referenced 
and offered as additional means.  This chapter looks at some themes common to both 
Borges and Varo, then separately examines in more detail the work of each of these 
two artists. First, a distilled and succinctly stated description of the artist-philosopher 
dynamic is required, albeit difficult.  
The Artist-Philosopher Dynamic 
Why describe this phenomenon as a “dynamic” and why is it difficult to 
define? Although farther ahead it is also accurately described as an “agency,” to 
describe the artist-philosopher as a dynamic is accurate, given the reciprocally 
amalgamating process underlying that dynamic. That the artist-philosopher 
phenomenon is a dynamic, or the opposite of static or inactive, seems obvious—a 
primary characteristic is its continually shifting activities and its functional, 
accomplishing nature. It is a unique dynamic of making and thinking, or vice versa, 
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and not infrequently it is an expression of the simultaneity of making and thinking.153 
That an artist makes things and a philosopher thinks about everything seems at first 
glance to be a valid (albeit over-simplified) statement. At the same time, using words 
like “things” and “everything” reflects a generality that in itself yields an overview of 
interwoven elements of philosophy and art. In that regard, one might argue that every 
human being has some characteristics of both an artist and a philosopher. When 
someone is primarily a working artist, that fact is often unambiguously obvious. 
Likewise, if an individual’s character reflects a strong philosophical bent, in an 
artistic context or not, that aspect of their character is usually recognizable and 
acknowledgeable through the person’s communications and actions.154 To say that the 
actions of an artist-philosopher attest to a process in which the artist addresses 
philosophical questions and creates answers through making his or her art is both too 
diffused and too adamantine. A working artist is already engaging an artistic process 
that generates a wide variety of inquiries, challenges, thoughts and responses, even if 
the artist is the only person who witnesses the details of that process. A fixed 
definition of the artist-philosopher remains challenging because of evolving stages 
and the non-fixed or plastic and shifting directions of both artistic and philosophical 
work. 
Thus, since the phrase “artist-philosopher” is self-descriptive in a rudimentary 
sense, why can a simple description not suffice? If by simple one means universally 
concrete, the dilemmas and obstacles begin to surface. Why these challenges appear 
is obvious—the creative process itself is a highly individualistic, which is to say a 
highly subjective, dynamic, even if initiated through another artist’s or thinker’s 
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work.  This point is not to assert that artists cannot collaborate, as can be seen in work 
of Gilbert & George, Picasso and Braque, Jake and Dinos Chapman, Robert 
Mapplethorpe and Louise Bourgeoise, Björk and Matthew Barney, Man Ray and Lee 
Miller, and countless other pairings, as well as group artistic efforts. Collaborations, 
however, must nonetheless find ways to process individual aesthetic orientations and 
inspirations because every established artist who is not strictly a student or disciple 
artist presumes and calls upon an individualistic subjective artistic process, even 
though, as we have already considered, subjectivity involves more than a common 
presumption of utilizing a separative self-identified modus operandi. Art especially 
demonstrates this because of inherent cultural and societal influences such as art 
historical and sociopolitical factors, as well as marketing issues. The idealistic ivory 
tower orientation to artistic endeavors is no longer (and to some extent probably 
never was) an accurate description of the creative process, even if an artist or writer 
may work alone much of the time.  
That seemingly solitary effort is never truly solitary, except perhaps in a 
physical sense. While working alone implies (if there is not a literal collaboration) the 
efforts of a single individual at work, that is not exactly so because even then one 
works with memories of and sensibilities to the other. Almost any formal and honest 
statement of one’s own work should generously acknowledge the resources or 
support of other people, or at least the influences of other people’s work.  
An elementary sense of Husserlian intersubjectivity seems key here, as does 
intertextuality, be it a scholarly textual or artistically visual orientation. And as will 
be presented shortly, an inevitable Bakhtinian polyphonic dialogism could be said to 
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underlie what appears to be a solitary action. Thus, while solitude as well as 
loneliness are experiences generally understood by everyone, it remains questionable 
if  “aloneness” is completely accurate given the myriad forms of relationship 
characteristic of humankind.  
Nonetheless, there exists, when one begins, the blank page or empty canvas, 
the bare stage or the mere thought of a creative project. Both Varo and Borges 
communicate a sense of this artistic aloneness, yet paradoxically neither artist fails, in 
her or his art, to challenge the validity of that expression. In fact, one could argue that 
it is through the philosophical component accessed by each artist that the sense of 
existential solitude, positive or negative, is fractured.  
For example, while Varo’s painting Revelation or The Clockmaker (figs.32-
33) and her comments about it emphasize an instance of a temporal theme, complete 
with various visual themes Varo used repeatedly in her paintings such as the cat, a 
window, and a person working at a table or desk. This painting also reflects how Varo 
demonstrates a fractured or multiple sense of self.  When Varo comments on this 
painting in her wonderfully modest and plain-spoken style, she notes how each 
timepiece contain “a figure from very distant epochs,” although she could easily and 
just as accurately described each of those figures as a version of herself, or a version 
of the central seated figure. Although the artist verbally magnifies the sense of 
distinctive epochs, noting how she used period costumes, there remains in fact a 
visual sense, when one simply looks at the painting, of those figures expressing the 
multiplicity of self: 
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Fig. 32. Remedios Varo. Revelation or The Clockmaker (Revelación o El 
relojero) 1955. Oil on Masonite. 27 7/8 x 33 in. Private Collection. 
 
This painting is about time. That’s why there is a clockmaker (who in 
a sense, represents our ordinary time), but through the window comes 
a revelation and all of a sudden the clockmaker comprehends a whole  
lot of things. I have tried to make him look both astonished and 
enlightened. He is surrounded by a series of timepieces all showing the 
same time, but containing a figure from very distant epochs. I achieve 
this effect through different period costumes. Each clock has a window 
with bars, like a prison (Ovalle 111).  
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Fig. 33. Remedios Varo. Detail from Revelation or The Clockmaker 
 (Revelación o El relojero) 1955.  
Oil on Masonite. 27 7/8 x 33 in. Private Collection. 
 
[Aquí se trata del tiempo. Por eso hay un relojero (que en cierta 
manera reprsenta el tiempo ordinario nuestro), pero por la ventana 
entra una “revelación” y comprende de golpe muchísimas cosas; he 
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tratado de darle una expresón de asombro y de iluminación. A su 
alrededor hay cantidad de relojes que marcan todos la misma hora, 
pero dentro de cada uno hay el mismo personaje en muy diferentes 
épocas; eso lo consigo por medio de los trajes característicos de 
épocas muy distintas, cada reloj tiene una ventana con rejas como en 
una cácel. (Ovalle 111).] 
 
The Artist-Philosopher Dynamic as Agency 
The artist-philosopher dynamic serves as agency for taking action in the world 
and addressing humankind beyond the limitation of separative self-identification. 
Thinking of the artist-philosopher as agency provides a clearer view of the artist-
philosopher dynamic underlying such an agency. What, then, is agency?  While the 
most common definition is “a person or organization acting on behalf of another, or 
providing a particular service” (“agency, n.," I.), a related definition is “action or 
intervention producing a particular effect” (“agency, n.," II,5,a.), and more 
specifically, “a being or thing that acts to produce a particular effect or result” 
(“agency, n.," II,5,b.). In this last description, it is not simply the artistic component 
that is called into action to produce a particular affect. By asserting that Borges and 
Varo are artist-philosophers, what must be asked is how the philosophical component 
is revealed in their work—how does their work become (for each artist-philosopher) 
agency?  
The Artist-Philosopher Dynamic as Agency in Borges and Varo 
Both Varo and Borges emphasize the nonlinear plasticity and ephemeral 
qualities of “facts” in their respective bodies of work; they continually challenge the 
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presumed concreteness of factual knowledge. To unearth some of the artistic artifacts 
Borges and Varo left in the wake of their irrealistic journeys, and to look at some of 
the philosophical ideas pervading their creative processes and art, requires a 
Husserlian bracketing out of presumptions not only about what reality is, but what 
philosophical discourse is presumed to be. Borges’s writings, including his non-
fictional essays, fictional stories, and poetry, attest to the consistent, sinewy 
philosophical quality of his work. The thematic range of Varo’s paintings, on the 
other hand, seem at first appearance to be merely about the occult and other strange or 
bizarre themes, but that are nonetheless recognizable representational phenomena. 
The numinous sensibility in her simultaneously robust and fastidious work actually 
covers a broad philosophical landscape, even if one must sometimes penetrate her 
outwardly playful interest in the magical and the occult to recognize her meaningful 
philosophical orientation. If one looks at the painting previously considered, 
Revelation or The Clockmaker (figs.32-33), the inherent issues such as the temporal-
spatial theme, intersubjectivity, metaphorical means that signal  ontological 
significance, symbolism, and other philosophical topics do surface.   
When someone is a working artist with a pronounced philosophical 
orientation, the artist-philosopher appears, and that confluence and reciprocal 
assimilation between thinking and making can be quite complex, as it is with both 
Borges and Varo, whose literary and visual artistic compositions are philosophically 
proposed and artistically composed or constructed through their irrealistic fabulist art.  
Both Borges and Varo address issues and topics such as the nature of 
existence and reality, time and space, subjectivity and the other, search and journey, 
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wonder and the numinous. While in a broad sense all artists have a philosophical 
strand woven into their creative processes, one that may or may not be evident in the 
art they make because some are more emphatically and recognizably philosophical 
than others. In spite of this, some artist-philosophers do not claim to be known as 
philosophers, and this is the case with both Borges and Varo. When a given artist 
disclaims philosophical intentions, even if the philosophical component is clearly 
evident, that artist’s denial may be a response to his or her work being described as 
philosophical, a description the artist may not seek or desire. And yet the 
philosophical seriousness behind the playfulness of each of these artists repeatedly 
surfaces.  
 
Fig. 34. Remedios Varo, 1958. Fig. 35. Jorge Luis Borges. 1968 
Fotografía tomada del catálogo Central Park, New York City. 
razonado publicado por Era  by Diane Arbus. 
por Kati Horna. 
Applying Husserlian Transcendental Phenomenology to Varo and Borges 
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At this point it is useful consider more explicitly how Husserlian methodology 
in a philosophy of art context can be applied to Borges and Varo. We might begin by 
noting that givenness (Gegebenheit) becomes relevant when examining an artist’s 
creative process. Givenness in Husserlian terms is essential to understanding 
experience as an experience of something, the object appearing (being given in 
appearance) and experienced (received), at which point the subject, actually either the 
artist or the viewer, is perceiving the object that is given in appearance. There are 
multifarious influential elements, depending on the form of consciousness being 
experienced, that enter into Husserlian givenness. Remedios Varo’s consciously and 
subconsciously fueled visions of art, for example, make visible a process already 
aligned with some of the principles of Husserlian phenomenology.  
As can be seen, the distinction between image consciousness (Bildbewußtein, 
or “depicting consciousness”) (Moran and Cohen 158-159) and perception serves the 
explication of both Varo and Borges’s creative processes. When explicating 
phantasy155 presentation as pictorialization, Husserl’s observations might be applied 
to Varo’s visualization or irreal creativity as it could be done with other artists156 who 
might also be considered as creating forms of fantasy:  
We characterized perception as an act in which something objective 
appears to us in its own person, as it were, as present itself. In 
phantasy, to be sure, the object itself appears (insofar as it is precisely 
the object that appears there) but it does not appear as present. It is 
only re-presented; it is though it were there, but only as though. It 
appears to us in image. The Latins say imaginatio. Phantasy 
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presentation seems to presuppose or claim for itself a new 
characteristic of apprehension; it is pictorialization (Husserl, Phantasy, 
18). 157 
Husserl’s phrase “re-presented” is a key to understanding how a non-physical 
object can be presented or given in phenomenological terms. As proposed in this 
study, Borges and Varo repeatedly re-present their work via fabulist irrealism, or 
irreal fabulism.158 Irreal fabulism is explicated ahead in more detail and depth. 
Along these lines, and as presented in more detail ahead, a thematic literary 
strand that accentuates consciousness in Borges’s storytelling surfaces when his 
attraction to numinous sensibility becomes the expressive element of his aesthetic. 
When that expressive element becomes interwoven with the receptive element of his 
aesthetic, albeit in his uniquely presented Borgesian intertextual fashion, the irreal 
fabulist search for a numinous gateway surfaces more visibly, albeit in a literary 
rendering.  
Husserlian intentionality, as noted earlier, does not indicate the common 
meaning of intending to do something as in a volitional usage, but instead is 
essentially about aiming the experience of attention towards an object and receiving 
(in Husserlian terms intuiting) that object. Thus one might say intentionality is the 
directedness of  the conscious state. Directedness of the conscious state is a key 
understanding of phenomenological intentionality. 
When Husserlian intuition is activated it becomes the act of incorporating or 
“having” or receiving of the object that appears in consciousness, even if that object 
is, as in a Varo painting,  an imaginary (in Husserlian terms “phantastic”) object. This 
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is the artistic imagination at work within a  Husserlian phenomenological  
infrastructure of methodology. Husserl repeatedly described how imagination is a re-
presentation of an object. 
If  the presentation or re-presentation is the givenness of an object in 
consciousness, then the intentionality (directedness) of the artist or viewer of 
receiving the object in consciousness becomes, when completed,  an intuition (or 
reception) of the object. What can be misleading is how this phenomenological 
process cannot accurately be described as a linear process. While there seems to be a 
give and take process indicating a linear sequence, that linearity does not exist (except 
perhaps in a mischievous or playful way for Borges and Varo) because givenness of 
the art object and the creative expression of the artist seem to occur, or at the very 
least can occur, simultaneously. The creative dynamic between subjectivity and art 
could be seen as seamless and indefinable, except that in this case (and undoubtedly 
in many instances) the relationship between consciousness and subjectivity, or 
consciousness and selfhood, is complex and in some respects nebulous in both Varo 
and Borges. “In his earliest essays, such as ‘The Nothingness of Personality,’ Borges 
challenged the notion of the self, and a continuing desire to do so runs through much 
of his writing” (Griffin 7). This essay presents a proposal of intention (not 
phenomenological intentionality, but more like the volitional usage of intending to do 
something) in the author:  
Intention. I want to tear down the exceptional preeminence now 
generally awarded to the self, and I pledge to be spurred on by 
concrete certainty, and not the caprice of an ideological ambush or a 
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dazzling intellectual prank. I propose to prove that personality is a 
mirage maintained by conceit and custom, without metaphysical 
foundation or visceral reality. I want to apply to literature the 
consequences that issue from these premises, and erect upon them an 
aesthetic hostile to the psychologism inherited from the last century, 
sympathetic to the classics, yet encouraging to today’s most unruly 
tendencies (Selected Non-fictions 3).  
 Borges’s desire stated above to “tear down the exceptional preeminence now 
generally awarded to the self” brings another experience into view, one that surfaces 
repeatedly in this investigation, though not directly addressed by Husserl. 
If Husserlian intuitions are perceptions or modifications of perception, and 
intuition indicates a “location” where an intentional object is directly present via that 
intentionality, when an intention is “filled” by the apprehension of an object, that 
object is intuited. While the appearance of the object is “given” and Borges’s 
reception of the given object, for example, will be as real or irreal as the author 
decides it should be, that object—be it the Library of Babel, the Circular Ruins, the 
Aleph, a Dreamtiger, a Garden of Forking Paths, or Hakim, the Masked Dyer of 
Merv—remains a key element in his creative dynamic.159 His intentionality to render 
the numinous visible via layers of irreal and intertextual narrative represents a form of 
direct apprehension in which a given object fulfills intentionality as an intuition of the 
object. The fantasy aspect of Varo’s creative process reveals how intentionality and 
apprehension yield an intuition of immediate structure as evidence of life in art, 
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which also echoes Michel Henry’s argument of material phenomenology and 
interiority as invisible life. 
Henry Applies Husserlian Elements to a Study of Invisibility and Kandinsky 
Mentioning Michel Henry’s work generates a series of brief interjections, 
beginning with Henry’s use of Husserlian phenomenology in his explication of 
Kandinsky’s work, that serve as supportive or secondary materials. Henry’s 2005 
Seeing the Invisible: On Kandinsky (published in English in 2009) is a preeminent 
philosophico-phenomenological study of Kandinsky’s aesthetic, some of which is 
relevant here. Henry discusses at length, for example, the implications and meanings 
of invisibility in non-objective abstract art. For instance, Henry does not hesitate to 
apply Husserl’s epochē to Kandinsky’s work: 
[Kandinsky] showed how by separating a letter or sign from its 
linguistic meaning or any other context in which it usually occurs one 
could again experience its “pure form,” its “purely pictorial” form. But 
once the world and all its meanings have been set aside, once its logos, 
which has always been that which is spoken by men, has been 
silenced, what exactly is left? According to Husserl and those artists 
who gave up realism, we are left with the sensate appearances to 
which the true, given world is reduced, the pure experience of the 
world (377). 
 While this is an  original explication of how to apply epochē to abstract art, it 
is also, if extended, applicable to a sensibility to the numinous in Varo and Borges’s 
art. For instance, when Henry is discussing the theory of elements in Kandinsky’s 
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work, and specifically commenting on Kandinsky’s Point and Line to Plane and the 
positive aspects of studying and analyzing the artistic picture plane, Henry writes:   
This derives from the fact that it is an essential analysis, in the 
phenomenological sense that Husserl gives the term, leading us to the 
essence of the thing, pertaining here to the pure pictorial elements. The 
essence of the pictorial element is the abstract content, the invisible 
life that this element seeks to express (33). 
 One might understandably ask what this has to do with Varo and Borges, 
since their art is not nonobjective abstraction but irrealist fabulism. However, a 
connection in a sensibility to the invisibility of the numinous can occur by any artist 
or the viewer or reader (and the reader is a kind of viewer via imagination). While 
writing about Kandinsky’s intense emotion in response to viewing but not really 
seeing or recognizing Monet’s haystacks at an 1896 Moscow exhibition, Henry 
writes: 
He joined the lesson from it with the one that he drew from reading 
Niels Bohr: physical reality has no substance and in some way no 
reality; quanta of energy move in leaps without crossing through it. In 
physics as well, matter is broken down in to the dust of dubious, 
virtual particles; it dissolves into reality and a sort of immaterialism 
(15).  
In Husserlian givenness, or the appearance itself, multifarious influential 
elements are possible, depending on the form of consciousness being experienced. 
This includes forms of the irreal. 
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Fabulism, Irrealism and Fantasy 
In proposing that Varo and Borges are modern fabulist artist-philosophers, 
and that fabulism allows wonder to fuel some aspects of their creative processes, 
fabulist storytelling needs to be explicated. Part of that explication is to consider 
“irrealism” as contrasted with “magic realism” and “fantasy,” terms sometimes 
assigned to these artists’ work. In general, one of the most salient descriptive aspects 
of the term “magic realism” is its oxymoronic quality, contrasting realism, or what is 
“real,” with “magic,” which is understood not to be real in the usual sense of reality. 
The term “magic realism” first appeared in 1920’s Germany. In his 1925 book Nach-
Expressionismus, Magischer Realismus: Probleme der neusten europäischen Malerei 
(Post-Expressionism, Magic Realism: Problems of the Most Recent European 
Painting), art critic Franz Roh “coined the term that is translated as ‘magic realism’ to 
define a form of painting that differs greatly from its processor (expressionist art) in 
its attention to accurate detail, a smoother photograph-like clarity of picture and the 
representation of the mystical non-material aspects of reality” (Bowers 8-9).  
While Remedios Varo was not part of the so-called Neue Sachlichkeit art 
movement, Bowers description above also serves as a general description of 
Remedios Varo’s uniquely accomplished representational paintings about magic, 
mysticism, and mystery. The formal definition of magic realism under “art and 
literary theory” in the Oxford English Dictionary, includes: “In extended use: any 
artistic or esp. literary style in which realistic techniques such as naturalistic detail, 
narrative, etc., are similarly combined with surreal or dreamlike elements” (“Magic 
realism”). This term has been referenced primarily to describe “the narrative mode 
 251 
that offers “a way to discuss alternative approaches to reality to that of Western 
Philosophy, expressed in many postcolonial and non-Western works of contemporary 
fiction by, most famously, writers such as Gabriel García Márquez and Salman 
Rushdie” (Bowers 1). Magic realism also brings to mind writers like Julio Cortázar, 
Franz Kafka, Günter Grass, John Fowles, Isabel Allende, Angela Carter, Alejo 
Carpentier, and Arturo Uslar-Pietri, among many others. Beyond generalization, 
however, magic realism has various usages (Bowers 1-7).160   
The term “magic realism” is referenced here infrequently, however, because 
the present focus is on philosophical, phenomenological, and aesthetic investigations 
as related to fabulist storytelling rather than a deconstruction of literary or artistic 
categories. To reiterate, this study examines the work of two artists who worked with 
irrealistic fabulist art, which, although containing elements of magical realism, is not 
magical realism per se.   
What attracts both Varo and Borges, and fuels their art-making, is the impact 
and influence of a sensibility to the seemingly invisible numinous in life experience 
and philosophical thought. This attraction to excavating this invisible presence can 
inspire, and in its most undiluted potential, initiate, a sense of self-forgetting, which 
in turn is related to memory and time-consciousness, as well as to the dream state, 
which is paramount in Varo paintings and especially in Borges’s poetry. 
When Husserl describes fantasy or the imagination as a representation of 
something, this is of course evident in the sense of storytelling or fabulism in some of 
Varo’s paintings and some of Borges’s stories. In the latter, Borges often uses so-
called real references within imaginary fabulist contexts. Proper names, for example, 
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are both used as they are understood in conventional reality and as used in assigned 
literary roles. Although this is obviously not unique to Borges’s literary work, his life 
and his literary work interweave in many ways, as do Varo’s life and her paintings.  
The Husserlian temporal aspect can be complex because fantasy is not like memory:  
The fantasized image is apprehended in the present tense although that 
present is not itself experienced as perceptual present tense. By the 
same token, the fantasized image can reappear and be recovered in 
memory, so it has a certain kind of identity transcending the act of 
fantasy (Moran and Cohen, 120-121). 
Given the specific fabulist storytelling technique underlying narratively in the 
art of Borges and Varo, the content of their work is best described as irrealistic. Thus 
it is useful to consider what irrealism is, which is something more than simply being 
unrealistic. Since scholarship is obliged to question presuppositions, it would be less 
than scholarly to presume everyone knows exactly what reality or realism is. I would 
suggest that reality is generally understood to be “what you see is what you get” or—
following the lead of The Oxford English Dictionary in order to deepen that rather 
superficial version of reality—“The quality or state of being real. Real existence; 
what is real rather than imagined or desired; the aggregate of real things or existences; 
that which underlies and is the truth of appearances or phenomena” ("reality, n."). In 
other words, imagination itself is not considered to be real but imaginary, and indeed, 
Husserl’s use of “phantasy” as a synonym of the imagination signals that usage.  
However, the irrealistic work of Varo and Borges (and other artists and 
writers) resist conventional definitions of reality, as well as most literary or artistic 
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genres, signaling the paramount importance of making art. Noting that the ostensible 
“goal of narratology is the objective, almost scientific, classification of literary texts” 
(Swinford 176), Dean Swinford defines irrealism as a “particular mode of postmodern 
allegory” (176-177) in the sense that artistic products are a response to the mutation 
and usurpation of the natural world by the economy and characteristics of 
contemporary culture. Swinford does observe, however, that irrealism is not easy to 
classify:  
The attempt to define Irrealism as a literary and artistic mode allows 
for an analysis of a current of cultural development without 
overloading the already cumbersome narratological critical 
vocabulary. Irrealism is a term which does not define an entire genre, a 
single species or family, but a group of characteristics adapted by 
different cloth-bound creatures to accommodate for widespread 
variations in their increasingly unnatural habitat. To define a new 
genre is an impossible project because, to some extent, each individual 
text is its own genre, and each specimen a species (177).  
This last point is relevant here, and to some extent it is relevant for all 
attempts to classify anything. Irrealism can serve as a general label for art challenging 
notions of reality, but as Swinford himself emphasizes: “Furthermore, these works 
which I classify as Irreal, such as, among others, Italo Calvino’s Cosmicomics, Jorge 
Luis Borges’ Ficciones, and the paintings of Remedios Varo, are themselves 
interested in patterns, puzzles, classification” (178).  
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This is key—that the work of Borges and Varo are inherently irrealistic and 
thus continually undermine presumptions about reality, a fact both delightful and 
challenging. While acknowledging that one definition of irrealism could be described 
as an indicator of postmodern allegory, and in spite of the fact that Borges’s work has 
been called both high modern and postmodern, I would hesitate to define irrealism as 
a postmodernist phenomenon. One could easily argue that the art of Hieronymus 
Bosch, work that greatly influenced the young Remedios Varo, is irreal. In fact, 
Swinford does compare two paintings, one by Varo and one by Bosch, using Bosch’s 
The Last Judgment (fig. 36) as an example of Christian allegory of symbolic 
language.  
 
Fig. 36. Hieronymus Bosch. The Last Judgment.  
Oil-on-wood triptych. c. 1482.  
Left and right panels: 167.7 x 60 cm and center panel 164 x 127 cm. 
Academy of Fine Arts, Vienna. 
 
Irrealism is a principle key to understanding Borges and Varo, and while 
Swinford’s theory of the irreal as allegorical postmodernism is not inherently invalid, 
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there are other definitions and theories for irrealism.  In his The Art of Fiction, writer 
and critic John Gardner describes irrealism as one of several genres that are “non-
realistic movements—Kafkaesque expressionism, and the formalist ‘irrealism’ of 
writers like Borges and Barthelme” (136). Gardner, discussing the fiction of Donald 
Barthelme, notes that writers who, like Barthelme, are irrealists are working outside 
of conventional fiction, and have abandoned “the attempt to deal directly with reality” 
(138).  
Alice Whittenburg agrees with Gardner that irrealism aims to translate 
psychological reality into physical reality. Whittenburg adds that an attempt to depict 
psychological reality as physical reality “imitates the reality of a dream” (149), and 
she goes on to discuss Erich Fromm’s discussion of “accidental symbols” in 
individual writers:  
However, we contend that, in irreal fiction, the dreamlike nature of the 
work is sustained precisely by the writer’s use of accidental symbols 
without comment. Borges’ labyrinth, Kafka’s bureaucratic mazes, 
Carrington’s horses161 all seem to come from intense personal 
experiences but are used in fiction as they occur in a dream—without 
comment and with intense emotional and psychological import. As a 
result, irreal fiction, like dreams, is both deeply personal and truly 
international (150).   
The definition of irrealism used in this study is closest to a combination of  
descriptions offered by Alice Whittenburg and G.S. Evans. In describing the 
distinction between magical realism, fairy tales, and other forms of fantasy related 
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realism as compared to irrealism, Evans notes, “One of the key differences is that in 
these other genres, there is an internal consistency to the ‘impossible’ physics of the 
story; that is, once the reader understands and accepts this alternative physics, he or 
she can assume that the story and the world it describes will be consistent with it” 
(153). In other words, in the other genres a special physics is set up by the author of 
the story so that this physics is maintained throughout the story: “In an irreal story, 
however, not only is the physics underlying the story impossible, as it is in other 
genres, but is also fundamentally and essentially unpredictable (in that it is not based 
on any traditional or scientific conception of physics) and unexplained” (Evans, 
“What is Irrealism?” 154). These two elements—the unpredictable and the 
unexplained—are clearly primary to the work of  Borges and Varo. Interestingly, this 
description works of irrealism stands as a description of wonder as well.  
Also, while Borges’s creative process bears some resemblance to other 
“literary philosophers” such as Italo Calvino and Umberto Eco,162 the point here is 
that Borges’s fictional writing and poetry contain a combination of philosophical, 
fabulist, and other literary elements, including an erudite intertextuality and an 
interest in mysticism, all of which are topics or aspects of storytelling that are not 
alien to the fable. Varo combines these elements and uses them in her visual 
narratology. Both artists present an irreal quality to their fabulist storytelling, which 
are not simply a fantasy, a term too general to describe their work. 
“Fantasy” has a broader range of meanings and uses ("fantasy | phantasy, 
n.")163, but rather than used as a literary genre or as a psychological term, fantasy is 
emphasized and explicated as a Husserlian phenomenological understanding of 
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fantasy as “imagination, or the process or the faculty of forming mental 
representations of things not actually present” (“fantasy | phantasy, n." definitions 4a, 
4b, 4c). That process is evident in the work of both Varo and Borges. As was 
explicated in Chapter One on Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, the 
structural aesthetic workings of fantasy or creative imagination can be examined in 
detail in the fabulist work of Varo and Borges. That their work is rooted in wonder 
even before being subsequently called magical, mysterious, fantastic or imaginative 
would seem to be a simple point, but as will be seen ahead, it is a complex topic less 
explored than one might expect.  
The fable is a distinct form of fiction. In fact, fable can be understood to be 
different from fiction, according to Foucault, who notes that fiction is “an ‘aspect’ of 
the fable” (Aesthetics 137).  The fable, Foucault emphasizes, is what is functioning 
within a narrative as episodes, characters, or other content being related, whereas 
fiction is the narrative system (Aesthetics 137). Nonetheless, a fable is generally 
considered to be a genre of storytelling, or what would be categorized under fiction. 
How a fable differs from a fairy tale, folk tale, anecdote, parable or apologue is clear 
in some respects and nebulous in other ways. The last two categories mentioned—
parable and apologue—are the closest in kind to fables, although the distinctions 
between even those three labels are less than absolute. The main difference between a 
parable and a fable is that a fable can include anthropomorphized characters—
animals, plants, and even inanimate objects, while a parable does not; both can 
express a moral lesson, but this moral instructive quality is not an obligated 
characteristic for a fable. The apologue usually does contain moral instruction, but 
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like a fable can have anthropomorphized animals, plants and objects. George 
Orwell’s Animal Farm, for example, can be described as an apologue. Thus, while 
apologue is perhaps the nearest literary cousin of fable, inherent moral instruction is 
not mandatory for a fable. Again, these distinctions are not always clear.  The fable, 
like some of the other categories of storytelling, is an ancient form, and one that is 
universal among the world’s cultures. Storytelling in India and Africa in particular 
have strong connections to fabulism. Famously classic fabulists in Europe include 
Aesop, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, and even Leonardo da Vinci. In modern times, 
Leo Tolstoy, Franz Kafka, Ambrose Bierce, James Thurber, Italo Calvino, and Jorge 
Luis Borges have all been described as fabulists. In the interest of consistency, but 
also because these artists are often (although not always) creating work within a 
sphere that can be described as fabulism, the term fabulist is used here for both 
Borges and Varo. 
The highly idiosyncratic oeuvres of Varo and Borges reflect the synergetic 
interaction that arises between individual consciousness and a sense of universality 
and prior unity inherent in many artistic sensibilities aimed at locating and expressing 
the numinous in art. Borges and Varo’s respective preferences to acknowledge and 
portray human consciousness and human self-identification at the root of their 
fabulist storytelling—no matter how irrealistic and strange—becomes one of the most 
accessible and most luminous factors of their art.  
Borges and Varo’s uses of irreal fabulism are related to subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity.  Thus it is relevant to understand how Husserl’s work with 
fantasy164 is related to Borges and Varo’s irrealism, because much about Husserlian 
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fantasy or imagination can be incorporated into fabulist storytelling, including their 
orientations to time and space. 
The Temporal-Spatial Theme 
There are a number of themes that appear in the work of both Varo and 
Borges, albeit via different approaches, that define both artists’ work as irrealistic 
fabulist narratives. While narrative remains central to the creative processes of each, 
it must be emphasized that when we speak of narrative in Varo and Borges, we must 
necessarily accentuate nonlinear narrative. Time and space are challenged and 
reshaped for artistic purpose in their work, while at the same time subjective self-
identification disintegrates and recombines in startling ways. Varo and Borges add a 
spatial-temporal plasticity to their narratives, which makes sense also in that spatial-
temporal plasticity is inherent in irrealism. 
A concept of journey-as-search, or journey-as-revelation sometimes arises in 
relation to time. One theme surfacing in much of their work is an artistic reflection 
and in some cases direct acknowledgement of an invisible eternal and infinite 
absolute that is real beyond socially presumed conventions of physical appearances 
and conventional presumptions about spatial mechanics. These sometimes playful 
themes, in other words, seem more substantial in the context of fabulist storytelling 
than either unquestioned rote belief or uninspected denial of ontological “reality.”  
Questioning reality and presuppositional belief systems about the world and 
self while simultaneously envisioning underlying, even invisible appearances are not 
unique to fables. Genres like science fiction and magical realism, surrealism and 
cubism, and especially some modernist non-objective abstract painting enter this 
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philosophical terrain of invisible and redefined reality. However, those genres of 
visual and literary art are not fabulist art in the sense that the storytelling narratives of 
Varo and Borges are fables.  
While an underlying reality—which is described as a numinous presence in 
this study—can be explored by the artistic genres mentioned above, the main point is 
that many works of literary and visual art explore what seems to be hidden behind 
outer appearances. This numinous, invisible presence can be felt, experienced and 
expressed through some styles of art making and some art, including the fabulist art 
of Varo and Borges.  
Another issue is to consider how the portrayal of human identification is an 
orientation to art for life’s sake. This particular usage of the phrase “art for life’s 
sake” is intended to reference neither the 1875-1920 American arts and crafts 
movement nor a superficial notion or theory that every person is an accomplished 
artist, however genuine and significant those types of topics may be in their own 
contexts. More relevant renderings of art for life’s sake in the context of the present 
study are the ideas and writings of Ellen Dissanayake and Mikhail Bakhtin.  
Art for Life’s Sake: Dissanayake  
 Dissanayake’s view of art for life’s sake is distilled into to what she refers to 
as a “palaeoanthropsychobiological” description of art that includes, Dissanayake 
notes, several interrelated points:  
First, that the idea of art encompasses all of human history (i.e., as far  
back as the Paleolithic or even earlier): second, that it include all 
human societies (i.e., is anthropological or cross-cultural); and third, 
 261 
that it accounts for the fact that art is a psychological or emotional 
need and has psychological or emotional effects. Most people would 
probably agree that their personal “idea of art” includes these things, 
but I will show you that as presently practiced and taught in the West, 
art is a conceptual ragbag or casserole full of the most incompatible 
and confusing notions” (“Art for Life’s Sake” 169).165 
While Dissanayake’s assertion about art in the West makes 
palaeoanthropsychobiological sense, she also makes a point about the modern 
distinction between art and decoration, thereby addressing how an elitist presumption 
feeds the idea that art is a superfluous activity as compared with seemingly more 
critical sociopolitical issues:  
To be sure, among the settlers of our country, women—motivated 
perhaps by notions of gentility—did put pictures on the walls, curtains 
at the window, embroidered covers on the pillows. James Agee, in Let 
Us Now Praise Famous Men, describes the lacelike paper cutouts 
made by a sharecropper’s wife to decoratively edge her mantelpiece. 
And young ladies of the 1920’s, going out to work or aspiring to 
become proper housewives, learned from books like Harriet and Vetta 
Goldstein’s Art in Every Day Life how to dress themselves and furnish 
their homes with good taste (Art and Intimacy 175).166  
 Dissanayake emphasizes that since women have been, “disparaged and 
disregarded, so have, perhaps by association, artists—for similarly reasons: they are 
traditionally more concerned with appearance (‘making things nice’) and involvement 
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with other people and their emotional needs” (Art and Intimacy 175-176). A search 
for a universal evolutionary aesthetic standard, however, is sure to require an 
unearthing of the idea of beauty, which in modern times has led a vast array of 
opinions. Dissanyake emphasizes that a “naturalistic criteria for aesthetic quality” 
(Art and Intimacy 209) does exist, a criteria rooted in the Greek aeshetikos, or sense 
perception, which also incudes the sensation or feeling of beauty. While it is a given 
that sensation enters into every human action or engagement, contemporary society—
and especially contemporary art and academic society—generally questions the 
notion and feeling of beauty: 
Over recent decades, and for what seem like good democratic reasons, 
we have learned to shun terms such as “beauty,” “quality,” and 
“transcendence” and deny the ideas they embody. While these words 
were staples of Victorian conversations about the elevating effects of 
art, they have become as unmentionable and taboo in contemporary 
discourse as “breast” and “thigh” were to the Victorians. With their 
residue of patriarchy, privilege, religiosity, and European dominion, 
the very words now imply a kind of unexamined self-satisfaction, self-
interest, and ultra-conservatism that has become widely suspect (Art 
and Intimacy 207). 
While the discrediting of beauty and aesthetic value by postmodernist theory 
makes sociopolitical sense in regards to critically addressing the presumptions of self-
interests and presumed elitist privileges of the powerful in society, something is also 
lost via the inhibitive nature of that sociopolitical injunction. Dissanyake goes on to 
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point out that evolutionist art theorists also presume that human beings make choices 
that are ultimately beneficial for the person making a choice. The logic of that 
argument and the cultural experience underlying such choices seems clear if art is 
understood to be “an accidental by-product of big brains”  (Art and Intimacy 207) and 
the “enticements of our adaptive interests” (Art and Intimacy 208), but what if art is 
understood to be a more universal human motivation and capacity? What if art-
making is as natural to Homo sapiens as sex and reproduction, or food gathering and 
eating? This is certainly part of Dissanyake’s argument, and if one studies the 
evidence of all artistic history sans any unconscious Eurocentric intellectual 
theoretical bias or consciously constructed and arbitrary art history categorizations, 
that possibility presents its own validation. From the Chauvet, Lascaux, and Altamira 
cave art167 to the art of Joseph Cornell, Adolf Wölfli, Banksy and other graffiti artists, 
and the countless examples between the prehistoric and the contemporary, art for 
life’s sake is everywhere evident as a primary manifestation. 
Art for Life’s Sake: Bakhtin  
Of the numerous possible scholarly explications of art for life’s sake, several 
are clearly relevant in the work of Mikhail Bakhtin. As noted by Deborah Haynes, 
“Of particular focus are [Bakhtin’s] ideas regarding ‘art for life’s sake’ and 
‘theoretism” (Bakhtin Reframed 11).168 Considering the former idea, and the 
distinctions between art for art’s sake and art for life’s sake that, as Haynes notes, was 
asserted earlier by Kant, Schiller, Goethe, Schelling, and others,  “the intersection of 
art and life that Bakhtin valued” (12) is key to understanding the orientations of Varo 
and Borges.  
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Bakhtinian Carnivalesque, Dialogical, Polyphonic Elements in Varo and Borges 
In fact, a number of Bakhtinian theories are relevant when examining Varo’s 
paintings and Borges’s stories. Bakhtin's theory of "carnivalesque" can help explicate 
their artistic preferences for irrealism, as well as reflecting artistically "art for life's 
sake." Carnivalesque is especially useful for explicating Varo's paintings, which 
reflect various aspects of unconventional social turmoil and self-identification, 
search, and mystery. Also Bakhtin's "dialogism" is useful in understanding the 
storytelling or narrative drive of both artists, and how they deal with subjectivity in 
their respective creative inventions, especially for Borges, whose literary characters 
can be immersed in multiple perspectives that contrast monologism with polyphonic 
and dialogic dynamics, even within a single protagonist: 
Bakhtin conceives existence as the kind of book we call a novel, or 
more accurately as many novels (the radically manifold world 
proposed by Bakhtin looks much like Borges’s Library of Babel), for 
all of us write our own such text, a text that is then called our life. 
Bakhtin uses the literary genre of the novel as an allegory for 
representing existence as the condition of  authoring (Holquist 30).  
Furthermore, some of these Bakhtinian issues can be related coherently to 
Husserlian phenomenological explications of memory, fantasy, and image 
consciousness in the specific work of Varo and Borges.  
The Bakhtinian carnivalesque elucidates the use of  irrealist fabulism in the 
writings of Borges and paintings of Varo while also signaling a life-positive 
orientation to the human being, one that affirms a sensibility of art for life’s sake. In 
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his Rabelais and His World, Bakhtin considers the role of the carnivalesque in the 
festive life of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, including its relationship to the 
medieval festival known as the Feast of Fools. Bakhtin broadens that orientation into 
a cultural and literary assessment of the carnival spirit that can be applied beyond his 
study of Rabelais’s Gargantua and Pantagruel. Bakhtin presents the carnivalesque as 
a merging of the sacred with the irreligious or profane, inspiring an anti-authoritarian, 
contrarian celebration of life and art. A liberating attitude towards the humor and the 
grotesque is inherent in the carnivalesque, and has been noted earlier, humor is one of 
the cardinal elements in the creativity of Varo and Borges. Disorder and chaos 
merged with a sense of openness to the world and the human spirit in the sense of 
Bakhtinian “gay relativity” yields what can be described as an abasement of authority 
that yields not only freedom but spiritual affirmation. As a celebration of the human 
body and spirit, even in its grotesqueness, the carnival or carnivalesque lends power 
to an undermining of hierarchical officialdom and authoritative presuppositions. 
Borges and Varo each respectively finds an ability to combine carnivalesque humor 
with a spiritual gravitas through their fabulist excursions into irreality.  
Irrealism allows an artist to obliquely address reality, as is evident in many of 
Varo’s paintings and Borges’s stories. While the landscape of their respective visual 
and literary storytelling might be called a form of fantasy, the sense of feast in the 
midst of journey—a celebratory anarchy or bedlam considerably more disarrayed and 
complex than Hemmingway’s moveable feast—leaves in its wake a challenging 
response to authoritative pieties missed by more widely acknowledged genres and 
categories. Both artists immerse their work in popular cultural while simultaneously 
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challenging, through the carnivalesque, categorical presumptions and cultural 
limitations of a seemingly stabilized society. 
 Bakhtin’s concepts like dialogue and the dialogic are also relevant here. 
Deborah Haynes writes about the significance of dialogue in Bakhtin’s work: 
First, dialogue refers to the fact that every utterance is by nature 
dialogic. Second, dialogue means utterances that are directed to 
someone in a unique situation, and thus dialogue can be either 
monologic or dialogic. Third, Bakhtin understood life itself as 
dialogue. We participate in such dialogues our entire lives, with our 
bodies and through the acts we undertake. Dialogue, therefore, is 
epistemological. Only through dialogue do we know ourselves, other 
persons and the world  (Bakhtin Reframed 142).  
 Thus, even in the midst of employing dialogism as a literary aesthetic concept, 
Bakhtin remains rooted in life itself. That Borges and Varo’s works pivot on the 
theme of art for life’s sake signals how art cannot be divorced from or unrelated to 
human existence 
 Nor is this without a strong connection to phenomenology, one scholar, using 
Merleau-Ponty’s work169 to address dialogue and life in Bakhtin, writes: “Like 
Bakhtin, Merleau-Ponty sees the human subject as living on borderlines, essentially 
tuned to the other, within and without” (Erdinast-Vulcan 157).  
Bataille as Artist-Philosopher 
In regards to presenting an additional example of the writings of an artist-
philosopher, the work of Georges Bataille is worth mentioning in that it might be 
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described as presenting a highly emotive version of the Bakhtinian carnivalesque. 
Similarly, like Borges, Bataille is an atypical seeker of spiritual truth, albeit one more 
expressive and disclosed about sacred orientations in art than Borges. Bataille’s 
approach is asymmetric in the sense that his search for the numinous is continually 
being revised to express the multifarious aspects of  seeking the seemingly 
incommunicable mystery of the sacred. Although he shared with Schopenhauer and 
Borges a reluctance to acknowledge a more conventional or religious approach to 
spirituality in art, it is his passion for that search that is underscored: “Bataille was a 
seeker after God, even though he didn’t admit it,  ‘a new mystic,’ who would propose 
a desertion of History in favor of ‘ecstatic swoon’ ” (Besnier 13).170 Bataille, perhaps 
partly due to his emotional nature, proved incapable of suppressing his attraction to 
the numinous in spite of his  intellectual aspirations: 
I too ‘want to see myself as an intellectual’ provided that I do not take 
it lightly—that is, provided that I do not give the impression of being 
‘upright’ and honest  by renouncing my espousal of existence in its 
totality, on the pretext of restricting myself to knowledge, or by letting 
it be imagined that is possible scientifically to overcome ‘the 
unpredictable course of things’ (15).171 
 Bataille’s words echo his orientation to knowledge and nonknowledge, his 
resistance to the virtually universal acceptance of scientific materialism as a measure 
of validity, and his observations about chance and the limitations of conventional or 
fixed approaches to intellectuality.  
It does not matter if a reader or viewer judges something to be real or not real 
 268 
because fabulist art exists via the representative function of imagination. To reiterate 
what was emphasized above, the imagined object, which is to say the represented 
object, does not have to exist in the same spatial or temporal setting as the so-called 
real object being represented by the imagination.  
Real existence means what? One definition: “What is real rather than 
imagined or desired; the aggregate of real things or existences; that which underlies 
and is the truth of appearances or phenomena” ("reality, n."). In other words, 
imagination itself is not considered to be real but imaginary, and indeed, Husserl’s 
use of “phantasy” as a synonym of the imagination signals that usage. However, 
given that the irrealistic work of Varo and Borges (and other artists and writers) resist 
conventional definitions of reality, as well as any literary or artistic genre, also points 
to the paramount importance of art. Genre-making seems to be an irresistible impulse 
for many literary and art theorists and critics, and while a philosopher like Nelson 
Goodman172 can accurately define and describe irrealism in epistemological terms, 
irrealism itself defies categorization.  
 At this point, it is useful to describe the irreal fabulism of Borges and Varo 
separately in more detail. 
Borges: Artist-Philosopher 
 Although Borges, one of the most erudite creative writers of modern times, 
has been described as a literary philosopher,173 Borges never described himself as a 
philosopher: “Borges was not a philosopher, and never considered himself to be one” 
(Griffin 5). From a distance, then, philosophy and theory might be seen by a spectator 
as two anxiously hungry dogs following Borges—in spite of his ignoring them—
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during one of his walks through the streets of Buenos Aires. Borges approached 
philosophy via his own highly individual path,  primarily an oblique literary approach 
of a philosophical storyteller. “I am neither a philosopher nor a metaphysician; what I 
have done is to exploit [explotar: also ‘explode’],174 or to explore—a more noble 
word—the literary possibilities of philosophy” (Johnson 1).175 
In other words, Borges uses philosophy for his art, something that is apparent 
for any reader of his fabulist work. Borges is working, in a highly creative and 
frequently playful way, with philosophy in the manner of an artist-philosopher despite 
his claim to not being a philosopher. Although Borges claimed he could not read 
Kant, his lifelong reading of Schopenhauer is well-known, as is his longtime interest 
in the writings and ideas of the Swedish theologian and mystic Emanuel Swedenborg 
(1688-1772), the writings of William James, and other thinkers who did not shy away 
from topics about the numinous and related topics.  
An influence on the young Borges in Buenos Aires was his father’s friend 
Macedonio Fernández, an eccentric writer, humorist, philosopher, and attorney whose 
thoughts, talks, and writings reflected an extreme idealism (Williamson, Borges, 96). 
Macedonio’s influence on Borges is related to issues such as subjectivity and 
irrealism: 
In later years Borges came to regard Macedonio Fernandez as a far 
better talker that he was a writer. Even so, the influence of 
Macedonio’s ideas on Borges’s writing was crucial, especially as 
regards two fundamental themes that would not come to maturity until 
the 1940’s—the “unreality” of the material world and the nonexistence 
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of the “I,” or individual subject. Borges would elaborate this latter idea 
into one of his most striking themes—the arbitrariness of personal 
identity, the notion that an individual could, in principle, be any other, 
an idea he had already come across in Schopenhauer (Williamson, 
Borges, 97). 
In Borges’s case, his interest in mysticism is often acknowledged by literary 
scholars as being only a peripheral phenomenon. Yet the opposite could be argued 
and has been argued by some writers and scholars.176 Borges’s interest in numinous 
was clearly more than a peripheral matter only distantly related to being a literary 
artist. The titles of some of his creative writings alone indicate Borges’s interest in 
this area, including pieces like “The Aleph,” “The Cult of the Phoenix,” and “The 
Approach to Al-Mu’tasim.”  Likewise, Borges’s philosophical bent is evident in his 
titles: “A Problem,” “Everything and Nothing,” The Other,” and “His End and His 
Beginning,” among many others.  
Consider, for example, “A Problem.”177 As he did years earlier in “Pierre 
Menard, Author of Quixote,” Borges pivots his story around one of the world’s 
preeminent masterpieces of fictions,  The Ingenius Gentleman Don Quixote of La 
Mancha (El ingenioso hidalgo don Quijote de la Mancha). However, it is how he 
accomplishes this creative appropriation that is significant in “a Problem.”  
“Let us imagine…” opens this fable (Collected Fictions 308). As mentioned 
earlier, Husserl uses the word phantasy as a synonym for imagination. What is 
immediately “given” in Husserlian terms is the appearance of an object of fantasy. 
The reader, then, receives or intuits that presentation, which because this is a work of 
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imagination is actually a re-presentation. Yet as always with Borges, the line between 
imagination or fantasy and so-called reality is nebulous in that the narrative is a 
woven strand of what is “real” (historical) and imaginary, a strand described in this 
study as irrealism. The entire opening sentence of “A Problem” reads, “Let us 
imagine that a piece of paper with a text in Arabic on it is discovered in Toledo, and 
that paleographers declare the text to have been written by that same Cide Hamete 
Benengeli from whom Cervantes derived Don Quixote” (308).  
After openly declaring the imaginary state, or re-presentation of this “piece of 
paper,” the author immediately begins to construct a communication based on an 
amalgamation of fantasy and fact. One might say Borges is “bracketing in” facts into 
his fables or stories. The character Cide Hamete Benengeli is not a historical person, 
yet neither is he invented by Borges. Benengeli is a character invented by Cervantes 
who is then appropriated by Borges.  References like the Arabic text and Toledo are 
obviously “factual.” This kind of creative invention in fiction is not unique to Borges, 
of course, but, as noted earlier, how he accomplishes that creative process in a 
scholarly style reflects a distinctive Borgesian style. In a single fabulist sentence 
Borges presents elements of irrealism, literary intertextuality, and an undermining of 
historical authenticity. The question then arises as to whether or not Borges’s work 
can be more clearly understood via critical theory explications. 
Borges and Critical Theory 
In terms of structuralist and poststructuralist critical theory, while there was 
some positive acknowledgement of Borges’s literary creations, there was scant in-
depth critical regard for his work until critics and literary scholars began to write 
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studies of Borges. Foucault’s positive response to Borges has been discussed earlier. 
Michael Wood, in an essay titled “Borges and Theory,” describes how Borges draws 
near to some of the common issues in French theory without actually merging with 
them:  
The world of Borges’s fiction, in its most amply philosophically 
mischievous measures, maps very convincingly on to a number of 
preoccupations we find in (French) critical theory, associated in 
particular with the names of, respectively, Michael Foucault, Louis 
Althusser, Roland Barthes, and Jacques Lacan. I am thinking of 
discourse (rather than material event) as the source of meaning in 
history; ideology as ubiquitous and unavoidable (rather than 
representing any given set of chosen political assumptions); mythology 
as an aspect of every day contemporary life; and the realm of the 
symbolic as that of shared social existence. These notions differ from 
each other in important ways, of course, but each has a touch of 
Borges about it, and each involves a system of meaning which allows 
for the investigation of realities felt to be (often distressingly) out of 
reach or caught up in complicated mediations (33).  
 The final sentence is a lucid summation of the relationship between Borges 
and critical theory. Wood adds: 
“If his writing forms an attractive provocation for Foucault, and a 
half-denied parallel project for Lacan,178 for other Europeans it is 
something like an indispensable reference, the mark of a stylish and 
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informed modernity, and an acknowledgment that playfulness too 
must be part of any sophisticated skepticism” (33).  
Other theorists such as Jacques Derrida, who references two quotations from 
Borges in his essay “Plato’s Pharmacy” but does not substantially comment on 
Borges beyond Borges’s words—words Derrida uses primarily to support his own 
argument (Wood 34)—knew about Borges but did not write extensively or directly 
about his work. Julia Kristeva responded similarly, noted Wood: “Julia Kristeva’s 
chief allusion to Borges is similar in style to Derrida’s: a swift evocation and a trail of 
associations” (35).179 Wood goes on to say that Kristeva does quote from Borges’s 
story “The Cruel Redeemer Lazarus Morrell” in his A Universal History of Iniquity 
because in  “Morrell’s sinister ingenuity Kristeva finds an allegory of modern writing, 
cut off from the sacred” (36), but he accurately points out that she goes on to 
emphasize her own, not Borges’s, accents of horror, which are like a void beneath 
beautiful artifices: 
Borges certainly looks into this void, and his elegant, worldly irony 
recognizes, or glances at, all kinds of horrors. But he doesn’t sink into 
them. His writing is a way of navigating the space between the dark 
and the light (36). 
This elucidates a key point for both Borges and Varo’s work—they both 
navigated a  route between dark and light, and yet neither artist sank into darkness or 
negativity, partly because of their playfulness and humor, but primarily because of 
their respective searches for the numinous.  
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Wood discusses Borges and Roland Barthes as well. Although in his writings 
and lectures Barthes never mentioned Borges, they were on the same page, so to 
speak, in that, as Wood says, “…what really connects Borges and Barthes, makes 
them ‘precursors’ of each other, so to speak, is the sense not that the author is hidden 
or ghostly or inaccessible or not needed but that the reader creates the author” (37). 
Wood points out that Borges’s story “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote” from the 
1944 The Garden of Forking Paths (El jardín de senderous que se bifurcan)180 
perfectly reflects this notion of the reader creating the author.  
In fact, there is much about “Pierre Menard” that echoes Borges’s role in this 
study: questions of subjectivity, reality, fantasy, memory, and invisible presence, 
among others. As in much of Borges’s fabulist literature, the opening paragraph of 
this story conveys a seemingly authentic scholarly tone, with compelling and 
seemingly factual details from life and history. Most importantly, at least to this 
reader, is that a resonant, attractive quality arises as the words flow by. This resonant 
and arresting feeling remains distant yet unmistakably present in the reader’s 
awareness, forming initially a confluence of narration and reader consciousness, but 
quickly establishing a sense of assimilation between the narrative and the reader, and 
between the characters and the reader, an amalgamating quality that instills a sense of 
intersubjective singularity in the reader.  Existing on the cusp between conscious and 
unconscious awareness, the reader begins to identify with the anonymous author 
presenting the narrative:   
The visible oeuvre left by this novelist can be easily and briefly 
enumerated; unpardonable, therefore, are the omissions and additions 
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perpetrated by Mme. Henri Bachelier in a deceitful catalog that a 
certain newspaper, whose Protestant leaning are surely no secret, has 
been so inconsiderate as to inflict upon that newspaper’s deplorable 
readers—few and Calvinist (if not Masonic and circumcised) though 
they be. Menard’s true friends have greeted that catalog with alarm, 
and even with a degree of sadness. One might note that only yesterday 
were we gathered before his marmoreal place of rest, among the dreary 
cypresses, and already Error is attempting to tarnish his bright 
Memory….Most decidedly, a brief rectification is imperative 
(Collected Fictions 88). 
Also evident in the opening to “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote” are 
some of the qualities mentioned earlier by Michael Wood that are present in the 
majority of Borges’s creative work: discourse, ideology, mythology, the symbolic. 
The narrator goes on to reveal that Menard has authored many obscure and 
philosophical works, and has written two chapters of Don Quixote. Yet Menard’s 
writings are not exactly the same two chapters of Don Quixote written by Miguel de 
Cervantes, or more accurately, they are and they are not. How can this be? It is 
actually Borges’s narrator who addresses this issue:  
It is a revelation to compare the Don Quixote of Pierre Menard with 
that of Miguel de Cervantes. Cervantes, for example, wrote the 
following (Part I, Chapter IX): 
 …truth, whose mother is history, rival of time, depository of deeds, 
witness of the past, exemplar and adviser to the present, and the 
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future’s counselor. This catalog of attributes, written in the 
seventeenth century, and written by the “ingenious layman” Miguel de 
Cervantes, is mere rhetorical praise of history. Menard, on the other 
hand, writes:  
…truth, whose mother is history, rival of time, depository of 
deeds, witness of the past, exemplar and advisor to the present, 
and the future’s counselor.  
History, the mother of truth!—the idea is staggering. Menard, a 
contemporary of William James, defines history not as delving into 
reality but as the very fount of reality. Historical truth, for Menard, is 
not “what happened”; it is what we believe happened. The final 
phrases—exemplar and adviser to the present, and the future’s 
counselor—are brazenly pragmatic (94).   
 That both versions of the commentary above—that of Cervantes and 
Menard—are identical, says everything about Borges and his ability to 
simultaneously disclose and deceive, to graciously bestow and mischievously beguile, 
while entertaining and transporting the reader. Borges transports the reader into his 
irreal storytelling, and once the reader is within the story, he or she becomes almost 
unknowingly activated as a participant—the fabricator, commentator, and narrator of 
a fabulist tale. A number of issues germane to the present study surface in this kind of 
milieu—two being the self-forgetting and not-knowing experiences of the reader-
narrator. Also apparent is the plasticity of thought—inherent temporal-spatial 
alignments and instability of what is only apparently stable philosophical truth. 
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Borges does not hesitate to dismantle ontological and epistemological 
presuppositions; he continuously challenges intellectual belief systems. In “Pierre 
Menard” the narrator says: 
There is no intellectual exercise that is not ultimately pointless. A 
philosophical doctrine is, at first, a plausible description of the 
universe; the years go by, and it is a mere chapter—if not a paragraph 
or proper noun—in the history of philosophy (94).   
Being himself a master of philosophical obscurity allows Borges to create a 
forest of non-sequiturs for thinkers. Entering one of Borges’s famous mazes is a 
philosophical, even an aesthetic risk. In fact, the reluctance of Lacan, Derrida, 
Barthes, and other modern French theorists to adequately address Borges’s work may 
be partly due to its idiosyncratic, irrealistic style, confounding any preconceived 
expectations—literal, narratological, philosophical or theoretical.  In some respects, 
Borges can be more obscure and oblique than some of the French theorists who have 
occasionally been accused of being obscure and oblique. What makes Borges’s 
fabulism in some sense as rich if not richer than the work of those illustrious theorists 
is that theorists, despite being at times brilliantly original and witty, often take 
themselves very seriously. Does Borges take himself seriously? At some level, how 
could he not? Yet Borges remains a genius of elegant and playful humor, even of a 
kind of quiet hilarity and self-effacement. His work reflects a quality—not his 
primary quality, perhaps, but nonetheless on that is always present—of  not quite 
trusting philosophy either in his beloved library or in himself.  
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On the other hand, it could also be argued that Borges’s work was simply a 
literary precursor of what later came to be developed by the French theorists:  
In “Pierre Menard,” Borges presents a conception of writing which is 
radically new, indeed revolutionary, and which seems to anticipate by 
some twenty years certain ideas developed by French theorists. Like 
Michael Foucault, Menard questions the existence of an objective 
historical reality and suggests that the reader constructs the so-called 
truths of history; like Julia Kristeva, Menard wants to show that a text 
is not an original piece of writing but a web of “intertextual” relations; 
and like Jacques Derrida, Menard denies the possibility of discovering 
the “presence” of an author in a literary text. Above all, the story 
heralds what Roland Barthes would famously call the “Death of the 
Author”—Menard’s project undermines that idea that a text 
communicates a message from what Barthes called the “Author-God.” 
Every reader, therefore, is a kind of Pierre Menard who repeats the 
worlds of the text as he reads and changes their meaning as he adjusts 
them to his own subjectivity (Williamson, “Borges in Context,” 211). 
Nonetheless, Jacques Derrida is well aware of Borges’s work. In what is one 
of Derrida’s most beautiful books, Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other 
Ruins, he considers with his usual insight and accomplished intertextual finesse some 
great writers who were blind or who became blind—Homer, Joyce, Milton, Borges 
(33). Derrida writes, “Borges begins with Homer; he then ends with Joyce—and, still 
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just as modestly, with the self-portrait of the author as a blind man, as a man of 
memory, and this, just after an allusion to castration” (35).    
Borges discussed his making of fables at times. In one conversation with 
fellow Argentinian Osvaldo Ferrari in the 1980s about Borges’s upcoming second trip 
to Japan, Italy and Greece, Ferrari asks Borges why he still retained (at his advanced 
age and in spite of his blindness) an excellent facility for travel. Borges replied: 
One reason would be my blindness, my feeling countries without 
being able to see them. If I stay in Buenos Aires, my life will 
be…insignificant. I will always be inventing fables, dictating. On the 
other hand, if I travel, I will be acquiring new impressions. 
Impressions which will, in the end, turn into literature (Borges and 
Ferrari, Conversations Volume 1, 7).   
This statement is interesting because it indicates that Borges was not simply 
“inventing” fables to dictate as short stories, but merging his fables with so-called real 
life. While referencing the non-fictional world and one’s personal life may be 
common, if not universal, with literary writers, merging fact with fiction was a 
paramount aspect of Borges’s work. 
Besides Derrida’s book being a excellent example of erudition and his ability 
to apply heterogeneous approaches to a topic, it is a wonderful instance of the levels 
of complexity that sometimes arise with intertexuality—wherein an intertextual 
comment can be pivoted from another intertexual comment. Given the scholarly 
erudition of both Borges and Derrida, one can only wonder at what an active 
friendship between the two might have given the world.  
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To return to the point being discussed—there actually are connections 
between Borges and critical theorists. In a sense, one could argue that theorists and 
philosophers—at least in some cases and at least in certain moments—are so 
committed to their concepts that they unconsciously become trapped in an 
unintentional sophism. One challenge for scholars is determine how to navigate the 
exclusivities and limitations of scholarly language, as well as how to dismantle 
whatever academic conservatism might underlie scholarly professionalism. Borges 
almost invariably remains humble and even self-deprecating. Theorists, although 
some are modest individuals, are not, generally speaking, self-deprecating.181  One of 
the chief advantages the artist-philosopher has over other thinkers is 
straightforward—the artist-philosopher can present concepts, ideas, and even theories 
through making art. A preeminent contemporary thinker, Alain Badiou, has 
commented at length on the artist-philosopher dynamic: 
A bond that is forever affected by a symptom, one of oscillation, of 
throbbing. From the very beginning there is Plato's judgement 
ostracizing poetry, theatre and music. By and large the founding father 
of philosophy—a refined connoisseur of the arts no doubt—preserves, 
in The Republic, only military music and patriotic chants. On the other 
hand, you find a pious devotion to art, a contrite bending of the 
concept, reasoned as technical nihilism, against the poetic word that 
alone proffers the world at the latent Openness of its own angst. Yet, 
after all, Protagoras the sophist, singled out the apprenticeship of arts 
as the key to education. There was an alliance of Protagoras and 
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Simonides the poet, which Plato's Socrates attempts to thwart the 
casuistry and enslave the rational¹s intensity to his own benefit. An 
image comes to mind, an analogous matrix of meaning: philosophy 
and art are historically coupled the way the Master and the Hysteric 
coalesce in Lacan. You know how the hysteric confronts the master 
and says: "The truth speaks through my tongue, I am 'there,' and you, 
who knows, do tell me who I am." And you surmise that whatever 
wisdom and subtleties lie in the master's reply, the hysteric will let him 
know it is not as yet that, that her "there" evades the catch, that all 
should be resumed, and a lot of effort is required to please her. She 
thereby takes command over the master and becomes maîtresse du 
maître. As it is, art is always already there, addressing the thinker with 
the silent and scintillating question of its own identity. However, 
through constant invention—its metamorphosis—art dismisses 
whatever the philosopher has to say concerning its own self (Badiou 
“Art and Philosophy”). 
The artist in a thinker, or the thinker in an artist, creates an unusual situation. 
In Borges’s case, despite his rich and extensive literary output of fiction, nonfiction, 
and poetry, and his immense erudition, Borges is attracted to anonymity, obscurity, 
and self-imitation. The art of both Varo and Borges contains mirrors and labyrinths, 
conundrums and paradoxes. In a metaphorical sense, Borges is a richly attired clown 
who is attracted to and can deftly and eloquently transmit the carnivalesque and the 
grotesque via his irrealistic, fabulist narrative.  In fact, as pointed out by Manuel 
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Duráin and Fay R. Rogg, there are parallel universes in Borges’s Pierre Menard, and 
Cervantes’ Don Quixote, not to mention the work of another irreal storyteller, Franz 
Kafka:  
Borges (1899-1986) and Kafka [1883-1924] have much in common. 
Both like parables. Kafka’s parables tend to be mysterious, dark, and 
tragic. Borges’s parables are more whimsical, sometimes contradictory 
and ambiguous, often disconcerting, and occasionally irritating. 
Borges plays games, invents nonexistent literary works, even 
encyclopedias. He creates fake footnotes; in other words, he has fun 
and at the same time sends messages for the reader to decipher. This 
technique is reminiscent of that found in murder mysteries where the 
reader may eventually guess the identity of the murderer after 
uncovering clues along the way (228).   
 And of course there are parallels between the narratives of Borges and 
Cervantes, which is another reason “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote” has long 
fascinated literary scholars. “Borges’s approach to criticism is ironic and devastating” 
(229). Duráin and Rogg go on to address the Borgesian maze, which is significant 
enough to quote at length because the authors elucidate much about Borges’s work: 
The words used to define history are the same, but [between Cervantes 
and Menard], but their meaning is not, simply because the cultural 
horizon has shifted toward relativity. Starting wit the Enlightenment 
and Kant’s philosophy, this fact erodes the belief in an absolute, 
immutable truth in the field of history, accessible to true, devoted, 
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scientific historians. Whatever Cervantes may have thought about 
history, we are today less confident of reaching a perfect 
understanding of the past, and Borges’s essay (or is it an obituary?) 
states this in an ironic and oblique fashion; there will always be room 
for another interpretation of the past. This applies to Cervantes’s 
novel, which will be the subject of new interpretation as new 
generations appear on the historic horizon. Borges himself stated again 
and again that his readers have interpreted whatever he wrote and that 
basically it is up to them to decide on the meaning of his work (230).  
This point signals how what was asserted earlier in the present study—that a 
work of art or literature is not complete until it is completed by the viewer or the 
reader—is always relevant.  That Duchamp emphasized this issue as well as Borges is 
interesting; neither of them liked their work being categorized by scholars or fit into 
definitive aesthetic categories.  
Borges and Subjectivity 
Borges’s fictional prose in pieces like “Borges and I” reflect an ongoing 
struggle with subjectivity and the idea of self. Describing this “other” man—
“Borges,” the author “allows” both his and Borges’s existence, about which the 
author of “Borges and I” feels, at best, ambivalence:  
I t would be an exaggeration to say that our relationship is hostile—I 
live, I allow myself to live, so that Borges can spin out his literature, 
and that literature is my justification. I willingly admit that he has 
written a number of sound pages, but those pages will not save me, 
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perhaps because the good in them no longer belongs to any individual, 
not even that other man, but rather to language itself, or to tradition. 
Beyond that, I am doomed—utterly and inevitably—to oblivion, and 
fleeting moments will be all of me that survives in that other man. 
Little by little, I have been turning everything over to him, though I 
know the perverse way he has of distorting and magnifying 
everything. Spinoza believed that all things wish to go on being what 
they are—stone wishes eternally to be stone, and tiger, to be tiger. I 
shall endure in Borges, not in myself (if, indeed, I am anybody at all), 
but I recognize myself less in his books than in many others’, or in the 
tedious strumming of a guitar (Collected Fictions 324). 
Borges’s poetry expresses the emotional tone of this attraction to self-
forgetting more directly. As emphasized by Jason Wilson (194), Borges, in his sonnet 
“On Waking” (El despertar” also translated as “Waking Up” in the 1964 collection 
The Self and the Other, or El otro el mismo) does express his desire to be released 
from self: 
 The trappings of my day also come back:  
 My voice, my face, my nervousness, my luck. 
 If only Death, that other waking-up,  
 Would grant me a time free of all memory 
 Of my own name and all that I have been! 
 If only morning meant oblivion! (Selected Poems 201) 
 [Vuelve también la cotidiana historia:  
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 Mi voz, mi rostro, mi temor, mi suerte. 
 ¡Ah, si aquel otro despertar, la muerte,  
 Me deparara un tiempo sin memoria 
 De mi nombre y de todo lo que he sido! 
 ¡Ah, si en esa mañana huybiera olvido! (Selected Poems 200-201)] 
 Another poetic rendering of the existential desire to acknowledge the 
paradoxical and bifurcated nature of self-identification is in a 1975 anthology182 in 
Borges’s poem “The Dream” or  “El sueño” (Selected Poems 348-349). 
“The Dream” 
While the clocks of the midnight hours are squandering 
an abundance of time, 
I shall go, farther than the shipmates of Ulysses, 
to the territory of dream, beyond the reach 
of human memory. 
From that underwater world I save some fragments, 
inexhaustible to my understanding: 
grasses from some primitive botany, 
animals of all kinds, 
conversations with the dead, 
faces which all the time are masks, 
words out of very ancient languages, 
and at times, horror, unlike anything 
the day can offer us. 
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I shall be all or no one. I shall be the other 
I am without knowing it, he who has looked on 
that other dream, my waking state. He weighs it up, 
resigned and smiling. 
[“El sueño” 
Cuando los relojes de la media noche prodiguen 
Un tiempo generoso, 
Iré más lejos que los bogavantes de Ulises 
A la región del sueño, inaccessible 
A la memoria humana. 
De esa region inmersa rescato restos 
Que no acabo de comprender: 
Hierbas de sencilla botánica, 
Animales algo diversos, 
Diálogos con los muertos, 
Rostros que realmente son mascaras, 
Palabras de lenguajes muy antiguos 
Y a veces un horror incomparable 
Al que nos puede dar el día. 
Seré todos o nadie. Seré el otro 
Que sin saberlo soy, el que ha mirado 
Ese otro sueño, mi vigilia. La juzga, 
Resignado y sonriente.] 
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 It should be noted that O’Rawe and others have proposed that Borges’s early 
poetry is more directly expressive of spiritual themes.  
Borges also questioned throughout his adult life what was conventionally 
presumed to be “real.” In fact, Borges considered literature, which is to say art, to be 
more real than the material world that humankind presumes is real, the world within 
which art seems to be physically created. He questioned everything, which is clearly a 
philosophical orientation to the phenomena of life, and his questions arise in both his 
fabulist storytelling and in his non-fiction essays, a distinction that is itself sometimes 
a nebulous and shifting separation.  
As noted, a primary characteristic of fables is an inclusion of animals and 
other creatures, some humanoid, others not, and some mythical or imaginary, others 
not. This characteristic is inherent in some of both artists’ work. In fact, for both of 
these fabulists, the interaction of humans and other species, and sometimes the 
blending of species, is an essential feature in their work. 
Borges fascination with the tiger surfaces repeatedly in his fabulism. The 
narrator’s opening to “Blue Tigers” in his 1983 book, Shakespeare’s Memory, 
addresses this fascination.  
A famous poem by Blake paints the tiger as a fire burning right and an 
eternal archetype of Evil; I prefer the Chesterton maxim that casts the 
tiger as a symbol of terrible elegance. Apart from these, there are no 
words that can rune [sic] the tiger, that shape which for centuries has 
lived in the imagination of mankind. I have always been drawn to the 
tiger. I know that as a boy I would linger before one particular cage at 
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the zoo; the others held no interest for me. I would judge 
encyclopedias and natural histories by their engravings of the tiger. 
When the Jungle Books were revealed to me I was upset that the tiger, 
Shere Khan, was the hero’s enemy. As the years passed, this strange 
fascination never left me; it survived my paradoxical desire to become 
a hunter as it did all common human vicissitudes (Collected Fictions 
494).  
The narrator in Borges “Blue Tigers” is a Scotsman working in India as a 
professor of Eastern and Western logic, who also hosts a weekly seminar on Spinoza, 
and who notes that “it may have been my love of tigers that brought me from 
Aberdeen to Punjab” (494). Tigers, he goes on to say, are always in his dreams.    
Included in Borges’s 1964 Dreamtigers, a collection of stories and poems, is a 
poem that offers some words that point to the importance of the tiger to Borges, and 
to other themes that attracted him: other animals, the library, the river, the quest, 
dreams. 
“The Other Tiger”  
And the craft that createth a semblance  
—Morris: Sigurd the Volsung (1876) 
 
I think of a tiger. The gloom here makes 
The vast and busy Library seem lofty 
And pushes the shelves back; 
Strong, innocent, covered with blood and new, 
It will move through its forest and its morning 
And will print its tracks on the muddy 
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Margins of a river whose name it does not know 
(In its world there are no names nor past 
Nor time to come, only the fixed moment) 
And will overleap barbarous distances 
And will scent out of the plaited maze 
Of all the scents the scent of dawn 
And the delighting scent of deer. 
Between the stripes of the bamboo I decipher 
Its stripes and have the feel of the bony structure 
That quivers under the glowing skin. 
In vain do the curving seas intervene 
And the deserts of the planet; 
From this house in a far-off port 
In South America, I pursue and dream you, 
O tiger on the Ganges’ banks. 
In my soul the afternoon grows wider and I reflect 
That the tiger invoked in my verse 
is a ghost of a tiger, a symbol, 
A series of literary tropes 
And memories from the encyclopaedia 
And not the deadly tiger, the fateful jewel 
That, under the sun or the varying moon, 
In Sumatra or Bengal goes on fulfilling 
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Its rounds of love, of idleness and death. 
To the symbolic tiger I have opposed 
The real thing, with its warm blood, 
That decimates the tribe of buffaloes 
And today, the third of August, ’59, 
Stretches on the grass a deliberate 
Shadow, but already the fact of naming it 
And conjecturing its circumstances 
Makes it a figment of art and no creature 
Living among those that walk the earth. 
We shall seek a third tiger. This 
Will be like those others a shape 
Of my dreaming, a system of words 
A man makes and not the vertebrate tiger 
That, beyond the mythologies, 
Is treading the earth. I know well enough 
That something lays on me this quest 
Undefined, senseless and ancient, and I go on 
Seeking through the afternoon time 
The other tiger, that which is not in verse  
(Dreamtigers 70-71). 
[“El Otro Tigre” 
Pienso en un tigre. La penumbra exalta  
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La vasta Biblioteca laboriosa  
Y parece alejar los anaqueles;  
Fuerte, inocente, ensangrentado y nuevo,  
Él irá por su selva y su mañana  
Y marcará su rastro en la limosa  
Margen de un río cuyo nombre ignora  
(En su mundo no hay nombres ni pasado  
Ni porvenir, sólo un instante cierto.)  
Y salvará las bárbaras distancias  
Y husmeará en el trenzado laberinto  
De los olores el olor del alba  
Y el olor deleitable del venado;  
Entre las rayas del bambú descifro  
Sus rayas y presiento la osatura  
Bajo la piel espléndida que vibra.  
En vano se interponen los convexos  
Mares y los desiertos del planeta;  
Desde esta casa de un remoto puerto  
De América del Sur, te sigo y sueño,  
Oh tigre de las márgenes del Ganges.   
Cunde la tarde en mi alma y reflexiono  
Que el tigre vocativo de mi verso  
Es un tigre de símbolos y sombras,  
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Una serie de tropos literarios  
Y de memorias de la enciclopedia  
Y no el tigre fatal, la aciaga joya  
Que, bajo el sol o la diversa luna,  
Va cumpliendo en Sumatra o en Bengala  
Su rutina de amor, de ocio y de muerte.  
Al tigre de los símbolos he opuesto  
El verdadero, el de caliente sangre,  
El que diezma la tribu de los búfalos  
Y hoy, 3 de agosto del 59,  
Alarga en la pradera una pausada  
Sombra, pero ya el hecho de nombrarlo  
Y de conjeturar su circunstancia  
Lo hace ficción del arte y no criatura  
Viviente de las andan por la tierra.   
Un tercer tigre buscaremos. 
Éste Será como los otros una forma  
De mi sueño, un sistema de palabras  
Humanas y no el tigre vertebrado 
Que, más allá de las mitologías,  
Posa la tierra. Bien lo sé, pero algo   
Me impone esa aventura indefinida,  
Insensata y antigua, y persevero  
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En buscar por el tiempo de la tarde  
El otro tigre, el que no está en el verso.]  
In the final stanza, the third tiger appears as “a system of words / A man 
makes” (71) that serves an impulse of seeking, a seeking that drives Borges’s life and 
art.  
In his essay “A New Refutation of Time,” Borges writes, “Had this refutation 
(or its title been published in the middle of the eighteenth century, it would be 
included in a bibliography by Hume, or at least mentioned by Huxley or Kemp Smith. 
But published in 1947 (after Bergson) it is the anachronistic reductio ad absurdum of 
an obsolete system, or even worse, the feeble artifice of an Argentine adrift on a sea 
of metaphysics” (Selected Non-fictions 317). 
 One obvious characteristic of Borges’s work is intertextuality, which 
in itself represents a philosophical facet of the temporal theme. Borges is a 
preeminent example of someone whose work is pervaded by an aesthetic of 
intertextuality. 
Borges, Time and Intertextuality 
Ancient authors become contemporary in some sense, and obscure voices 
grow famous in his storytelling. In “A New Refutation of Time,” an essay of 16 pages 
(Selected Non-fictions 317-332), Borges references David Hume, George Berkeley, 
and Arthur Schopenhauer repeatedly, but he also refers to the work of biologist 
Thomas Henry Huxley, philosophers Norman Kemp Smith and Henri Bergson, 
philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Buddhism and Tibetan 
mythology, sociological writer Gustav Spiller, Cartesian ideas, scientist and satirist 
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Georg Christoph Lichenberg, Mark Twain’s Huck Finn, Peruvian Captain Isidoro 
Suárex, essayist Thomas De Quincy, Shakespeare, philosophers Heraclitus and 
Plutarch, Cain of the Old Testament, dramatist George Bernard Shaw, author C.S. 
Lewis, Zeno and Lucretius and Plato, philosopher Josiah Royce, St. Augustine, 
philosopher and essayist Thomas Carlyle, Platonist John Norris, Judah Abrabanel, 
Gemistus, Plotinus, theologians Malebranche, Johannes Eckhart, F. H. Bradley, 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Parmenides and Anaxagoras, philosophers 
Alexander Campbell Fraser and  Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, philosophers Hermann 
Lotze and Boethius, physician and philosopher Sextus Empiricus, priest and poet 
Angelus Silesius, Chuang Tzu, scientist, and philosopher, theologian and mystic 
Emmanuel Swedenborg.  Borges’s erudition as a working librarian and scholar, poet 
and fabulist, is impressive. Borges referenced in his decades of  writing fiction and 
nonfiction a vast number of thinkers and literary artists. 
 As might be expected from an accomplished poet, Borges language could also 
be very lyrical, as when, summarizing his concluding assessment at the end of  “A 
New Refutation of Time,” he writes, “Time is the substance of which I am made. 
Time is a river that sweeps me along, but I am the river; it is a tiger that mangles me, 
but I am the tiger; it is a fire that consumes me, but I am the fire. The world, 
unfortunately, is real; I, unfortunately, am Borges” (Selected Non-fictions 332).  
 Borges noted that he placed a refutation of time in every book he wrote 
(Selected Non-fictions 318), and he brings forth Berkeley’s argument that nothing, no 
object, exists outside of the human mind perceiving it, except that when no human 
individual perceives an object, God still does. Borges considers both Berkeley and 
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Schopenhauer to be idealistic thinkers, and he notes that both Berkeley and Hume, 
each in his own way, affirmed the existence of time.  Exactly what about time Borges 
refutes emerges in his essay; essentially he denies “in a large number of cases” 
temporal succession and simultaneity (322). Finally in “A New Refutation of Time,” 
Borges quotes Schopenhauer that the present, not the future or the past, is “the form 
of all life” (331). As is often the case when it comes to philosophy, and in spite of 
some minor differences in a given context, Borges agrees in general with 
Schopenhauer’s orientation to time, and quotes him at length in his essay:  
We can compare time to an endlessly turning circle: the constantly 
falling half would be the past, the one constantly arising the future, but 
on top, the indivisible point touched by the tangent would be 
unextended present. Just as the tangent does not roll on with the circle, 
neither does the present, the point of contact between the object, 
whose form is time, and the subject, which has no form because it does 
not belong among objects of possible cognition, but is a condition of 
all objects of possible cognition. Or: time is like a ceaseless stream and 
the present like a rock on which it breaks, but does not sweep along 
with it (Schopenhauer, WWP I, 331).  
 It is worth considering if Schopenhauer’s “endlessly turning circle” raises 
another point. Does Borges subscribe to a cyclical version of time? He definitely 
investigates this idea, rejecting the Nietszchian notion of cyclical time and eventually 
seeming to prefer another version: “Finally, we arrive at the third and least 
threatening version of this doctrine: the view that there is a repetition of similar but 
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not identical cycles. It is Borges’s favorite version and he cites several formulations” 
(Bossart 105).  
Santiago Colás, after noting in “The Difference that Time Makes: 
Hopelessness and Potency in Borges’s ‘El Alep’ ” that Borges, famous for his 
economy, wrote a single sentence two pages long. Colás, pointing out that the 
narrator (called “Borges” in “The Aleph”) is obsessed with his unrequited beloved 
Beatriz Viterbo to the point that he repeats the name “Beatriz” seven times in seven 
sentences, writes, “We have then, right from the beginning of ‘Borges’s description, 
the experience of time as a problem along with a proposed solution: resistance to time 
through repetition” (88).  Colás goes on to describe “Borges” meetings with Beatriz’s 
cousin, Carlos Argentino Daneiri, who also has found time a problem, and whose 
home holds the Aleph. A paragraph in Colás’s essay is worth repeating here, because 
it says much about Borges the writer who has invented a fable told by the narrator 
“Borges”: 
The Aleph is a sphere, two or three centimeters in diameter. It contains 
everything in the universe seen from every point of view, 
simultaneously, “without transparency and without superposition.” 
And it is under a staircase in Carolos Argentino Daneri’s basement. 
Daneri apparently discovered the Aleph as a child and returned 
frequently to savor its dizzying perspectives. As an adult, however, he 
has taken to composing a poem, which he calls “The Earth,” recoding 
his visions. Already in this fact we can see something of our narrator’s 
own aversion to time in this enterprise. To capture the Aleph via the 
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word, via the poetic representation, is an extended version of the 
narrator’s own project of repeating the name Beatriz not only as a way 
of remembering, but as a way equally of preserving abstract identity in 
the face of the difference time makes (89).  
 Colás also brings up memory, a topic intimately related to time.  
Borges and the Numinous 
Given Borges’s self-description of being an agnostic, his interest in mysticism 
and spirituality, or what is described here as the numinous, seems contradictory. 
However, Borges’s interest in the numinous is reflected in his first visit to Japan in 
1979, during which Borges met with and questioned both Buddhist and Shinto monks 
and nuns, and visited various sacred and monastic sites in Kyoto and elsewhere in 
Japan. Although deeply affected by his encounter with Japanese spirituality, Borges 
did not automatically become a religious believer. It has been noted that “the visit to 
Japan, therefore, did not resolve Borges’s spiritual yearnings, but what it did was to 
awaken him to a new consciousness of a numinous reality beyond the self, and 
Shintoism, specifically, acted as a catalyst for the elaboration of what we might call 
an ‘agnostic mysticism’ of his own, for its accommodating mysteries allowed for a 
reconciliation of metaphysical perplexity with a kind of religious awe” (Williamson 
446). That Williamson directly acknowledges Borges connection to “a new 
consciousness of a numinous reality beyond the self” (446) is relevant here, and it is 
not surprising that Borges might be seen as an agnostic mystic, given some of his 
preferences, such as his lifelong appreciation for Arthur Schopenhauer, whose 
philosophy is described here as a type of spiritual atheism.  
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Noting Borges’s interest in mysticism points to a subtopic throughout this 
study, namely the challenge of explicating and discussing in a philosophical context 
the association writers, artists, and thinkers have with what seems to be ineffable and 
thus beyond explication. While topics such as intuitive understanding, spiritual 
consciousness, subjective mystical experiences, self-transcendence are approached 
herein via the concept of numinous presence, this remains a thematic territory 
infrequently seen in objective scholarship. Thus this thematic territory often is either 
excluded or marginalized in philosophy. Nonetheless, Borges was keenly interested in 
this marginalized territory, despite his cautionary and somewhat ambivalent 
orientation. For instance, Borges’s interest in Emanuel Swedenborg, the Swedish 
Christian theological, philosopher, scientist, and mystic has been well-documented.183  
This spirited interest in the numinous was not unique to Borges or an isolated 
phenomenon. Besides Borges, Swedenborg’s writings attracted the attention of 
Immanuel Kant, William Blake, Henry James, William James, James Joyce, W.B. 
Yeats, and many other well-known literary and philosophical figures (Lang 196). In 
spite of this widespread and documented interest in mysticism among many 
prominent thinkers and writers, however, Borges himself remained ambivalent about 
mysticism, aligning himself more with Arthur Schopenhauer’s spiritual atheistic 
orientation than that of a religious believer.  
It should be noted that ambivalence towards the numinous and so-called 
mysticism has been a widespread phenomenon throughout intellectual history, but 
especially in modern philosophy. Most philosophers have avoided serious studies of 
mysticism, as well as—except for theological studies—esoteric spirituality. Creative 
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writers and artists, however, have had the advantage of their own literary and visual 
artmaking aesthetics to explore what seemingly cannot be seen or heard, except 
through a dynamic of wonder. Borges, for example, emphasized that his agnosticism 
openly allowed wonder, thus opening consciousness to all possibilities: “Being an 
agnostic means all things are possible, even God, even the Holy Trinity. This world is 
so strange that anything may happen, or may not happen. Being an agnostic makes 
me live in a larger, a more fantastic kind of world, almost uncanny. It makes me more 
tolerant" (Shenker 3).  
At least some of Borges’s philosophy is rooted in Schopenhauer: “It is the 
Schopenhauerian principle in Borges which makes him wonder what is real and what 
is illusory in our common experience. And it is this which makes him deliberately 
blur the borderline be-tween his fiction and his essays: as if in order to imitate nature 
he blurs the boundary between reality and dream” (Agassi 288).  
Borges joins with Schopenhauer in rejecting the possibility of philosophically 
validating the mystical experience because of its resistance to conceptual renderings, 
which is to say its ineffable, invisible and thus unverifiable nature. This ambivalent 
approach in Borges and Schopenhauer to mystical experience and the numinous has 
been recognized by others: 
Schopenhauer, whom Borges acclaimed as the most lucid and sound of 
all philosophers, argued that mysticism is the origin and also the 
culmination of all religion, but that, unlike James’s suggest of noetic 
value, no knowledge is to be derived from the ecstatic mystical state. 
Indeed, argued Schopenhauer in The World as Will and Representation 
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(a book of which Borges was particularly fond), mysticism opposes 
philosophy and cannot constitute a pathway to knowledge owing its 
inherently subjective rather than objective relationship with the 
individual (Lang 99). 
Whether one agrees or disagrees with this assessment of Schopenhauer and 
Borges, it should be noted that ambivalence towards the numinous and so-called 
mysticism and even the common experience of wonder has been a widespread 
phenomenon throughout intellectual history, but especially in modern western 
philosophy. Most philosophers have avoided serious studies of mystical experience, 
as well as—except for theological studies—esoteric spirituality.  
Varo as Artist-Philosopher 
Some of what can be said about Borges can be said, with some revisions, for 
Varo. Varo also never described herself as a philosopher per se. In fact, she felt 
unqualified to enter into the intellectual and philosophical conversations of other 
surrealist artists when she lived in Paris before moving to Mexico (Kaplan 55-57).  
Part of Varo’s reluctance was undoubtedly related to the exclusion of women, or at 
least the uninspected or openly acknowledged male dismissal of art made by women, 
that was characteristic of that era (Kaplan 57), but another aspect of this issue is that 
Varo was simply not a conventional thinker. While the influence of associating with 
the surrealists in Paris and Marseilles during that time was a powerful factor in her 
life, Varo would eventually after moving to Mexico feel free to cultivate her own 
subjective and highly individualistic artistic and philosophical orientation, including 
her specific thematic preferences and aesthetic motifs.  
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Another aspect of her unconventional orientation is that Varo, like many 
painters, is a visual thinker. Nonetheless, Varo is also a storyteller, a feature her 
paintings accentuate. Almost every painting announces and presents a story, and 
again, as is with Borges and his readers, it is the viewer who appropriates and 
completes her visual fable. An unusual  thinker and dreamer, her sense of journey, 
quest, narrative incident, and other references and revelations are inherent in her 
visual work, just as they are in Borges’s written work.  
Varo’s 1956 painting Discovery (Hallazgo) reveals themes repeatedly 
expressed in many of her paintings: journey, search and encounter, fabulist mystery, 
and revelation. Ultimately Varo is attempting to present the phenomenon of self-
transcendence, or the revelation of what is greater than the object. Her comments on 
this painting echo those themes: 
After lengthy comings and goings, these travelers have finally found a 
sort of thick pearl in the little woods in the background; the small 
luminous sphere, or pearl, represents inner harmony, and the travellers 
stand for persons attempting to gain access to a higher spiritual level 
(Ovalle and Gruen 112).  
[Esos viajeros después de mucho ir y venir encuentran por fin esa 
especie de perla gruesa en el bosquecillo al fondo; esa esferita 
luminiosa or perla representa la unidad interior, los viajeros 
representan gentes que buscan llegar a un nivel más alto espiritual. ] 
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Fig. 37. Remedios Varo. Discovery (Hallazgo). 1956.  
Oil on Masonite. 78 x 69 cm. Private Collection. 
  
It is worth considering, in Husserlian terms, how these themes appear. A river 
boat with human crew is re-presented from the imagination of the artist or given in 
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consciousness. It is not, as in a documentary, that a “real” boat is represented in the 
painting. The boat is imaginary, which is why it is re-presented rather than presented 
directly as a boat. Intentionality surfaces in both the artist who made the painting and 
the viewer receiving the painting—both must receive or “intuit” the object of the 
painting and necessarily the content of  the painting. Again, a performance-assisted 
subjective process remains central to understanding Varo’s paintings. 
Here one might note, given some of the travels in Varo’s life, that imagination 
is never far from memory of actual events. For instance, during Varo’s 1947-1949 
stay in Venezuela, she did explore with her boyfriend of that time, Jean Nicolle, the 
region between the Orinoco River184 and the Andes mountain range that contained an 
intricate network of slow-moving rivers (Kaplan 114-115).  
 The boat in Discovery is re-presented against the mystery of woods, so that 
the viewer necessarily must intuit (a Husserlian term for receiving the presentation or 
re-presentation of an appearance of an object “given” in consciousness). One might 
argue that by receiving or intuiting everything in this painting, the viewer necessarily 
receives or intuits the object, the woods with all its qualities.  
Varo’s interests in mystery and mystical revelations of mystery are made 
abundantly clear through her paintings and correspondence. She translated those 
interests at times into philosophical ideas and themes—spatial and temporal issues, 
ontological and phenomenological topics, and questions about reality and the validity 
of subject-object dichotomies. Thus while Varo was only somewhat interested in the 
ideas of mainstream western philosophy, she was very interested in an expansive 
array of Western and Eastern ideas most frequently, and sometimes erroneously, 
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described as mystical or occult. Such ideas are only infrequently explicated by either 
analytic or continental philosophy. Her interests included the writings of C.G. Jung, 
G. I. Gurdjieff, P.D. Ouspensky, Helena Blavatsky, and Meister Eckhart, as well as 
themes such as Sufism, the I-Ching, alchemy, sacred geometry, and the legendary 
Holy Grail. 
As already addressed in Chapter Four, the fact that these themes attracted 
many modernist artists—from Wassily Kandinsky to Hilma af Klint to Jackson 
Pollock to Agnes Martin to Brice Marsden and even some contemporary artists—is 
well known, even if sometimes discounted, ignored or avoided by some 
contemporary art historians and art scholars. Varo was far from the first modern artist 
to demonstrate interest in the numinous even when perceived via its various mystical 
and magical appearances.  
As discussed earlier in regards to Husserl himself, it makes sense when 
applying a Husserlian methodology to the work of these two artists to first consider 
their engagement of subjectivity.  




Fig. 38. Remedios Varo. Vagabond 
(Vagabundo) 1957. 
Oil on Masonite, 22 x 10 5/8 in. private collection. 
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Remedios Varo also deals with the self in her work, albeit in ways distinct  
from Borges’s poems and writings. Her paintings often reflect fragmented versions of 
herself, and especially express her seeking to understand herself and her life as an 
artist as a journey. Varo painted many versions of herself, but what those versions 
have in common are a sensibility of seeking the numinous. Her “selves” are all 
seekers. Her self-portraits reflect a highly imaginary variety of selves. 
Janet Kaplan’s excellent Remedios Varo: Unexpected Journeys introduced the 
work of this remarkable artist to the English-speaking world in 2000. As Kaplan 
points out, Varo’s explorations of self and knowing are also often expressed in what 
seems to be self-portraits:  
Varo did not paint self-portraits in the traditional sense. She did not 
seek to render a naturalistic likeness after careful scrutiny of the 
mirror. Her work is filled with self-portrait characters, but they are 
abstracted, metaphoric, ironic. Placed in a variety of situations—some 
related to her life experience, others purely invented—they become 
symbolic equivalents of the artist herself. Even if one does not know 
the details of Varo’s physiognomy, there is a quality of self-absorption 
that soon communicates the sense that the work is autobiographical. 
Like an actress taking on roles, Varo consistently used these self-
portrait characters as a way to explore alternative identities, both 
personal and universal, in a style that quickly became her signature 
(Kaplan, Unexpected, 147).  
In comments addressed to her brother, Dr. Rodrigo Varo,  Remedios Varo did 
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comment on some her paintings, including Vagabond (fig. 35):  
I think this painting is one of my best. Here is a design for a 
vagabond’s clothing, but in this case the vagabond is not liberated. It’s 
a very practical and comfortable suit. As a means of locomotion it has 
front-wheel drive; by lifting his walking stick he can come to a halt. 
The garment can be sealed hermetically at night, and has a little door 
that can be locked. Some parts of the garment are made of wood but, 
as I said, the man is not liberated. On one side of the suit is a niche 
which serves as a living room. There you will find a portrait hanging 
and three books. On his breast he is wearing a flowerpot with a rose 
growing in it, a more select and exquisite plant than the ones he 
encounters in these woods. But he needs the portrait, the rose 
(symbolizing nostalgia for a little garden in a real house) and his cat; 
he isn’t really free (Ovalle 115). 185 
 Here it is useful to note Varo’s physical orientation to mystical themes. She 
invariably describes the physical or visible elements of a given painting even though 
she is attempting to depict or reveal themes that accentuate the ineffable and invisible.   
Kaplan suggests that there is an autobiographical element to this painting:  
“Perhaps the vagabond is emblematic of Varo herself. Although she 
left France for Mexico with only what she could carry, she, too, found 






Fig. 39. Remedios Varo. The Juggler (El malabarista o El juglar), 1956. 
Oil and inlaid mother-of-pearl on Masonite, 35 7/8  x 48 in. private collection. 
 
Swinford then compares Bosch’s painting to Varo’s The Juggler (fig.36)  as 
an example of what he describes as a modern allegorical system (181):   
In The Juggler, Varo creates a personal allegorical system which relies 
on the predetermined symbols of Christian and classical iconography. 
But these are quickly refigured into a personal system informed by the 
scientific and organized like a machine. The work features a host of 
symbols familiar from Christian iconography and demonology: the 
lion, the owl, the goat, the pentacle-shaped juxtaposition of the 
juggler’s magician hat and eerily forked facial hair. But this system is 
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disrupted by personal symbols which recur throughout Varo’s work. 
Who is the girl in the juggler’s cart? Why the horde of identical 
observers wrapped in a single cloak? In the irreal work, allegory 
operates according to an altered, but constant and orderly iconographic 
system (181-182).  
Swinford also references a comment from Octavio Paz, who noted that Varo 
is painting a mirror-image—“Not the world in reverse, but the reverse of the world” 
(182).186 Paz’s assessment affirms Varo’s work and allows her to be the agency she 
is, an artist working in the margins of conventional aesthetics. Varo is not affirming 
the world as it appears; she is confirming a kind of reversal of how the world appears 
in that she is signaling the existence (and radical significance) of a seemingly 
invisible, ineffable numinous gate.  
Applying a Husserlian orientation to The Juggler, if the so-called juggler or 
magician is understood to be re-presenting an action as object (the juggling), this re-
presentation echoes a larger contextual representation within which the juggler acts. 
A phenomenological layered appearance necessarily arises in consciousness;  the 
audience is receiving the givenness of the juggler’s activated object, itself an irreal re-
presentation occurring within a broader irreal re-presentation. The layers of 
imagination in a Varo painting echo’s the multifarious possibilities of a irreal 
fabulism inherent in Varo’s work altogether. Since a viewer must enter Varo’s world 
as depicted in her paintings, the viewer too must account for layers or stages of re-
presentation. To some extent, this accounts for uniqueness of Varo’s style of 
surrealistic imagery wherein a Varo painting is not simply a depiction of symbols and 
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unconsciousness, but a world that includes both the “real” world and the “phantasy” 
or imagined world, but also includes an imaginary world within imaginary settings 
rooted in a previously imagined world. One world leads into another world, 
depending on to what extent or depth of layering the intentionality of the artist (and 
viewer) expresses aesthetically. The point is that a Varo painting, while meticulously 
composed, is not static or “completed” in a fixed sense; it is a challenge for a viewer 
not to imagine what happens next in a Varo composition. That action leads to action, 
and that layer uncovers layer, is alive in Varo’s artist-philosopher dynamic. It is 
literally a dynamic via her art itself. Varo is inquiring into a given appearance, that 
inquiry or artistic intentionality eventually opens the numinous gate the artist senses 
and is seeking. Varo’s art is a search to locate the numinous.  
The artist’s description of The Juggler is much simpler, yet her description is 
more of a pointing towards a territory the magician himself is pointing  towards:   
The painting is about a magician full of tricks, color, and life. In his 
covered wagon he has all sorts of marvelous things and animals; 
before him is a uniform “mass” of beings. So that is even more evident 
that they are a mass, they wear a collective cloak, an enormous piece 
of gray fabric with holes for their heads. They all look alike, have the 
same hair, et cetera (Ovalle 113).  
[Se trata de un prestidigitador, está lleno de trucos, de color, de vida, 
en el carricoche lleva toda clase de cosas milagrosas y animales, ante 
él está la “masa”; para que sea más “masa” hasta llevan un traje 
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común, un enorme pedazo de tela gris con agujeros para sacar la 
cabeza, todos se parecen, tienen igual pelo, etcetera (Ovalle 113).]  
Varo and the Temporal-Spatial Theme 
Varo also often depicts human confrontations with the fluid nature of time. 
 
Fig. 40. Remedios Varo. Creation of the Birds (Creación de las aves), 1957. 
Oil on Masonite, 20 15/8 x 24 5/8 in., Private Collection 
 
Almost every Varo painting can be understood as a fable. Admittedly this is 
only one of several approaches to her art, but there are numerous aspects of a Varo 
painting that are fabulist in tone and content. Relative to nonhuman species, one the 
most famous of her paintings is Creation of the Birds (fig. 40). In that painting a 
human with an owlish humanoid-bird appearance herself sits at table or desk 
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“painting” birds that fly away once created.  Her brush is musically inspired in that it 
is attached by a line to a violin that hangs from her neck; simultaneously the artist 
holds up a triangular magnifying glass that intensifies the light shining through a 
window of a bright star in the deep space of the night. A contraption stands next to 
her desk. It appears to be scientific device of some sort with three extended tube-
fingers that deposit different colored paint on the artist’s palette. 
Is this a depiction of divine creation? That description seems inaccurate. A 
more accurate summary would be that the painting depicts an inspired work of art, 
one inspired both externally by the phenomenal universe and internally by the artist’s 
imagination. It is a work that acknowledges or counters the illusion of subject-object 
dichotomy that separates humans from other species. The magnified starlight, musical 
paint brush, and the mysterious dispenser of paints, laboratorial like in appearance, do 
not necessarily mean God or a supreme being creates art or even life, but that the 
creative process and art itself can be inspired and to some extent accomplished within 
the mystery of infinity. The laboratory or a room of active investigation does appear 
regularly in Varo paintings. Varo was attracted to science but also frustrated with 
what she perceived to be the limitations of how scientific evidence is perceived and 
validated. If quantum mechanics had surfaced during her lifetime, she might have 




Fig. 41. Remedios Varo. Weaving of Space and Time (Tejido espacio-tiempo), 
1954. Oil on Masonite, 26 x 21¼ in. (66 x 54 cm.) 
 
In this painting, Weaving of Space and Time, Varo, as she often does, includes 
machinery. The woman’s legs are a wheel, and her torso includes meshed gears, but 
much more is depicted. A clock appears between the man with a lily and  the woman 
with a candle. Inner and outer space are inside a woven cloth or perhaps a basket. 
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Tere Arcq writes at length about this painting, referencing Varo’s intense interest in 
P.D. Ouspensky and the fourth dimension: 
Everything seems to be stretched and prolonged along a timeline: past, 
present and future are one and the same. Kant established the fact that 
everything that the senses perceive is perceived in terms of time and 
space. In other words, extension in space and existence in time are not 
inherent properties of things, but rather properties of our sensorial 
perception: they are categories of our reasoning. [...] Weaving of Space 
and Time is an interesting attempt to encapsulate Ouspensky’s vision, 
to represent how a mind that escapes the limitations of the senses’ 
perception can be elevated to another plane and see the past, present 
and future coexist simultaneously, “beyond the limits of the circle 
enlightened by our usual consciousness” (Arcq 76-77).187 
It should be noted here that the explication of meaning in Varo’s 
metaphorically rich paintings can almost always go down any of several interpretative 
paths, depending on the elements or features being accentuated by a given writer. An 
example would be the next two paintings.  
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Fig. 42. Remedios Varo. Unsubmissive Plant (Planta insumisa) 1961. 
Oil on Masonite, 33 x 24 5/8 in. Private Collection. 
 
It is interesting to first hear Varo’s comments before other 
interpretations:  
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This scientist is experimenting with different plants and 
vegetables. He is somewhat bewildered because there is an 
unruly plant. All the plants are growing shoots in the form of 
mathematical figures and formulas, except for one that insists 
on producing a flower. And the only mathematical branch it 
sprouted at the beginning, which drops onto the table, is very 
withered and weak and besides, is mistaken, for it says “two 
plus two is almost four.” Each hair on the scientist’s head is a 
mathematical equation 
(Ovalle 120).   
Janet Kaplan, whose excellent Remedios Varo: Unexpected Journeys 
introduced the work of this remarkable artist to the English-speaking world in 2000, 
discusses the flower in Discovery of a Mutant Geologist (fig. 43) in another context 
by first considering Unsubmissive Plant (fig. 42):  
Unsubmissive Plant presents Varo’s mixed feelings about scientific 
study in a succinctly ironic image. Science, in this case botany, seeks 
to understand nature through abstraction but grows greedy for control 
and, in the process of controlling, is alienated from the very nature that 
was its starting point. Varo offered the ultimate results of such 
abstraction in Discovery of a Mutant Geologist (fig.43). Another 
scientist, with even more elaborate equipment, carefully studies an 
unnaturally large flower, the only sign of life in a barren landscape 
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denuded by the radiation of an atomic bomb. Studying intently, he is 
unaware that he, too, has mutated, sprouting the winds of an insect and  
 
Fig. 43. Remedios Varo. Discovery of a Mutant Geologist  
(Descubrimiento de un geólogo mutante) 1955. 
Oil on Masonite, 30 x 20 in. Richard J. Woods.  
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the tail of a raccoon. It is noteworthy that in areas closest to the bomb 
sites, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where all forms of life had been 
immediately destroyed, it was documented that within days of the blast 
there were violent eruptions of abnormal plant growth, causing fields 
of lush flowers to spring up overnight. It is not known if Varo’s image 
of the gigantic flower referred to that fact or if she simply intuited the 
possibility (173-174).  
Varo’s description of this painting is more succinct: “In a landscape devastated 
by an atomic bomb, a geologist—who has mutated because of the radiation—is 
examining a gigantic flower. The geologist is carrying a very interesting piece of 
laboratory equipment” (Ovalle 120).   
Varo and the Numinous 
The paintings of Remedios Varo reveal a visual orientation to the numinous via 
compositional representation, creating a reality that allows visual contextual 
representations of mysterious and magical figures and occurrences. Whereas Borges’s 
short stories often reflect a philosophical playfulness that challenges conventional 
presuppositions about reality and self-identification, as well as spatial-temporal 
presuppositions, Varo’s paintings express a transformative process through themes of 
journey, doorways, and the disintegration of conventional self-identification. This last 
theme is not uncommon in surrealist art, but with Varo’s work there is often a sense 
of action and search. In the 1950’s in Mexico Varo began to extend her work beyond 
her earlier experiments influenced by her association with Surrealism and the Paris 
group of artists led by Andre Breton. Her paintings more and more assumed a unique 
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aesthetic, as described here by Alberto Ruy Sánchez:   
Remedios Varo’s fascinating body of work appears to us as a 
revelation and a mystery at one and the same time. A revelation so 
compelling that its aesthetic power has caused her name to be 
inscribed in the annals of the greatest and most disconcerting 
accomplishments of modern art. It is impossible to remain indifferent 
before the meticulous brushwork and incessant imagination seen in her 
paintings (Sánchez 14). 
Sánchez goes on to describe four paradoxes that intensify Varo’s painting 
skills and magnify the imaginative imagery alive in her paintings: (1) a strong formal 
language that “espouses a profoundly delirious discourse” and “scrupulous logic of 
nonsense”; (2) a “technically pure academic background” combined with a “primitive 
palpitation” of details that “approaching innocence or naïvetá”; (3) the “precise 
geometry” of her compositions, albeit with “lines and motifs of equal delicacy and 
clear fragility”; and (4) the “finished thought” concluding a quest combined with a 
simultaneous “yearning for an open and constant search” (Sánchez 14). 
 However, as noted earlier, the approach herein is not to examine the occult per 
se, although the varieties of occultism, magic, mysticism, and related topics surface 
from time to time within the philosophical and aesthetic themes of the study.  
Summary Review of Varo’s Paintings 
Attempting to categorize the work of Remedios Varo undermines that work. 
Calling her art irreal fabulism, while not inaccurate, is ultimately an inadequate 
description.    One can assign descriptive labels to both Varo and Borges, but in both 
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cases arbitrary, historically rooted classifications quickly reach inherent limitations; 
using established means of describing Varo’s paintings becomes the metaphor of 
looking at a closely passing elephant through a tiny viewing hole.  What can be seen 
of the whole work? This is one reason whey art writers and scholars has proposed 
multifarious interpretations of her work. The visual details of a Varo painting much 
extend the narrative or storytelling aspects of most surrealistic art. Her paintings are 
more than depictions of the unconscious and more than the state dream 
consciousness, though both factors represent relevant elements. The key to work is 
found more in the fabulist destination being presented. The revelation of ontological 
and spiritual purpose beyond characteristics of journey and search are first sensed and 
then revealed in the details of a Varo painting. In other words, the entertaining and 
playful attractiveness of  a Varo painting only signals another purpose.  
If the purpose of art is, as Varo asserted, to communicate the incommunicable, 
is that accomplished in her art? Visually, Varo’s irreal fabulism transports the viewer 
to what is called here the numinous gate. Varo repeatedly leaves the viewer standing 
in front of that gate, looking over the gate, so to speak, and left in the most 
advantageous location for pushing open that gate.  
Can that so-called numinous gate even be pushed open. It’s not clear that one 
can open push open a gate merely through volitional energy; it is almost as if the gate 
must open itself. The proposal here is that no work of art is completed until the 
performance-assisted subjective process is completed, so that the artist and viewer, or 
writer and reader, are merged in a sensibility to this numinous gate and its inherent 
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spiritual revelation. Essentially that revelation is rooted in a sensibility to prior unity 
that in itself allows revelation of prior unity and what is seemingly incommunicable.  
This is not a seamlessly perfect approach to discovering ultimate reality. Varo 
had her doubts; in fact, doubt is a rich means that must be allowed and utilized in any 
process of revelation of truth or reality. Varo both uses and dismisses scientific 
“fact.” She both accepts and glorifies, while also refusing and reshaping, for example, 
the physical appearance of the human being. Varo combines mechanical and fleshy 
elements in her fabulism. Sometimes a human subject is multiplied as a plurality of 
intersubjective awareness, at other times a kind of subjective solitude permeates a 
compositional scene.  
A primary point is that Varo’s irreal fabulism is almost invariably a story 
about a search for what is hear described as the numinous gate. One of many 
paintings that illustrate this is Varo’s 1962 Spiral Transit (Tránsito en espiral) (fig. 
44).   
Kaplan notes about this painting that the travelers “are embarked on a journey 
beyond the realm of mere navigations” (169), and that “theirs is a spiritual voyage…” 
(169). Luis-Martin Lozano also offers—quoted at length because its summary 
insight—commentary that unravels Varo’s broader purpose in this and other 
paintings: 
In addition, the iconographic exploration would help to understand the 
permanent metaphysical quest within the dimensionality of her 
painting. Either the characters she paints acquire a platonic attitude of 
meditation and explore within themselves, or they advance in a 
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continuous and frantic exploration that leads them to climb analogous 
mountains, to submerge themselves in murky, back world waters, 
tireless travelers reaching the miasmas of the Orinoco River in search 
of the primal origin of all oracles; where it will be commonplace to 
encounter sailors who cross over into hidden dimensions, making use 
of fantastic means of locomotion to travel winding roads and 
labyrinthine canals; always furtive, they will discover the secret 
passages in the walls and cathedrals, seeking answers to the mysteries 
of the universe. This is well illustrated in one of the key paintings by 
Remedios Varo: Spiral Transit, of 1962, a work conceived as  a 
microcosm surrounded by its own sea and celestial vault, in the 
manner of the Flemish panels of Hieronymus Bosch (Ovalle 71).  
Lozano’s comments acknowledge the journey theme in Varo, the secret 
passages in her paintings, the combination of inner self and outer search. I would add 
that an aesthetic quality pervades Varo’s work, a quality of mystery that directly 
points to spiritual search and revelation, as it does, for example, in Alejandro 
Jodorowksy’s film El Topo, among other modern works of art. This film, as Ben 
Cobb emphasizes, reflects elements from The Bhagavad Gita, Sufi mysticism, and 
(like Varo’s work) the work of G.I. Gurdjieff  (Cobb 71). 
Varo uses storytelling in the form of irreal fabulism to show search and 
journey, as well as qualities common to travel: points of anonymity, playful attraction 
to what does not seem to be knowable, nonrecognition combined with recognition of 
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stereotypes, plasticity of appearance in the midst of mystery—all of this continually 
arising within a world of wonder. 
 
Fig. 44. Remedios Varo. Spiral Transit (Tránsito en espiral), 1962. 
Oil on Masonite, 39 3/8 x 45 ¼ in. Private collection. 
 
Wonder in Varo and Borges 
Wonder is one of the keys to understanding the philosophical implications of 
both Borges and Varo’s artistic creations. There are very few Remedios Varo 
paintings that do not reflect a sensibility of and orientation to wonder, as well as a 
visual orientation to the numinous via compositional representation rooted in irreal 
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fabulism. As emphasized in her commentary about the clockmaker in her painting 
Revelation or The Clockmaker (figs. 32-34), wonder is a key element for Varo: “I 
have tried to make him look both astonished and enlightened” (Ovalle 111).  
Her paintings create a reality that allows visual contextual representations of 
mysterious and magical figures and occurrences. Whereas Borges’s short stories often 
reflect, as noted previously, a philosophical playfulness that challenges conventional 
presuppositions about reality and self-identification, as well as spatial-temporal 
presuppositions, Varo’s paintings express a transformative process through themes of 
journey, doorways, and the disintegration of conventional self-identification. This last 
theme is not uncommon in surrealist art, but with Varo’s work there is often a sense 
of action and search. In the 1950’s in Mexico Varo began to extend her work beyond 
her earlier experiments influenced by her association with Surrealism and the Paris 
group of artists led by Andre Breton. Her paintings more and more assumed a unique 
aesthetic. As with many creative thinkers, there is a continual interest in the role of 
the ineffable in both Varo and Borges.  
Shiomy Mualem, contrasting Wittgenstein’s emphasis that philosophy is 
essentially about elucidations that clarify cloudy and indistinct thoughts, notes that 
“Borges assumes the opposite: the act of making reality somewhat cloudy turns our 
attention toward philosophical quests, since it evokes in us the initial amazement; 
philosophy begins in wonder” (76). Wonder is, in fact, one of the keys to 
understanding the philosophical implications of both Borges and Varo’s artistic 
visions. In some ways, what is very beautiful about art in comparison to philosophy, 
which by the way can also be beautiful, is that art can show and not just tell.  
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Although with Varo and Borges this gap is considerably reduced in light of 
their storytelling fabulist artistic orientations, there nonetheless remains a contrast 
between art and philosophy—the making of things and the thinking about everything, 
although one could also argue that thinking is likewise a form of making. That Borges 
so resonated with Schopenhauerian thought undermines Borges’s claims to not being 
a philosopher. Art and philosophy are like two great streams flowing into each other 
and creating an even greater river that flows to a seemingly endless sea. And indeed, 
art and philosophy each have many tributaries that feed both their respective streams 
as well as that single combined river. 
Borges and Varo in the Margins 
 If Borges allows wonder to summon up an eternal universe only sensed at the 
margins of logical thought, wonder also allows Varo to open a doorway in her art that 
reveals what cannot be seen but imagined. Both of these artists render the invisibility 
of infinity visible through their fabulist art, however strange or illogical their art may 
seem in a world that naively claims to make the world linear and fixed. In some 
sense, they do more than straddle a line between real and irreal—they change and 
cross that line, working in the margins of reality, in that area that is presupposed to be 
invisible and inaccessible. 
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Conclusion—The Numinous Gate 
 As acknowledged in the introduction, this study makes no claim to explicating 
nicely packaged explications or definitions of philosophical truth and reality. The 
central proposal of this study has been that Remedios Varo and Jorge Luis Borges 
attempt to communicate the numinous in their art, as have many other modern artists, 
including modernist, postmodernist, and contemporary artists. That the numinous is 
immersed in consciousness and appears or is felt as consciousness, and yet remains 
apparently incommunicable via rational thought and linear concepts, has been the 
central issue being addressed here. The major challenge has been to undertake this 
investigation in philosophical and phenomenological, or as expressed earlier, in 
philosophico-phenomenological fashion rather than proposing a theological or other 
belief system exclusivity.  
Since the “numinous gate” in the title is a metaphorical entranceway into 
experiencing the numinous in consciousness, a gateway opened via a state of wonder 
and awe, the complex thematic conundrum of the study has continually surfaced. 
What is a conundrum and what is that conundrum in the present context? Again, the 
definition of a conundrum applicable here is: “Any puzzling question or problem; an 
enigmatical statement” (“conundrum, n., 4.b.”). More specifically the conundrum 
here pivots around communicating what seems to be incommunicable yet does exist. 
The existence of the numinous, for the most part, remains a mystery that can only be 
sensed or “felt,” yet does in some circumstances become becomes temporarily visible 
and capable of being directly experienced.  
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Thus the issue has been to explicate in philosophico-phenomenological terms 
how these two artists, among many other modern artists, acknowledge a sensibility to 
the numinous and to attempt, through their respective creative processes, to express 
the numinous through their art. Obviously, this is not a simple issue. Sometimes what 
the artist actually communicates is his or her search for the numinous, or that artist’s 
sensibility to the numinous, or even that artist’s own doubt about and challenges to 
expressing or revealing the numinous in his or her art.  
For example, and as explored already, even though Varo’s paintings do 
express mystical and magical elements, she is not literally a mystic or magician 
(although her art has been described as “magical”), but an artist very much aware of 
and capable of confronting the conventional limitations of rational thought:  
Personally, I do not think I am endowed with special powers, 
but rather an ability to quickly see the relationship between 
cause and effect beyond the current limits of ordinary logic” 
(Personalmente, yo no me creo dotada de poderes especiales, 
sino más bien de una capacidad para ver rápidamente las 
relaciones de causa a efecto, y ello fuera de los límites 
ordinaries de la lógica corriente) (Cartas 81-82).188  
On the other hand, and as stated throughout this investigation, the fabulist 
literary art of Borges communicates through his art a sensibility to the numinous 
more through an intertextual layering and philosophically accented narratology. 
 In a sense, it is the nature of the numinous, and the search for it, that creates 
the artist-philosopher dynamic in Borges and Varo. Both the fabulist, irreal paintings 
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of Varo and the fabulist, irreal stories of Borges are more than visual and literary 
storytelling. As proposed earlier, a primary focus is on the sensibility to the numinous 
that these two artists—and many other modern artists, as well—express, a sensibility 
that fuels and shapes their artistic attempts to excavate and make visible the numinous 
via image consciousness.  
How can this occur? Often it is wonder that initiates a dynamic rupture in 
consciousness that acts as the hinge allowing the numinous gate proposed herein to 
become visible and to swing open. In other words, wonder expressed through the art 
itself—as visible and communicable expressions of the artists’ sensibility to the 
numinous—becomes that numinous gateway in consciousness.  
Nor is this simply a description of someone making and presenting art to “the 
other.” The conjunction of the artist with the viewer or reader is a completion of the 
work of art, allowing that metaphorical gateway or entranceway into the numinous to 
become the reality that was previously only sensed, felt, or intuited.189 This naturally 
brings up subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and the concept of self, topics that have been 
considered throughout, leading especially to the assertion that art is an intersubjective 
phenomenon, and that the idea of a separative self-identified self is itself at best only 
a partially valid notion in the sense of being an incomplete idea. This is reflected in 
part in Husserl’s work to extend and revise Cartesian theory. 
This study has considered many relevant concepts and factors to assist in 
clarifying and authenticating its central theme, including Husserlian transcendental 
phenomenology, the Schopenhauerian aesthetic, wonder and self-forgetting, not-
knowing or unknowing, and other ideas and writings. The writings of both 
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Schopenhauer and Husserl provided some functional and conceptual means for 
serving the excavation of the numinous within a larger context of perception that 
includes the seeing of all “things.” In the present context, if there is an answer or 
solution to the question inherent in the thematic conundrum of communicating the 
incommunicable, that solution is art. In other words, what is proposed and argued is 
that art can be a means to make visible the invisibility of the numinous.  
Husserl’s epochē is an essential means for magnifying a focus that can 
penetrate the ephemeral and ineffable nature of the numinous. Because the epochē 
brackets out presuppositions, preconceptions, and prejudices that could obstruct the 
investigation and appearance of the numinous gate, a more direct and vivid vision 
becomes possible, one that can allows a shift in consciousness that ushers in a 
visibility of the numinous beyond a felt sensibility to it. Specifically with Varo and 
Borges, when the artist allows an intentionality of reception of appearance, or 
receives that givenness (the appearance of an art object) in consciousness, not-
knowing and self-forgetting may spontaneously accompany the reception of that 
appearance of a reshaped irreal object. The work of Borges and Varo, appearing as it 
does in the irreal fabulist context of their specific aesthetics, allows the artist to both 
give and receive the art object, and also allows the viewer or reader to receive that art 
object and its appearance as the numinous gate. Understanding Husserlian 
intentionality as an antecedent event, one that occurs before (and sometimes 
simultaneously with) conceptually encountering the object, also leads to 
understanding how the intersubjective encounter takes hold as an interactive 
encounter between artist and viewer. In some ways, the two—artist and viewer, writer 
 330 
and reader—are inseparable. It may be that nothing is as powerfully disruptive to 
linear temporal-spatial presuppositions as the artist-viewer synergetic conjunction.  
Undertaking this topic of how art, art-making and art-viewing are related to 
the numinous leads to other conclusions. This is not simply a “transcendent” issue or 
the intervention of what creative writers have sometimes called (usually in critical 
terms) the God Box, where an aspect of the art suddenly just happens in miraculous 
terms. While there may be some legitimacy to this imaginary or visualized 
phenomenon, that has not been the orientation of this study. In fact, one result of the 
study has been to understand more clearly how non-rational aspects of the numinous 
arise in contextual territories, whether by alternative states of consciousness or within 
so-called sacred cultures, but in this context, via art. The disruptive experience of 
wonder that is here proposed as the hinge that allows the numinous gate to visibly 
swing open, is a subjective experience, even though Borges and Varo continually 
challenge fixed ideas of the self. Here it is useful to note again that making and 
viewing art is a performance-assisted subjective process (Adi Da 94) that represents 
an aspect of seeking the numinous. The artist-philosopher dynamic in Borges and 
Varo fuels their respective creative processes of their fabulist art, which involves an 
irrealistic interplay with subjectivity, wonder, knowledge, not-knowing, self-
forgetting and so on. The proposal herein has been that while truth and reality are 
inherent in the numinous, they are ultimately indefinable yet not inaccessible aspects 
of the performance-assisted “subjective” process in art-making and art. 
Proposing that the making and viewing (or reading) of art pivots around image 
consciousness or Bildbewußtein (also translated as “depicting consciousness”), the 
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imagination (Husserlian “phantasy”), and memory, and blending that with a 
multifarious array that includes the artist-philosopher dynamic, intertexualities, and 
various forms of intersubjectivity, have as a whole served the elucidation of the art 
and creative processes of Remedios Varo and Jorge Luis Borges.  
In regards to mystery and the invisible, which is to say the numinous, part of 
the purpose here has been to challenge the widespread notion that such topics are 
impenetrable to scholarly investigation. To undermine philosophical investigation 
with presuppositional, linear understanding is to place philosophy inside the 
restrictions of a belief system rooted in scientific materialism. This study has been a 
protest against that attitude, as well as a remonstration against the often unspoken and 
uninspected contemporary prohibition or taboo against acknowledging that a 
sensitivity to the numinous in art is a theme worthy of scholarly investigation.  
Ultimately the numinous is apodictic. That is said with the caveat that simply 
claiming the numinous is apodictic is insufficient. Evidence of how the numinous is 
apodictic is a conclusion, but it is a partial conclusion that is challenged herein by 
examining the irreal, fabulist work of the two artist-philosophers featured in the 
study. 
Finally, this investigation has argued that art for life’s sake is central to 
Borges and Varo. The Bakhtinian carnivalesque is a strand in the writings of Borges 
and paintings of Varo, one that engenders a life-positive orientation to humankind 
and the art of humankind. A liberating attitude towards the humor, the grotesque, and 
the carnivalesque pervades the work of Varo and Borges. Simultaneously, their work 
authenticates Plato’s emphasis on wonder as “the beginning of philosophizing as a 
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divine phenomenon, a sort of epiphany, related to the sight of divine beauty” 
(Chrysakopoulou 95). That wonder is an instance of not-knowing is not as unusual as 
one might think; the argument herein has been that wonder is also a version of 
quotidian experience functioning as disruption (Gosetti-Ferencei 1). 
The intention here, then, has been to navigate through what is actually one 
aesthetic and philosophico-phenomenological territory, albeit one that displays a great 
variety of features across its landscape. While it is clearly evident and has been noted 
before that Borges and Varo explore consciousness via their fabulist art-making, it 
has been less evident in the philosophy of art that their work is fueled by a sensibility 
to the numinous. Thus it is hoped that this study will initiate other studies similar to 
this theme, whether for the artist-philosophers examined here or for art and the art-
making of the artist-philosopher in general.  
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1 The distinctions among magic realism, fantasy, fabulism and other terms are 
examined farther ahead, as well as the reasons for choosing irreal fabulist storytelling 
as the narratological term of choice.  
2 While the word “mystery” is an essential term here, it should be noted that there are 
theological and religious uses of the word as well as non-theological uses, and while 
both uses are significant in this study, several relevant uses of the word “mystery” 
will be explored in more detail in the chapters ahead. One non-theological definition 
immediately relevant is defined in the The Oxford English Dictionary as: “A hidden 
or secret thing; something inexplicable or beyond human comprehension; a person or 
thing evoking awe or wonder but not well known or understood; an enigma” 
(“mystery, n.1,” II. 5a). 
3 The term “philosophico-phenomenological” is borrowed from Anthony Steinbock’s 
Phenomenology and Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience, and will be 
examined more closely ahead.  
4 In saying that art is rooted in this impulse, no claim is being made that every piece 
of art made throughout the history of humankind has been made via that impulse to 
make visible the invisibility of the numinous. Obviously art is made for all kinds of 
reasons. But any attempt to determine precisely what art is rooted in that impulse 
would be foolhardy and inaccurate. Thus the statement is not that “some art” is made 
via that impulse, because that adjective would be misleading and false to some degree 
as well. A major aspect of the thesis herein is that far more art has been and continues 
to be made with that impulse than has been openly acknowledged in scholarship. In 
some cases the artist himself or herself may be motivated unconsciously by that 
impulse, but to find and use those unconscious cases of seeking the numinous is not 
the orientation here. Through artist commentaries and art scholarship, it is clear that 
much modern art—modernist, postmodernist, and contemporary—has been openly 
rooted in a seeking for and sensibility to the numinous. This is abundantly evident in 
modernist art, but whatever the art history era or category, examples are used 
throughout this study of art-making in which a seeking for and a sensibility to the 
numinous are clearly and consciously evident in one way or another.  
5 Borges writes this in his essay “Narrative Art and Magic.” The quote is also used in 
The Cambridge Companion to Jorge Luis Borges, 209. 
6 Epochē is a seminal Husserlian concept, one that is critical to this study. As will be 
discussed in more detail, epochē’s central value here is that it serves to set aside 
uninspected presuppositions about art, reality, perception, and various additional 
concepts and issues that pervade (at times unconsciously) Eurocentric thought. 
7 While the term leitmotif is generally related to music, there are other uses that signal 
a principle theme in other fields. See "leitmotiv, n." OED Online. Oxford University 
Press, March 2015. Web. 5 June 2015. 
8 Blindness is also an important theme in Borges’s work, given that he became 
gradually more and more blind as he aged.  
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9 Plato attributes to Socrates numerous times in the Socratic dialogues this “not-
knowing” orientation to knowledge.  
10 The complete reference to this passage is summed up by writer and widow of 
Borges, Maria Kodama: “This experience is narrated in one of his [Borges] first 
works, ‘El idioma de los argentines’ (‘The Language of the Argentines’), from 1928, 
and later he included it in two more publications including “A New refutation of 
Time.” He referred to the experience as ‘sentirse en muerte,’ or ‘feeling in death’.” 
11 As noted above, Borges includes this experience in “A New Refutation of Time”  
in Jorge Luis Borges, Selected Non-Fictions. Eliot Weinberger, ed. New York: 
Penguin Books, 1999, 324-325. 
12 The Magic of Remedios Varo opened in February 2000 at the National Museum of 
Women in the Arts in Washington D.C. before traveling in June 2000 to the Mexican 
Fine Arts Museum in Chicago. The four thematic sections of the exhibition included 
(1) “The Transferable Being: Metaphors of the Inner World, (2) “In Search of other 
Dimensions: The Conjunction of Magic Forces,” (3) “Time, Cosmos & Energy: 
Paradigms of a New Science,” and (4) “Enlightenment of the Forbidden: Revealing 
Knowledge of an Occult World.” 
13 Thirteen years before the Kandinsky’s Munich incident, a minor yet seminal “not-
knowing” experience initiated a root awakening to the significance of perceptual and 
emotional engagement of the art object: “About a year before leaving Russia he saw 
an exhibition of French Impressionists in Moscow, and for the first time became 
aware of the characteristics of modern painting. Before [i.e. before viewing] one of 
Claude Monet’s Haystacks, he did not recognize the object [i.e. did not “see” a 
haystack], missed it, but at the same time he noticed that the picture moved him 
deeply, becoming engraved in his memory with all its special charter.” This anecdote 
is in Will Grohmann’s Wassily Kandinsky: Life and Work, 32.  
14 See especially Kandinsky’s seminal book on this topic, his 1912 Über das Geistige 
in der Kunst (Concerning the Spiritual in Art). 
15 While the role of abstraction in modernist art history is not a primary theme in this 
study, it is a significant factor underlying any understanding wonder and the 
numinous in art, as will be discussed in Chapter Four.  
16 One of the more directly relevant scholarly studies of this topic is Jennifer Anna 
Gosetti-Ferencei’s The Ecstatic Quotidian: Phenomenological Sightings in Modern 
Art and Literature. 
17 For example, sociopolitical, conceptual, technical, and so on.  
18 This chapter, in the pages ahead, will expand and bring more detail to the initial 
definition of irreal presented in the introduction, but in Chapter Six the irreal in the art 
of Borges and Varo will be considered in more direct detail and depth. 
19 See, for example, Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary 
Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, edited by Jean Petitot and others; Mind in 
Life: biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind, by Evan Thompson; or The 
Phenomena of Awareness: Husserl, Cantor, Jung, by Cecile T. Tougas.  
20 1900: Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik 
(Logical Investigations, Vol 1). 1901: Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Teil: 
Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis (Logical 
Investigations, Vol 2). English translation: 1973. 
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21 1913: Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen 
Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie 
(Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology). English translation in three 
volumes: 1980-1989.  
22 A collection of Husserl’s writings on time consciousness was published in 1928 in 
Husserl’s Jarbuch. It included a short foreward by Heidegger, who was listed as 
editor, but it was Edith Stein who actually gathered and organized the writings while 
she worked as Husserl’s assistant in 1917. This book was published in 1966 as Zur 
Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917), with an English 
translation published in 1991 titled On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of 
Internal Time (1893-1917).  
23 Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory (1898-1925) is a gathering of 
posthumous texts (lectures, notes, sketches) by Husserl on representational 
consciousness. This book more than any of Husserl’s other works, discusses art and 
aesthetics in regards to Husserlian transcendental phenomenology and consciousness. 
Also relevant to this study, as will be seen, is Husserl’s Cartesian Mediations: An 
Introduction to Phenomenology. 
24 The ways in which Husserl agrees and disagrees with Descartes will become 
clearer as this chapter unfolds. 
25 As pointed out in a translator’s note (1) to Cartesian Mediations: An Introduction 
to Phenomenology, that book is an elaboration of two 1929 lectures Husserl delivered 
at the Sorbonne in Paris entitled “Einleitung in die transzendentale Phänomenologie” 
(Introduction to transcendental phenomenology). 
26 Interrelated terms surface everywhere in Husserl’s methodology. Husserlian 
intuition (Anschauung) and givenness (Gegenbenheit), for example, together form a 
unitary,  reciprocally cooperative activity, as do object (Objekt) and intentionality 
(Intentionalität). 
27 Here, the emphasis is on Husserl’s later thought, after his so-called “transcendental 
turn.” Clearly, any thinker influenced by the work of Plato and Kant must necessarily 
clarify his or her own useage and meaning of the word “transcendental.” 
28 Carr is referencing a section title (#53) in Husserl’s The Crisis of European 
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological 
Philosophy (178).  
29 Brough is referencing in quotations George Dickie, The Art Circle: A Theory of Art 
(New York: Haven Publications, 1984). Thomas Prufer: a contemporary professor of 
philosophy and author. 
30 I refer to Husserl’s method as a methodology in the present context because 
“methodology” better describes how the main thrust of this study is to investigate 
topics related to the art of Varo and Borges, and how that is accomplished by using a 
methodology grounded in scientifically rigorous Husserlian transcendental 
phenomenology. This allows for a consistency of language and investigative concepts 
to be applied to Varo and Borges’s work. In other words, that specific methodology is 
used as the primary means to investigate their visual and literary art. 
31 In all fairness, since the authors of this art history textbook are discussing Sartre’s 
aesthetic, and not attempting to explicate the range of Husserl’s thinking, they are 
emphasizing Husserl’s “intentional consciousness,” which was a starting point for 
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Sartre’s aesthetic, although some Husserlian scholars have noted that Husserl’s 
students and assistants such as Heidegger, Sartre, and Derrida did not really study 
Husserl’s writings and lectures closely enough or with enough depth, and did have 
some misunderstandings about his work. This is understandable, of course, given the 
vast nature and enormous range of Husserl’s work. And, as stated already, neither 
does this study claim to address all of Husserl’s work. It seems as if everyone picks 
and chooses from Husserl what is useful for their own arguments and studies.  
32 This quote initially came to my attention via Dan Zahavi’s “Husserl and the 
“absolute.” 
33 A.D. Smith, in Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Husserl and the Cartesian 
Meditations. London, Routledge. 2003. Print. 
34 This point is also referenced by A.D. Smith in The Routledge Philosophy Guide 
Book to Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations (20). It is also worth noting the title of 
the specific part of Husserl’s The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology where this issue is addressed. See Section 8 in “Part II: Clarification 
of the Origin of the Modern Opposition between Physicalistic Objectivism and 
Transcendental Subjectivism.”  
35 Other scholars have argued that other principles are central or primary in Husserl’s 
phenomenology. Epochē, for example (see Bourne-Taylor and Mildenberg 25).  
36 Some of the points in this chapter about Husserl’s rendering of imagination will be 
returned to in Chapter Six about the artist-philosopher dynamic. 
37 Forms of consciousness are discussed numerous times in Husserl’s writings, but 
especially relevant here are his discussions in Logical Investigations and in Phantasy, 
Image Consciousness, and Memory (1898-1925). 
38 Steinbeck here references Edmund Husserl’s Analyses Concerning Passive and 
Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic, Anthony J. Steinbock, trns. 
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, introduction to Part 2. 
39 See Gregory Minissale’s brilliant book on this subject: Framing Consciousness in 
Art: Transcultural Perspectives (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2009). 
40 Irrealism in the specific art of Borges and Varo is examined in detail in Chapter 
Six.  
41 Although Husserl uses the spelling of fantasy as “phantasy,” the spelling employed 
in this study is, for the most part, “fantasy.”  
42 John B. Brough translated into English the 2005 Springer edition of Husserl’s 
Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory (1898-1925). Professor Brough also 
wrote the essay “Art and Artworld: Some Ideas for a Husserlian Aesthetic,” included 
in the 1988 anthology Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradition: Essays 
in Phenomenology, edited by Robert Sokolowski. Serbian poet, essayist, and 
philosophy professor Milan Uzelac wrote one of the most detailed, penetrating, and 
frequently referenced essays on Husserl and art, “Art and Phenomenology in Edmund 
Husserl,” published in 1998. These works are listed in the bibliography and are used 
extensively in this paper. Also it should be noted that many if not most extended 
discussions of aesthetics and phenomenology (regardless of which phenomenological 
theorist or thinker is being discussed) will at various points refer to Husserlian 
phenomenological principles. 
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43 That there are at least two sides and several stages to Husserl’s work is well known. 
Even the titles of some of the books by Husserl or books about him and his work 
reflect that multiplicity or what some interpret as a dichotomy. Consider these: 
Husserl’s The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An 
Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy; Donn Welton’s The Other Husserl: 
The Horizons of Transcendental Phenomenology and The New Husserl: A Critical 
Reader; Quentin Lauer’s The Triumph of Subjectivity: An Introduction to 
Transcendental Phenomenology; Maurice Natanson’s Edmund Husserl: Philosopher 
of Infinite Tasks; Roman Ingarden’s On the Motives Which Led Husserl to 
Transcendental Idealism; Marvin Farber’s The Foundations of Phenomenology: 
Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy; Harrison Hall’s 
essay “Was Husserl a Realist or an Idealist?” in Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive 
Science; and so on. Husserlian phenomenology, generally considered to be one of the 
foundational forces of Continental Philosophy, has been taken up not only by 
Continental philosophers, but neurobiological scientists, analytic philosophers, 
materialists, theologians and scholars of religion. The bibliography both for Husserl’s 
work and the literature about him and his work is vast. And that wide wake of his 
work broadens to include the works of Husserl’s students such as Heidegger, Levinas, 
Roman Ingarden, Max Scheler, Adolf Reinach, Eugene Fink, Edith Stein, Ludwig 
Landgrebe, or other phenomenological scholars and artists deeply influenced by his 
work such as Sartre, Derrida, Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricouer, Michel Henry, Anna-
Teresa Tymieniecka, Ortega y Gassett, and many other thinkers. 
44 Here Bourne-Taylor and Mildenberg are referencing Husserl’s words in his Logical 
Investigations, as well as referencing Merleau-Ponty in his The Primacy of 
Perception. 
45 Moran and Cohen reference a page from Edmund Husserl, Psychological and 
Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927-1931). 
This section of the book, page 98, is one of the drafts of the infamous Encyclopaedia 
Britannica article on phenomenology, written jointly by Husserl and Heidegger, 
which, despite each thinker’s efforts, they could not agree on. A section of that page 
follows: 
Accordingly, transcendental phenomenology is not one particular science among 
others; rather, when systematically elaborated, it is the realization of the idea of an 
absolutely universal science, specifically as eidetic science. As such it must 
encompass all possible a priori sciences in systematic unity, specifically by 
thoroughly considering the a priori connections in absolute grounding. We could 
even bring up the traditional expression and broaden it by saying: Transcendental 
phenomenology is the true and genuinely [p. 520] universal ontology that the 
eighteenth century already strove for but was unable to achieve. It is an ontology that 
is not stuck either in the naïve one-sidedness of natural positivity or, like the 
ontologies of Baumgarten and Wolff, in formal generalities and analytic explanations 
of concepts far removed from issues. Our ontology draws upon the original sources of 
a universal intuition that studies all essential connections, and it discloses the 
complete system of forms that pertains to every co-possible universum of possible 
being in general and, included therein, that belongs to every possible world of 
present <p. 32>  realities. 
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46 David Michael Levin is referencing Jacques Derrida, “Force and Signification,” in 
Writing and Difference. Chicago: U Chicago P, 1978, 28. 
47 It must be noted that David Michael Levin is a preeminent scholar of 
phenomenology and no novice to Husserl’s work. See Levin’s Reason and Evidence 
in Husserl’s Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1970. 
48 In addition to Professor Christian Lotz’s “Depiction and Plastic Perception. A 
Critique of Husserl’s Theory of Picture Consciousness,” and David Michael Levin’s 
chapter “Husserl’s Transcendental Gaze” in his The Philosopher’s Gaze: Modernity 
in the Shadows of Enlightenment, and of course the many criticisms of Husserl’s 
work by both Heidegger and Derrida (which must be addressed where relevant to a 
Husserlian aesthetic), there are the somewhat more positive critical essays of 
Professor Christian Ferencz-Flatz, including “The Neutrality of Images and 
Husserlian Aesthetics.” 
49 See, for example, Husserl’s writings in Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and 
Memory (1898-1925), 38-41, 132: discussing Raphael and Dürer, 182-184: discussing 
Titian, 192-193: discussing a painting by Franz and Ida Brentano. Throughout this 
volume are many general considerations of art and aesthetics, including both visual 
and literary art, as well as music. See also Husserl’s discussion of Dürer’s “The 
Knight, Death, and the Devil” in his Ideas: General Introduction to Pure 
Phenomenology, 228-229. This last example will be explored in more detail in 
Chapter One of the present study. 
50 Not meaning to be presumptuous, I wish to note that one of the goals of the present 
study, echoed in Wallenstein’s statement below, is in fact to tell at least some aspects 
of this story. 
51 These were early students of Husserl’s work. As John J. Drummond points out 
(64), Husserl was very interested in this group, the so-called Munich School, who 
included Adolf Reinach, Moritz Geiger, Alexander Pfänder, and Max Scheler. he 
notes, “The Munich School was committed to a form of metaphysical realism and a 
Platonism regarding idea objects ….” Eventually, Husserl disagreed with some details 
of the group’s concepts. The Göttingen Philosophical Society, although attracted 
originally to Husserl’s Logical Investigations, did not agree with or follow him in his 
turn to “transcendental idealism,” in which objects are dependent on consciousness 
(205). 
52 See Henry’s Material Phenomenology. New York: Fordham University Press, 
2008.  
53 In a footnote (72) Malpas notes: “‘Objectivity’ is being used here in a deliberately 
idiosyncratic fashion that is not intended to imply any notion of factual correctness, 
and it ‘ontological’ rather than ‘epistemological’ in its orientation. ‘Objectivity’ refers 
to the way in which an object is an object—to its being (or becoming) as object—in a 
way that is intended to direct attention away from a concern with identity or 
individuation conditions and on to the question of the object in its active or process-
character.” 
54 The phrase sub specie aeternitatis means, roughly, in its essential or universal form 
or nature. It is also defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “Viewed in relation 
to the eternal; from a universal perspective” ("sub specie aeternitatis, adv." OED 
 359 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Online. Oxford University Press, December 2014. Web. 24 February 2015).  Also, 
Rubenstein is quoting Wittgenstein from Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 6.44-6.45. 
55 Rubenstein is quoting Wittgenstein from Notebooks, 86/86e.  
56 Rubenstein is quoting Wittgenstein from Culture and Value, 5/5e. 
57 Cahill quotes from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 6.522. The German reads: “Es gibt 
allerdings Unaussprechliches. Dies zeight sich, es ist das Mystische.” Schopenhauer’s 
work is discussed in detail in Chapter Five—Philosophico: An Intertexual Orientation 
to Aesthetic Thinkers. 
58 The Gateless Gate is a famous collection of Chan (Zen) Buddhist koans that 
appeared first in China in the early 13th century and subsequently in Japan. A koan is 
a question, statement, story, or dialogue used in Zen Buddhist practice to provoke 
great doubt and test a Buddhist practitioner’s spiritual understanding, especially in the 
Rinzai Zen Buddhist tradition. The title to this collection has been more accurately 
translated in modern times by Zen teacher Robert Aitken as The Gateless Barrier. See 
Aitken’s book, The Gateless Barrier: The Wu-Men Kuan (Mumonkan), San 
Francisco: North Point Press, 1990. 
59 See The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta, by Raniero Gnoli.  
60 See Schopenhauer’s Encounter with  Indian Thought: Representation and Will and 
Their Indian Parallels, by Stephen Cross; and Understanding Schopenhauer Through  
the Prism of Indian Culture: Philosophy, Religion and Sanskrit Literature, Arati 
Barua, Michael Gerhard, Matthia Koßler, eds.  
61 See, for example, Transformative Philosophy: A Study of Sankara, Fichte, and 
Heidegger, by John A. Taber. Also, Agents of Uncertainty: Mysticism, Scepticim, 
Buddhism, Art and Poetry, by John Danvers. 
62 See especially John Golding’s Paths to the Absolute: Mondrian, Malevich, 
Kandinsky, Pollock, Newman, Rothko, and Still. 
63 The footnoted quote on page 252 from Kant is: “Two things fill the mind with ever 
new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more frequently and persistently 
one's meditation deals with them: the starry sky above me and the moral law within 
me.” Emphasis is Kant’s. 
64 See especially Patrick Sherry, “The Varieties of Wonder.” Philosophical 
Investigations, 36.4 (2013): 340-354.  
65 The essays in Phenomenology, Modernism and Beyond contain some of the most 
significant writings available about Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology in 
relation to the arts. Critical questions regarding phenomenology and modernist art in 
this unique collection also reference the work of thinkers Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Martin Heidegger, Michel Henry and Paul Ricoeur. 
66 Mildenberg quotes from Virginia Woolf, “The Mark on the Wall” in Selected Short 
Stories (London: Penguin Books, 1993), 69. 
67 Here Mildenberg adds in a footnote: “For different interpretations of ‘doubt’ in 
Woolf see Marc D. Cyr, ‘A Conflict of Closure in Virginia Woolf’s ‘The Mark on the 
Wall’’, Studies in Short Fiction 33:2 (1996), pp. 197-205, and Stephen J. Miko’s 
stimulating article ‘Reflections on The Waves’, Criticism 30, pt. I (1988), pp. 63-90.” 
68 Mildenberg is quoting from Husserl’s Ideas, 107-108.  
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69 Natanson’s book Mildenberg refers to is Maurice Natanson, Edmund Husserl: 
Philosopher of Infinite Tasks. Evanston, Indiana: Northwestern University Press, 
1973.  
70 See also Kevin M. Cahill’s The Fate of Wonder: Wittgenstein’s Critique of 
Metaphysics and Modernity, and Gordon C.F. Bearn’s Waking to Wonder: 
Wittgenstein’s Existential Investigations.)  
71 This quote in The Phenomenology Reader came originally from a section of 
Merleau-Ponty’s The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays. Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern UP, 1964, 12-27. Print. 
72 Bearn is quoting Wittgenstein via a conversation G.E.M. Anscombe had with 
Wittgenstein, reported by Anscombe in her “Opening Address [of the 6th International 
Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel, August 1981]” in 
Language and Ontology, W. Leinfellner, et al., eds. Vienna: Hoelder-Pichler-
Tempsky, 1982, 28. Print. Anscombe (1919-2001) was an analytical philosopher and 
one of Wittgenstein’s students, as well as the translater of some of his writings, 
including Philosophical Investigations. Note from Bearn: “A second edition with an  
index (of the first edition) and a new version Wittgenstein’s “Notes on Longic: 1913” 
was published by the University of Chicago Press in 1979. The pagination up to p. 91 
is the same.” 
73 Bearn quotes Wittgenstein from (6.44) Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, 5.552. 
74 Focault is referring to a passage in Borges’ 1942 essay “The Analytical Language 
of John Wilkins” (El idioma analítico de John Wilkins). Focault goes on to note, 
“This passage quotes a ‘certain Chinese encyclopedia’ in which is written that 
‘animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (be) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) 
sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) include in the present 
classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair 
brush, (l) et cetera, (me) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long 
way off look like flies’.” 
75 This blend of heavy subject matter and humor is reflected in the titles of some of 
Borges’ books: A Universal History of Iniquity, The Garden of Forking Paths, The 
Book of Sand, Artifices, and some of his stories: “The Widow Ching—Pirate,” “Man 
on Pink Corner,” “Et cetera,” “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,” “The Library 
of Babel,” “A Dialog Between Dead Men,” “A Weary Man’s Utopia,” and so on. 
76 This is one of a series of comments by Remedios Varo on some of her paintings as 
addressed to her brother, Dr. RodrigoVaro. 
77 At times in this study, the quotations used may not follow the best uses of English, 
especially in the many translations from Spanish, German, and French, the last, for 
example, as it is translated from Bataille’s writings. This may well not be the 
translators fault, but only reflecting the usage in the original language. 
78 It is critically important to establish evidence that many modernist artists, and also 
some contemporary artists, and not simply Varo and Borges, attempt to express 
various versions of their individual sensibilities to the numionous. Chapter Four—
Seeking the Numinous in Modern Art focuses on this topic. 
79 Regarding “theological-philosophical” see Philip C. Almond’s Rudolf Otto: An 
Introduction to His Philosophical Theology. 
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80 A number of resources used in this study utilize these terms. These include Roger 
Lipsey’s An Art of Our Own: The Spiritual in Twentieth-Century Art; Wassily 
Kandinsky’s Concerning the Spiritual in Art; David F. Martin’s Art and the Religious 
Experience: The “Language” of the Sacred; Jungo Yoon’s Spirituality in 
Contemporary Art: The Idea of the Numinous; Tuchman and Blotkamp’s The 
Spiritual in Art: Abstract Painting 1890-1985; Anthony J. Steinbock’s  
Phenomenology and Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience; Pacquement 
De Loisy’s Traces du Sacré; Clément and Kristeva’s The Feminine and the Sacred; 
as well as Otto’s The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the 
Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational. 
81 It should be noted that some important scholarly works have approached this topic 
from a variety of perspectives, including studies about Husserl, Heidegger, Levinas, 
Marion and others being done by Espen Dahl. See Dahl’s books in Works Cited. 
82 Since “immanent” and “immanence” have, like transcendental, been used in both 
religion and philosophy, it worth noting the OED emphasis on the philosophical 
interpretation:  1. Indwelling, inherent; actually present or abiding in; remaining 
within. In recent philosophy applied to the Deity regarded as permanently pervading 
and sustaining the universe, as distinguished from the notion of an external 
transcendent creator or ruler; immanent principle (with Kant), a principle limited to 
the realm of experience: opposed to transcendental principle. ("immanent, adj.". 
OED Online. December 2013. Oxford University Press. 11 December 2013. 
83 One famous longtime practitioner of Transcendental Meditation is filmmaker 
David Lynch. See Lynch’s  Catching the Big Fish: Meditation, Consciousness, and 
Creativity. 
84One challenge to researching and writing a study like the present one that is related 
to spirituality is how to compositionally bracket out presumptions and preconceptions 
about what spirituality is in a fresh or immediate sense beyond historical and cultural 
labels. An important aspect of that challenge is simply diction. Although “numinous” 
is the word I have selected to more precisely express—in a philosophico-
phenomenological thematic context—the spiritual impulse underlying much modern 
and contemporary artmaking and art viewing, there are other words that support or 
enhance at times the usage of numinous. Though not exact synonyms, these terms can 
serve to clarify given instances of the more broadly applied expression “sensibility to 
the numinous.” Besides specific words that are more Asian in character (words like 
“samadhi” and “satori”), there are various western nouns and adjectives that can be 
associated with numinous.  One such term is “epiphany” or  “epiphanic”. A more 
generalized term would be “revelation” or “revelatory”. Ecstasy and intuition, 
likewise are associated with numinous, and others words and phrases will surface 
during the process of writing this study.  
85 Of course the word “feeling” is also a culturally overloaded term, and a generalized 
amorphous concept, given its relationship to psychology and subjectively specialized 
meanings. Ultimately, I think it is important to retain the whole phrase of “feeling 
sensibility” rather than try to make feeling itself into a valid conceptual principle. If 
one has a “feeling sensibility,” it is a sensibility to “something,” which in this study is 
going to be a feeling sensibility to the numinous in relation to the functioning of 
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image consciousness in art. It is important to remain consistently specific in this 
regard.  
86 There are numerous anthologies of these experiences. Besides the highly regarded 
1902 The Varieties of Religious Experience by William James, two of the more 
respected longtime popular anthologies are Aldous Huxley’s 1944 The Perennial 
Philosophy and Richard Maurice Bucke’s 1901 Cosmic Consciousness: A Study in 
the evolution of the Human Mind.  
87 For that fact, Cox referenced E.J. Sharpe’s same statement in Comparative 
Religion: A History. London, Duckworth, 2nd Edition, 1986, 162. 
88 Espen Dahl attributes this comment to E. Husserl, Briefwechel VII. Husserliana 
Doumente III, ed. E. Schumann and K. Schumann. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994, 207. 
89 Here Husserl has misspelled the name of his student, Heinrich Ochsner (1891-
1970), who became a professor.  
90 The letter is dated March 5, 1919. Two Notes: (1) from Thomas Sheehan, trns.: The 
original copy of this letter is found in the Rudolf-Otto-Nachlass at the 
Universitätsbibliotek in Marburg, West Germany, catalogues as Hs 797-794. It has 
been published in Hans-Walter Schütte, Religion und Christentum in der Theologie 
Rudolf Ottos, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969, pp. 139-142. I have followed the more 
accurate transcription that is found in the Husserl Archives in Leuven, catalogued as 
R. I. Otto 5.III.19. I am grateful to Professor Samuel I Jsseling, Director of the 
Leuven Archives, for permission to translate this text. Although the letter is chiefly 
concerned with Oxner and with Otto’s book Das Heilige, it is one of the earliest 
documents in which Husserl mentions Heidegger, and specifically Heidegger’s 
religious orientation to Protestantism. Moreover, while this would be the first time 
that Otto heard the name Heidegger, it would not be the last. During 1925 Otto 
worked vigorously to oppose Heidegger’s promotion at Marburg to the chair vacated 
by Nicolai Hartmann. (Tr. note.) 2. Note via Religious Studies Stanford Education: 
Letters Husserl and Heidegger: March 5. 1919: Edmund Husserl to Rudolf Otto 
[Briefwechsel 7:205-8] Husserl writes to Professor Rudolf Otto, author of The Idea of 
the Holy, to offer his impressions of his student Heinrich Ochsner (1891-1970), 
whose name Husserl misspells here as “Oxner.” Ochsner, who had studied with 
Husserl and who was planning to convert from Catholicism to Protestantism, had the 
prospect of an assistantship with Otto at Marburg University. In the course of the 
letter Husserl reveals at least as much about the young Heidegger, who had become 
his assistant less than two months before, as he does about Ochsner, including 
Heidegger’s shift (if not “conversion”) to Protestantism.  
91 It is important to emphasize that Otto’s numinous is non-rational rather than 
irrational.  
92 Harten’s essay excerpt “Creating Heaven” in Simon Morely’s anthology, The 
Sublime, was extracted from  Heaven: An Exhibition That Will Break Your Heart 
(Düsseldorf: Kunsthalle Düsseldorf /Ostfildern-Ruit: Hate Cantz Verlag, 1999) 9-11. 
93 This of course does not even take into account the influence of Kant’s general 
thought on thinkers like Nietzsche, Heidegger, and others up to the present day.  
94 Simon Morley describes this: “Broadly speaking, four approaches to the sublime 
can be identified within contemporary art and theory. These derive from Longinus, 
Burke, Kant and Schiller. From Longinus comes an emphasis on the transcendence of 
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reality through the heroic act; from Burke, the idea of the sublime as an experience of 
shock and awe and as a destabilizing force; from Kant the notion of the sublime as 
revealing a reality that is fundamentally indeterminate, undecidable and 
unpresentable; and from Schiller a reading of the sublime as ecstatic experience.” 
Morley goes on in that anthology (see Morley, The Sublime, which emphasizes 
modern and contemporary commentaries on the sublime) to divide the texts of that 
anthology into seven sections or categories. He names these sections The 
Unpresentable, Transcendence, Nature, Technology, Terror, The Uncanny, and 
Altered States. In the present study, contemporary writings that address the sublime in 
the sections Transcendence and Altered States are most useful, but any of the texts in 
The Sublime may reappear as resource materials for various topics or subtopics. 
95 In the 1790s Goethe developed numerous friendships, including becoming friends 
and collaborator with Schiller. Goethe’s 1810 Theory of Color will be accessed later 
in this study during some considerations of color in modern art. As to Goethe and the 
sublime, as might be expected, his is a highly original orientation. The following is an 
abstract of a current dissertation titled Goethe and the Sublime, or Das Erhabene bei 
Goethe, by John M. Koster at the University of Toronto: The dissertation situates the 
Goethean sublime in an obscured countermovement of resistance to the 
aestheticization the concept underwent in the 18th century. Before the encounter with 
the English aesthetic concept of the sublime, the German notion of das Erhabene (the 
sublime) named not a category of aesthetic experience, but a social affect. In contrast 
to the Sublime of Edmund Burke's theory, which explicitly excludes melancholy from 
the sources of the Sublime, das Erhabene is an affect related to the self-overcoming of 
melancholic subjectivity. As the aestheticized notion of the sublime displaced das 
Erhabene, Goethe became one of the most radical innovators of the aesthetics of the 
sublime. But as is demonstrated in chapters on The Sorrows of Young Werther, 
Elective Affinities, Faust and Wilhelm Meister, he did so with the aim of recovering 
the displaced meaning of das Erhabene as social affect. Goethe's sublime aims to 
show at every turn that the so-called "aesthetic experience" of the sublime is really 
displaced social affect. His treatment of the sublime therefore constitutes a radical 
critique of the establishment of aesthetics as an independent sphere of inquiry. There 
is for Goethe no way to understand aesthetic experience independently of its social 
context. By reconnecting the sublime to the original social meaning of das Erhabene, 
Goethe recovers the aesthetics of the sublime as a means of mediating and facilitating 
the movement of subjectivity from frustrated stasis to divine creativity; i.e., from 
exclusion to participation in the material creation of reality. 
>http://hdl.handle.net/1807/35868< 
96 In The Sublime, author Philip Shaw references Kristeva once, in a section subtitled 
“Towards the Fragile Absolute” (144-146), which discusses “the Lacanian thesis of 
woman as the foreclosed or sublime object of patriarchal discourse” (144). Shaw does 
frequently reference Slavoj Zizek, and at times uses the films of David Lynch to 
accentuate points to emphasize a more contemporary and at times postmodernist 
version of the sublime.  
97 Morely, in his editor’s introduction to The Sublime, names two of Lyotard’s essays, 
the 1984 “The Sublime and the Avant-garde” and the 1982 “Presenting the 
Unpresentable: The Sublime” (first appearing in Art Forum).  
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98 On this point Shaw references P. Hamilton’s “From Sublimity to Indeterminancy: 
New World Order or Aftermath of Romantic Ideology,” in Romanticism and 
Postmodernism, ed. Edward Larrisey, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999. 
99 Todd A. Gooch references Scheler’s Vom Ewigen im Menschen, Gesammelte 
Werek, Vol. V, ed. by Maria Scherler, Bern: Francke, 1954, p. 166. 
100 It is worth quoting Otto’s assessment of Goethe’s “pagan” orientation to the 
numinous to give a more detailed sense of the difference between the two: There can 
be no clearer expression than this of the prodigiously strong impression which 
divination of the numinous may make upon the mind, and that obviously not on a 
single occasion but repeatedly, till it has become almost a matter of habit. But at the 
same time this 'divination' of Goethe is not one that apprehends the numinous as the 
prophet does. It does not rise to the elevation of the experience of Job, where the non-
rational mystery is at the same time experienced and extolled as supra-rational, as of 
profoundest value, and as holiness in its own right. It is rather the fruit of a mind 
which, for all its depth, was not equal to such profundities as these, and to which, 
therefore, the non-rational counterpoint to the melody of life could only sound in 
confused consonance, not in its authentic harmony, indefinable but palpable. 
Therefore, though it is genuine divination, it is the divination of Goethe 'the pagan', 
as he sometimes used to call himself. Indeed, it is a divination that functions only at 
the level of the 'daemonic' which, as we saw, precedes religion proper, not at the level 
of the divine and the holy in the truest sense; and it shows very clearly how that sort 
of merely 'daemonic' experience of the numinous may in a highly cultivated mind only 
stir emotional reactions of bewilderment and bedazzlement, without giving real light 
or warmth to the soul (Otto 153). 
101 For this quote from Faust, Bishop’s attribution is: J.W. von Goethe, Faust II, 
II.6272-74 (J.W. von Goethe, Faust: Part Two, trans. D. Luke, Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 52-3).  
102 According to Roderick Main (158), Jung began to reference the concept of the 
numinous in his writings in the 1930’s, especially using it as “one of the defining 
characteristics of archetypes,” but also as the “core of religious experience.” 
103 Murray Stein attributes part of the Otto’s preference for feeling over thinking to 
Otto’s experiences of what he came to term “the numinous” in India and what is now 
Morocco during his extensive travels (41). However, it should be noted here that 
despite his travels and liberal observations of other religious cultures, and his 
suffering the abusive criticism and ridicule of his  theological colleagues because of 
his liberal attitude towards other religions, Otto continued to consider Christianity to 
be a religion superior to all others (43), and this attitude of Christian exclusivity and 
superiority is undeniably reflected in his Das Heilige.  
104 See, for example, Stein’s references to Jung’s writings as evidence of Jung’s own 
“receptivity to numinous experience” (45), including the descriptions in Jung’s 1963 
Memories, Dreams, Reflections. 
105 See Jungu Yoon, Spirituality in Contemporary Art: The Idea of the Numinous.  
106 See Alondra Yvette Oubre´, Instinct and Revelation: reflections on the Origins of 
Numinous Perception. 
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107 Goethe wrote “The Trilogy of Passion” at the age of 75. It was appended to an 
edition of The Sorrows of Young Werther published at that time. See The Poems of 
Goethe, 200. 
108 The chapter that explicates Schopenhauer’s aesthetic is, like the present 
explication of the numinous and Husserlian methodology, central to this study. Much 
of Schopenhauer’s thought, and especially his argument about the pivotal 
transcendent importance of the artistic experience, is thematically essential to 
elucidating the thesis here. One of the challenges in explicating and including the 
Schopenhauerian aesthetic, besides weaving that aesthetic with a Husserlian 
transcendental phenomenological methodology, is showing how Schopenhauer’s 
passionate expression of the sublime in art is simultaneously a sensibility to the 
numinous, the root of which is being excavated in the present chapter. 
109 Roy references for this assertion include: Reginald W. Bibby, The Poverty and 
Potential of Religon in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Press, 1987), 69-70; Andrew M. 
Greeley, The Sociology of the Paranomral: A Reconnaissance (Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1975), 57-8; David Hay, Exploring Inner Space: Scientists and 
Religious Experience (Harmondwworth: Penguin Books, 1982), 112-29, and 
Religious Experience Today (London: Mowbray, 1990), 79-85 for “international 
statistics.” 
110 In his Transcendent Experiences: Phenomenology and Critique, Roy considers 
how the writings of Kant, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hegel, William James, Rudolf 
Otto, and other philosophers or philosopher-theologians are significant in his study of 
the transcendent experience. Some aspects of Roy’s explication of his thesis are 
relevant to this study, others are not.  
111 See Louis Roy’s discussion of Husserl as well as how Husserl’s concept of 
intentionality and “inner perception” both echoes and differs from the concepts of his 
mentor Franz Brentano in Roy’s Mystical Consciousness: Western Perspectives and 
Dialogue with Japanese thinkers. 7-10, 40. 
112 Roy quotes Husserl’s words in  Mystical Consciousness, 8. 
113 Roy notes that Otto’s discussion of Gefühl occurs in Otto’s 1909 book The 
Philosophy of Religion Based on Kant and Fries, in the “Author’s Notes on the 
Translation” written at the time of the English translation. 
114 Roy references a section (146-147) of Otto’s Das Heilige in which Otto is 
considering Schleiermacher's writings: What Schleiermacher is feeling after is really 
the faculty or capacity of deeply absorbed contemplation, when confronted by the 
vast, living totality and reality of things as it is in nature and history. Wherever a 
mind is exposed in a spirit of absorbed submission to impressions of 'the universe', it 
becomes capable--so he lays it down--of experiencing 'intuitions' and 'feelings' 
(Anschauungen and Gefühle) of something that is, as it were, a sheer overplus, in 
addition to empirical reality. This overplus, while it cannot be apprehended by mere 
theoretic cognition of the world and the cosmic system in the form it assumes for 
science, can nevertheless be really and truly grasped and experienced in intuition, 
and is given form in single 'intuitions'. And these, in turn, assume shape in definite 
statements and propositions, capable of a certain groping formulation, which are not 
without analogy with theoretic propositions, but are to be clearly distinguished from 
them by their free and merely felt, not reasoned, character. In themselves they are 
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groping intimations of meanings figuratively apprehended. They cannot be employed 
as 'statements of doctrine' in the strict sense, and can neither be built into a system 
nor used as premises [sic] for theoretical conclusions. But, though these intuitions are 
limited and inadequate, they are none the less indisputably true, i.e. true as far as 
they go; and for all Schleiermacher's aversion to the word in this connexion they must 
certainly be termed cognitions, modes of knowing, though, of course, not the product 
of reflection, but the intuitive outcome of feeling. Their import is the glimpse of an 
Eternal, in and beyond the temporal and penetrating it, the apprehension of a ground 
and meaning of things in and beyond the empirical and transcending it. They are 
surmises or inklings of a Reality fraught with mystery and momentousness. 
115 Virtually all the organized religions include sacred art. Tibetan Buddhism and 
Christian Byzantine art are two (of many) salient examples. While such art can be 
beautiful, it is also sometimes clearly intended to be a means of worship or devotion 
for the particular religion associated with it.  On the other hand, the contemplation of 
any art, including modern art, is not necessarily an expression of religious 
motivations. Such contemplation may in fact even be rooted in a more general 
spiritual impulse, one not associated with a specific religion.   
116 Bass is quoting Robert A. F. Thurman from “The Buddha’s Smile: Enlightenment 
and the Pursuit of happiness,” in In Pursuit of happiness, Leroy S. Rouner, ed. Notre 
Dame, Ind.: U Notre Dame P, 1995, Print. 89-90.  
117 See also Lawrence Weschler. Seeing is Forgetting the Name of the Thing One 
Sees: Over Thirty Years of Conversations with Robert Irwin (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2008). 
118 Obviously, it was not only Hilma af Klint and Emma Kunz’s interest in the occult 
and spiritually accented themes that marginalized them; the fact that they were 
women working in a gender-biased society was equally significant. One could easily 
argue that these are two biases have continued to this moment, although gender 
prejudice has been addressed far more frequently in recent years.  
119 As noted in the previous chapter, much evidence points to the early abstractionists 
interest in spirituality and art. Besides many books on this topic, see also exhibition 
catalogs that focus on the works of these artists. See especially the essays, 
commentaries, and art images in exhibition catalogs:The Spiritual in Art: Abstract 
Painting 1890-1985, Traces du Sacre (Traces of the Sacred), The Third Mind: 
American Artists Contemplate Asia, 1860–1989, and Inventing Abstraction 1910-
1925: How a Radical Idea Changed Modern Art.  
120 It should be noted here that intentionality is not meant to be comprehended as or 
restricted a completely separate means to navigate the labyrinth of the transcendent 
experience in art, at least not in this study. The quote from Husserl about three 
concepts of consciousness, for example, is given in a chapter of his Logical 
Investigations, and the title of that chapter illustrates the point being made in this 
endnote. The title of Husserl’s chapter is “Consciousness as the phenomenological 
Subsistence of the Ego and Consciousness as Inner Perception” (LI, v. 2, 81). 
121 This transcultural aspect of Percy’s work expresses not so much a self-conscious 
“borrowing” of Asian aesthetic as a demonstration of “Asia as Method,” a reference 
made by scholar and curator Alexandra Munroe to a 1960 lecture of that title by the 
Japanese scholar of Chinese literature Takeuchji Yoshimi. Munroe, the Samsung 
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Senior Curator of Asian Art at the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum in New York, 
and the curator of the 2009 exhibition at that museum, The Third Mind: American 
Artists Contemplate Asia, 1860-1989, referenced Yoshimi’s lecture in her brilliant 
introductory essay of the catalog for The Third Mind. It should be emphasized that 
this exhibition and the excellent large catalog that accompanied it, provide some of 
the most extensive and detailed materials and resources ever created to address the 
influence of Asian aesthetics on American art. 
122 For a full consideration of Percy’s aesthetic and his abstract art, see my essay: 
Carroll, “Transcultural Intuition and Beauty in the Paintings of Robert Percy.”  
123 Cage’s interest in Zen Buddhism, on the other hand, has been acknowledged in art 
scholarship. 
124 Originally in Graham’s Marcel Duchamp: Conversations with the Grand Master, 
1968, 3. 
125 Interesting here is that the word “stoppages” is associated with invisibility. 
126 See John F Moffitt’s 2003 Alchemist of the avant-garde: The Case of Marcel 
Duchamp, published in the SUNY series in Eastern Esoteric Traditions. 
127 The orientation here is neither a denial nor validation of Joselit’s study.  
128 “For the rest of his life he spoke and wrote English almost like a native—could 
indeed sometimes pass as one for his first few minutes with an English stranger. The 
English prose he was to write in adult life, though containing minor blemishes of 
grammar and syntax, had the same highly distinctive character of his German, though 
this is perhaps less surprising when one remembers that his adult German prose had 
an English model. Despising as he did the pretentiousness so characteristic of German 
writing—and the long, convoluted sentences that went with it—and seeing nothing in 
the language itself that called for these things, he consciously set out to write German 
in the way Hume wrote English” (Magee 5).   
129 Almost every book about Schopenhauer’s philosophy, both his metaphysical 
philosophy and his aesthetic philosophy, comments at some point about how 
emphatically Schopenhauer’s writings influenced various artists, writers, poets, 
musicians, and other individuals in the arts. These books include, among others, 
Sophia Vasalou’s  Schopenhauer and the Aesthetic Standpoint: Philosophy as a 
Practice of the Sublime; Julian Young’s Schopenhauer; W. Wallace’s Life of Arthur 
Schopenhauer; Rüdiger Safranski’s Schopenhauer and the Wild Years of Philosophy; 
Stephen Cross’s Schopenhauer’s Encounter with Indian Thought: Representation and 
Will and Their Indian Parallels; David E. Cartwright’s Historical Dictionary of 
Schopenhauer’s Philosophy; Willing and Nothingness:  Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's 
Educator, Christopher Janaway, editor; Schopenhauer, Philosophy and the Arts, Dale 
Jacquette, editor; Better Consciousness: Schopenhauer’s Philosophy of Value, Alex 
Neill and Christopher Janaway, editors.  
130 As Cartwright points out (125), Schopenhauer did write that “my doctrine is 
pessimism” in 1828 while comparing his philosophy with pantheism, the latter of 
which he described as being optimism. Cartwright cites this remark as being found in 
Manuscript Remains, vol. III. “Adversaria,” para.66.  
131 Discussing objects and the experience of objects in the world immediately invites 
a comparison with Husserl’s phenomenology and the concepts about objects and 
perception, and intentionality and givenness, for example.  
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132 The second volume, WWP II, consisting of “supplements” or essays expanding the 
Books of the first volume, was published in 1844. 
133 The complexity of Schopenhauer’s thought is a challenge to effectively 
summarize. In fact, to label Schopenhauer as simply being a “pessimist,” as he so 
often has been categorized, is an obvious example. Besides the challenges of 
summarizing his work, such labels undermine the significance of his original and also 
optimistic thought and aesthetic.  
134 As Aquila notes (xii, footnote iv): “ ‘Representation’ and its cognates are fairly 
standard in translations of Kant, e.g., in the translations of the Critique of Pure 
Reason most frequently cited in the literature: Norman Kemp Smith (London: 
Macmillan, 1929); Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998). 
On the other hand, Werner Pluhar ops for ‘presentation’ (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Co., 1996). References to the Kritik der Vernunft appear in standard A/B 
format, referring to the pagination of the first (1781) and second (1787) editions, 
typically so indicated in the margins of modern editions.” 
135 For versions of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung using the word “idea” as a 
translation of Vorstellung, see The World as Will and Idea, tr. in 3 vols., R.B. 
Haldane and J. Kemp (London: Trubner & Co., 1883-1886); The World as Will and 
Idea, abridged, ed. David Berman, tr. Jill Berman (London: J.M. Dent, 1995 
[Everyman Library]).  
136 Another scholarly advantage to Aquila’s translation of The World as Will and 
Presentation is that far more footnotes are included than with other translations. For 
example, at this junction while discussing Schopenhauer’s use of presentation in a 
theatrical and spectator context, Aquila includes a useful footnote that also notes 
Schopenhauer’s use of Puppenspiel (puppet show) and a “tragi-comedy” of which 
one is the spectator. Aquila then states, “Just as with the corresponding English term, 
Vorstellung can refer either to what is presented or to the process or action in 
presenting it” (xiii).   
137 It worth noting as an aside, however, the somewhat paradoxical and humorous 
nature of Schopenhauer’s advice to put aside emotion and passion, given that Arthur 
Schopenhauer was one of the most emotionally fueled, passionate, and strongly 
opinionated voices in the history of philosophy! 
138 Schopenhauer also later considered On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of 
Sufficient Ground: A Philosophical to serve as an introduction to WWP I (Cartwright 
53).   
139 As he did with so many of Schopenhauer’s ideas, Nietzsche took and used for his 
own purposes the term principium inviduationis directly from Schopenhauer. See 
Tom Rockmore's Art and Truth after Plato, 246.  
140 The passage from the Upanishad quoted by Schopenhauer: Oupnekhat, Vol. 1, p. 
202. CF Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, III, 7, 23. 
141 This is not the first time scholars have assigned a mystical connection to 
Schopenhauer’s work. An earlier quote by Dale Jacquette on page 2 began with this 
sentence (emphasis on “mystical” is mine): “With its roots firmly embedded in a 
particular interpretation of Plato, Kant, and Asian philosophy, Schopenhauer’s theory 
sheds light on these important intellectual and mystical religious traditions.” 
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142 The same might be said of Nietzsche, who is often described as Schopenhauer’s 
student.  See Magee’s The Philosophy of Schopenhauer,  Safranski’s Schopenhauer 
and the Wild Years of Philosophy, and especially Janaway’s Willing and Nothingness: 
Schopenhauer as Nietzsche’s Educator.  
143 See Magee’s The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, especially “A Note on 
Schopenhauer and Buddhism,” 340-345. 
144 Here Charles Muses notes that such critiques are typified especially by “a quantity 
of popularizing writings.” A larger question that might be addressed beyond Muses 
comments and beyond the scope of the present study is why western philosophy has 
been willing to remain self-enclosed by a Eurocentric sheath of presumed exclusivity. 
While the term “global art” indicates that contemporary philosophical and aesthetic 
orientations are challenging that exclusivity, this is a relatively recent shift. In that 
sense, Schopenhauer was a pioneer in that his thought refused such exclusivities, and 
Nietzsche, somewhat less than Schopenhauer, acknowledged the importance of 
Eastern thought as well. Heidegger, on the other hand, while incorporating some 
Asian concepts into his philosophy, generally failed to acknowledge those sources. 
(See, among other resources, Heidegger’s On the Way to Language, Harper, 1982; 
Reinhard May’s Heidegger's Hidden Sources: East-Asian Influences on his Work, 
Routledge, 1996; Peter Wilberg’s Heidegger, Phenomenology and Indian Thought, 
New Gnosis Publications, 2008; Wei Zhang’s Heidegger, Rorty, And the Eastern 
Thinkers: A Hermeneutics of Cross-cultural Understanding, State University of New 
York Press, 2006; J.J. Clarke’s Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter Between 
Asian and Western Thought, Routledge, 1997; and Graham Parkes’ Nietzsche and 
Asian Thought, University of Chicago Press, 1996. 
145 Wittgenstein, Derrida, Roland Barthes, many other thinkers come to mind. In the 
context of Varo and Borges’s irrealistic fabulist art-making, language remains as one 
primary and very significant element, one that I intend to address primarily through 
Bakhtinian aesthetics, as discussed at the conclusion of this chapter and in even more 
detail in the final chapter on the artist-philosopher.  
146 The “passage already quoted” by Schopenhauer signals the same quote he used 
following his earlier reference (WWI 224) to Byron’s words: “Are not the mountains, 
waves and skies, a part / Of me and of my soul, as I of them?” (Childe Harold’s 
Pilgrimage, III, 72, Canto III).  
147 Much of Kandinsky’s writing brings up the subject of music. See especially his 
1926 Point and Line to Plane (Punkt und Linie zu Fläche), which was the ninth in a 
series of fourteen Bauhaus books edited by Walter Gropius and L. Moholy-Nagy, and 
many other Kandinsky writings. See also Kandinsky’s exchanges with his friend the 
composer Arnold Schoenberg (who was also influenced by Schopenhauer’s work), 
especially in Schoenberg, Kandinsky, and the Blue Rider. Also see The Sounding 
Cosmos: A Study in the Spiritualism of Kandinsky and the Genesis of Abstract 
Painting, by Sixten Ringbom.    
148 Another orientation of Gefühl would be that conceptual thought and a sensibility 
to the numinous can occur simultaneously, a point that will be returned to later in the 
study. 
149 Deborah J. Haynes is a pioneer in applying Bakhtin’s theories to visual art. See her 
books  Bakhtin and the Visual Arts and her Bakhtin Reframed. 
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150 In noting that many the terms in Bakhtin’s early essays are related to theology, 
Haynes is referencing Graham Pechey’s Mikhail Bakhtin: The Word in the World 
(153).  
151 According to Husserl, “The life of humans is nothing but a way to God. I try to 
reach this goal without theological proofs, methods, supports; namely, to arrive at 
God without God. I, as it were, must eliminate God from my scientific existence in 
order to pave the way to God for humans who do not have, as you do, the certainty of 
faith through the Church. I know my procedure could be dangerous for me were I not 
a human deeply bound to God and a faithful Christian” (See Laycock, 1-2, and 22). 
152 See especially the work of phenomenological scholar Angela Ales Bello: The 
Divine in Husserl and Other Explorations, and “Archeology of Religious 
Knowledge” in Phenomenology and the Numinous. 
153 See http://philosopherartists.blogspot.com for some of the strongest writing about 
the artist-philosopher. There are some strong connections at that blog with professors 
and graduate students the European Graduate School in in Saas-Fee, Wallis, 
Switzerland.  
154 Although some of this material was covered in Chapter Four about the numinous 
and modern art, what comes to mind immediately are all the artists who wrote 
influential books, some only about aesthetic details, but many about the philosophy of 
art and general philosophy as well. Some, such as Kandinsky, Mondrian, Malevich, 
Rothko, and others were and are excellent writers.  
155 Although it can be confusing, when referring directly to Husserl’s words or 
concepts, the spelling “phantasy” is used, Husserl’s spelling, but when considering 
the general topic of fantasy it seems more appropriate to use the contemporary 
spelling “fantasy.” 
156 See Hilma af Klint: Pioneer of Abstraction, edited by Iris Müller-Westermann, 
with Jo Widoff; and 3X Abstraction: New Methods of Drawing: Hilma af Klint, 
Emma Kunz, Agnes Martin, edited by Catherine de Zegher and Hendel Teicher. 
157 Husserl put a footnote at the end of this excerpt: “We intend to try to pursue as far 
as possible the point of view of imagination and the notion that phantasy presentation 
can be interpreted as image presentation—although there is no dearth of objections to 
this attempt, objections that subsequently turn out to be justified.” 
158 In some respects irrealism and fabulism or interchangeable. In this study whatever 
is the dominant topical issue in a given sentence is made the noun, be it “irreal 
fabulism” or “fabulist irrealism.” 
159 Since these are discussed as “objects” rather than stories, they are not enclosed in 
quotes like most story titles, but are given formal capitalization because they are 
places or people. The Library of Babel is not just a story, but a place within the story 
that is given its reality by the author. 
160 In her book Magic(al) Realism, Maggie Ann Bowers delineates three terms: 
“magic realism,” “magical realism” and “marvelous realism,” but uses the term 
“magic(al) realism” where all three have common features. 
161 This is a reference to British surrealist painter Lenora Carrington, a close friend of 
Remedios Varo who also lived and worked in Mexico for years. 
162 See Gracia, Jorge J.E, Carolyn Korsmeyer and Rodolphe Gasché, eds. Literary 
Philosophers: Borges, Calvino, Eco. Also see Williams, Merel, Henry James and the 
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Philosophical Novel: Being and Seeing, and Singer, Irving. George Santayana: 
Literary Philosopher. 
163 These different meanings are defined at "fantasy | phantasy, n." OED Online. 
Oxford University Press, June 2014. Web. 8 September 2014. 
164 Although Husserl uses the spelling of fantasy as “phantasy,” the spelling 
employed in this study is, for the most part, “fantasy.”  
165 Although this article is referenced in the bibliography as “Art for Life’s Sake,” Art 
Therapy: Journal of the American Art Therapy Association, 9 (4), 169-175, 1992, the 
journal editor notes: “Art Therapy would like to thank the author and the National Art 
Education Association for permission to reprint this article. The article originally 
appeared in What is Art For? Keynote Addresses of the 1991 NAEA Convention, 
Karen Lee Carroll, ed., 15-26.”  
166 Besides referencing the books by Agee and the Goldsteins in this passage, 
Dissanayate is referencing a 1997 paper presented at the College Art Association by 
Carma R. Gorman titled “Period Eye.” 
167 A recent important resource for prehistoric art is Werner Herzog’s remarkable 
documentary film, Cave of Forgotten Dreams, which takes the viewer along on a 
exclusive expedition into the Chauvet Cave in France, home to the most ancient 
pictorial art discovered—dating back over 30,000 years.  The sense that art-making is 
an innate human capacity and need is directly communicated in that film. 
168 Also very relevant to a study of Varo and Borges is, as will be seen ahead in this 
chapter,  Bakhtin’s carnival or the carnivalesque.  
169 On the page quoted, Daphna Erdinast-Vulcan references Merleau-Ponty’s 
Phenomenology of Perception, The Prose of the World, and The Visible and the 
Invisible.  
170 In his essay, “Bataille, the Emotive Intellectual,” Besnier attempts to address three 
charges widely leveled at Bataille—that he was hostile to democracy and was 
seduced by Fascism, that he became a Stalinist, and that he was a spiritual seeker. 
Besnier notes that while there are some factual elements in these accusations by the 
intelligentsia of his day, none of the charges reflected a definitive or complete 
orientation to Bataille’s work, even though his writings were to some degree 
marginalized because of the reactions to these charges. Part of the reaction may have 
been the unconventional approach to eroticism in some of Bataille’s writings, 
especially in his controversial 1928 novel, Histoire de l’oeil, (Story of the Eye) (under 
pseudonym of Lord Auch). In the current study, the fundamental elucidation of 
Bataille’s work focuses on his spiritual search and writings about mysticism, which 
was at least as taboo as his erotic writings. Even though his work was valued 
posthumously by Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, Baudrillard, Kristeva, and others, his 
interest in the numinous and fascination with mysticism was criticized and scorned by 
intellectual contemporaries such as Sartre. 
171 Besnier references Bataille’s “Letter to Roger Caillois, 20 July 1939” for this 
quote. 
172 See especially Goodman’s Languages of Art. 
173 Among the many studies of Borges and his work, see especially Literary 
Philosophers: Borges, Calvino, Eco, edited by Jorge J.E. Gracia, Carolyn Korsmeyer, 
and Rodolphe Gasché; Signs of Borges, by Sylvia Molloy; Out of Context: Historical 
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Reference and the Representation of Reality in Borges, by Daniel Balderston; The 
Narrow Act: Borges’s Art of Allusion, by Ronald Christ; Borges and Memory: 
Encounters with the Human Brain, by Rodrigo Quian Quiroga; and Borges and His 
Fiction: A Guide to His Mind and Art, by Gene H. Bell-Villada.  
174 Johnson’s comment. 
175 David E. Johnson found (and translated) this quote in María Esther Vázquez’s 
Borges: Imágenes, memorias, diálogos, Caracas: Monte Ávila Editores, 1977, 105. 
Johnson also references in a footnote a quote from Ivan Almeida’s essay, “De Borges 
a Schopenhauer” in Variaciones Borges 17: 103-41: “appreciation of a philosophical 
doctirine is, for Borges, a function of the virtualities of fiction that this doctrine offers 
him” (113). 
176 See especially William Rowlandson’s 2013 Borges, Swedenborg and Mysticism, 
and Maria Kodama’s 2010 introduction to Jorge Luis Borges: On Mysticism. 
177 “A Problem” was included in Borges’s 1960 collection, The Maker. 
178 Lacan, in a seminar, mentioned Borges. That reference is described as, “Lacan’s 
tribute is grandiose and ambiguous” (Wood 32). 
179 Actually Derrida does write more about Borges in another context, which is 
discussed farther ahead.  
180 The Garden of Forking Paths (El jardín de senderous que se bifurcan) was 
actually published as one of the volumes of the two-volume collection titled 
Ficciones (1935-1944), with Artifices (Artificious) as the second volume. 
181 This is not at all intended to mean that all critical theorists and philosophers are 
hopelessly arrogant and egocentric characters. Quite the contrary, many thinkers are 
modest men and women. One thinks of Husserl, Wittgenstein and Bakhtin, three 
relatively humble philosophical giants, and of numerous other figures. And even for 
those philosophers or theorists who have moments of seeming quite “full of 
themselves,” those may be an instance when the writer is unconscious about how he 
or she is communicating in a passionate moment of arguing for an idea. Nonetheless, 
this issue does need to be openly acknowledged.  
182 Originally from La rosa profunda (The Unending Rose), 1975.  
183 See especially Peter Lang’s Borges, Swedenborg and Mysticism, as well that 
book’s extensively documentation and bibliography on this subject. 
184 See also Fig. 1: Exploration of the Sources of the Orinoco River (Exploración de 
las Fuentes del rio Orinoco), 1959. 
185 Her original words are:  Este cuadro es a mi juicio uno de los mejores que he 
pintado. Es un modelo de traje de vagabundo, pero se trata de un vagabundo no 
liberado, es un traje muy práctico y cómodo, como locomoción tiene tracción 
delantera, si levanta el bastón, se detiene; el traje se puede cerrar herméticamente por 
la noche, tiene una puertecilla que se puede cerrar con llave, algunas partes del traje 
son de madera, pero como digo, el hombre no está liberado: en un lado del traje hay 
un recoveco que equivale a la sala, allí hay un retrato colgado y tres libros. En el 
pecho lleva una maceta donde cultiva una rosa, planta más fina y delicada que las que 
encuentra por esos bosques, pero necesita el retrato, la rosa (añoranza de un jardincito 
de una casa) y su gato; no es verdaderamente libre (Ovalle 115). 
186 Swinford is quoting from Octavio Paz’s Visiones y desapariciones de Remedios 
Varo. 
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187 Arcq is referencing and quoting from P.D. Ouspensky’s Tertium Organum: The 
Third Canon of Thought, A key to the Enigmas of the World. Rochester, New York: 
Manas Press, 1920. 
188 This quote from Varo’s letter to a Senor Gardner can also be found elsewhere, one 
being in the catalog for the 2012 exhibition Indelible Fables: Remedios Varo, in the 
catalog’s essay, “Remedios Varo: In Search of the Invisible Thread” by Terri Geis.  
189 In this sentence, intuition is meant in the more common usage of sensing 
something rather than the usage of phenomenological intuition introduced earlier in 
the study. 
